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The purpose of this thesis is to identify the influence of the doctrines of the 
Medieval European Ius Commune on the Scots law of moveable succession in the 
crucial period of its development: from the Reformation to approximately 1700. To 
this purpose, this research is dealing with the Scottish writings, case law and archival 
materials, comparing them with the relevant Civilian and Canonistic texts and treatises 
of Medieval and Early Modern Continental authors. 
This research specially concentrates on particular fields within the Scots law 
of succession. In some fields, such as the constitution and form of testamentary deeds 
and the destinations (tailzies), the Ius Commune influence was quite weak, but even 
there it is discernible in specific issues. The same can be said of the Scottish attitude 
to the agreements on future succession (pacta successoria); in this respect, as my thesis 
shows, Scots law used to have more in common with the Civil law than it has now.  
On the other hand, the influence of the Continental doctrines was much more 
noticeable in the fields of the evidential force of last wills and the donations mortis 
causa. However, beginning from the 1660s, Scottish practice in these fields diverged 
from the Continental models. This was due to various practical reasons.  
The regulation of the office of executor in Scotland in the 1500-1700, in many 
respects, seems to be heavily inspired by the Ius Commune regulation and by English 
practice of that time. In some respects, Scots practice on the office of executor 
followed the Ius Commune rules more closely than English practice.  
In summary, the influence of the Ius Commune on the Scots law of succession 
in this period was real, due both to the retaining of tradition of ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction and to the knowledge of doctrine by the judges and litigants. However, 
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1. Definition of terms. 
A good way to start this thesis would be by defining some terms. The most 
important of them is “Ius Commune”.1 The term Ius Commune is taken here in the 
meaning used by, e.g., M. Bellomo,2 designating the system of doctrines based on the 
rules of the Corpus juris civilis and Corpus juris canonici and elaborated by Medieval 
and Early Modern legal authors. It may also be designated in this work as a “Learned 
law” or “Civil, Canon and Feudal laws”. 3  The Ius Commune was the source of 
common legal discourse for lawyers all over the Continental Europe. National and 
local legislation, customs and practices in this conceptual system were designated “Ius 
Proprium”; their status could vary, but they were always supposed to be in some 
relationship vis-à-vis the Ius Commune. 
Moveable4 succession is the focus of the present thesis. Moveable and heritable 
succession, until the enactment of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, constituted two 
separate systems of succession in Scotland. The former applied to moveable goods and 
rights and the latter to land and other heritable (immoveable) rights; however, in 
practice the distinction between heritable and moveable property could be a very 
complicated issue. 5  Unlike succession to moveables, heritable succession was 
governed by feudal principles and was closely associated with the system of brieves 
of the Medieval Era. However, the two systems of succession overlapped in many 
points and shared many common principles, as was evidenced by the classical Scottish 
legal writers. 6 Because of this, some topics of this research could not be adequately 
elaborated without dealing with both heritable and moveable succession. This is why 
some chapters of the present thesis, particularly the chapters on pacta successoria and 
                                                          
1 This thesis uses a modern Latin spelling, distinguishing between “i" and “j”; however, as the spelling 
“Ius Commune” is more widely accepted in the modern literature, it will be spelled in this way 
throughout this work.  
2 M. Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of Europe: 1000-1800 (1995).  
3 The “Feudal law” in this system was mainly inspired by the Libri feudorum (mid-12th century) and the 
learned commentaries to it. 
4 This spelling is traditional and still widely accepted in the Scots legal literature.  
5 Infra, s.5.4. 
6  For example, Th. Craig’s Jus Feudale (c. 1600) contains title 17 of book II – “Communia de 
successionibus” – which deals with moveable as well as heritable succession.  
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on destinations and substitutions, effectually deal with both systems, which exercised 
influence on each other.7 
2. Modern scholarship on the Ius Commune and Scots law. 
The issue of the influence of the Civil law, the “Roman law”, the Canon law 
and Continental doctrine in general on the development of Scots law has traditionally 
been the object of significant scholarly interest. Among the classical scholars, dealing 
with this issue, one may mention here J. Dove Wilson,8 Henry Goudy,9 among the 
more modern ones, Thomas B. Smith,10 Peter G. Stein,11 William M. Gordon,12 James 
J. Robertson.13 Among contemporaries, this topic is pursued by John W. Cairns, Robin 
Evans-Jones, A. Mark Godfrey, Roderick R.M. Paisley, Kenneth G.C. Reid, W. David 
H. Sellar, J.D. Ford and many others. 
This thesis follows the general trend in the scholarship of the recent three 
decades, aiming to look at the Scots law as a substantially “Civilian” legal system in 
historical context. Despite the almost universally accepted “mixed” character of the 
Scottish legal system, comprising the features of both the Continental Civil law and 
the English Common law, some scholars observed that a “neo-Civilian reaction” in the 
Scots legal science started in the 1990s, led by K.G.C. Reid, R. Evans-Jones and 
R. Zimmermann. As a result, the Scots law nowadays is predominantly looked upon 
as a Civilian system ruled by Civilian concepts. 14  
                                                          
7 See infra, chapters IV, V. 
8 J.D. Wilson, ‘Reception of the Roman Law in Scotland’, JR, vol 9 (1897), 361-394. 
9 H. Goudy, An inaugural lecture on the fate of the Roman law north and south of the Tweed (1894). 
10 T.B. Smith, ‘Scots Law and Roman-Dutch Law: a Shared Tradition’, Studies Critical and Comparative 
(1962), 46-61. 
11 P.G. Stein, ‘The Influence of Roman Law on the Law of Scotland’, JR, vol 8 (n.s.) (1963), 205-245; 
P.G. Stein, Roman Law in Scotland // IRMA, pars V 13b (1968); P.G. Stein, The Character and Influence 
of the Roman Civil Law (1988); P.G. Stein, Roman Law in European History (1999).   
12 W.M. Gordon, ‘Roman Law in Scotland’, Civil Law Tradition in Scotland // SSP, suppl vol I (1995), 13-
40; W.M. Gordon, ‘The Civil Law in Scotland’, ELR, vol 5 (2001), 130-144; W.M. Gordon, Roman Law, 
Scots Law and Legal History (2007).  
13 J.J. Robertson, ‘Scottish legal research in the Vatican Archives: a preliminary report’, Renaissance 
Studies, vol 2 no 2 (1988), 339-346; J.J. Robertson, ‘The Canon Law Vehicle of Civilian Influence with 
Particular Reference to Scotland’, The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law (1997), 117-133. 




Within this paradigm, Scotland is seen as a part of the Medieval and Early 
Modern European tradition of the Ius Commune, albeit holding a peculiar place in that 
tradition.15 The law of property has received particular attention in that respect.16 A 
recent Ph.D. thesis by John MacLeod looks upon the Scots law on voidable transfers 
in the historical context of the Ius Commune.17  Professor Mark Godfrey revealed 
significant Civilian influences in the procedure adopted by the Scottish Lords of 
Council throughout the 16th century.18 
Professor John W. Cairns has paid significant attention to the concept of the 
Ius Commune and the evolution of the attitude to it in Scottish legal treatises and other 
texts. In the mid-16th century, the term “common law” in the Scots texts designated 
precisely what we have defined above as the Ius Commune. Scots lawyers in this 
period considered both the Civil and the Canon law directly binding in Scotland, 
regulating all issues not directly covered by Acts of Parliament. The most popular Ius 
Commune authors in that period were Abbas (Panormitanus)19 and Bartolus20 from the 
Middle Ages. 21  Similar observations were made by Professor Gero Dolezalek. 22 
According to Dr. Andrew R.C. Simpson, the expert consensus of the members of the 
College of Justice, heavily inspired by the Ius Commune learning, enjoyed the force of 
law in Scotland of this period.23 However, after c. 1600 a different approach started to 
prevail, when “common law” designated Civil law only, was no longer seen as of 
                                                          
15 W.D.H. Sellar. ‘Scots Law: Mixed from the Very Beginning? A Tale of Two Receptions’, ELR, vol 4 
(2000), 14-18; W.M. Gordon. ‘The Civil Law in Scotland’, 132-144. 
16 E.g., G. MacLeod has been able to assess the “Romanization” of Scots law of property in the Scottish 
Institutional writers, based on the frequency of invocation of Civil law source to solve novel Scots 
problems. The law of moveable property had already been heavily “Romanized” at the time of Stair, 
but it was in Bankton’s time when this process reached its “high noon” (G. MacLeod, ‘The 
Romanization of Property Law’, A History of Private Law in Scotland, vol I (2000), 221-242). 
17 J. MacLeod, Fraud and Voidable Transfer: Scots Law in European Context, PhD thesis (2013).  
18 A.M. Godfrey, ‘Arbitration and Dispute Resolution in Sixteenth Century Scotland’, TvR, vol 70 (2002), 
109-135; A.M. Godfrey, ‘Ius Commune, Practick and Civil Procedure in the Sixteenth-Century Court of 
Session’, TvR, vol 72, 283-295; A.M. Godfrey, Civil justice in Renaissance Scotland (2009).  
19 Real name Nicolo de Tudeschi, lived 1386-1445.  
20 Bartolus de Saxoferrato, 1313-1357.  
21 This was a characteristic of the pre-Reformation collection of the practice of the Court of Session – 
the Sinclair’s Practicks (1540s). Such legal philosophy was also expressed in the 1570s by John Lesly in 
his book De origine moribus et rebus gestis Scotorum (J.W. Cairns, ‘Ius Civile in Scotland, ca. 1600’, 
Roman Legal Tradition, vol 2 (2004), 139-140). 
22 G. Dolezalek, Scotland under Ius Commune // SSP, vol 55 (2010), 1-12. 
23 A.R.C. Simpson, ‘Legislation and authority in early-modern Scotland’, Law and Authority in British 
Legal History, 1200–1900 (2016), 85-89. 
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direct vigour in Scotland and was to be applied only in so far as it contained the 
principles of natural reason. This period saw the rising popularity of the more modern 
Humanist Civilian authors and of the collections of precedents of Continental law 
courts, while the Canon lawyers became less popular.24 
Research in a similar direction was provided in 2011 by Dr. Adelyn 
L.M. Wilson, who examined the influence of the Civilian literature on Viscount Stair’s 
Institutions. It revealed that the most influential treatise on Scots law was inspired 
mainly by 17th century literature, lying within the Humanist and Natural law tradition: 
H. Grotius, A. Vinnius, P. Goudelin.25 Cairns, in another article, traced the subsequent 
evolution of the attitude towards Civil law in Scots legal writings, showing that by the 
18th century the Civil and Canon laws were seen as valid only in so far as “received” 
in Scotland.26 Professor John D. Ford, in his book,27 showed the current within the 
Scottish legal thought in the 17th century. 
3. Scholarship on the history of the Scots law of moveable succession. 
Despite this significant interest to the Ius Commune in the recent years, the law 
of succession remains a neglected topic. The 2000 History of the Private Law in 
Scotland (edited by K.G.C. Reid and R. Zimmermann) did not contain a chapter on 
the law of succession. The only work to elaborate on the Civilian influence on the 
development of this branch of Scots law was Prof. Peter G. Stein’s 1963 article.28 The 
article provided an overview of the most obvious examples of Civilian influence in 
this field, especially on the rules on interpretation of legacies. Some Civil law rules 
were expressly rejected by the case law, such as “pupillary substitution” and the 
identification of the “Bairn’s part” with the querela inofficiosi testamenti. The main 
deficiency of Stein’s account was that he used only the post-1660 printed precedents, 
not dealing with the earlier case law or with the archives of the Commissary Courts. 
                                                          
24 This was a feature of Th. Craig’s, J. Skene’s and R. Spottiswoode’s writings (J.W. Cairns, op cit, 150-
167).  
25 A.L.M. Wilson, The Sources and Method of the Institutions of the Law of Scotland by Sir James 
Dalrymple, 1st Viscount Stair, With Specific Reference to the Law of Obligations, PhD thesis (2011). 
26 J.W. Cairns, ‘The Civil Law Tradition in Scottish Legal Thought’, The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law 
(1997), 200-219. 
27 J.D. Ford, Law and Opinion in Scotland during the Seventeenth Century (2007). 
28 P.G. Stein, ‘The Influence of Roman Law…’, 233-235.  
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The only exception to the general lack of interest in the law of succession is, 
perhaps, the narrow issue of conditio si sine liberis decesserit – two rules of the 
interpretation of wills in Scots law, which have been the subject of quite intensive 
scholarly attention in recent years. William M. Gordon published research on 
“conditio…” in 1969. He came to the conclusion that both “conditio si testator…” and 
“conditio si institutus…” were grounded in both the Ius Commune and the 
development of the Ius Proprium.29 Recently, Roderick R.M. Paisley has elaborated 
on the origin and the mechanism of the “conditio si testator…” rule in much detail, 
noting the strong familiarity of the 17th century lawyers with the Civilian sources.30 
Other authors also made contributions on this topic.31 
The influence of the Ius Commune on other fields of the Scots law of succession 
has attracted even less interest.  Dr. John C. Gardner in 1928 defended a PhD thesis in 
Edinburgh on the origin of the rights of a surviving spouse and the children in the Scots 
law of succession.32 One of the author’s subjects was the origin of “tripartition” – the 
immemorial custom of dividing the defunct’s movable estate into three (in case of the 
widow and children surviving) or two (in case of either just the widow or just the 
children surviving). These are named the “Legitim” (“Bairn’s part”), the “Jus 
relictae”, and the “Dead’s part”. This scheme has always been and in fact still is the 
foundation of the rules of moveable succession in Scotland. Gardner rejects the view 
that it was borrowed from Roman law and, instead, points to the medieval Norman 
origin of the custom. This view, however, was rejected by other scholars in favour of 
an Anglo-Saxon origin of the custom.33 
Further notable research into the early Scots law of movable succession was 
carried out by Professor Alexander E. Anton in his study of the Pre-Reformation 
                                                          
29 W.M. Gordon, ‘Roman Law and Scot Law - the conditiones si sine liberis decesserit’, JR, vol 14 (n.s.) 
(1969), 108-127. 
30 R.R.M. Paisley, ‘Roman and Civilian Origins of the Conditio si Testator Sine Liberis Decesserit in Scots 
Law’, ELR, vol 11 (2015), 13-16.  
31 D.R. MacDonald, ‘Lapse of Legacies in Scots Law’, Modern Studies in Property Law, vol I (2001), 275-
287; A.R. Barr, ‘The conditio si institutus sine liberis decesserit in Scots and South African Law’, ELS 
(2007), 177-192.  
32 J.C. Gardner, The origin and nature of the legal rights of spouses and children in the Scottish law of 
succession, Ph.D thesis (1928).  
33 A.E. Anton, ‘Parent and Child’, ISLH, 122-123.   
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ecclesiastical practice on the office of executor, summarized in his article from 1955.34 
Despite the scarcity of the pre-Reformation records, the research showed that that 
practice was largely consistent with the Canon law of the Decretals and with 
subsequent Scots practice. 
Despite the abundance of textbooks on the Scots law of succession from the 
19th to the 21st century, they tell little to nothing at all about the historical development 
of this field of Scots law, not to speak about the specific issue of the Ius Commune 
influence and comparison.35 The rest of the literature is limited to occasional articles. 
It seems, a breakthrough happened in 2007, when Exploring the Law of Succession 
was published. W. David H. Sellar’s article from that collection largely views the 
history of the Scots succession law as comparable to the contemporary English 
succession law.36 George L. Gretton, in his article on fideicommissary substitutions, 
is more open for comparison with the Civil law, although he notes a peculiar blindness 
of the Scots authors to the Civil law.37 Professor Kenneth Reid also provided helpful 
summaries of the Scots law as to testamentary formalities in the first two volumes of 
Comparative Succession Law.38  
The history of the English law of movable (personal) succession could provide 
some insights into its Scottish counterpart, taking into account the similarity of the 
two, especially the retaining of the institution of executor (administrator) as the main 
mechanism for the distribution of estate goods. Unfortunately, the history of the 
English law of personal succession, especially its early stages, is not researched much 
better than the Scots one. The research here has generally been concentrated on the 
practice of the secular courts, mentioning ecclesiastical practice only on matters of 
jurisdiction.39 Michael M. Sheehan conducted some research into the Medieval last 
                                                          
34 A.E. Anton, ‘Medieval Scottish Executors and the Courts Spiritual’, JR, vol 67 (1955), 129-154. 
35 David Robertson's treatise on the law of succession provided a very limited historical narrative, 
concentrated on statutory law (D. Robertson, A treatise on the rules of the law of personal succession 
(1836)).  
36 W.D.H. Sellar, ‘Succession Law in Scotland - a Historical Perspective’, ELS (2007), 49-66.  
37 G.L. Gretton, ‘Fideicommissary Substitutions: Scots Law in historical and comparative perspective’, 
ELS (2007), 156-176.  
38 K.G.C. Reid, ‘Testamentary Formalities in Scotland’, CSL, vol I (2011), 404-431; K.G.C. Reid, ‘Intestate 
Succession in Scotland’, CSL, vol II (2015), 371-399.  
39 See, e.g.: R.J.R. Goffin, The Testamentary Executor in England and Elsewhere (1981).  
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wills and the probate procedure in the Church courts.40 In recent years, Professor 
Richard H. Helmholz provided much insight into the late Medieval and Early Modern 
practice of the Ecclesiastical courts, matters of succession included.41  
4. Significance of the topic. 
Why is moveable succession an important topic in this context? This is mainly 
because it is the field where we should expect to find at least some Ius Commune 
influence. The law of succession had been one of the most well-elaborated areas in 
Roman law, and this continued in the Ius Commune. 11 out of 50 books of the Digest 
of Justinian were dedicated to succession alone. The Ius Commune literature on the 
law of succession was enormous in volume. Moreover, in pre-Reformation Scotland 
the Church courts possessed an almost exclusive jurisdiction over moveable 
succession. Unlike England, where they were in constant competition with the royal 
courts and gradually lost much of their jurisdiction,42 in Scotland the business of the 
former Church courts, after a short confusion, was in a wholesale manner taken over 
by the Commissary courts, subordinate to the Court of Session. 43  It would be 
surprising not to find any Ius Commune doctrines whatsoever in the post-Reformation 
Scots succession practice.  
The law of succession is also important because it gives us an opportunity to 
look into the practice of the Commissary courts, which has been a terra incognita of 
Scots legal history for a long time. The cases on matrimony and ecclesiastical 
benefices, from the Commissary records, have been investigated by John Riddell and 
Patrick Fraser44 and, more recently, by Dr. Thomas Green.45 In 1953, Anne Ashley 
published the results of a small survey of the last wills confirmed by the Commissary 
courts in the 16th century. The research revealed the absence of any visible restrictions 
                                                          
40 M.M. Sheehan, Will in Medieval England (1963).  
41 See the works of R.H. Helmholz in the bibliography section.  
42 R.H. Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England (1990), 79-89.  
43 D.B. Smith, ‘The spiritual jurisdiction 1560-1564’, Records of the Scottish church history society, 
vol 25 (1995), 1-18; Th. Green, The Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh: consistorial law and 
litigation, 1559-1576, PhD thesis (2010).  
44 J. Riddell, Inquiry into the Law and Practice in Scottish Peerages: Before, and After the Union..., 
Thomas Clark, Edinburgh (1842); P. Fraser. Treatise on Husband and Wife, According to the Law of 
Scotland, T&T Clark, Edinburgh (1876-1878). 
45 Th. Green, op cit; Th. Green, ‘Scottish Benefices and the Commissary Court of Edinburgh: The 
Example of McGibbon v Struthers’, Miscellany VI // SSP, vol 54 (2009), 45-61.  
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for married women in making of the last wills (unlike neighbouring England) and 
provided evidence that the ‘community of goods’ concept was deeply rooted in the 
Scots law and practice already in that period.46   
5. Subject matter and scope of the thesis. 
Even moveable succession alone would have been too wide a topic for a Ph.D. 
research to cover. This is why this thesis will concentrate on several specific topics 
within the law of succession. They were intentionally chosen as the fields where the 
Ius Commune influence has always been doubtful and unclear. For example, it is well 
known that the Scots rules on interpretation and vesting of legacies were strongly 
based on the Civil law, which was noted by P.G. Stein in his 1963 article. The Civil 
law was so influential in respect of interpretation and vesting of legacies that the 
Scottish 18th century judges sometimes had to apply the Civilian rules reluctantly.47 
The ‘Conditio si institutus…’ rule is already well researched in the literature (supra, 
pp.4-5). Instead of dealing with these obvious examples, this thesis concentrates on 
more obscure ones. There are six of them: constitution and form of last wills, evidential 
force of last wills, donations mortis causa, agreements on future succession (pacta 
successoria), substitutions and destinations, and the office of executor.  
The historical period under investigation here was crucial for the development 
of the law of succession. Its starting point (1560) is determined by the Reformation, 
which brought a “takeover” of the testamentary jurisdiction from the former Catholic 
consistories, effectually incorporating it into the general law of the land. The ending 
point (1700) loosely signifies the time when the practice of moveable succession had 
already been well established. It does not mean that legal development in this field 
stopped after 1700 (in fact, numerous new developments occurred in the 18-19th 
centuries, as will be shown below) but that the collections of case law and the learned 
Institutional writings became an influential source of law on their own. Thus, any 
possible influences of the Ius Commune were conscious and explicit after then.  
                                                          
46 A. Ashley, ‘Property in Relation to Marriage and Family’, JR, vol 65 (1953), 37-68, 150-181.  
47 As evidenced by this quotation from Lord Braxfield: “I should be against the legacy, had I never heard 
of the civil law, and I own that the civil law speaks less sense in this case than in many others” (Burnets 
v. Forbes, 1783, quotation by: P.G. Stein, ‘The Influence of Roman Law…’, 234). 
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The chief Scottish materials the present research is dealing with are: 1) the 
contemporary and subsequent legal writings and literature, 2) the published ‘practicks’ 
and case reports and 3) the archives of the Commissary courts. The last source has not 
been used in this research as extensively as was initially planned. This is because the 
Commissary courts’ practice turned out to be quite routine and homogeneous, while 
the substance of the litigants’ pleas and the reasoning of the judges was never made 
explicit in the records. For example, in the 1563-1564 Edinburgh Commissary court 
act book (CC8/2/1) the records refer to the “principal precepts” and other original 
documents, without disclosing the cause of the action or the exception. Those original 
documents might theoretically be found in the “Processes” section of the archival 
record; unfortunately, that section is extremely disorganized48 and hard to read, which 
prevented their inclusion into research. Moreover, pure cases of succession were quite 
rare: e.g., in 1639 (CC8/2/62), there were only three claims for legacies and four claims 
for estate goods in the Edinburgh Commissary court. Nevertheless, the registers of 
Acts provided some useful insights into succession practice. The analysis of confirmed 
testaments – both their copies in the registers of testaments and the original 
testamentary deeds, designated as “Warrants of Testaments” in the archives – 
produced even more fruit, especially in respect of the will’s structure and form.  
This present research has generally limited itself to use of the printed versions 
of the reports and ‘practicks’. Although G. Dolezalek has identified the use of citations 
of the Ius Commune in the diverse and differing manuscripts and also explored the 
variety and nature of the manuscripts themselves and their interrelationship,49 research 
into the issue of sources is still at too early a stage to be practical for a thesis of this 
nature, which focuses on the juridical content of a specific area of law. Sensitive use 
of the printed material in fact allows the exploration of the law and its development 
sufficient to present a convincing argument and indeed a general picture.   
Considerations of time also meant that the case law of the Scottish Interregnum 
(“Usurpation”, 1652-1660), when the Court of Session was disbanded and the 
Cromwell-appointed Commission acted as the supreme court of the land, had to be left 
                                                          
48 E.g., in the Processes, allegedly from 1580 (CC8/4/587/1), documents from the 17th century were 
found.  
49 G. Dolezalek, op cit, vol 55-57.  
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out of the scope of this research. It is notable, however, that this case law was quite 
influential in subsequent practice and literature.50 
6. Methodology. 
The main method employed by the present research is the doctrinal historical 
legal method.51 The assumption is taken that, at least, a substantial number of the Scots 
legal authors and practitioners were acquainted with the principles and doctrines of the 
Ius Commune. The task then is to take particular Ius Commune doctrines, principles 
and even simple rules and to see whether Scots practice employed them, in full or in 
part. This research, to an extent, is dealing more with the evolution and interrelations 
of legal ideas rather than of strict rules. 
To a very limited extent, a method of quantitative analysis was also used in the 
course of this present research. It allowed identifying the changes in the proportion of 
a particular type of form of last will from the 16th into the 17th century. It also helped 
to interpret the effects of early 17th century legislation on the jurisdiction of the 
Commissary courts. The Act of the Commissariats and Jurisdiction Given to 
Archbishops and Bishops 52  had ambiguous wording on whether the Edinburgh 
Commissary court lost its privileged right to confirm testaments for large estates.53 
The general number of testaments confirmed in the Edinburgh court dropped, around 
the year 1610, from c. 4000 testaments per year to c. 1500 testaments. This confirmed 
that Edinburgh’s court was curtailed, as all the Commissaries were since then 
subordinate only to respective bishops and the Court of Session.  
 
7. Selection of the literature of the Ius Commune. 
The literature of Ius Commune on the law of succession is very extensive. There 
is a substantial volume of secondary literature in French and in German, dedicated to 
                                                          
50 A.L.M. Wilson, ‘Practicks in Scotland’s Interregnum’, JR, vol 57(n.s.)(2012), 319-352. 
51 See the description of this method in: D. Ibbetson, ‘Historical Research in Law’, The Oxford Handbook 
of Legal Studies (2005), 872-874. 
52 RPS, 1609/4/20.  
53 This right was granted to the Edinburgh court by the 1563 Charter of Constitution (Balfour’s Practicks, 
670-673) in respect of the estates where the “Dead’s part” exceeded 50 pounds Scots.  
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the Ius Commune of succession, enumerated by H. Coing in his handbook on the 
history of European private law.54  Giovanni Chiodi is one of the today’s leading 
experts on the Ius Commune of succession; his works on the interpretation of 
testaments in both Continental and English doctrine were very helpful in preparation 
of the present research.55 Nevertheless, the most efficient way to study the doctrine 
and principles of Ius Commune proved to be dealing with the primary sources: glosses, 
commentaries and treatises.  
However, a selection had even to be made among the primary sources. Which 
authors, from what era and school, were to be given preference? The Ius Commune 
texts demonstrate a strong interconnection through mutual references. However, they 
lacked a uniformity of detail: every jurist provided his own interpretation on the extent 
of this or that particular rule and his own unique “tree” of distinctions arising out of 
that interpretation. This would make an attachment to one particular work or author 
counterproductive for this present research. However, some ideas or criteria for 
distinction, formulated by the more popular authors (e.g., Bartolus), were often taken 
by other authors and incorporated into their own classifications. This fits well to the 
subject matter of this research, which concentrates mainly on legal ideas, not on the 
details of legal regulation. 
However, besides disagreements in detail, there are also much more significant 
differences among the learned authors, sometimes going to the core of the relevant 
                                                          
54 H. Coing (Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte, 
vol II(1-2) (1977), 378-395) lists the following works on the European law of succession in 1500-1800: 
Ch. Lefevre, Cours de doctorat sur l'histoire du droit civil français. L'Ancien droit des successions (Paris, 
1912); L. Fabre, La succession testamentaire et ab intestat dans les pays de droit écrit, thèse (Toulouse, 
1930); G. Lepointe, Les successions dans l’ancien droit (Paris, 1945); H. Auffroy, L’évolution du 
testament en France, thèse (Paris, 1899); R. Caillemer, L’exécution testamentaire dans l’ancien droit, 
thèse (Lyon, 1900); F. Maury, Etude historique sur l'institution contractuelle, thèse (Caen, 1902); 
Navières du Trevil, Étude historique & juridique sur la promesse d'égalité, thèse (Paris, 1907); H. Fèrèol-
Riviere, ‘Essai historique sur les partages d’ascendants’, Rev. de législation, vol 3 (1847), 406-422; 
G. Boissonade, Histoire de la réserve héréditaire, et son influence morale et économique (Paris, 1873); 
J. de Laplanche, La réserve coutumière dans l’ancien droit français, thèse (Paris, 1925); G. Boissonade, 
Histoire de droits de l’époux survivant (Paris, 1874); J. Simonnet, Histoire et théorie de la saisine 
héréditaire dans les transmissions de biens par décès (Dijon, 1851); H. Thiercelin, ‘De la saisine 
héréditaire dans l’ancien droit français’, Rev. critique, vol 37 (1870), 80 ss., Rev. critique, vol 1(n.s.) 
(1871/1872), 779-791. 
55 G. Chiodi, L’interpretazione del testamento nel pensiero dei glossatori (1996); G. Chiodi, ‘Any Thing, 
Every Thing, Nothing. Note sull’interpretazione del testamento tra ius commune e common law’, 
Relations between the ius commune and English law (2009), 203-221.  
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legal concepts. This is especially true in regards to the differences between the 
Commentators and the Humanists. With their critical approach to the text of the 
Corpus juris civilis, the Humanists were often able to understand the original meaning 
of the Roman law institutions and point out the mistakes of their Medieval 
predecessors. A good example here is the jus accrescendi. 56  The Medieval 
Commentators and the Early Modern Humanists held directly opposite views as to 
when jus accrescendi was applicable. In order to reconcile the various fragments of 
the Digest, the Commentators deduced a “jus non decrescendi” - an institution 
analogous to the jus accrescendi; the Humanists did not recognize the existence of “jus 
non decrescendi”.57 Such disagreements are irreconcilable.  
The authors of which school should be paid more attention in conducting this 
research? As was mentioned above, the preferences of Scots lawyers changed with 
time. In the 1500s, the Medieval mos italicus authors were still the primary texts of 
reference for the Scots. Th. Craig’s Jus feudale, one of the first treatises that 
incorporated together the Ius Commune and the Scots Ius Proprium, refers to Bartolus 
and Baldus quite extensively. In the 17th century, the Humanist mos gallicus literature, 
like that of F. Hotman, became the most popular in Scotland, together with collections 
of Continental judicial practice. In the late 17th – 18th centuries, the Dutch lawyer 
Johannes Voet (1647-1713), who belonged to the Humanist tradition, became the 
undisputable leader in the number of direct references in the Scots case law. Thus, in 
the historical period subject to the present research, both historical schools of the Ius 
Commune were relevant. 
It is the opinion of the author of this thesis, that, all things being equal, the 
authors of the more conservative school of the Commentators should be given a 
somewhat bigger attention here. The main reason for that is that it is in the works of 
the Commentators that one should expect a systematic exposition of the legal doctrine 
on a particular subject. The treatises of the authors belonging to the mos gallicus 
tradition (Ch. DuMoulin, F. Hotman, A. Le Conte, J. Voet, etc.) are also employed in 
this research. However, by their nature, they contain much less strict and consistent 
                                                          
56 Infra, n.847. 
57 Pau.Castr., C.6.51.10; J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, D.30.1, nu. LX-LXII.  
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doctrine, as they often concentrate on the discussions over the meaning of passages 
from the Digest and on the various diverging local practices. In this, they are less 
valuable as a source of the doctrine and principles of the Ius Commune.  
Another reason why this research prefers the older Medieval Ius Commune 
authors is the assumption of a certain conservatism immanent for all lawyers. The 
cases of moveable succession were decided by the Commissary courts. Among the 
first judges of the Edinburgh Commissary court we find Edward Henryson and 
Clement Litil, both well-learned in the Civil law, as well as James Balfour, who was 
one of the last Officials of the Archbishop of St. Andrews.58 Any potential input of the 
Ius Commune into Scots succession practice was most probably to start in the 16th 
century, when the old mos italicus was still more popular in Scotland. It is reasonable 
to presume that subsequent Commissaries tended to follow the practice of their 
predecessors, without introducing unnecessary changes.  
A third reason is that it is only in the works of the Commentators that we are 
expected to find certain institutions elaborated and invented in the Middle Ages. The 
testamentary executor, absent from the Roman texts, was developed by the Medieval 
lawyers (infra, s.6.1); this institution persisted in the Continental practice until the 
1500s, when it started to fade away there in favour of universal heirs.59 
In dealing with the Ius Commune sources, the author of this thesis has generally 
followed the recommendations of Harry Dondorp and Eltjo J.H. Schrage,60 according 
to whom, the first step of research in the medieval Ius Commune texts is to identify the 
relevant sedes materiae – the focal fragments of the Digest or Code on particular 
topics. Then, the Ordinary Gloss to such fragments is studied, with attention paid to 
all references contained in it. Subsequently, the commentaries of the key 
Commentators to the fragment are studied, taking note of the citation of earlier authors 
and thus tracing the evolution of the legal doctrine. This is the approach adopted in the 
                                                          
58  Notably, Henryson was the author of the commentary to the title of the Institutes on the 
constitution of of last wills, first published in 1752. See: A.R.C. Simpson, op cit, 117; Th. Green, The 
Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh…, 25, 43-44.  
59 R. Zimmermann, ‘Heres fiduciarius? Rise and Fall of the Testamentary Executor’, Itinera fiduciae 
(1998), 270-286. 
60  H. Dondorp, E.J.H. Schrage, ‘The Sources of Medieval Learned Law’, The Creation of the Ius 
Commune…(2010), 52-56.  
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present work, although it was not always possible to use the editions that Dondorp and 
Schrage recommended. 
The texts dedicated to the Ius Proprium of other countries and the 
implementation of Ius Commune in local practice (collections of decisions, customary 
law, etc.) are largely avoided in this thesis, in order not to complicate it with an 
unnecessary comparative element. The exception is the law of England, especially the 
works of English Civilians and Canonists (W. Lyndwood, H. Swinburne), which, 
because of their simultaneous similarity and difference from the Scottish 
circumstances, provided some extremely useful insights into the Scottish legal 
development.  
8. Notes. 
This thesis contains numerous quotations in English, Scots and Latin 
languages. All Latin quotations are given in italics; modern Latin spelling (with “j” 
and “u”) is given preference. Many English and Scots texts, especially those 
encountered in the archival records, contain unorthodox spelling. As the identification 
and reproduction of the original spelling in many instances would be problematic, the 
author of the present thesis took the liberty to correct (modernize) the spelling. The 
corrected quotations are given in plain font. The English and Scots quotations where 
the original spelling was reproduced are given in italics.   
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Chapter I. Constitution and Form of Last Wills. 
1.1. Fides instrumentorum in the Ius Commune. 
The Ius Commune regulations on the solemnities of last wills may not be 
understood outside of the general context of authentication and faith of documents. 
And this last topic was extremely controversial. Despite the obvious practical 
implications of this topic, the discussions mainly involved doctrinal arguments, with 
various mutually incoherent passages of the Corpus juris being given one or another 
interpretation. 
The most important places in the Corpus juris civilis establishing the 
requirements for the authentication of instruments were C.4.2.17 (requiring 
subscriptions of three witnesses for private debt instruments to the amount exceeding 
50 pounds of gold), C.4.19.5 (denying full faith to private instruments), C.4.21.17(16) 
(setting up the procedure for making contracts in writing), C.4.21.20(19) (setting up 
requirements for the writings used for comparatio litterarum) and C.8.17(18).11 
(determining which instruments may prejudice third parties). But the biggest impact 
in execution of instruments was effected by Justinian’s Nov.73 (A.D. 538). The 
unclear wording of that Novel has made trouble for several generations of jurists, while 
the multiplicity of its innovations helped to give birth to numerous Authenticae in the 
Code.61 
Generally, neither Civil nor Canon law required a written proof in most day-
to-day private deeds. One gloss to Liber Sextus (Sext.3.20.1, s.v. “In scriptis”) 
enumerated 34 cases where the Ius Commune required an act to be in writing, most of 
such cases being quite narrow and specific. 62  The more general and potentially 
widespread cases were the requirement to prove the payment on a written obligation 
by writ or five witnesses (C.4.20.18(14)), as well as the requirement to disprove 
confessio made in a written contract by another writing (C.4.30.13). Paradoxically, 
written contracts required stricter solemnities than oral ones, often requiring a larger 
                                                          
61 Here is the list of Authenticae, based on the Nov.73: C.4.2 Auth. Sed Novo Jure, C.4.21 Auth. At Si 
Contractus, C.8.17 Auth. Si Quis Vult. 
62 For example, an oath by a minor about him being in reality an adult was to be in writing (C.2.42.3).  
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number of witnesses to be involved. 63  The usual justification for this was the 
distinction between “witnesses to the contract” and “witnesses to the writing”: the 
latter were not required to know the contract’s contents but were considered less 
reliable because of the “similarity of all writings”.64 
By the criterion of function performed, Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400) 
classified all instruments into three categories: 1) writings made as the substance of a 
particular act, 2) writings made as necessary (indispensable) proofs of some act, 
3) writings made as facilitating proofs.65 Into the first category fell, inter alia, written 
testaments (C.6.23.21) and the contracts intended by the parties not to be valid unless 
embodied in writing (“contractus in scriptis”, C.4.21.17(16)); these acts were one and 
the same thing with the respective writings, although their tenor might be proved by 
witnesses in case of loss.66 In contrast, acts secured by the documents within the 
second category could be confessed to by the party to the litigation, taking away the 
necessity of their production. As an example of the second category, Baldus mentioned 
written confessiones defeating other written confessiones (C.4.30.13). Finally, writings 
within the third category were made voluntarily by the party or parties to a transaction. 
Unlike the first two categories, such writings were not strictly subject to any 
solemnities, falling under Emperor Leo’s constitution (C.8.17(18).11), which accepted 
(quite controversially) the probative value of private documents and “subscriptions”. 
However, the exact probative value of such documents varied greatly, depending on 
their form. 
The basic distinction upheld in the Corpus juris civilis was that between public 
and private instruments.67 The Canonist Panormitanus added a third category – “non-
public authentic instruments” – which mainly included the letters of bishops and other 
public officials.68  
                                                          
63 For example, a contract made by an illiterate person in the city for the amount greater than one 
pound of gold could be made verbally before two witnesses. But if it was made in writing, it was to be 
subscribed by a notary and four witnesses (Nov.73.8).  
64 See, e.g., Bart., C.4.21 Auth. At Si Contractus.  
65 Bald., C.4.2 Auth. Sed Novo Jure.  
66 On proving the tenor see C.4.21.5, with Gloss and commentaries.  
67 See especially: C.4.19.5, C.8.17(18).11.  
68 Abb., X.2.22.1.  
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Public instruments were more or less the subject of consensus. They were 
instruments written by the hand of a notary public. They had the force of as many 
witnesses as were mentioned in them by name.69 However, two witnesses were usually 
deemed enough to refute a public instrument, while one contradicting witness could 
turn the instrument into a “suspected” one, creating a necessity to prove its 
authenticity.70 In the time of the Glossators it was an accepted point that a document 
could also become suspected if it contained erasures, vituperations (changes) and other 
defects in “suspected” parts.71 If suspicion was not cleared, the party producing the 
instrument was to be prosecuted as a forger.72 If the writer of the document was 
doubted, the doubt was to be settled by the notary-writer himself, and in case of his 
decease by his subordinates or by comparatio litterarum – comparison of the notary’s 
handwriting with that of undoubted specimens (scripturae ex quis).73  
The requirements of notarial instruments were extracted by the jurists from 
numerous passages of the Corpus juris. Undoubted requirements were an invocation 
of God’s name, mentioning the names of a ruling emperor or pope, the date and place 
of making, a subscription and a paraph of the notary.74 The presence of witnesses, at 
least two, was also deemed necessary.75 The notary was to be specially empowered by 
the parties to make the instrument - “invited” (rogatus) to make it. Whether the 
“inviting” of the notary was to be explicitly mentioned in the instrument or could be 
presumed, was controversial.76 The majority opinion was that the witnesses in most 
public instruments (especially testaments) were also to be “rogati”, which was to be 
explicitly mentioned in the instrument.77 
Documents kept in public archives bore the same force as public instruments.78  
                                                          
69  A popular saying by Bartolus (Bart., D.28.1.21, C.4.21.15; see also: G.D. Durante, De arte 
testandi, II.1). 
70 Bart., D.29.3.1.2.  
71 Tancred, Ordo judiciarius, 5.5. The main authorities for the position were C.6.33.3 and X.2.22.3.  
72 C.4.19.24, et ibi Bartolus. 
73 Nov.73.7; Bald., C.4.2 Auth. Sed Novo Jure.  
74 See, Bart., repetitio in D.2.13.6.6; see also C.10.71(69).3, s.v. “Servituti”.  
75 Bart., ibid.  
76 Bart., D.45.1.30; Bald., C.6.23.21pr.  
77 Bald., C.6.23.21pr; Alex., C.6.23.21.  
78 C.4.21 Auth. Ad Haec(=Nov.49.2.2). 
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Private instruments were a much more controversial topic. Every jurist made 
his own attempts at reconciling C.4.19.5, which rejected the probative force of private 
writings, and C.8.17(18).11, which assumed that private documents had a probative 
force. Much effort was also paid to interpreting Nov.73, to discern the exact formal 
requirements of private instruments and the ways to prove them, including comparatio 
litterarum.  
The Glossators, it seems, came to admit that private writings provided a full 
proof, subject to the confession of the maker or the proof of his/her signature.79 If the 
granter denied the document and there was no proof by witnesses, the Gloss of 
Accursius seems to hold that the document provided a half-proof,80 subject to potential 
corroboration (“adminiculation”) by other proofs of the underlying cause (receiving of 
money, etc.). 
This position, however, was significantly qualified by Bartolus. His account of 
the authentication of private instruments, contained in his commentaries to D.12.2.31, 
D.39.5.26 and C.4.21 Auth. At Si Contractus,81 was often incoherent, as he obviously 
changed his mind with time. What lasted, however, was his influential classification 
of private writings into three: apocha (or apodissa, chirographum), a letter missive 
and a book of accounts.  
An apocha was a document executed in favour of a party who was present. The 
rules of Nov.73 were fully applicable to it. The most solemn form in which an apocha 
could be executed contained the subscriptions of all parties to the act along with those 
of three witnesses. This requirement was deduced from several diverse passages of the 
Corpus juris civilis, mentioning three witnesses.82  Such a document, in Bartolus’ 
opinion, was “unlikely to be forged”.83 In his earlier texts he opined such document to 
have “full faith”. 84 However, with time his views were becoming less “liberal”: he 
                                                          
79 See Gloss to C.8.17(18).11.  
80 C.4.1.3, Gloss s.v. “Decidi oportet”; C.4.19.5, s.v. “Non aliis quoque”.  
81 There is also Bartolus’s commentary to C.8.17(18).11, which, however, is very divergent from the 
rest of his writings and the writings of other jurists; that is why this commentary was not included into 
analysis.  
82 C.4.2.17, C.4.21.20(19), C.8.17(18).11, Nov.73.1, Nov.73.7.1.  
83 Bart., C.4.21 Auth. At Si Contractus.  
84 This opinion was expressed in his commentary to D.12.2.31 and in the antiqua lectura (second 
commentary) to C.4.21 Auth. At Si Contractus. In fact, 1552 Lyon edition of Bartolus’s commentaries 
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began to consider it necessary for witnesses to come and recognize their subscriptions 
at trial. If all three witnesses were available, the instrument was proved; this opinion 
of Bartolus was widely accepted by the later scholarship.85 If all three witnesses were 
dead or unavailable, some passages of Bartolus suggest that comparatio litterarum 
alone might decisively establish the document’s authenticity;86 however, subsequent 
writers, especially the Canonists, opposed that view.87  If only one or two of the 
witnesses were available, both their testimony and comparatio were to approve the 
document; however, there was an opinion that the judge possessed discretion in 
assessment of the evidence in case the comparatio and witnesses contradicted each 
other.88 
An apocha that did not contain the subscriptions of all parties and of three 
witnesses was still valid; however, if the contract under dispute was entered into in a 
city and exceeded one pound of gold,89 both the testimony of three witnesses (even 
unsubscribing) and a comparatio were necessary to establish the full faith of the 
writing.90 Three witnesses alone or handwriting alone could only make “half-proof” in 
such cases. Thus, a private writing lacking the necessary number of instrumentary 
witnesses could only make a “half-proof” even after corroboration by comparatio; 
nevertheless, it could be fortified by additional proofs as to the subject-matter of the 
deed (like witnesses to the contract, as distinguished from instrumentary witnesses).91 
A writing unconfirmed by comparison of hands created, in Bartolus’ opinion, 
                                                          
to the Code titled the second commentaries to the laws as “additiones novae”, assuming they were in 
fact the posterior ones. However, Panormitanus in dealing with the same topic confirms that this was 
the earlier commentary (Abb., X.2.22.2). Moreover, the second commentaries of Bartolus to the Code 
actually look like the older ones, usually being less definite and citing more contrary arguments.   
85 Bart., D.39.5.26; Abb., X.2.22.2; see also opinion of Giovanni da Imola, cited by Decio (Dec., X.2.22.2, 
nu. 13). However, Baldus and Decio disagreed with that opinion, deeming both witnesses and 
comparatio necessary in any case (Dec., ibid.; Bald., C.4.2 Auth. Sed Novo Jure).  
86 Bart., C.4.21 Auth. At Si Contractus, first commentary.  
87 See: Abb., X.2.22.2, - where Panormitanus criticises this opinion on the ground that Nov.73.2 did not 
allow comparatio alone as a proof, irrespective of the number of subscriptions. It is probable that 
Panormitanus (and F. Decio, who followed him, Dec., X.2.22.2) was also wary of potential conflict of 
this opinion with the law of Decretals (X.2.22.2), which held that death of instrumentary witnesses 
invalidated a private instrument, unless the latter contained a seal (infra, p.22).  
88 This was the way Panormitanus interpreted Bartolus’s commentary to D.12.2.31 (Abb., X.2.22.2).  
89 These were the contracts to which Nov.73 applied (Nov.73.7.2, Nov.73.8). 
90  In his commentary to D.12.2.31, Bartolus accepted a possibility of judicial discretion in case 
comparatio alone or witnesses alone presented strong evidence; however, in the commentary to 
D.39.5.26 the author seems to have abandoned that view.  
91 Abb., X.2.22.2.  
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“aliquam praesumptionem”, being of somewhat less value than “half-proof”. This 
“presumption” stemmed from “unlikelihood” that a party to litigation would produce 
a forged instrument to the court.92 However, this last position was considered illogical 
by many subsequent authors.93 
Letters missive, in Bartolus’ initial opinion, were not subject to the formalities 
of Nov.73. The reason provided by him was that a receiver could not be blamed for 
not securing the appropriate form of the letter, executed by the distant sender. Because 
of this, the “old law” of C.4.21.20(19) remained applicable to letters missive, with 
comparatio litterarum making full proof of the letter’s authenticity. 94  Moreover, 
obviously under the influence of Canon law (infra, p.22), Bartolus held that letters 
with an authentic seal of an official made full faith against the sender, irrespective of 
comparatio.95 In a later commentary96 Bartolus seems to back down on the privileged 
status of letters missive as regards authentication; however, the Canonist F. Decio 
(1454-1535) reports Bartolus’ original opinion as commonly accepted in Decio’s 
time.97  
Books of account (libri rationum) received an extremely favourable treatment 
from Bartolus and subsequent authors. The reasons given for that were that books of 
account were “hard to forge”; they also were, obviously, outside the scope of Nov.73.98 
Later authors also named the mercantile custom of using such books as another 
reason. 99  Bartolus considered comparatio litterarum sufficient to establish the 
authenticity of a book of account, if doubtful. In his view, the book of account 
prejudiced the maker only if it was written by the maker’s own hand;100 this, however, 
was challenged by Baldus and other later authors, who held that any entry in one’s 
                                                          
92 Bart., D.12.2.31.  
93 Dec., X.2.22.2, nu. 14. 
94 Bart., D.12.2.31, D.39.5.26.  
95 Bart., D.39.5.26, C.4.21 Auth. At Si Contractus, first commentary. Influence of Canon law is obvious 
from Bartolus’ referring to C.1.3.22 as the ground for special importance of seals in letters. That law 
mentions the letters of bishops.  
96 Bart., C.4.21 Auth. At Si Contractus, first commentary, where he, contrary to the abovementioned 
commentaries, considers letters without a seal equal to apochae in their status.  
97 Dec., X.2.22.2, nu. 30-33.  
98 Bart., D.39.5.26; Abb., X.2.22.2, nu. 8; Bald., C.4.2 Auth. Sed Novo Jure. 
99 Bald., C.4.18 sub rubr. 
100 Bart., D.39.5.26. 
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book was presumed written with the owner’s consent. 101  There were sharp 
controversies on the necessary form of an account book, with Baldus deeming 
indispensable for a book to be single, bound and containing both debits and credits of 
the owner.102 The exact evidential force of the information contained in books of 
account will be dealt with in more detail later in this work.103 
Comparatio litterarum, for its employment, required the availability of 
acceptable specimens of the handwriting under question. The array of documents 
qualified to be specimens was limited: public instruments, instruments from public 
archives, writings submitted or recognized by the party to a litigation, private writings 
with subscriptions of three witnesses (who were either to come and confirm their 
subscriptions or comparatio could be used to confirm them). 104  There was a 
controversial question whether a defendant denying his or her own handwriting might 
be compelled to write down a specimen in the judge’s presence, if there were no 
available specimens. 105  Comparison of handwriting was committed to “scriptores 
periti”, who took an oath on making a faithful comparison.106  
Subscription, as an element of a document, was looked upon as performing two 
main functions. One function was providing the “sign of completion”. A public 
document, as well as a contract made in scriptis, was deemed complete only after it 
was subscribed by the maker and the parties.107  
Another function of subscription was the expression of consent. A person 
subscribing a writing of another was deemed to be consenting to that writing.108 In 
later law, the general rule was formulated that subscribing a document entails the same 
effect as writing it fully by hand.109 This function received special importance in the 
context of the law against forgery. The Lex Cornelia de falsis (c. 81-79 B.C.) forbade 
                                                          
101 Bald., C.4.21 sub rubr. 
102 Bald., C.4.18 sub rubr, C.4.21 sub rubr; Dec., X.2.22.2, nu. 44-46.  
103 See infra, chapter II.  
104 See Gloss and comments to C.4.21.20(19), C.4.21 Auth. Ad Haec; Abb., X.2.22.2, nu. 13; Alex., 
cons. 76, vol III.  
105 Bart., C.4.21 Auth. At Si Contractus; Abb., X.2.22.2, nu. 13; Dec., X.2.22.2, nu. 55-59.  
106 C.4.21.20(19), s.v. “Ab his”.  
107 C.4.21.17(16).  
108 Bart., D.2.14.47(48).1, D.24.3.33.  
109 Dec., X.2.19.11, nu. 200-205  
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the scribe of another’s document to write anything to the scribe’s own benefit. An 
exception was made for a case when, after being written down, the document was 
subscribed by its granter, thus approving the suspect disposition. A “general 
subscription” was enough if the beneficiary-writer was a family member of the granter, 
whereas, in the case where the writer was an extraneous person, a “special 
subscription” was required, referring to the suspect parts of the text, such as “foresaid 
I have narrated and approved” (D.48.10.1.8). The medieval lawyers debated the exact 
meaning of “special subscription” and the scope of its application. Bartolus held that 
any mutual contract, where one of the parties was a writer, was to be subscribed 
“specially” by the other party to be valid.110 However, the common opinion of the later 
authors considered a “general” subscription sufficient for such contracts. 111  The 
consensus seems to have been that corrections and marginal additions to an instrument 
required approval by a “special subscription”.112 
The Canonists strongly contributed to the Ius Commune doctrine on the effect 
of seals. A decretal by Pope Alexander III (1159-1181) provided that a private writing 
would lose evidential faith when all the instrumentary witnesses had died, unless it 
contained a seal (X.2.22.2). The canonists, on the basis of this and other decretals, 
elaborated the concept of a “non-public authentic instrument”. In their doctrine, the 
letters of bishops and other officials possessing authentic seals, although not public 
instruments, constituted full proof in matters pertaining to the granter’s competence.113 
Panormitanus went even further, holding that in private matters private seals (“rings”) 
should also be held “authentic”, irrespective of whether the instrument was a letter or 
an apocha. 114  By the early 16th century, the opinion appeared that a document 
containing an authentic seal and subscribed by witnesses made full faith in all matters, 
being effectually equal to a public instrument.115 
If a particular act, made or evidenced in writing, required in law specific 
formalities for validity, the question arose of whether compliance with such formalities 
                                                          
110 Bart., D.48.10.15.2.  
111 Bald., C.2.1 Auth. Si quis in aliquo; Dec., ibid.  
112 Bart., D.48.10.15.2.  
113 Abb., X.2.19.7, nu. 5-9, X.2.22.1, nu. 2.  
114 Abb., X.2.22.2, nu. 14-16, - where the author expounds the law of seals in much detail.  
115 Dec., X.2.19.7, nu. 31, 36, 49.  
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was to be mentioned in the text? The jurists responded by distinguishing between 
intrinsic formalities (inseparable from the words used, such as offer and acceptance in 
a stipulation) and extrinsic formalities (such as witnesses). The former were usually 
presumed, while compliance with the latter was to be specially mentioned in the 
text.116 
1.2. Solemnities and Proof of Last Wills in the Ius Commune. 
The issue of the solemnities of last wills in the Ius Commune was extremely 
complicated and controversial. The standard Roman testament, made in writing and 
solemnized by seven witnesses, was largely disregarded by the learned authors, who 
instead preferred to deal with nuncupative notarial testaments, ‘parental testaments’, 
soldier’s wills and other forms that were marginal in the Roman world. This obviously 
reflected the practice the learned jurists were dealing with. Moreover, Papal legislation 
created new forms of wills, thus contributing to the “deformalization” of the law of 
wills in the learned doctrine. 
The doctrine recognized two major ways in which an ordinary, unprivileged 
testament could be made: either in writing or nuncupatively. A nuncupative testament, 
in its turn, might either be reduced into writing (redactum in scriptis) or not reduced 
into writing. The forms of testament were separate from each other; the choice of form 
was determined by the testator’s own will. A testament could not be written and 
nuncupative at the same time, although, e.g., Paulus de Castro117 admitted that an 
incomplete written testament might be recognized as containing an “implicit 
nuncupation” (infra, p.26).118 
A nuncupative testament reduced into writing was inspired by the form 
described in Justinian’s constitution of 521 A.D. (C.6.22.8) and originally prescribed 
for blind testators. The form involved participation of a notary and seven witnesses, or 
eight witnesses, if a notary was unavailable. The will was fully narrated by the testator 
to the notary and witnesses or written in advance and read aloud by the notary to the 
                                                          
116 Distinction was also made between formal (constituting the “substance” of the act) and material 
formalities, with the former more easily presumed from the text. See: Bart., D.45.1.30, C.4.32.1.  
117 C. 1360 – c. 1441.  
118 Pau.Castr., cons. 93, vol I. 
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testator before witnesses. The subscriptions of the notary and all of the witnesses were 
necessary. Such a will was not considered as made in scriptis, but as nuncupative, 
because the witnesses were expected to hear the contents of the will.119 This law was 
widely seen as an argument for the possibility of reducing the contents of a 
nuncupative testament before seven witnesses (described in C.6.23.21.4 and 
C.6.23.26) into a public instrument;120 an exception was the subscriptions of witnesses, 
which were not generally required in a public instrument. The requirements of a public 
instrument, dealt with above (supra, p.17), were applicable to a notarial testament, as 
well.  
A nuncupative testament, evidenced in notarial form, was obviously quite a 
convenient form, as it allowed illiterate people to make a last will in a secure way. Its 
advantage also lay in that the document proved itself – there was no need to “publish” 
such testaments (infra, p.31). The seven witnesses, enumerated in such testament by 
name,121 played quite a passive role – there was no need for them to be literate or to 
be called after the death of the defunct. At the same time, such witnesses could only 
be men and could not be among the instituted heirs.122 They were supposed to know 
the testator personally in case he was illiterate.123 If, on the other hand, a nuncupative 
testament was not reduced into writing, all seven witnesses were to testify to every 
single statement by the testator.124 
The Ius Commune authors did not pay much attention to the solemn testament 
made by private writing (C.6.23.21, 28-29). Perhaps, it was, partially, due to the clarity 
and elaboration of this form in the text of the Corpus juris, and, partially, to the 
impracticality of making such a formal document, which was not considered a full 
proof of its own authenticity (infra, p.31-32). The law of Theodosius and Valentinian 
of 439 A.D. (C.6.23.21) provided that such a will was to be subscribed by the testator 
before seven witnesses, or by the eighth witness on the testator’s behalf. Alternatively, 
                                                          
119 Gloss to C.6.22.8, s.v. “Per nuncupationem”.  
120 C.6.23.21.4, s.v. “Sine scriptura”.  
121 Initially there were discussions on whether a testament where only two witnesses were mentioned 
by name proved itself (D.28.1.21, s.v. “Heredes palam”). 
122 Inst.Just.II.10.6, 10.  
123 Bart., C.6.30.22.2.  
124 Bart. and Pau.Castr., C.6.11.2.  
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the testator could show a closed and tied document to the witnesses. Then it was to be 
subscribed by the witnesses and then sealed by them. Every single action was to be 
made uno contextu125 and without interruption, so that the witnesses and the testator 
could see each other. Subsequently, Justinian’s constitution (C.6.23.28) dispensed 
with the requirement of subscription in a case where the will was fully written by the 
testator’s own hand. Another constitution (C.6.23.29) provided that the names of the 
heirs were to be either written with the testator’s hand or spoken with his own voice 
and confirmed by the witnesses in their subscription. However, this last constitution 
was completely abolished by Nov.119 (544 A.D.).126 
Papal legislation, notoriously, introduced a new form of testament. Alexander 
III issued a decretal Quum esses (X.3.26.10), referring to the law of Moses (Deut 
19:15) and recognizing the validity of last wills made in the presence of a priest and 
two witnesses. Later Canonists quickly interpreted the decretal as not admitting any 
priest but only a parish priest, with a universal cura animarum over the parish where 
the will was made, so that his authority was based on a “jurisdiction” of a sort.127 The 
priest’s function in the solemnity was to “exclude fraud”;128 this meant that the jurists 
agreed that two additional witnesses might be substituted for him, raising the number 
to four.129 The Canonical will, according to the prevalent opinion of Canonists, was 
supposed to be recognized in secular forums.130 
Commentators devised various additional, often “mixed” types of wills, 
obviously to address practical needs. Thus, Bartolus in his commentary to D.35.1.38 
provides an example: a testator before seven witnesses declares his last will to be 
contained in a handwritten document he had made earlier and deposited in a 
monastery. Bartolus held such a will to be valid as “nuncupative”, because the testator 
in this case implicitly “announced” the contents of the writing before witnesses. He 
                                                          
125 Expression based on the text of C.6.23.9, where the term “conspectum” is used, however.  
126 Nov.119.9(=C.6.23. Auth. Et Non Observato). There was an opinion, however, that speaking the 
heirs’ names with testator’s own mouth was necessary for nuncupative wills, as distinguished from 
the written ones. See: D.28.1.21pr, C.6.23. Auth Et Non Observato, s.v. “Scribat”; see also Baldus’ 
discussion, C.6.23.29.  
127 In this “jurisdictional” interpretation, the Canonical will was compared to the Civilian “testament 
submitted to the Prince” of C.6.23.19 (G.D. Durante, De arte testandi, II.2).  
128 Gu. Durantis, Speculum judiciale, II.2 De instr edit, rubr. Compendiosae, fo. CLXXXVI; Abb., X.3.26.10.  
129 G.D. Durante, ibid; Gu. Durantis, ibid.  
130 Abb., rep in X.3.26.10.  
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qualified this, however, with the condition, that there should be legitimate clues 
(indicia) to prove after his death that it was his writing: e.g., comparatio litterarum.131 
Paulus de Castro christened this form of will a “nuncupative testament with implicit 
nuncupation”.132 By analogy to this form, the possibility of “secret notarial wills” was 
also allowed by the learned authors, where closed sheets of paper were inserted into a 
notarial protocol before witnesses, so as to acquire full proof after the testator’s 
death.133  
Bartolus also mentioned the possibility of a notary making an inscription on a 
written will, thus certifying the will’s compliance with formal requirements and 
bestowing the force of a public document upon it.134 His idea was adopted by later 
authors.135  
Another kind of a last will, besides the testament, was a codicil. This was a 
document which did not appoint or disinherit heirs, but instead bestowed or cancelled 
legacies or fideicommisses. There were no formal requirements for codicils, besides 
the five witnesses to testify their making (C.6.36.8); there was no requirement of 
unicus conspectus, and at least some or all the witnesses could be female.136 The jurists 
of the 16-17th century usus modernus Pandectarum would not even require the 
presence of witnesses for codicils which were referred to in a testament, because they 
were considered as constituent parts of the testament;137 however, this position was 
not expressly stated by the medieval Commentators. Even “nuncupative codicils” were 
possible.138 
There also were other, special forms of last wills. Thus, Valentinian and 
Theodosius’ 439 A.D. constitution provided that a solemn testament could be 
cancelled by an informal writing, testified by five witnesses and appointing heirs ab 
intestato (C.6.23.21.5); this was considered a special kind of last will. An agreement 
                                                          
131 Bart., D.35.1.38.  
132 Pau.Castr., cons. 93, vol I.  
133 G.D. Durante, op cit, II.3; C.4.21 Auth. Ad Haec=Nov.49.2.2.  
134 Bart., D.29.3.2.  
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between two soldiers, that the survivor would succeed to the predeceasing one 
(C.2.3.19), was also considered a separate type of last will.139 
Besides the aforementioned forms of last wills, the Ius Commune sources 
provided for several types of “privileged” wills, which allowed significant departures 
from the normal solemnities, depending on the nature of the testator, the place of 
making, and the contents and the purpose of the will. The Code itself provided a minor 
softening of formalities for testaments made by rustici in the countryside.140 However, 
the real relaxation of formal requirements was provided for soldiers’ wills, testamenta 
inter liberos (parental testaments), and wills ad pias causas (“for pious uses”).  
Soldiers’ wills were deemed to be freed from the solemnities of the jus civile 
and to follow the jus gentium directly.141 Being free from solemnities of form, soldiers’ 
wills only required two witnesses for a full proof. The privilege extended to those 
employed in active military service; such wills were to remain valid only for one year 
after the service ended.142 
Parental testaments (testamenta inter liberos) were a more complex matter. 
Their history in Roman law was closely connected to divisio inter liberos - a similar 
legal device, allowing a father to divide his goods among the children in advance, thus 
excluding actio familiae (h)erciscundae.143 A constitution by Constantine of 321 A.D. 
(C.3.36.26) provided that a father could provide for the distribution of his goods among 
children post mortem in any document, even in a letter missive. Nov.18.7,144 from 
which the Authentica “Si modo” was extracted, 145  added the requirement of 
subscription: either of the testator alone or of all the children. The aforementioned 
constitution of Valentinian and Theodosius (supra, p.26) provided that an “imperfect” 
testament was to bear no force, except as concerned the children of the testator 
(C.6.23.21.3). Novel 107146 (=C.6.23 Auth. Quod Sine) allowed the making of the 
                                                          
139 D. Covarruvias, De testamentis et ultimis voluntatibus tractatus // Tractatus selecti… (1569), 154. 
140 C.6.23.31. If such testament was made by a private writing, the number of witnesses might be five 
instead of seven; the witnesses needed not be literate and could subscribe for each other.  
141 Bart., D.29.1.13.1(29.1.14).  
142 D.29.1.21; C.6.21.5.  
143 In more detail, see: Ma.L. Blanco Rodriguez, Testamentum parentum inter liberos (1991).  
144 Auth.Coll.3.5.  
145 C.3.36 Auth. Si Modo.  
146 Auth.Coll. 8.3.  
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testaments, in which only the testator’s children were instituted heirs, by way of simple 
writing. Such writing, however, was to be written in the testator’s own hand, without 
abbreviations in “parts of substance”: the heirs’ names, their shares and the date of the 
will’s making. Such a will could also contain legacies in favour of third parties (i.e., 
not the children), but this was to be made in the presence of witnesses.147 
The approach of the Gloss to Nov.107 was quite cautious. The Glossators 
essentially recognized that a parental testament could be made by a holographic 
writing and did not require witnesses as a matter of formality, except as concerned 
legacies to extraneous persons, which, in their interpretation, required two 
witnesses.148 However, undermining this, Accursius also held that the authenticity of 
such a will after the testator’s death was to be either recognized by all the successors 
or proved by two witnesses!149  
Some of the later Commentators, such as Baldus150 and Alessandro Tartagni 
(1424-1477),151 followed that opinion. Tartagni in one of his consilia explicitly rejects 
the possibility of proving a holographic parental testament by comparatio litterarum 
alone. 152  Others, like Paulus de Castro, however, were ready to accept truly 
holographic parental wills. Paulus seems to have been the first jurist to take into 
account the origin of a holographic will for proving its authenticity. If a private writing 
(“schedula”), written by the father’s own hand, was found among his papers, its 
authenticity could be fully established by comparatio;153 in support of this position 
Paulus referred to Bartolus’ “nuncupative will with implicit nuncupation” (supra, 
p.26). And this opinion seems to have been accepted more widely among late mos 
italicus Commentators, e.g., G.D. Durante and G. Claro.154 Claro summarized the form 
of parental wills in the following way: they are either a) made before two witnesses, 
with or without writing, following C.6.23.21.3, or b) written by the testator’s own hand 
without any witnesses, in accordance with Nov.107, and left by the testator in his own 
                                                          
147 Nov.107.1.  
148 Nov.107, s.v. “Inter filios”.  
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150 Bald., C.6.23 Auth Quod Sine.  
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depository155 or in a notarial archive, so as to make faith without witnesses, as long as 
they are undoubtedly in his handwriting.156  
Although a parental will was to be valid “without solemnities”, a holographic 
parental will, to qualify as such, was supposed to comply with particular “solemnities”. 
As was already mentioned, names of heirs, their shares and the date were to be written 
by the testator’s own hand. The date of making was, in effect, a necessity for a 
holographic will, which distinguished it from all other private instruments, which did 
not required the date as a matter of law.157 The original meaning of Nov.107.1 was 
obviously to prevent testators from using any abbreviations, but the jurists allowed the 
generally accepted abbreviations. 158  Finally, even the requirement of writing the 
substantial parts with the testator’s own hand was dropped, with many jurists deeming 
a subscription sufficient! This was justified by reference to Nov.49.2.2,159 as well as 
by the general rule that subscribing an instrument is the same thing as writing it in full 
(supra, p.21).160 G. Claro opined that a subscription, to be fully authentic in a parental 
will, must be a “special” one,161 mentioning that the subscribed document is a will, in 
order to rule out potential misunderstandings of the testator.162 
The privileges of last wills made ad pias causas were based on Nov.131.11,163 
which provided that last wills in favour of the poor were to be enforced “secundum 
testatoris voluntatem”, and also on a decretal by pope Alexander III (X.3.26.11), which 
established two witnesses, even without a priest, as sufficient to prove a legacy in 
favour of the Church. The decretal resulted in “pious” wills receiving basically the 
same treatment as “soldiers’ wills”. They could even be made by a nod or another 
gesture.164 Which cause could qualify as a “pious” one was a complicated question, 
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159 See Pau.Castr., C.6.23 Auth “Quod Sine”; cons. 93, vol I. 
160 See: Bart., D.2.14.47(48).1; Dec., X.2.19.11, nu. 200-205.  
161 See supra, p.29, on the matter of special and general subscriptions.   
162 G. Claro, ibid. 
163 Auth.Coll. 9.6.  
164 See: G. Claro, Recept. Sent., § Testamentum, qu. 8, - where Claro distinguishes a will ad pias causas 
from parental wills in this respect.  
30 
 
with many authors taking into account such issues as the financial position of the 
testator and the receiver of the disposition, their relation, etc.165  
Bartolus in his commentary on C.6.23.21.3 distinguished between testaments 
“imperfect” (i.e., incomplete) ratione solemnitatis, which could be valid in respect of 
children only, and ratione voluntatis, which bore no validity whatsoever.166 Thence 
arose the controversy, at what exact moment could a last will be considered perfected 
as to will? There was a general consensus among the Commentators that ordinarily a 
nuncupative testament, reduced into a public instrument, became perfected quoad 
voluntatem only after the notary read the will aloud before the testator and witnesses. 
This was the way to ensure the testator’s definitive consent to the contents of the 
instrument.167 Here the question arose: what if the testator narrated his last will before 
witnesses, or witnesses and a notary, but died before the text was formally recited to 
him by the notary? Could such a will be considered completed at least quoad 
voluntatem, if not quoad solemnitatem?  
Bartolus was not explicit on this topic, but there are some indications that he 
was leaning towards accepting such wills.168 Paulus de Castro, however, consistently 
rejected the validity of such incomplete wills even quoad voluntatem, so that they were 
invalid even in respect of children or ad pias causas.169 Whereas, for ordinary wills, 
Paulus deemed it indispensable that the will be signed by the notary within the 
testator’s life.170  
However, among the later authors the more popular solution was to consider 
reading of the will before the testator as just a solemnity. In A. Tartagni’s opinion,171 
if a testator reduced his will into writing, but died before the notary and witnesses 
could solemnize this writing into a public instrument, such will was valid in respect of 
children or ad pias causas, if it could be proved by at least two witnesses. F. Decio, in 
                                                          
165 G.D. Durante, De arte testandi, II.2.  
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his commentary to the Decretals, 172  quite confidently considered reading the 
instrument aloud a mere solemnity, so that it was unnecessary for notarial wills made 
“among the children” or ad pias causas. 
English Civilians, such as W. Lyndwood (c. 1375-1446) and H. Swinburne 
(1551–1624), held that two witnesses were a sufficient proof for any English will, 
irrespective of form. They justified this by reference to privileged forms: Lyndwood 
claims that any last will is “for pious uses”,173 while according to Swinburne English 
testaments “followed military law”. 174  As to holographic wills without witnesses, 
Swinburne’s work displays eclectism and some inconsistency; 175  ultimately, the 
author admits the possibility of proving such wills by comparatio litterarum together 
with other adminicles, such as finding the writing in the testator’s papers.176  The 
research of R.H. Helmholz showed that English ecclesiastical courts in the mid-17th 
century used the procedure of comparatio litterarum, similar to that of the Ius 
Commune;177 it is unclear, however, what exact probative value the comparatio bore.  
A testament made no faith, unless it passed the procedure of “publication” 
before the local magistrate.178 Bartolus made an exception for notarial wills, both 
nuncupative and written with notarial involvement, as they were deemed already 
“published” by the notary in his register.179 Like other public instruments (supra, 
p.17), a notarial will was worth as many witnesses, as were mentioned in it by name.180 
This was the main advantage of notarial wills. However, practice could diverge: 
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J. Sicchard mentions that in 16th-century Burgundy, even in notarial wills, the 
witnesses were to recognize their involvement.181 
All other wills were to be “published”. The opinions about that procedure 
varied greatly. The consensus, however, was that it involved calling and interrogating 
testamentary witnesses ad perpetuam rei memoriam.182 In nuncupative wills all seven 
witnesses were necessary for a successful publication; death or disability of even one 
of them rendered the testament unprovable and thus unenforceable. Sharp controversy 
was created by the opinion of the 12th century Glossator Martin, that two out of seven 
witnesses were enough to prove the solemnity of the testament, as opposed to its 
contents; 183  but even this would make a difference only when the testament’s 
authenticity was recognized by the opponent (intestate heir, possessor of the estate 
goods, etc.).184 In respect of testaments made by a private writing, the doctrine was 
unclear. It was obvious that a private instrument was unable to prove itself if all the 
witnesses died;185 whether one or two surviving witnesses were enough for proving 
the testament was not directly addressed by the Commentators. Some passages of their 
works suggest that a private testamentary deed by itself had some probative force, but 
the impression remains that they mostly avoided determining the exact measure of that 
force.186 
Publication of testaments required summoning all the parties who might be 
affected by it (e.g., heirs on intestacy). The extent to which the testamentary witnesses 
were to be interrogated was a controversial topic: thus, Baldus held that the witnesses 
to a private written will were only to recognize their seals and subscriptions under oath, 
without formal interrogatories submitted by the parties.187 As a result of publication, 
                                                          
181 Sicchard, Dictata et praelectiones ad Codicem, C.6.23.2.  
182 This way of taking depositions of witnesses was prescribed by C.4.20 Auth Sed Et Si Quis (=Nov.90.5). 
183 C.6.11.2, s.v. “Doceri potest”.  
184 Bart. and Pau.Castr. to D.28.1.21 and C.6.11.2.  
185 Bart., D.29.3.2; G.D. Durante, op cit, II.1.  
186 Thus, Bartolus holds that if a witness doubts his seal on a testament, the seal is not deemed 
suspected by this fact only (Bart., D.29.3.1.2, nu.1). Baldus mentions that, if a testator’s handwriting 
is publicly known and easily recognizable, the witnesses need not prove the verity, but only the 
solemnity of a written testament (Bald., C.6.23.1). Panormitanus holds that if a witness to a testament 
is also a legatee, his testimony may be fortified by the testamentary document so as to avoid doubt of 
bias (Abb., X.2.19.9).  
187 Bald., C.6.23.2. Sicchard, however, held that witnesses even to private written wills were to give 
evidence about the will’s contents; but his opinion, as well as his classification of wills (he considered 
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an interlocutory sentence was issued and an inscription made by the judge on the 
testamentary deed.188 The effects of publication and the possibility of challenging it in 
subsequent litigation were debated by the jurists; undoubted, however, was the right 
of interested parties to invalidate the published testament by providing strong proof of 
forgery.189 The testator himself might publish the testament within his life, following 
the same procedures.190 
J. Sicchard uses the term “confirmation” once while describing the procedure 
for publication of testaments.191 This was not standard Ius Commune terminology. 
However, “confirmation”, in a different meaning of the term, supposedly played an 
important role in the publication procedures used in England. H. Swinburne tells us 
about two forms of publication of testament, allegedly adopted in England in his time: 
a) the common form, which did not involve a citation of interested parties, but which 
was not definitive and could be challenged, and b) the special and solemn form, which 
involved a citation of the parties and was definitive.192  
Swinburne alleges that this distinction was developed in English practice by 
analogy to the distinction between the types of “confirmations”.193 The “confirmation” 
he is talking about here was based on title 30 of book 2 of the Liber Extra. This Canon 
law institution was originally associated with Papal letters, which “confirmed” 
particular rights, possessed or enjoyed by individuals and corporations. If “letters of 
confirmation” were issued in common form, i.e. without enquiry into the case, they 
could not prejudice existing third parties' rights. They could prejudice third parties, 
however, if issued in special form, after enquiry into the case (causae cognitio) and 
making mention of third parties' rights.194  
This analogy between the publication of the testament and the “confirmation 
of rights”, if reported correctly by Swinburne, suggests that in late 16th-century 
                                                          
private written wills “nuncupative”), was obviously contrary to the prevalent views of the 
Commentators (Sicchard, op cit, C.6.23.2).  
188 C.6.23.2, s.v. “Publicati”.  
189 This was based on on the Justinian’s law in C.4.21.21(20). See also: Bart., D.29.3.2.  
190 C.6.23.2, s.v. “Publicati”, additio; J. Sicchard, ibid. 
191 Sicchard, ibid.  
192 Swinburne, op cit, VI.14, pp.224-225.  
193 Swinburne, op cit, p.224, n.(c).  
194 X.2.30.3-4, 7.  
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England, unlike the Continent, the main perceived purpose of the relevant procedure 
was not to guarantee of the will’s authenticity, but to endow formally the successor 
with powers. Consequently, the differentiation of two forms of such endowment looks 
logical, considering that in England, unlike the Continent, the universal successor was 
always the executor, a person nominally disinterested in the estate goods and 
accountable before the ordinary. It was expedient that someone in charge of the estate 
was to be appointed as soon as possible; hence the publication of a testament in 
“common form”, leaving the will open to challenge by competing claimants, but 
providing administration for the defunct’s property.  
1.3. Authentication of Writs in Scotland: General Legal Background. 
Scotland has demonstrated a unique development of the law of execution of 
writs and written evidence in the Early Modern era. It was different from both 
Continental and English models in the way private writings in Scotland, complying 
with formal requirements, were fully “probative”, i.e., made full faith against the 
granters and third parties. However, despite practical dissimilarity, the Scots law on 
written documents does not look really devoid of roots in the Ius Commune doctrine.  
In the 15-16th centuries the use of notaries and notarial instruments came to 
prominence in Scotland. However, there is a scholarly opinion that this process might 
be more of a regression than a positive development, with Scots notaries often being 
poorly qualified and their instruments easy to forge.195 As Th. Craig famously wrote 
c. 1600, “as their use was born out of abuse of private writings, thus because of the 
vices of notaries recourse should be had to private writings”.196 Thus, Scottish legal 
practice took a restrictive approach to notarial instruments, so that by the late 17th 
century they were considered full proof only in respect of the legal acts which by 
custom required to be executed as notarial instruments as a matter of substance: 
transfers of seisin, resignations, requisitions, premonitions, consignations, intimations, 
protests of bills of exchange and similar documents.197 For other acts, such as offers to 
                                                          
195 J. Finlay, ‘The History of the Notary in Scotland’, Handbuch zur Geschichte des Notariats… (2009), 
394 (with reference to G.W.S. Barrow).  
196 “..ut eorum usus ex privatarum scripturarum abusu natum est, sic ex notariorum sceleribus ad 
privatarum scripturarum fidem recurrendum est” (Craig, Jus feudale, II.7.7).  
197 Stair, Inst.IV.42.9; Bankton, Inst.IV.27.4. It should be noted that even instruments of seisin were not 
probative without also producing the relevant charters (Craig, Jus feudale, II.7.7).  
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perform an obligation, notarial instruments made a full proof of their own authenticity, 
but required calling instrumentary witnesses to prove the act itself.198 In the 1611 case, 
Anstruther v. Thomson (M.12499), it was decided that acts and statements by a party, 
written down by the notary but not falling within established patterns, would make no 
faith.199 
The Practicks, traditionally attributed to James Balfour (c. 1580), tell us about 
the usual requirements for a private deed in the late 16th century: the seal and the 
subscription of the granter, justa causa, at least two instrumentary witnesses, the date 
and place of making.200 Although Balfour cites “Auld Lawes” in support, his list looks 
very similar to the Ius Commune’s requirements for public instruments. The same can 
be said of Balfour’s account of the procedure for “improbation” (disproval) of the 
charters: the defender bore the burden of calling the instrumentary witnesses or 
initiating the comparison of seals to prove forgery.201 This makes Scottish sealed and 
witnessed deeds look quite similar to sealed and witnessed letters under Canon law 
(supra, p.22).  
The form for Scottish written deeds was provided partially by statutes, partially 
by custom. Thus, the 1540 Act202 required a subscription as necessary in addition to 
the seal for sealed writs. The 1555 Act,203 which concerned reversions only, required 
a sealed and subscribed document for the reversion’s validity. The 1579 Act204 had 
most lasting consequences. It provided that all “contractis, obligationes… and 
generalie all writtis importing heritable title or utheris bandis and obligationes of greit 
importance” were to make faith only if made in writing, subscribed by the granter or 
by two notaries before four witnesses. This Act was later supplemented by the 1593 
Act, which required the documents to mention their writers.205 
                                                          
198 Bankton, Inst.IV.27.5.  
199 See infra, p.54, for more detail on this case.  
200 Balfour’s Practicks, Of probatioun be writ, c. 36.  
201 Balfour’s Practicks, Of probatioun be writ, c. 1. See also the 1557 Act (RPS, A1557/12/4), putting 
additional burdens on defenders wishing to improve the pursuers’ writs, and the Act of Sederunt of 
26/05/1581, which effectually introduced a necessity to plead improbations in a criminal way, 
involving the Lord Advocate. 
202 RPS, 1540/12/92.  
203 RPS, A1555/6/3. 
204 RPS, 1579/10/33.  
205 RPS, 1593/4/44. 
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Scots legal writers of the 17th century, namely R. Spottiswood 206  and 
G. Mackenzie,207  claimed that this statute was “taken verbatim” from the French 
Ordinance on the reform of justice, enacted in Moulins in 1566. Indeed, this Ordinance 
contained an article 54, which provided that the contracts in which a single payment 
exceeded the value of 100 livres were to be made either in notarial form or by the 
contracting parties’ own hands.208 The obvious similarity between the Ordinance and 
the Scots 1579 Act is the value of the transaction as a criterion in determining the 
form.209 Indeed, the later Scottish legal practice established 100 pounds Scots as the 
mark of the “great importance” of the deed;210 this mark was not contained in any 
statute, except for one Act of Sederunt from 1597, dealing with debt payments.211 The 
mentioning of notaries and holographic documents (infra, p.39) was another possible 
source of inspiration for Scots lawyers in the French Ordinance. However, the Scots 
1579 Act was hardly taken “verbatim” from the French source.  
The 1579 Act, strangely enough, did not mention the necessity of two 
instrumentary witnesses to deeds subscribed by the granter. Later Scottish authors, 
however, had no doubt about this requirement being “implied” in the Act.212 The Act 
also did not abolish the requirement of a seal on the document. It was later abolished 
for deeds submitted for registration.213 Th. Craig circa 1600 mentioned the seal as still 
necessary for charters.214 However, as pointed out by Erskine, during the 17th century 
private seals completely went out of use in Scotland as a matter of custom;215 as noted 
by Mackenzie, comparison of seals gave way to comparison of subscriptions.216  
                                                          
206 Spottiswoode’s Practicks, ‘Testaments’, 337.  
207 G. Mackenzie, Observations on the Acts of Parliament (1687), 195.  
208  The source of the text of the Ordinance: 
http://lecahiertoulousain.free.fr/Textes/ordonnance_1566_moulins.html. J. Bourhis courteously the 
helped the author with translation from Middle French.  
209 W.A. Wilson, ‘In Modum Probationis’, JR, vol 13(n.s.) (1968), 195-196; G. Lubbe, ‘Formation of 
contract’, A History of Private Law in Scotland, vol II, 1-46; W.D.H. Sellar, ‘Promise’, A History of Private 
Law in Scotland, vol II, 252-282. 
210  One of the earliest reported cases where 100 pounds rule was invoked was decided in 1605 
(M.12354).  
211 8/06/1597, Acts of Sederunt 1790, 28.  
212 Mackenzie, op cit, 193; Erskine, Inst.III.2.11; W.A. Wilson, op cit, 195.  
213 RPS, 1584/5/85. 
214 Jus Feudale, II.3.10.  
215 Erskine, Inst.III.2.7.  
216 Mackenzie, op cit, 146, 452.  
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The scope of applicability of the 100 pounds rule was controversial in Scots 
case law of 1579-1660. In an early case, Auchinleck v. Gordon (1580, M.12382), a 
point was made that a gratuitous promise might only be proved by a writ or an oath, 
irrespective of the amount. Colvil of Culross, reporting the case, disagreed with it on 
the ground of Ius Commune principles;217 however, it is possible that the Lords in that 
case themselves followed the Civil law paradigm of nudum pactum.218 Nevertheless, 
the subsequent practice was inconsistent: sometimes unilateral promises to pay a sum 
below 100 pounds were found provable by witnesses;219 sometimes not.220 Finally, in 
Deuchar v. Brown (1672, M.12386) it was settled that a gratuitous promise, even one 
given by the surety to an obligation, may only be proved by a writ or an oath. 
The extent of the influence of Ius Commune doctrine on Scots practice on 
private witnessed deeds in the 17th century is uncertain. Among 20th-century scholars 
there was a widely discussed topic on whether Scots law of that period distinguished 
between acts made substantially in scriptis and acts just evidenced by a written 
document. J.J. Gow in 1961 expressed doubt that Scots legal practitioners and writers 
really drew a difference between the two.221 W.A. Wilson insisted that this distinction 
was clear and explicit from Stair’s Institutions onwards: contracts in respect of 
heritable property and some other deeds required writing as a matter of substance, 
while obligations of “great importance” required writing (or, alternatively, an oath) as 
a matter of proof only.222 References to the Ius Commune were not explicit in the 
controversy; it obviously has implications for the topic of the Ius Commune influence 
in Scotland, seeing that the distinction between acts in scriptis and acts evidenced in 
writing was present in the Ius Commune doctrine, at least since the time of Baldus 
(supra, p.16). The consensus in the controversy seems to be that, before 1660, Scots 
                                                          
217 Namely, C.4.21.15, which established, as a general rule, that witnesses and writings have equal 
evidential force.  
218 The concept of “nudum pactum” as an informal agreement, not worthy of full legal protection, was 
obviously a part of the Scots legal discourse in 1579-1660 and was used in judicial practice. For 
example, in the case Sharp v. Sharp (1631, M.15562), as reported by Dury, the Lords took the trouble 
of explaining how the agreement under controversy was not a nudum pactum, because it had a just 
cause in creating mutually enforceable obligations of the parties.  
219 Ernock v. Preston (1636, M.12383).  
220 Russel v. Paterson (1629, M.12383), where the promise was for 99 pounds. 
221 J.J. Gow, ‘The constitution and proof of voluntary obligations’, JR, vol 6(n.s.) (1961), 1-20.  
222 W.A. Wilson, op cit, 197-199.  
38 
 
practice did not consistently differentiate between the one and the other;223 G. Lubbe 
also seems to hold this opinion.224  
W.A. Wilson called the money bond an “original obligatio litterarum” of Scots 
law, seemingly implying that even before 1660 it was looked upon as contractus in 
scriptis in the style of Civil law.225 However, all the early cases he cited in support of 
his claim dealt only with an issue of the oath that the document’s granter might be 
compelled to take;226 the earliest case expressly referring to the bond as obligatio 
litterarum was decided in 1749.227  
Scottish deeds in 17th century practice often referred to a Civil law device – 
“exception of not numerat money”, – which Scots bonds for money usually 
renounced.228 However, this was only a clause of style, having no real legal effect.229 
Subscription of illiterate or disabled persons’ deeds by a notary produced 
private, not public instruments in Scotland.230 There was at least one point of quite 
explicit influence of the Ius Commune doctrine on this type of document in Scotland: 
unicus contextus, requiring the subscription to take place in presence of all witnesses 
(supra, p.25). The term itself seems to have been used in a Scots case for the first time 
in 1633, 231  establishing that all notaries and witnesses were to be present at 
subscription; however, the Civil law fragment on stipulation was cited in that case232 
instead of the fragments on last wills. Another field where Scots deeds showed 
similarity to the Ius Commune was that of warrants of notaries: the deeds were required 
to mention the granter’s commission to the notary to subscribe for him, made before 
                                                          
223 E.g., in Anstruther v. Thomson (1611, M.12499), although the contract of sale concerned land, the 
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224 G. Lubbe, op cit. 
225 Wilson, op cit, 205-206.  
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witnesses, otherwise the deed was invalid.233 However, this last requirement might 
also be associated with the qualification in the 1579 Act about the granter’s inability 
to subscribe, forcing him to invite notaries instead.  
Many developments of 17th century practice were given a statutory basis by the 
1681 Act.234 The Act established the conditions for probativity of witnessed deeds. 
The witnesses were now required to put their signatures on the document; they were 
held to know the granter and see him subscribe or give the warrant to the notary to 
subsribe for him. Non-compliance entailed nullity of the writ.  
A mysterious problem in Scots legal history is the recognition of holographic 
writs. It is unclear how and when writs written fully or substantially by the granter’s 
own hand started to be recognized as valid as an exception to the 1579 Act. Balfour, 
Craig and Hope are still silent on them. R. Spottiswood mentions them in his 
propositions to the Parliament under no. 6, claiming that holographs were accepted on 
a customary basis and suggesting to give them statutory grounding.235 The earliest 
reported cases to deal with holographic writings were decided in 1610-1611. The very 
first one, Pursuer v. Titill (1610, M.16959), concerned a testament. Several subsequent 
cases concerned letters missive, receipts and bonds. The law as to holographs 
established by them was as follows. Holographic documents, unlike witnessed deeds, 
could not prove the date of their making against the third parties.236 This rule was quite 
logical in view of the need to prevent possible fraud against creditors, heirs and bonae 
fidei purchasers of rights; it was reminiscent of the Ius Commune rules.237 As concerns 
the granter of the deed himself, the law, as it stood before 1635, also seems to have 
followed a pattern similar to the Ius Commune: if the granter (or his successor) denied 
                                                          
233 Littlejohn v. Hepburn (1608, M.16828), Veitch v. Horsburgh (1637, M.16834), Philip v. Cheap (1667, 
M.16835), Laird of Culterallers v. Chapman (1667, M.16803).  
234 RPS, 1681/7/27.  
235 Spottiswoode’s Practicks, 363.  
236 Lord Forbes v. Marquis of Huntly (1611, M.12603), Howieson v. Howieson (1611, M.12271). There 
were later divergent cases, like Lesly v. Boquhen & Pitcaple (1629, M.12604). However, since Dickie v. 
Montgomery (1662, M.12606), the non-probativity of the holographic date has been settled.  
237 Which admitted private writings as proof against the third parties only if they were subscribed by 
three witnesses. See infra, p.64. 
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that the document was his/her holographic writing, the pursuer was to prove that fact, 
even if the document bore in the text that it was holograph.238  
However, the case of Earl of Rothes v. Leslie (1635, M.12605) confused the 
law of holographs, as it apparently decreed that a holographic writing was probative if 
the text stated so, with a burden of proof on the defender to refute authenticity.239 
Although the case law immediately following Earl of Rothes suggests that the Lords 
did not plan to establish a general rule to that extent,240 this was exactly the effect of 
Earl of Rothes in the long term. This is why Scots Institutional writers considered 
holographic writings probative;241  Stair even put holographic writings in the first 
position in importance, being “the least imitable” of all writings (Stair, Inst.IV.42.6). 
One might draw parallels with the Ius Commune rule on the presumption of 
solemnities mentioned in an instrument. 242  Nevertheless, this presumption of 
authenticity of holographic writs was considered unreasonable by more modern 
authors 243 and was finally abolished by the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act, 
1995.  
Comparatio litterarum – both the notion and the term itself - was well-known 
and employed in Scots practice. However, the procedure of comparatio in Scotland 
did not follow the Ius Commune pattern. There were no qualified experts (periti), 
specially called and sworn. Scottish judges allowed the parties to bring witnesses who 
“knew the hand” of the granter and give their personal opinions on authenticity of the 
text.244  Sometimes, it seems, the judges themselves performed the comparison.245 
Comparatio in Scotland, similarly to the Ius Commune, usually provided a “half-
                                                          
238 See: Kirkwood v. Inglis (1627, M.16926), Inglis v. McCubine (1631, M.16962).  
239 W.A. Wilson, op cit, 196. It should be noted that the type of writing involved in Earl of Rothes v. 
Leslie was quite special: it was a holographic arbitral award, written at the back of the arbitral 
agreement. 
240 In an anonymous 1638 case, as reported in I B.S.103, the defender, challenging a holographic bond 
on the ground of solemnity, lost the case, although he allegedly would have won if he had denied the 
bond’s authenticity. This is quite in line with the pre-1635 practice.  
241 Bankton, Inst.I.11.33; Erskine, Inst.III.2.22.  
242 Bart., D.45.1.30, C.4.32.1; supra, pp.22-23.  
243 M’Laren, Wills and Succession, vol I (1868), pp.236-237; A.G. Walker, ‘Further notes on holograph 
wills’, SLT(News) (1933), 41-45.  
244 Vans v. Malloch (1675, M.16885).  
245 See: Colvil v. Executors of Lord Colvil (1664, I Stair, 215), - where the Lords assessed the similarity 
of the subscriptions of witnesses.  
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proof” and could be supplied by one witness to make full faith;246 in some cases, 
however, comparatio provided a presumption in favour of the document, subject to 
“stronger proofs” from the opposite party.247 
Scottish judges showed a strong inclination to accept “not-so-solemn” writs as 
valid on the ground of custom, lex mercatoria or established practice of the parties.248 
Much of the case law in this vein concerned letters missive used in commercial 
practice. In one of the early cases, Pyromon v. Ramsay’s Executors (1627, M.16960 = 
1629, M.16963), it was established that for a letter between merchants a mere 
subscription was sufficient authentication. This rule persisted in practice,249 so that 
Lord Bankton in the mid-18th century would admit the validity of subscribed letters 
missive if they were the usual way of communication between the parties.250 Some 
commercial documents, like bills of exchange, began to be considered probative if they 
contained just a subscription.251  
However, similarly to the Ius Commune, probably the most privileged type of 
writing in Scotland was the book of account (compt-book). Not only was subscription 
enough for an account’s validity,252 but even without subscription it made some faith. 
In Brown’s Creditors v. Baillie (1631, I B.S.319=M.2428=M.12617),253  the Court 
found that the accounts in the defunct’s “compt-book”, subscribed by the defunct 
though written by someone else, were enough proof for the debt to compete pari passu 
with other debts against an insolvent estate, while unsubscribed accounts were to be 
‘adminicled’ by additional proofs. 254  Despite some cases to the contrary, 255  the 
                                                          
246 Vans v. Malloch (1675, M.16885). 
247 Rentoun v. Earl of Leven and Alexander Kennedy (1662, M.12652).  
248 Wilson, op cit, 197.  
249 See Earl of Northesk v. Viscount of Stormont (1671, M.16967).  
250 Bankton, Inst.I.11.33.  
251 Stair, Inst.IV.42.6. 
252 Rule v. Atton (1628, M.16961).  
253 In the Morison’s Dictionary the case is also cited as “Brown’s Creditors Competing”. See: M.2428, 
M.12617.  
254 This interpretation is apparent in the Spottiswoode’s report (Spottiswoode’s Practicks, ‘Creditors’, 
77) and implicit in the Auchinleck’s report (I B.S.319), with the latter reporting that the accounts were 
written by the defunct’s servant. The report of Dury, however, claims that the accounts were written 
by the defunct’s own hand.  
255 Brown’s Creditors seemingly contradicts another case from the same period - Ranken v. Watson, 
Mill et al. (1633, I B.S.340) – where an account, subscribed by the defender, was found not probative 
and not provable by the defender’s oath. However, the obvious difference between the two cases is 
that in Ranken the granter of the document was alive and contradicting it, while in Brown’s Creditors 
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probative force of the granter’s subscription of the account seems to have been settled 
as regards res mercatoria in Stuart v. Agnew (1680, M.12624).256 The 1696 Act257 
dispensed with the necessity of the book pages being “battered” together, provided that 
every page be numbered and subscribed. 
1.4. The Form of Last Wills in Post-Reformation Scotland: General Review.  
In contrast to other kinds of documents, there is very little reported litigation 
on authentication of last wills in Scotland. However, this does not mean that last wills 
have never been an object of special regulation.  The original Instructions to the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh of 1563258 provided that all testaments were to be made 
“in presence of a Minister… or in presence of an Notar… or subscrivit by the persoun, 
maker thairof…”, while all that was to be “befor witnessis” (c. 24). However, the same 
article ends with the words: “or otherwayis as accordis the law”. The openness of this 
list of accepted forms does not allow us to establish exactly its sources. However, the 
reference to clergy as officials eligible for writing testaments on par with notaries is 
an obvious reference to the Canon law “priest and two witnesses” last wills (supra, 
p.25). Absence of the requirement of sealing the wills and sufficiency of a simple 
subscription, long before the 1579 and 1584 Acts, are also notable.  
The obvious and express change was introduced by the subsequent Instructions 
of the Lords of Session to the Commissaries of Edinburgh, from 26 March 1567. The 
very first article reads: “in all time cuming nomination of executouris be provin by writ 
allanerlie”. This text implies that nuncupative testaments were lawful in Scotland 
before 1567. Whether they appeared in practice before and after 1567, will be dealt 
with below (infra, pp.48-49, s.1.7). However, this rule was well established in later 
Scots law. In fact, it was so well-established that in Shaw v. Lewis (1665, M.4494) 
even nuncupative testaments made abroad were deemed invalid as to nomination of 
                                                          
the executor did not challenge the accounts’ authenticity – it was the third party rights that were at 
stake. Another difference between the two cases might be that in Ranken the “account” was not a 
part of the book of accounts.  
256 In this last case the account was written by someone else and subscribed by the granter, who was 
a merchant. The Court found that 1579 Act did not apply to books of account, so that mere 
subscription was sufficiently probative, although open to improbation by comparison of handwritings.  
257 RPS, 1696/9/133.  
258 We cannot be sure of their dating because January and February of 1564 in 16th century Scotland’s 
calendar would be part of 1563.  
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executors for goods in Scotland: writing was considered not just a form but a 
“constitution of the essentials of act”! This “imperativity” of writing for Scottish wills 
was clearly contrary to the spirit of the 1567 Instructions, which required testaments 
only to be “proved” by writing, not “made” in that way. However, Shaw was cited with 
implicit approval by the Scottish learned authors259 and was still a part of Scots law in 
the late 19th century.260  
In Balfour’s Practicks, written by about 1580, only the requirement of two 
witnesses is mentioned as necessary for a testament; they could not be women.261 The 
legal writings we find after Balfour and before Stair’s Institutions (Th. Craig’s Jus 
Feudale, Th. Hope’s Major and Minor Practicks, R. Spottiswood’s Practicks) did not 
deal with the issue of testamentary formalities; neither did the subsequent Instructions 
to the Commissaries (1610, 1666).  
However, the issue was not altogether ignored by legislation. The 1584 Act,262 
forbidding ministers of the Kirk to get involved with notarial activity, made an 
exception in favour of testaments. This Act was obviously intended to be of purely 
disciplinary significance;263 however, it was interpreted as actually confirming the 
ministers’ authority to write down last wills in their own right. Thus, when in  Hepburn 
v. Laird of Wauchton (1606, M.16827) the authority of ministers to deal with 
testaments was challenged, the 1584 Act, not the 1563 Instructions, was mentioned as 
the basis of their authority. In reality, however, the source of the ministers’ power 
seems to have been Canon law. In Canon law (supra, p.25), a priest could draft 
testaments for his own parishioners only, his powers being area-restricted. The 
Scottish law on the matter was similar, as in the same Hepburn case the will was 
successfully challenged on the ground that the minister was from another parish.  
                                                          
259 Stair, Inst.III.8.35; J. Nisbet of Dirleton, ‘Testament’, Some Doubts and Questions in the Law… (1698), 
205; Erskine, Inst.III.2.41.  
260 M’Laren, op cit, vol I, pp.25-26.  
261 Balfour’s Practicks, ‘Anent testaments’, c. 11.  
262 RPS, 1584/5/12. 
263 In Hassington v. Bartilmo (1631, M.16832) a contract subscribed by a minister, who was also a 
notary, was found valid, although the minister was punished for that misdeed. See also: J. Finlay, op 
cit, 409.  
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Litigation over authentication of proper testamentary deeds was extremely rare 
in 1560-1660. However, the few reported cases that we have are revealing as to Scots 
law’s relation to the Ius Commune on this point. In Lady Inverleith v. Bishop of 
Glasgow (1613, M.16876) one of the witnesses to a testament was also the executor. 
The executor renounced his office before the action for reduction was initiated, and 
thus the testament was found void as regards his nomination but valid as to all other 
points. The report notes the point made by the Lords: had the executor-witness not 
promptly rejected the office of executry, the testament would have been invalidated 
entirely. This decision reveals that, in Scotland, appointing one of the witnesses as 
executor did not entail invalidity of the testament ipso jure, as it was with a witness 
appointed heir in Civil law.264 Such appointment in the early 17th century Scots law 
entailed voidability, “reducibility” of a testament, hence the importance of the moment 
of filing the action for reduction. The ground for reduction thus seems less that of the 
testament’s informality and more that of the law of proof: a witness may not testify in 
litigation he has an interest in. Such a document cannot be fully proved, hence its 
invalidity. The solution of Lady Inverleith seems similar to that proposed by 
H. Swinburne in his treatise, although in Swinburne’s situation the question was about 
legatees, not executors.265 We cannot be sure whether Swinburne exerted any actual 
influence on Lady Inverleith, but it should be pointed out that later Scots practice in 
similar situations followed a different way.266  
It seems that gradually Ius Commune concepts had influence on the distinction 
between testaments and codicils in Scottish legal doctrine, where “testaments” 
contained a nomination of executor and “codicils” just contained legacies of the 
testator’s free goods. The term “codicil” was still rare in Scots practice before 1660, 
with Dundas v. His Father’s Executors (1639, M.2195=M.12501)267 being one of the 
few instances of its use in that period. In this case, among the grounds on which the 
party attempted to challenge the codicil was that “there was a perfected principal 
                                                          
264 Inst.Just.II.10.10.  
265 Swinburne, A Briefe Treatise…, IV.22, 188. For a general discussion on legatee-witnesses in the Ius 
Commune, see: Abb., X.2.19.9. 
266  See: Forrest v. Veitch (1676, M.16970), - where the contracting parties were allowed to be 
instrumentary witnesses to a contractual deed. See also Bankton’s criticism of that decision 
(Inst.I.11.32).  
267 See also this case infra, p.55. 
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testament bearing no such legacy”. Although the report does not contain an express 
reference to the Civil law, the aforesaid objection is reminiscent of a peculiarly 
Civilian understanding: a formally defective codicil is to be referred to in the testament 
to be valid (supra, p.26). Anyway, the Lords rejected the plea, finding the codicil “in 
substance and matter… good in itself”. 
For Stair, the testament/codicil distinction was obviously an established part of 
doctrine. 268  In his time, testaments were to be made in writing as a matter of 
substance,269 and the formalities of testamentary deeds were deemed the same as with 
“probative deeds” in general: a subscription before two witnesses or the testator’s own 
handwriting in substantial parts.270  
Codicils (“legacies”), on the other hand, could be made nuncupatively and 
proved by witnesses, if they did not exceed the amount of 100 pounds Scots.271 This 
rule might sound identical to the rule for the “writs of importance” (supra, p.36), but, 
in reality, it was different. While inter vivos bonds and promises bigger than 100 
pounds could never be proved by witnesses in any part, nuncupative legacies 
exceeding that amount were provable by witnesses to the extent of 100 pounds.272 
Moreover, by the time of Bankton and Erskine, the writing came to be considered not 
a simple proof but an essential solemnity for the constitution of legacies over 100 
pounds,273 so they could not even be proved by oath of the defender as to such a big 
amount!274  
This obviously had not always been the rule. Stair, for example, speaks of a 
legacy under 100 pounds as “provable by witnesses”,275 possibly implying the rule to 
be that of proof, not of substantial solemnity. There is also earlier evidence, in the case 
Russel v. Defender (1609-10). This case was reported twice by Haddington, probably 
reflecting different stages of process. According to the 1610 report (M.12396), a debt 
                                                          
268 Stair, Inst.III.8.33-34.  
269 Shaw v. Lewis, 1665, M.4494. 
270 Stair, Inst.III.8.33-35; Mackenzie, Inst.III.9.2.  
271 Stair, Inst.III.8.36.  
272 Wallace v. Muir (1629, M.1350).  
273 Bankton, Inst.III.8.6; Erskine, Inst.III.9.7.  
274 See Mitchel v. Wright (1759, M.8082), where a distinction was drawn in that respect between the 
legacies and donationes mortis causa – the latter could be proved by an oath if exceeded 100 pounds.  
275 Stair, Inst.III.8.36 
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of 200 merks,276 due to the executor, was fully set off by a nuncupative legacy for the 
“like sum”, proved by witnesses. If the facts were truly as reported here, a legacy in 
excess of 100 pounds in the early 17th century could apparently be claimed by way of 
exception for set-off (compensation). Civil law allowed to set-off enforceable debts 
with obligationes naturales (e.g., those from a nudum pactum).277 If Russel had any a 
connection to the Civil law, then it would mean that a legacy larger than 100 pounds 
in that time created a naturalis obligatio, unenforceable by a direct action but valid in 
other respects.  
However, an earlier report of Russel (M.2546) from 1609 presents a different 
picture of the facts. In this report, the debt the executor was suing for arose from the 
defender’s intromission with the testator’s goods. And the defender here pleaded two 
exceptions: a nuncupative legacy for 50 merks and also a reciprocal debt against the 
defunct for goods supplied before the death, to the amount of 100 pounds. Together 
these two claims obviously make up the same 200 merks, but the legacy here is within 
the 100 pounds limit. This 1609 report creates an impression that the 1610 report might 
be a mistake or an oversimplification of facts. So, the possible interpretation of the 
legacy as a “natural” debt, proposed above, remains a conjecture only.  
Thus, Scots legacies look more formal than inter vivos promises. The 
development of such an approach is hard to trace due to the scarcity of practice. Some 
insight into the doctrine might be provided by one decision from 1711,278 where one 
of the parties unsuccessfully tried to have several small legacies, contained in a 
testament, which was invalid due to the lack of formality, recognized as “nuncupative” 
legacies. The other party cited Civil law sources in support of the position that, if a 
testator makes a last will in writing, it may not qualify as nuncupative, and vice versa 
(supra, p.23). This argument prevailed. This case might suggest that the Scots doctrine 
of constitution of legacies and last wills in general at least by the early 18th century 
was similar to the Civil law doctrine. Unlike with contracts, last wills required 
solemnities for their constitution as a matter of substance: one could either make a 
legacy nuncupatively, so that it would be valid to the value of 100 pounds, or make it 
                                                          
276 133 l. 6 s. 8 d. 
277 See: C.4.31.2 and commentaries of Bartolus, Baldus and Paulus de Castro to that law.  
278 Moncrief v. Monypenny (M.13307). 
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in writing, so that the legacy would be valid to the amount written. Later in the 18th 
century some influence of the Ius Commune rule on informal fideicommissa 
(C.6.42.32) also became visible, so that a nuncupative bestowal of the whole estate 
could be committed to the executor’s faith.279 
Unlike in the Ius Commune, there is no strong evidence to suggest existence of 
privileged testaments (soldier’s will, parental will, will ad pias causas) in the Early 
Modern Scots law. The word “strong” here is used to point out some evidence that the 
judges at least were aware of such categories of wills and were considering their 
application in practice. In Colonel Henderson’s Children v. Murray (1623, M.4481), 
as reported by Haddington, some Lords were of opinion that the testator’s status as a 
soldier, inter alia, might allow him to dispone heritable property by will while being 
abroad. Haddington objected to that opinion, pointing out that soldiers’ wills at Civil 
law only provided a privilege as to solemnities; his opinion prevailed in the narrow 
majority decision. In a much later case, Ker v. Hay (1708, M.16968), the concept of 
the soldier’s will (litt., “among soldiers”), as well as that of a “lack of legal advise”,280 
were invoked (this time – successfully) to cure a testament made abroad, which lacked 
the names of the maker and of the writer. 
Wills for “pious uses” were mentioned and bore some special status in Scots 
practice,281 but not in respect of authentication. Parental testaments seem to have never 
been mentioned in Scottish case law. One fragment of Stair’s Institutions (Inst.III.4.29) 
might create a false impression of the privileged status of such wills. In the fragment, 
Stair claims that holographic dispositions in favour of children are presumed to be 
made in liege poustie. 282  However, considering what other kinds of dispositions, 
according to Stair, bear this privilege,283  as well as the general illogicality of his 
                                                          
279 Legatars of Hannah v. Guthrie (1737, M.3836). In that case, a universal (residual) legacy was found 
provable by the executor’s oath irrespective of the estate’s value, because the duty of the executor to 
account was committed to his faith by the defunct. Civil law sources were cited in that case.  
280 The latter being similar to the testaments of rustic persons, lacking knowledge and legal advice, for 
which Civil law somewhat relaxed the formalities (C.6.23.31).  
281 Monro v. Scot’s Executors (1630, M.8048); Commissioners of the Shire of Berwick v. Craw (1678, 
M.6588).  
282 Infra, p.98. 
283 He also mentions deeds reserving liferent to the granter and those expressly dispensing with 
delivery as privileged in this respect (Inst.III.4.29).  
48 
 
words,284 it seems that Stair is referring to the case law on delivery of deeds. Deeds in 
favour of “unforisfamiliated” children did not require delivery, as the father-granter 
was at the same time the receiver of such deeds, being the children’s legal guardian.285 
So, Stair’s claim here looks more like an ungrounded expansion of existing precedents 
to the law of ‘deathbed’.  
1.5. Summary of Archival Evidence.  
In the course of the present research, 163 testaments were surveyed: the entries 
from the register of the Glasgow Commissary (CC9/7/2) for 1563-1564 and of the 
Edinburgh Commissary (CC8/8/39-40) for 1605, the original testamentary deeds 
(“warrants of testaments”) of the Edinburgh Commissary for 1575 (CC8/10/1/1, an 
envelope with 26 deeds), 1586 (CC8/10/3/9, an envelope with 27 deeds) and 1625 
(CC8/10/8, an envelope for November 1625 with 9 deeds).  
In so far as legibility allows us to discern relevant information, the results on 
the formalities of wills are the following. The majority of wills were made with 
“professionals” involved: in at least 75, a notary public was involved, in at least 31 a 
clergyman (“minister”, “reader”, “exhortar”, “vicar”, “curate”, etc.). It is notable 
that clergymen practically disappear in the post-1600 records. In several instances, the 
status of the subscriber was not disclosed,286 although the appearance of the same 
person in several wills obviously implies a professional.287 13 wills are identified as 
witnessed wills – bearing they are written or subscribed by the testator himself before 
witnesses.288 At least two wills are clearly holographic.289 Three instances of purely 
                                                          
284 If Stair were correct in the aforesaid fragment, the law of ‘deathbed’ would be totally undermined. 
Holographic dispositions, even made in favour of children, retained their main deficiency – they could 
not prove the time of their own making.  
285 See infra, s.3.3, on the delivery of deeds.  
286 CC9/7/2/47, “Thomas Pirry”.  
287 “Robert Maxwell” in consecutive CC9/7/2/102 and CC9/7/2/103.  
288  CC9/7/2/53, CC8/8/40/548; CC8/10/1/1/3, CC8/10/1/1/13, CC8/10/1/1/16 (this will is very 
interesting in that it was executed in France and written in French by Johne de Moncour – member of 
the French Garde Écossaise), CC8/10/3/9/3, CC8/10/3/9/6, CC8/10/3/9/25, CC8/10/3/9/26; 
CC8/10/8/nov1625, Sir Robert Deniston of Montjoy; CC8/10/8/nov1625, John 
Mitchelhill(?);CC8/10/8/nov1625, 23 February 1625 (Willaim McB…?).  
289 CC8/10/3/9/18, CC8/10/3/9/22.  
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nuncupative wills are found.290 At least 12 of the entries in the Glasgow 1563-64 
register and more than 16 in the Edinburgh 1605 register are on intestate succession.  
The boundaries between the various forms of wills were quite lax. There are 
several instances where a notary or a minister, due to whatever reason, subscribed as 
one of the witnesses.291 The will by William Browne from 1583292 was subscribed by 
his own hand; however, for some reason, the testator thought it necessary to add “with 
my own mouth” in the beginning. In some wills, the text is composed in the first person 
of the testator, in others in the person of the notary, but sometimes the handwriting in 
the original will is inconsistent with the pretended authorship.293 Sometimes even the 
subscriptions of different persons, at least from a first glance, look as if made by the 
same hand.294  
The internal structure of the wills was more or less uniform; the different forms 
of wills do not show much variation in that respect. A deed itself was usually entitled 
an “inventar, testament and latter will…” or a combination of these terms. It might be 
a distinctive feature of Scottish wills that almost all of them contained an inventory of 
the testator’s goods: corporeal goods first, then debits, followed by credits. These 
documents often leave an impression that the inventory was treated as the most 
important part of a will. The will of William Browne is even headed “just inventar”, 
despite also containing legacies. An inventory is usually followed by the legacies and 
the nomination of the “executor and universal intromitter”.  
Practically all the wills (with the exception of the few holographs) report the 
presence of witnesses, and the lists of the witnesses they are providing are usually quite 
long: 5-6 witnesses on average, often ending the list with “and uthers divers”. Only in 
the minority of cases are the subscriptions of some or all of the witnesses mentioned 
present. An express mention of specially inviting the witnesses to testify to the will 
                                                          
290 CC9/7/2/55, CC9/7/2/68, CC9/7/2/83.  
291 CC8/10/1/1/13, CC8/10/3/9/25, CC8/10/3/9/27.  
292 CC8/10/3/9/26. 
293 E.g., in a testament by “James Mow” (?), the body text is written in the person of the minister, while 
the subscription by the same minister below was obviously added afterwards by a different pen and, 
possibly, different hand (CC8/10/3/9/2).  
294 E.g., Lady of Wedderburn from 1584, CC8/10/3/9/25.  
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(“testes vocati”, “testes requisiti”), akin to the Ius Commune practice,295 was found 
only in two wills, one from 1564296 and the other from 1574.297 
Judging by the contents of the testaments, subscription seems to have been 
considered the most important formality. Subscriptions to notarial and holographic 
wills will be dealt with in more detail below (infra, s.1.6, 1.7). However, it can be 
generally pointed out here that there were no “special subscriptions” in the meaning 
attached to it by the Ius Commune writers.298 As already mentioned, a will might be 
seemingly written by one hand and subscribed by another;299 it might be expressly 
written by another person;300 sometimes the document seems cut in two, with the 
inventory glued in between afterwards,301 but the subscriptions do not mention or refer 
to these doubtful manipulations. Even additions at the margins, adding new legacies 
to the testament, are not always separately subscribed! 302  Moreover, despite the 
importance of subscription, only the minority of wills expressly mention that the 
subscription actually took place before the witnesses devised in them;303 it seems that 
the witnesses were expected to witness the will as a whole, not just the subscription. 
Only one of the attested wills found (Robert Monkray, CC8/10/1/1/1) contains 
the testator’s seal besides the subscription, and it is one of the earliest extant warrants 
of testaments.304 In all the wills confirmed afterwards, subscription, it seems, was 
deemed sufficient.  
Perhaps, the striking feature of the Scottish registers of testaments is that they 
contain almost no data on the way confirmation of testaments took place. This is 
particularly striking in respect of the few nuncupative wills found (infra, s.1.7). The 
Edinburgh and Glasgow registers do not even contain any formal declaration by the 
                                                          
295 Bart., D.45.1.30.  
296 TThomas Mwre, CC9/7/2/51.  
297 Thomas Scott, CC8/10/1/1/14. 
298 See supra, p.22.  
299 James Mow, CC8/10/3/9/2. 
300 Like in two wills subscribed by two professionals: CC8/10/3/9/17 and CC8/10/3/9/19.  
301 CC8/10/3/9/1, from 1585, name illegible.  
302 CC8/10/3/9/6; CC8/10/3/9/13, CC8/10/3/9/23.  
303 Michael Bartilme, 1585 (CC8/10/3/9/11), where a writing on a margin is just followed by a word 
“legaty” below. Cp. Bart. D.48.1.15.2.  
304 The year of this will’s original making cannot be known due to damaged text.  
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Commissary concerning the confirmation. Such declarations, quite long and generic, 
may be found in the register of Hamilton & Campsie Commissariat for 1574.305 
The act books (1564, CC8/2/1; 1639, CC8/2/62) are also not particularly 
helpful in regard to the confirmation of testaments. Their short entries report 
executors-nominate producing inventories and giving ‘caution’ (infra, s.6.2) by 
sureties and sometimes mention the executor’s taking of instruments relevant to 
confirmation.306  
It seems that looking through the inventories and calculating the “quots” was 
considered the most important element in the confirmation of testaments. On the 
reverse side of some of the original testamentary deeds, calculations of ‘quots’ may be 
found, with a few occasional notes on other issues. They are often hard to decipher; 
the ones which ultimately turned out to be legible mention the place of the will’s 
making or by whom the inventory was given,307 although in one instance the back of 
the will says that the original executor-nominate has died and an executor-dative was 
appointed instead.308 
1.6. Notarial Wills: “own mouth” and “own hand”.  
The first striking feature of the wills made by notaries and ministers is that 
some of them were only completed after the death of the defunct. At least 15 such wills 
were identified. Such wills either expressly mention the date of the death of the 
                                                          
305 Here is an excerpt of such declaration, in so far as it could be discerned: “I, Andro Hay... Commissar 
of... constitut by our sovereign majesty for confirmation of all testaments of quhat ... persons 
deceissand with in my said Jurisdiction quhairof the deid's part extends not the soume of fifty lib money, 
Be the tenor hereof ratifies, approves and confirms this present testament and Inventor insofar as the 
samyn is dewlie and lachfully maid, and gevis and commits full power of intromission with the guds 
and geir above expremit allandly to the saids ... executors forsaid, with power to claim, to call and 
pursew for the samyn and to ... debts to creditors ... and allways compt and reckoning to be maid of 
the intromission quhein and quhair the samyn sal be requirit as the law will. And the said executor has 
maid faith ..... and .... to ... the effect of executry foursaid and has foundin andro ... in the quharin 
cautioner and surety with the guds and geir containit in the testament sal be ....... .... to all parteis 
having interes thereto. In witness of the quhilk ... the seil of my commissarit with my subscription 
mannuall is affixt heirto ...”, CC10/5/1/124.  
306 CC8/2/1, p. 20v, second entry.  
307 On the back of one will, for example, the commissary pointed out that it was made in testator’s 
"own paroch in presence of Kirk” (CC8/10/3/9/2). 
308 James Kaa, 1573, confirmed in 1575, CC8/10/1/1/23.  
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testator309 or report that the testament was “given up” by the executors on a later date 
and written by the notary. For example, in one register entry from 1563 the testament 
expressly bore that it was written by the notary “by relation” of the executor and the 
spouse of the defunct.310  
Usually, however, such testamentary deeds report only one structural part to be 
compiled after the decease – the inventory. The technical term “given up by the mouth 
of executor” is often used in notarial wills.311 The exact way the inventories were 
“given up” before notaries is usually not revealed. One testament312 narrates that the 
legacies (“latter willis”) were made before three witnesses, two of whom, two months 
later, also witnessed the writing down of the inventory; it is not revealed if they 
confirmed to the vicar the tenor of both the inventory and the legacies. In another 
testament, the inventory is reported as given up by the executor and then written down 
by the vicar in presence of just one witness - with the same first and last name, so it 
must have been the executor!313 It might even seem that the presence of the notary, 
while the testator was making his will, was unnecessary, given that some wills reported 
the presence of the notary at the beginning, together with the witnesses, while in other 
wills the notary only mentions himself in the subscription at the end. However, such a 
conclusion cannot be securely deduced from the materials, especially taking into 
account that the presence of a notary or a priest was an element expressly required by 
the 1563 Instructions (c. 24).314 
It may be hypothesized that such deeds were drafted in two stages, with the 
nominations and legacies reduced into writing in the life of the testator, the inventories 
given up by the executors soon afterwards; and thus a finished document was produced 
after the testator’s death. However, even then such wills might seem to us quite worthy 
of suspicion, if not outright forgeries. Even in those wills where the inventory is 
                                                          
309  Sometimes a will states that someone died, e.g., “in the same month” (Beatrix Black, 1574, 
CC8/10/1/1/27), which might suggest an expectation of the imminent event. However, in other cases 
the exact date of death, subsequent to the date of the making of testament, is given (Christaine Reid, 
1586, CC8/10/3/9/9).  
310 Agness Allyson, CC9/7/2/123.  
311 E.g.: Jhone Aitoune, 1562, CC9/7/2/68; Williame Cochranne, 1564, CC9/7/2/91; Euphame Weir, 
1564, CC9/7/2/65; William Lawson, 1575, CC8/10/1/1/19, etc.  
312 Jhonne Craig, 1564, CC9/7/2/84. 
313 Euphame Weir, 1564, CC9/7/2/65.  
314 Supra, p.42.  
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expressly given up by the executors, the document as a whole is still often composed 
in the person of the testator.315 Moreover, the person who gave up an inventory was 
legally significant. The 1567 Instructions to the Commissaries (c. 2) expressly forbade 
the inclusion of any debts (liabilities) owed by the defunct in the inventories, unless 
they were given by the defunct himself.316 Yet, we find that practically all of such 
“posthumous” wills contained debts owed by the defunct, which does not seem to have 
prevented their successful confirmation!  
Therefore, whatever might have been the real situation, the following 
interpretation of such wills seems probable. They might have been the instructions 
made by testators in their life to the executors, before witnesses, and afterwards 
reduced into writing by the notaries with the executors’ involvement. Such 
interpretation agrees with the wording of the wills, always containing a command to 
the executor to execute it and to hold account before God at the Last Judgement. The 
notary, probably, wrote down a draft of the will within the life of the testator, adding 
the perfected inventory after the decease. Witnesses in such a scheme play the passive 
role of guarantors of the verity of the testator’s words.  
Such “posthumous” testaments do not seem to have had much prominence in 
the later law. There is only one later case, Gray v. Ballegerno (1678, II Stair 594), 
where the Lords of Session allowed proof of the testator’s warrant for the ministers to 
sign the bond after his death. This case did not concern a nuncupative act but a 
document made in writing, and, so, Bankton would later doubt the general implications 
of that decision.317 On the other hand, such documents are compatible with the Ius 
Commune as expressed by later authors.318 Reading a testamentary instrument aloud 
before witnesses has never been explicitly mentioned in Scots wills; neither was it 
necessary in the Ius Commune in respect of the wills inter liberos and ad pias causas. 
Therefore, the Scottish practice seems logical if the wills in Scotland were all 
                                                          
315 William Lawson (CC8/10/1/1/19), supra n.307.  
316 See infra, s.6.2, for more detail.  
317 Bankton, Inst.I.11.40.  
318 See supra, pp.30-31, opinions of A. Tartagni and F. Decio. 
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considered jus gentium wills (supra, p.27), an approach similar to that expounded by 
English Civilians.319  
The second striking feature of the early Scots notarial wills follows from the 
first one and is quite simple – most of them were actually nuncupative wills, reduced 
into writing. There seems to be nothing surprising in this fact from the Ius Commune 
perspective, but it sharply disagrees with contemporary and later Scots law and 
practice of notarial instruments.  
In Scotland, a person planning to make a contract, deed or another legally 
recognized transaction in writing (unless it was a special solemnized ritual: a transfer 
of seisin, a resignation of feu, etc.) but unable to write or subscribe it on his own, due 
to illiteracy or disability, was to have a notary subscribe the document for him, in 
presence of witnesses.320 Moreover, the act of subscribing on behalf of another person 
was customarily performed by “leading the pen” – the granter was holding the pen, 
while the notary was literally “leading” the granter’s hand through the document. This 
way of subscribing writs was provided by the 1555 Act in respect of reversions321 and 
had been well established in respect of other writs by at least the 1570s.322 It was only 
abolished by statute in 1876.323 
Scottish writs, subscribed by a notary by “leading the pen”, were considered 
the deeds of the party, not of the notary. Unlike the Ius Commune, where a party might 
make a statement about some fact to the other party in presence of the notary who 
would embody that act in the public instrument,324 Scots law did not recognize such 
statements as probative writs. The most explicit case on this issue seems to have been 
Anstruther v. Thomson (1611, M.12499). In that case, two notaries reduced into 
writing and subscribed the statement of the parties about assigning a tack. The Lords 
refused to recognize this document as probative, pointing out that, while the two 
notaries could put their subscription on the party’s behalf, they, nevertheless, could 
                                                          
319 Lyndwood, Provinciale…, III.13, s.v. “Residuis”, 169; Swinburne, A Briefe Treatise…, I.10, p.19.   
320 In respect of ‘writs of importance’, the 1579 Act required two notaries and four witnesses (supra, 
p.35).  
321 RPS, A1555/6/3.  
322 Nairn v. Sutor (1579, M.12270) is the earliest case mentioning this custom.  
323 J.G. Currie, The Confirmation of Executors in Scotland (1890), 38.  
324 See Gloss and commentaries to C.4.30.3.  
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not “make a contract” for him. It should be clarified here that the involvement of land 
in this case did not bring anything special. At the end, the case report mentions that 
the contract was deemed “not of great importance”, so the judges assigned the oath as 
to the tenor of the instrument to the defender. Therefore, in this case the “notarial 
confession” was not only deemed insufficient to make up a substantially written 
document (“obligatio litterarum”),325 but was even unacceptable as a piece of written 
evidence! So restricted was the authentic force of notarial instruments in Scotland 
already in the early 17th century! 
What does the archival evidence suggest on this issue? All of the surveryed 
wills from before 1579 were made as “nuncupative, reduced into writing”. Obviously, 
they were considered a sufficient “proof by writing”, required by the 1567 Instructions 
(c. 1). Only beginning with the 1585 collection (CC8/10/3/9) do we start to find the 
more or less standard Scottish instruments with “pen lead”: only 3 out of 14 notarial 
instruments from that collection were made in that way.326 Of these wills only one 
mentions expressly that the subscription with “touching the pen” took place in 
presence of the witnesses,327 which was deemed a necessary solemnity in the later 
law.328  
Thus, the data suggests that only after enactment of the 1579 Act did the 
understanding start to arrive that a testamentary deed was supposed to be subscribed 
by the notary before witnesses, not just put by him into writing from the testator’s 
nuncupative statement. And in post-1600 archival records we find “leading the pen” 
as the main form, employed in the majority of notarial wills.329 
However, the special treatment of last wills seems to have been recognized 
even in later case law. Nuncupative wills reduced into writing can be found even in 
                                                          
325 It is a doubtful question, to what extent the pre-1660 case law recognized the concept of obligatio 
litterarum (W.A. Wilson, op cit, 197, 205; supra, p.38).  
326 CC8/10/3/9/7, CC8/10/3/9/12, CC8/10/3/9/13.  
327 William Clarksone, 1586, CC8/10/3/9/13.  
328 Laird of Culterallers v. Chapman (1667, M.16803).  
329  CC8/8/39/474; CC8/8/39/544; CC8/8/39/679; CC8/8/40/55; CC8/8/40/424; CC8/8/40/491; 
CC8/8/40/538; CC8/8/40/707; CC8/10/8/nov1625, John Thomson; CC8/10/8/nov1625, David Cowane; 
CC8/10/8/nov1625, Thomas Henrysoune.  
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the later records.330 In Dundas v. His Father’s Executors,331 a “certificate” written by 
the parish priest, although not subscribed by the testator or in his name, was sustained 
as a ground for the legacy of more than 100 pounds Scots.  
The third feature of early Scottish notarial wills is that they were inconsistent 
in following the requirements of the 1579 Act. The Act prescribed that “obligations of 
importance” be subscribed by at least two notaries before four witnesses. It might be 
doubted, whether the criterion of “obligation of importance” had already been well 
defined in the 1580s the way it was interpreted in later law: i.e., 100 pounds Scots. It 
should be noted here that five wills found in the register have two professionals 
subscribing, obviously following the Act.332 However, there are at least four more 
wills in the 1585 collection, where the ‘Dead’s part’ is obviously bigger than 100 
pounds, but just one notary/minister was involved.333 This might suggest that some 
notaries took heed of the Act’s requirements, while others just continued with their old 
practice, deeming the statute inapplicable to last wills. This seems to be confirmed by 
the fact that the exception of last wills from the Act’s force was established quite early 
– no later than 1584, in Buchanan v. McArtey (M.16958).334 The point seems to have 
been finally settled in Bog v. Hepburn (1623, M.16960), where one notary was deemed 
enough for a legacy irrespective of the amount of the latter.335  
As concerns other solemnities used in notarial wills, they demonstrate 
inconsistent and only partial compliance with the Ius Commune requisites for public 
instruments. As already mentioned above, Scottish notarial wills did not mention their 
being read before witnesses (supra, p.50). On the other hand, among the earlier deeds, 
the intention may be discerned at least to comply with as much of the Ius Commune 
formalities as possible. Thus, at least five wills from the 1563-64 Glasgow register and 
five wills among the 1575 Edinburgh warrants are fully or substantially written in 
                                                          
330 See, e.g., the testaments by Alesoun Bassendyne (20 July 1604, CC8/8/39/401), Williame Betay (17 
December 1601, CC8/8/40/24); David Callendar (16 June 1605, CC8/8/40/382).  
331 1639, M.12501=M.2195.  
332  CC8/10/3/9/17; CC8/10/3/9/19; CC8/8/39/527; CC8/8/40/89; CC8/10/8/nov1625, Thomas 
Watsoune.  
333 CC8/10/3/9/2, CC8/10/3/9/20, CC8/10/3/9/21, CC8/10/3/9/23.  
334 There is no date for this case, but as it was reported by Alexander Colvil of Culross and obviously 
addressed the effects of the 1579 Act, it should have been decided in 1579-1584.  
335 See also Wardlaw v. Earl Marshall (1610, M.16959), where the losing party claimed that one notary 
was sufficient for an assignation, unsuccessfully trying to have it recognized as a “testament”.  
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Latin, although the inventory was usually given up in the vernacular. Among the same 
wills, at least seven mention a notary being “requisit”, which was the standard Scots 
term for giving warrant to a notary; however, at least one will uses the term “notarius 
rogatus”,336 which was the accepted Ius Commune term.  Some wills begin with the 
invocation of God’s name, and they also mention the name and the year of reign of the 
ruling king.337 On the other hand, all Scottish wills, not only public, but also private 
ones, contain the date (sometimes together with an exact hour) and place of their 
making. 
On the other hand, among the wills made after 1585, one no longer finds 
extensive inscriptions in Latin, invocations of God’s name in the beginning and the 
King’s name in the body of the text. The notarial and priestly subscriptions from this 
time look more or less uniform (“notarius publicus requisitus… premissis testo manu 
propria"); the term “requisit” becomes a routine technical term.  
1.7. Nuncupative Wills. 
As already mentioned, three cases of purely nuncupative wills were identified 
in the 1563-1564 Glasgow register. In two of them,338 the entire last will seems to have 
been nuncupative: it is reported as made before witnesses, given up and “exprimit to 
be of veritie” by the executor. In one case,339 after the notarial deed was copied into 
the register, the executors added one nuncupative legacy (“left kindness of his 
maling…”), allegedly made by the testator before the same (instrumentary) witnesses.  
The surprising fact about nuncupative wills, already touched upon above 
(supra, pp.50-51), is the absence from the register of any sign of formal proof. There 
is no sign that the witnesses to the last will were interrogated, no sign of anything like 
the “common”/“special” forms, accepted in England (supra, p.33). The register only 
reports about executors relating such last wills, together with inventories.  
Possibly, the words “exprimit to be of veritie”, present in the records, signify 
taking the oath by the executor, although the words “to make faith” would have been 
                                                          
336 Thomas Scott, 1574, CC8/10/1/1/14.  
337 CC8/10/1/1/9, CC8/10/1/1/14, CC8/10/1/1/20.  
338 James Guidwod, 1564, CC9/7/2/55; Gelis Greynheid, 1564, CC9/7/2/83.  
339 Jhone Aitoune, 1564, CC9/7/2/68.  
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more likely in such case. However, if the executor’s oath was really a proof sufficient 
for such a will, this would seem quite a dangerous practice, creating opportunities for 
abuse. A testamentary executor could be interested in the office; the undisposed 
residue of the ‘Dead’s part’ belonged to him, prior to the 1617 Act.340 Obviously, he 
would not be a person to be given full faith in proving the authenticity of the last will! 
It might be possible that this practical absence of checking the authenticity of 
nuncupative wills in Scotland meant that a confirmed will could be easily challenged 
by an interested party and put to a stricter proof. However, we do not have sufficient 
evidence to confirm this. 
In any case, the mere existence of nuncupative wills in Scotland before 1567 is 
a significant discovery by itself. It shows that early Scots testamentary practice was 
not particularly divergent from the English practice and the Canon law. The reference 
in the 1563 Instructions (c. 24) to the testaments made “otherwise as accords the law” 
now seems to imply nuncupative wills, with the Canon law, possibly, being “the law” 
referred to here. 
1.8. Holographic Wills.  
Present research shows that holographic wills were being confirmed by the 
Commissary courts as early as 1584. Just two holographic wills have been identified 
so far.341 One of them, made by David Crechton, expressly bears it was made “before 
no witnesses, but God only”. Both of them contain no inventory, but commit its 
making to the executor.  
Although holographic wills were not mentioned either in the 1563 Instructions 
(c. 24) or by Balfour,342 there seems to have been no problem with their confirmation. 
As with most other wills, there is no data on whether any special procedures were 
employed to check their authenticity. Considering what has already been said about 
nuncupative wills (supra, s.1.7), there were, probably, no such procedures. The later 
practice of the Scottish Commissaries seems to confirm that: according to the 
Commissary practice of the 19th century, an express mention in the will’s text, that the 
                                                          
340 RPS, 1617/5/28; infra, p.235.  
341 Robert Myller, 1584, CC8/10/3/9/18; David Crechton, 1585, CC8/10/3/9/22.  
342 Balfour’s Practicks, ‘Anent testaments’, c. 11.  
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will was written by testator’s own hand in its entirety or in substantial parts, was 
deemed sufficient; otherwise, an oath of the executor or affidavits of two witnesses 
were required.343 Only if the will was challenged by an interested party, would a full 
proof be required.  
The two holographic wills found so far do not reveal whether an oath of the 
executor or any other proof was taken. However, these do not bear that they were 
holographic as it was accepted in later practice. They only purport to be subscribed by 
the testator’s own hand. Again, as with most wills (supra, p.50), the subscription was 
obviously deemed the most important formality.  
There was a type of document in Scots law, which was similar to the last will 
in remaining in the granter’s hands until his death, for which a mere subscription 
without witnesses seems to have been sufficient, beginning from, at least, the early 
17th century. This was a book of account. And, as it has already been established 
(supra, p.41), an account of a deceased person was considered valid due to the 
presence of the subscription alone. Could the last wills of that period share a similar 
“liberal” approach? In Lady Inverleith v. Bishop of Glasgow344 a testament, in which 
one of the witnesses was appointed executor, was found reducible, not null and void 
ipso jure. This means that, before the reduction, such a testament was considered valid 
ex facie and lawfully confirmed by the Commissaries. What if that testament had never 
had any witnesses at all, but only the testator’s subscription? Presumably, it would 
have been confirmed by the Commissaries, but what if it had been challenged – would 
a mere subscription have constituted proof with comparatio litterarum or another 
‘adminicle’? Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to that question.  
However, the similarity of authentication between last wills and accounts is 
more obvious in the situation opposite to the one already considered: where the body 
text of the document was written by the granter’s hand but lacked subscription. Last 
wills made in such a way were recognized from quite an early period. In Pursuer v. 
Titill (1610, M.16959), probably the earliest reported Court of Session case on 
holographic wills, the testament lacked a subscription, as well as the date, but it was, 
                                                          
343 Currie, op cit, 44-45.  
344 1613, M.16876. 
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nevertheless, sustained because it was written by the testator’s hand.345 We do not have 
cases on books of account from the same decade, but in Brown’s Creditors v. Baillie 
(supra, p.41) the absence of subscription in an account was not seen as a ground for 
invalidity; and since the 1660s the Court of Session followed that position even if the 
granter’s successors denied authenticity.346 
For the sake of comparison, the Ius Commune position on holographs and the 
requirement of subscription should be recalled here. The late Ius Commune scholars 
equalized subscribing an instrument with writing it in full: initially for parental wills 
only347 and then for all other private instruments as well.348 And vice versa: writing a 
private instrument fully with one’s hand took away the legal requirement of 
subscription. 349  Such “alternative” solemnity, as we can see, was ultimately 
implemented in Scotland in respect of books of account. In respect of the Scottish last 
wills, only one part of the scheme is obvious: holographic wills did not need 
subscription, but it does not seem that a mere subscription in Scotland has ever been 
sufficient for anything more than a confirmation of the testament, which could always 
be subject to challenge. After all, in a situation where a literate testator subscribed a 
document written by someone else, specially called for that purpose, it is quite unlikely 
that the testator would not also call witnesses to the deed. Reflections of the Ius 
Commune scholars on such situation look largely theoretical.  
 
The first conclusion for this chapter concerns the law of documents and written 
evidence in general. Clear influence of the Ius Commune on the Scots law of written 
documents is discernible. However, it existed largely on a theoretical level, in that 
Scots law adopted roughly the same classes of documents (contracts in scriptis, letters 
missive, books of account) as the Ius Commune. 
                                                          
345 The report does not tell whether any proof of the testament’s authenticity was taken. 
346 In the following cases the holographic account was found to prove against the maker without 
subscription: Wardlaw v. Gray (1662, M.12620), Lawrie & Drummond v. Drummond (1675, M.12622). 
However, the winning parties in both cases had to adminicle the proof by their oaths.  
347 C.3.36. Auth. Si Modo; Pau.Castr., C.6.23. Auth. Quod Sine; see supra, p.29. 
348 Bart., D.2.14.47(48).1; Pau.Castr., cons.93, vol I; Dec., X.2.19.11, nu.200-210; G. Claro, Recept. Sent., 
§Testamentum, qu.14.  
349 Pau.Castr., C.6.23.28.  
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On the other hand, little to no influence or inspiration took place in the field of 
testamentary writings. Two exceptions stand out here. The first one is the ‘nuncupative 
testaments reduced into writing’, used both in the Ius Commune and Scots law (supra, 
pp.23, 54). The second one is more theoretical and is expressed in the distinction 
between testaments and codicils and in the requirement of writing as a matter of 






Chapter II. Evidential Force of Statements in the Last Wills. 
2.1. Summary on Evidential Force of Extra-Judicial confessiones in the Ius 
Commune. 
In the Ius Commune texts, the issue of the evidential force of written 
confessiones separated slowly from the issue of authentication of writings. The 
expression “fidem facere” initially referred both to the issue if a document is true and 
to that if a statement contained in the document is to be believed. The Gloss reveals 
only an embryonic distinction between the two. Thus, the Accursian Gloss to the 
Emperor Leo’s constitution of 472 A.D., addressing the crucial question of whether 
private instruments make faith, came to an opinion that they made faith if the 
subscription was either confessed or proved.350 Another gloss, to the title on exceptio 
non numeratae pecuniae, pointed out that, while a public instrument fully proves itself, 
an receipt of payment contained in such an instrument does not exclude the exceptio.351 
However, a profound exposition of the law of written extra-judicial confessiones is 
only found in the writings of the Commentators.  
Bartolus in his treatment of confessiones 352  deals with three types of 
documents, already enumerated above (supra, p.18): apocha (executed between 
present parties), a letter missive (sent to an absent party) and a book of accounts (made 
unilaterally). His general position on all three types of documents was that, if a party 
recognized his or her subscription of the document, the whole document made full 
faith against that party.353 Moreover, to make full faith, the private writings were 
always supposed to mention the causa of the transaction.354 
A statement of fact contained in an apocha constituted full proof against the 
maker, whether it was about a debt, a discharge or another relevant fact.355 The other 
party, however, could attempt to prove the contrary by, at least, two witnesses. If the 
document was not just a recognition of some act but a contract made in writing 
                                                          
350 C.8.17(18).11, s.v. “Suum robur”.  
351 C.4.30.3, s.v. “Probare”.  
352 Bart., D.12.2.31, D.39.5.16, D.39.5.26, D.42.2.6.3, C.4.19.5, C.4.19.13, C.4.30.13.  
353 Bart., C.4.19.5.  
354 Bart., D.39.5.26, C.4.19.5. 
355 Bart., D.39.5.16.  
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(‘contractus in scriptis’),356 the contrary proof could only be provided by another 
written evidence.357  An apocha, however, would not make faith against the third 
parties, unless it was made as a public instrument or contained subscriptions of three 
witnesses.358 In doubt, a document was presumed executed between present parties, 
and thus, being an apocha.359 
Confessiones contained in letters missive could constitute full proof, in 
Bartolus’ eyes, depending on whether they concerned an obligation or a discharge, 
whether they were expressed directly or incidentally 360  and whether the facts 
confessed were actions of the parties to the correspondence or someone else’s 
actions.361 If the confessio in a letter was on some legal “status” or a situation, the letter 
might constitute a “quasi-possession” of such status: e.g., induce a particular person to 
be “considered as a kinsman” of the sender.362 Baldus later systematized Bartolus’ 
classification of statements in the letters missive.363 However, both authors did not 
elaborate on the evidential force of such statements in respect of the third parties.  
Confessiones in books of account were the most controversial. The reason for 
this was the fragment of Ulpian in the Digest (D.42.2.6.3), which clearly stated that a 
statement made in absence of the recipient made no proof. Bartolus in his commentary 
to this law expressed an opinion that this law was applicable irrespective of the facts 
recognized, whether those facts were to oblige or to relieve someone of an obligation. 
In another commentary he points out that, even if the unilateral statement were made 
before a notary public, it would not make faith. 364  In the long commentary to 
D.12.2.31, expounding on the basics of the law of evidence, Bartolus also mentions 
                                                          
356 Supra, p.16. 
357 Bart., C.4.30.13.  
358 C.8.17(18).11.  
359 Bart., C.8.37.1.  
360 I.e., whether the statements of fact were used in the text for their own sake, leaving no doubt as 
to the intention to recognize, or were just mentioned in the text incidentally. Thus, statements in the 
letters missive, made incidentally as to obligation, were not to produce proof 
(Bart., D.2.14.52(53)pr, D.39.5.16).  
361 Only statements as to what the parties might have done between themselves made full faith (Bart., 
C.4.19.13). 
362 Bart., C.4.19.13, D.39.5.16.  
363 Bald., C.4.19.13.  
364 Bart., D.39.5.26. Note, however, that it was not applicable if the notary accepted the statement as 
a representative (negotiorum gestor) of the beneficiary and had his deeds ratified by the latter, thus 
creating a jus quaesitum tertio. See: Bart., D.45.1.38.17, D.45.1.48.20.  
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that a document made by two parties, mentioning a payment from the third party, 
makes “half-proof” in regard of that payment; however, the author does not elaborate 
on this. 
On the other hand, there was clear evidence in the Corpus juris, that accounts 
could be used as valuable evidence in proceedings.365 Bartolus, however, agrees with 
an opinion of Dynus, that confessiones, written in the books of account by the debtor’s 
own hand, make full proof against him. Writing the account by the debtor’s hand 
distinguished it, in Bartolus’ view, from a nuncupative and spontaneous confessio, 
dealt with in D.42.2.6.3. Bartolus claimed that “writing always speaks” (“scriptura 
semper loquitur”): whenever the creditor acquired possession of a written account, the 
confessio was perfected! Strangely enough, Bartolus compared the account with the 
letter missive on this point.366 A written confessio was, in his opinion, good enough 
for full proof against the maker, irrespective of the latter’s status. Obviously, this 
position was quite practical, seeing that books of account could in some cases be 
requested by the pursuer from the defendant in a litigation367 and that the comparison 
of handwritings was enough to establish the account’s authenticity (supra, p.20).  
Unlike proving against the maker of the account, proving for the maker, in 
Bartolus’ opinion, was only possible if deeds recognized could be perfected by the 
mere will of the maker. Acceptance of the estate (aditio hereditatis) was a generic 
example. 368  However, Bartolus admitted that the account could create “some 
presumption” in favour of the maker and his/her successors, if the maker was an 
“honest person”.369  
In the case when the book of accounts proved neither for nor against the maker 
but in favour of a third party (e.g., in case of assignation of account held with a banker), 
in Bartolus’ opinion they could only constitute full faith if the maker held a public or 
“quasi-public” office. This officium quasi publicum was supposed to be similar to that 
held by argentarii and nummularii in the Roman times. Admitting that those “offices” 
                                                          
365 D.2.13.6, D.2.13.9.2.  
366 Bart., D.39.5.26, D.12.2.31.  
367 D.2.13.4-6. The general rule was that a pursuer could not request the defendant’s own written 
instruments to be used as proof against him (C.2.1 Auth. “Si quis in aliquo”=Nov.119.3).  
368 Bart., D.12.2.31, D.39.5.26.  
369 Bart., D.12.2.31, C.4.19.6.  
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were no longer extant in his time, Bartolus, nevertheless, deems merchants and other 
organized professions, contemporary to him, as taking place of the Roman “public 
officials”, because their accounts could provide a half-proof in respect of the third 
parties.370  
Bartolus’ point of view was criticized, especially his maxim scriptura semper 
loquitur. Baldus and his brother, Angelo da Ubaldi, attacked Bartolus’ analogy 
between the account and the letter missive: a letter is intentionally sent to the recipient, 
while an account is a pure confessio absenti! In Baldus’ opinion, merchants’ books 
made faith only for the exact reason that they were made by merchants (holding “quasi-
public” office) and were made in the form of a single formalized book, containing 
various debits and credits both in favour and against the maker. If the accounts, instead, 
were contained in separate unbound papers or were but copies (“memorabilia”) of the 
original book of accounts, they could not be considered reliable evidence, being just 
confessiones absenti.371  
The “liberal” position of Bartolus, however, found such influential supporters, 
as Panormitanus372  and F. Decio, 373  who held that even accounts not bound into 
uniform books and made by non-merchants could make full proof or half-proof. They 
fortified that position with Canon law references.374  
Panormitanus’ original contribution to the doctrine of confessiones was the 
active use of the “half-proof” category. Thus, a half-proof, in his opinion, was 
constituted by the confessiones made incidentally in the letters missive and last 
wills.375 Moreover, he interpreted Bartolus’s statement in commentary to D.12.2.31 as 
a general rule, that the confessio to an absent party supplies a half-proof.376 
                                                          
370 C.4.1.3, Gloss s.v. “Decidi oportet”, Bart., D.12.2.31, D.39.5.26. In the commentary to C.4.21 Auth. 
At si contractus (=Nov.73.8-9), Bartolus, however, mentions that even accounts of private individuals 
make half-proof.  
371 Bald., C.4.18 sub rubr, C.4.21 sub rubr; see also Abb., X.2.22.2.  
372 Abb., ibid.  
373 Dec., X.2.22.1, nu. 44-51.  
374 Thus, the Clement V’s decretal of 1312 (Clem.5.5.1), which allowed using books of account of a 
usurer to prove his crime, was cited in support of that opinion (Abb., idid, Dec., ibid). 
375 Abb., X.3.27.3.  
376 See more on this infra, p.70. 
67 
 
2.2. Effect of confessiones in Last Wills in the Ius Commune. 
The issue of statements of fact in last wills is closely linked with an associated 
issue of the interpretation of the factual statements (“enunciative words”), contained 
in the last wills, as dispositions. A large mass of both the original Corpus juris texts 
and the commentaries to them were dedicated to the question of whether particular 
descriptions or implications of fact in the testaments might be interpreted as 
legacies.377 However, this is not an issue to deal with here. A legacy is only paid out 
of the free goods: it is liable for the Falcidian quarter, the natural portion of children, 
etc. On the other hand, a recognition of the obligation, made in the last will, can have 
a much stronger effect, having a force of aes alienum.  
Moreover, seeing that a last will was a unilateral deed, depending on the sole 
will of the testator, revocable at his or her will and creating no consequences for the 
testator until death, statements contained in it might easily become an instrument of 
abuse, prejudging the successors of their legal rights and creditors of the debts due to 
them. So, it was natural that confessiones in last wills were given a weak effect by the 
Ius Commune scholars.  
The main sedes materiae on the effect of confessiones in the last wills were 
C.4.19.6 (accounts and last wills of the defunct do not prejudice the heirs), C.4.19 
Auth. Quod obtinet378 (an oath of the defunct may prejudice heirs), D.32.37.5-6 (a 
recognition of debt in the testament, joined with an oath, is a proof, except when made 
in fraud of law), D.34.3.8(9).4 (about a discharge by a last will). A canon from the 
Liber Extra (X.3.27.3 – a confessio made in the last will was accepted as a half-proof 
of the previously made donation) was also influential in shaping the doctrine on the 
issue.  
It seems to have been the general consensus of the learned lawyers that 
statements contained in a last will could not be used in favour of the testator, lest they 
might prejudice creditors and the third parties.379 As to the confessiones the testator 
                                                          
377 The key passages on the interpretation “enunciative” words as legacies: D.31.34.3; D.34.2.18; 
D.39.5.16; C.6.23.6 and the whole title 44 of book 6 of the Code.  
378 Based on Nov.48.  
379 C.4.19.6, with Gloss. 
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made against himself and his successors, the Glossators, (e.g., Azo) were of the 
opinion that restrictive (“taxative”) words, used in the last wills as to the amount of 
debt due to the defunct (“just 100”, “only 200”, etc.), could prove the discharge of the 
debt, if the testator was in “certa scientia”; they would not, if he was in error.380 The 
Gloss to D.34.3.8(9).4381 admitted that a direct recognition of the discharge of debt in 
the last will would provide an exceptio doli to the debtor.  
Bartolus, however, was quite consistent in denying the evidential force of 
confessiones made in last wills. His main grounds for that were two: 1) were one to 
allow the last will an extensive evidential force, a regular legacy (in accordance with 
the title 44 of book 6 of the Code) could never be induced from such confessio; 2) a 
field for abuse would be opened, to defraud the heirs or even the creditors of their legal 
rights. He even denied that a last will might give rise to an exceptio doli.382 The crucial 
difference of the last will from contracts, letters and other inter vivos documents dealt 
with above (supra, s.2.1) was, in Bartolus’ eyes, that the last will was not made in 
presence of the other party – the recipient of the confessio. This is why Bartolus 
allowed, e.g., the evidential force for a statement made in a will, if it was made in 
presence of the party or a notary public acting in the party’s name.383 It was even 
easier, in his view, to admit the discharge of a debt: a discharge could be made by a 
nudum pactum, and, thus, any person, not necessarily a notary, could accept such 
confessio on behalf of the debtor, subject to subsequent ratification. 384  However, 
strictly speaking, such forms of confessio were not a part of the last will – they special 
kinds of document, annexed to the last will. 
It might be noticed, however, that the books of account were similar to last 
wills in that they were made in the beneficiary’s absence; nevertheless, as clear from 
the survey above (supra, pp.64-66), the books of account, in most circumstances, were 
deemed a full proof of confessiones contained in them. Bartolus explained this on the 
basis of different functions of the two kinds of documents. A last will was made 
"mainly for disposition", unlike a book of account, which served mainly an evidential 
                                                          
380 Ibid., s.v. “Quantitatem” 
381 S.v. “Debitoris” 
382 See Bart., D.32.37.5, D.34.3.8(9).4, C.4.30.13.  
383 Bart., D.32.37.5.  
384 Bart., D.34.3.8(9).4. 
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function.385 So, unlike letters and books of account, a last will made full faith as to the 
facts contained in it only if it: 1) concerned the facts which depended on the mere will 
of the defunct (an acceptance of estate, a ratification of the agent’s deeds, etc.), 2) 
contained the oath of the testator; 3) the third possibility might be testator using 
‘taxative’ (restrictive) adjectives as to the sums of debt or property due to him.  
The (1) case, besides including purely unilateral acts, also allowed the testator 
to interpret post factum the transactions he made within his life, in so far as his 
intention was doubtful. E.g., the testator could interpret a prior act he had performed 
in favour of his wife as a donation, because a donation could be made by a ‘nude 
pact’.386 In a situation like this, however, a preceding act, potentially creating inter 
vivos consequences, was to be established. Otherwise, the testator's confessio would 
only be a legacy at best, and not even a privileged legacy.387  
The probative force of an oath was founded on the Authentica “Quod Obtinet” 
(C.4.19), itself excerpted from Nov.48. The text of the Novel’s preamble justified the 
rule by the fiction that the heir is “one person” with the testator. The oath would prove 
(creating prejudice for the heirs) that the testator made an inter vivos act in his life or 
that the estate in succession extended to a particular amount and no further. Also, in 
Bartolus’ opinion, a sworn statement was to be interpreted so as to give it the greatest 
validity legally possible.388 However, even with an oath, a last will could not be used 
in fraudem legis: e.g., to prove a debt in favour of the person restricted in succession 
(e.g., a second wife or a bastard).389 Moreover, although Bartolus held that the oath 
precluded the heirs from proving the contrary facts on the ground of an error of the 
testator,390 nothing in his or another Commentator’s writings suggests that heirs were 
not allowed to prove that the oath defrauded them of legitima or other obligatory rights. 
And, of course, an oath could not create any prejudice to the defunct’s creditors – this 
was expressly provided both in the Nov.48 body text and in Auth. “Quod obtinet”.  
                                                          
385 Bart., D.32.37.5. 
386 Bart., D.32.33.2. As to the ‘nude pact’ as a donation, see C.8.53(54).35, Gloss s.v. “Detinuerit”.  
387 Bart., D.34.2.18: if something is left to someone as the recipient’s “debt” or his “own” thing, it is 
deemed a regular legacy, unless the debt or ownership is fully proved by separate proofs.  
388 Bart., D.31.77.23, D.39.5.16.  
389 Bart., D.32.37.6.  
390 Bart., D.39.5.16, C.4.19.6.  
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Taxative words were, in theory, deemed to have a weaker force than the 
enunciative ones, as they did not infer a disposition by the testator, except when he 
was proved to act in certain knowledge. However, Bartolus, fusing the positions of 
Azo and Hugolinus on the matter, held that such words created a presumption against 
the heirs, so that the heirs were to prove that the amounts or quantities of debts and 
property were bigger in reality.391 If the testator was proved to act ex certa scientia, 
the taxative words were interpreted as legatum liberationis.  
Beyond the above exceptions, the last will would not infer a full proof of the 
acts and debts of the testator. Bartolus does not state expressly if a statement in the last 
will infers any kind of half-proof or presumption against the heirs or creditors. As was 
mentioned above (supra, p.64), in the commentary to D.12.2.31 he claims that a 
nuncupative confessio in favour of an absent third person induces the half-proof. He 
does not elaborate whether this is applicable to all confessiones in favour of absent 
persons or just to the specific situation he describes in the commentary.  
Later medieval writers contributed to Bartolus’ account on confessiones in the 
last wills. Thus, Baldus disagreed with him on a confessio of discharge, holding such 
a confessio would fully prove an inter vivos discharge, not just induce a legatum 
liberationis. Baldus also touched upon the question whether the oaths contained in the 
last wills were revocable. In his opinion, they were revocable, as they were just 
“supplements” to the wills they were contained in; however, they were not revocable 
as to spiritual forum.392  
The Canonist Panormitanus elaborated on the topic of confessiones in last wills 
in his commentary to X.3.27.3, becoming the author of two alternative summaries to 
that decretal. In the fabula of the decretal,393 an archpriest donated all his goods to the 
monastery in presence of one witness; afterwards, lying on his deathbed (“in 
extremis”), he confirmed his previous donation in a nuncupative last will, made in 
presence of the recipient abbot and two witnesses. According to Panormitanus’ 
interpretation of this canon, reconciling it with the Civil law authorities, the confessio 
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itself did not constitute a full proof in this case, because it was spoken “incidentally”, 
not “principaliter et per se”. So, confessio here constituted just a half-proof and 
required a corroboration by one witness to the original donation. More importantly, 
Panormitanus holds, although obiter, that, if the confessio had been made principaliter 
but in absence of recipient-abbot, the confessio would have also provided just a half-
proof. Panormitanus ascribes this to the aforesaid commentary by Bartolus to 
D.12.2.31,394 which, in Panormitanus’ view, implied a general rule that a confessio to 
the absent party constitutes a half-proof.  
2.3. Statements of Fact in Last Wills and Books of Account in Scotland. 
In contrast with the Ius Commune, in Scotland, from the early times, debts 
given up (i.e., acknowledged) by the deceased in the testament seem to have been 
prejudicial as to successors. The overwhelming majority of testaments contain detailed 
inventories. They are never confirmed by an express oath of the defunct. In the notarial 
testaments the notary never accepts an acknowledgement of any debt on behalf of the 
third party. 
Already in 1561395 we encounter a piece of evidence of the force of ‘taxative’ 
statements contained in last wills. In the case Executors of Marjoribanks v. Wilsone 
(Maitland 102), the executors were pursuing for an estate debt of 800 pounds. 
However, as the testament of the defunct creditor stated the amount of the debt as 600 
pounds, the remaining 200 pounds were deemed discharged.  
The 1567 Instructions (C. 2) were the first document to restrict expressly the 
debts which could be voluntarily confirmed by the executors. The debts given up by 
the testator's "own mouth" were one of these. The restriction seems to have been 
mainly aimed at preventing the fraud as to ‘quots’ due to the Commissaries. However, 
it was ostensibly motivated by the protection of "bairnis, and utheris havand interes". 
The instruction does not tell us if a recognition by the testator is alone enough to 
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prejudice these interested parties. The restriction was later repeated in the Instructions 
of 1610396 and 1666.397 
The practice embodied in the 1639 Edinburgh act book (CC8/2/62) suggests 
that a statement in the testament alone was a sufficient proof of the debt against the 
testator's executors. Most of the executry debt claims in that year were uncontested; 
some of them were won on the ground of executor's non-appearance at trial, which 
was a ground for a decreet pro confesso against him. However, in some of the recorded 
cases the testament is expressly the decisive proof for the victorious creditor. For 
example, in the suit by James Broun against the executors of the umquihile Patrick 
Wood,398 the pursuer grounds two of his claims on assigned bonds and one of them on 
the testator’s recongition in his testament, which was “well-known to the 
Commissary”. And, although the defenders were absent, the court expressly accepted 
the confirmed testament as the only proof of the last claim (“provin primo tempore”).  
This is confirmed by the subsequent case law of the Court of Session, 
specifically by Tutor of the Children of F.Ross v. A.Ross (1668, I B.S.573). In this 
case, a tutor possessed a bond issued the deceased debtor, containing the debt for the 
goods purchased from the underage children. In his testament, however, the debtor 
described the bond as due to the tutor in his personal capacity. The tutor sued the 
executor on the ground of the acknowledgement in the testament. The suit was rejected 
by the Court, who found the testament insufficient proof of the debt as to the tutor 
personally; the pursuer was required to prove that there had been a second bond, given 
to the tutor personally. The wording of the report: “The Lords would not sustain the 
testament to be a sufficient title, without production of the bond; because they found it 
was only an error in the defunct designing the bond to have been given to the tutor 
proprio nomine…”, - suggests, a contrario sensu, that the testament would have been 
sufficient title, if there had been no obvious error of the testator. So, a recongition of 
debt in the testament in Scotland bore pretty much the same effect against executors, 
as a confessio with an oath in the Ius Commune against heirs.  
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The law was different as regards the interest of third parties. Thus, in the case 
of Executors of Edgar v. Edgar (1628, M.12487), a debt recognized in the testament 
was paid by the executor without a judicial decree, but the original bond of the debt 
was not preserved. The executor was then sued by another creditor and pleaded 
exhaustion of the estate due to the payment of debts. The Lords found it relevant for 
the executor to verify the first debt by the oath of the creditor to whom he had paid 
without decree.399 Here, obviously, the recognition made in the testament does not 
make full faith as to the creditors of the defunct. Although the term is not used, it 
makes something akin to a half-proof. This position looks similar to that generalized 
by Panormitanus for the Ius Commune: a confessio in absence of the recipient makes 
a half-proof (supra, pp.65, 71).  
The idea that the early 17th century Scots law on statements of fact in absence 
of the recipient might rely on the Ius Commune rules seems to receive verification not 
only from the practice on last wills, but also from the practice on statements made in 
books of account. In the already mentioned above case, Brown’s Creditors v. Baillie,400 
the accounts subscribed by the defunct’s own hand were found to bear enough faith 
for the creditors in them to compete with others, while the accounts from the same 
book, which were written down by the defunct’s servant and lacked subscription, were 
found only partial proofs: the respective creditors were required to ‘adminicle’ the 
accounts by proving the supply of goods and swearing an oath on their values. The 
solution provided by this case is similar to the solution of Bartolus: an account written 
by the granter’s hand “always speaks” and thus makes full faith against the maker, 
while an account written by someone else is a nuncupative confessio in absence of the 
recipient, so it makes just a half-proof.401 This “half-probativity” of the account in 
respect of the third parties persevered in later cases. Just as in the Ius Commune, the 
merchant status of the maker and the oath of the party could fortify the account in 
Scotland so as to make it fully probative.402 
                                                          
399 See also Falconer v. Blair (1629, M.12487), where the creditor was also requested to give an oath. 
That case, however, dealt with a heritable debt.  
400 1631, I B.S.319=M.2428=M.12617.  
401 Bart., D.12.2.31; supra, p.64. 
402 Thus, the book of account of a merchant found to prove the transaction’s date against a third party, 
with ‘adminicles’ (Skene v. Lumsden, 1662, M.12618); the oath of the party was taken to support the 
74 
 
It is important to note here that the evidential force of last wills in the early 17th 
century Scots practice was facilitated by the non-application of the law of ‘deathbed’403 
to the statements of fact. There is no direct evidence on this as to last wills, but there 
is a case on bonds - Creditors of Byres v. Byres (1628, I B.S.246) - where a bond of 
corroboration, recognizing a preceding debt, was granted on deathbed. After the 
debtor’s decease, the creditor on the bond obtained confirmation as the executor-
creditor404 to him. Competing creditors sued him, claiming that he was not entitled to 
have the priority of payment by virtue of his confirmation, because the bond was 
granted on deathbed. However, the Court found in favour of the executor-creditor, thus 
giving a full evidential force to the bond issued on deathbed. The evidence provided 
by this case is not particularly strong. Stair in his Institutions interpreted this case as 
applicable to the confirmations of executor-creditors only, not to the debts in 
general.405 Nevertheless, as concerns the 1620s, Creditors of Byres, in combination 
with the above cases on last wills and accounts, suggests the possibility of prejudging 
of the testator’s successors by the acts executed on deathbed.  
From the 1670s on, however, the view on the probative force of the last wills 
was clearly different. The last wills were no longer deemed fully probative against 
universal successors in respect of the law of ‘deathbed’. Instead, the case law in the 
late 17th century recognized the testaments and other statements made on deathbed as 
a half-proof of the respective debts against the heirs-at-law. Thus, a long term of 
marriage, taken together with the husband's recognition in his testament, was deemed 
a sufficient proof of payment of dowry by the wife, against the husband's heir-at-
law.406 In another case407 the heir-at-law was sued for the moveable debt on a small 
loan (less than 100 pounds), unsecured by any written evidence but acknowledged 
nuncupatively by the testator on his deathbed. The defender pleaded the ‘law of 
deathbed’ to challenge the acknowledgement, but the Lords allowed the witnesses to 
the acknowledgement to be fortified by the witnesses to the intromission with the 
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borrowed money by the defunct in his life. In later cases, declarations made on 
deathbed were allowed to “fortify” trusts created in the granter’s life.408 Nevertheless, 
all these cases showed that a statement made in the last will might be easily challenged 
on the ground of the law of ‘deathbed’. This development obviously undermined the 
evidential significance of last wills in Scots law.   
 
This short research into the evidential force of the last wills reveals strong 
evidence that Scots practice might have experienced influence of the Ius Commune. 
However, this influence came not from the Ius Commune rules on the last wills, but 
rather from the Ius Commune rules on the books of account. Both Scottish books of 
account and last wills generally followed the principle that a statement of fact proves 
against the maker of the document and his general successors. The third parties could 
only be prejudiced if there were additional proofs, ‘adminicles’; the document would 
have a force of a half-proof against them. The similarity to the doctrines of the Ius 
Commune writers, like Bartolus and Panormitanus, is too strong to be a simple 
coincidence. It further proves that the Civilian and Canonistic teachings on the last 
wills were not particularly relevant for the Scots practitioners, who preferred to invoke 
the more general rules on the instruments and to treat Scots last wills accordingly.  
  
                                                          






Chapter III. Donatio mortis causa 
Donatio mortis causa (hereafter – “DMC”) was a term of Civil law that has 
been accepted by many legal systems. It did not bear the same meaning everywhere, 
with some countries more or less receiving the Civil law definition, and others 
receiving the term only. However, everywhere it meant a special device, standing at 
the boundary line between last wills and contracts, aimed at facilitating the inter-
generational transfers of property. Such function was especially important in Scotland. 
The various tight restrictions and difficulties associated with testaments in Scotland 
provided for the popularity of various “will-like” devices in place of the testaments. 
This is why the Scots practice on DMCs and similar devices was relatively abundant, 
in comparison to practice on last wills.  
3.1. Donatio mortis causa in the Ius Commune. 
The best definition of DMC, which was very influential in Medieval and Early 
Modern texts for its convenience, was given in the beginning of the Digest’s title De 
mortis causa donationibus et capionibus by Marcian (D.39.6.1), who defined a DMC 
as a donation “in which one prefers himself to be owner over the donatary, but prefers 
the donatary over one’s own heir”. The definition reflects the function of such 
donation: to exclude some property from the usual process of succession in a situation 
when the donator is moved to do so by fear of death.  
Whether the DMC was to be classified as a form of last will or as a form of 
contract was already a controversial topic in Classical Roman law, between Sabinians 
and Proculians.409 Justinian in his 530 A.D. constitution claimed to have resolved the 
controversy as concerns the formal requirements, defining the DMC as a last will 
(C.8.56.4); however, the controversy continued among the Medieval lawyers.410 It 
seems that, by the Early Modern period, the opinion of Jason de Mayno (1435-1519) 
prevailed, which was that a DMC was more like a contract as to its constitution and 
more like a last will in its effect.411  
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The French Humanist legal scholar Fr. Hotman (1524-1590) provided one of 
the best lists of similarities and differences between a DMC, an inter vivos donation 
and a last will (legacy).412 Like a legacy and unlike inter vivos contracts, a DMC was 
always revocable by the donator. It was also always conditional on death, could burden 
the donatary by a fideicommissum, was subject to the Falcidian quarter,413 required 
five witnesses for its validity and could bestow ownership post obitum upon the 
donatary without a transfer of possession. 
On the other hand, like a contract and unlike a legacy, a DMC required the 
presence of the other party for its constitution. It was also not a constituent part of the 
donator’s testament and could be made by a filiusfamilias with the father’s consent. 
While legacies were supposed to be received by the legatees from the heir’s hands and 
the heir could use the interdict Quod legatorum against legatees taking unauthorized 
possession, the heir could not use this interdict against a mortis causa donatary, who 
received possession from the testator himself.414 The medieval learned lawyers added 
other differences. Thus, unlike legacies, a DMC came into force upon the death of the 
testator, without aditio hereditatis.415 DMCs were also preferable to legacies in case 
of insolvency.416 
The abovementioned characteristics of a DMC may be essentially summarized 
into three peculiarities of this institution, making it different from both contracts and 
last wills. First, a DMC was subject to special requirements as to its constitution. 
Second, a DMC was revocable; special legal devices were developed to ensure its 
revocability. Third, a DMC had some unique properties in respect of the way the 
ownership might be transferred to the donatary.  
                                                          
412 Hotman, op cit, 119-120.  
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In respect of the constitution, as was already said, a DMC was to be made in 
presence of five witnesses, irrespective of whether in writing or nuncupative 
(C.8.56.4). The Roman jurist Julian enumerated three specific ways of making a DMC: 
1) a donation out of general “contemplation of mortality”; 2) a donation in the 
imminent danger of death, with either a) immediate effect or b) the postponed transfer 
of ownership (D.39.6.2). However, medieval scholars greatly widened the various 
forms of DMC. It could be made by a promise to bestow property at the moment of 
death (in the form of a stipulation or just a nudum pactum), or the donator could 
transmit possession of the property in his life, either providing for an immediate 
transfer of ownership or postponing it to the time of death.417 The Roman sources also 
provided the possibility for a DMC in consideration of the death of another person 
(C.8.56.3; D.39.6.18), but, unfortunately, Medieval and Early Modern scholars did not 
pay enough attention to that possibility.  
Whatever the form of a DMC, its essential requirement was “consideratio 
mortis”. Whatever the position of Classical Roman law, the late Roman legislation 
(C.4.11.1) allowed the creation of inter vivos obligations and contracts taking effect at 
death and post mortem. Thus, a simple mention of death could only be just one of the 
signs of a DMC, not the decisive criterion (infra, p.81). Nevertheless, the 
“consideration of death” was a relatively wide criterion, based on the subjective 
motives of the donator. Cl. Aboucaya showed how different was the DMC in French 
“pays de droit écrit”, which allowed a general “consideration of death”, from the DMC 
in the Paris region, which was valid only if made in extremis, in a situation of actual 
mortal danger.418 English Common law also historically required an objective danger 
of death for a DMC.419 
Any DMC was deemed essentially a pact, an agreement, which is why it always 
required participation of the other party in its constitution. Like any other donation, a 
DMC could be made by a ‘nude pact’, so the donatary was not necessarily even to say 
or state anything, as his presence created a presumption of consent; however, his 
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presence, either real or fictitious, was to be established. 420  Early Modern jurists 
elaborated devices to overcome this requirement, so that a stipulatio alteri, sometimes 
together with a constitutum possessionis, could be made before a notary public, which 
created a jus quaesitum tertio in favour of the donatary. The latter was just to ratify 
such transaction ex post facto.421 
The revocability of a DMC was its substantial characteristic, so that a donation 
which included a clause or a promise not to revoke it could only be classified as an 
inter vivos donation (D.39.6.27). However, there was an opinion that the right of 
revocation could be restricted in some way in the contract.422 There were four main 
modes of revocation: 1) the express declaration by the donator, either inter vivos or in 
a last will; 2) the predecease of the donatary (unless the donation included his 
successors); 3) the alienation of the donated goods by the donator (similar to ademptio 
of legacies); and 4) the recovery of the donator, stricken with mortal disease.423 If the 
donated thing was in the possession of the donatary or his heirs, after revocation the 
donator had rei vindicatio or condictio for the recovery of goods. If ownership of the 
thing had been previously transferred to the donatary, the donator could claim it by an 
actio in rem utilis.424 In fact, this created a peculiar institution, reminiscent of a special 
kind of real right. 
A DMC displayed unique properties in respect of the way of transfer of 
ownership to the donatary. A passage from the Digest, dealing with the actio 
Publiciana (D.6.2.2), mentioned that the actio Publiciana could be acquired not only 
by traditio of possession, but also by a DMC, arguing that DMCs, similarly to legacies, 
do not require traditio. This passage was interpreted by the Medieval and Early 
Modern jurists in the way that DMCs do not need a transfer of possession for the 
change of ownership. Therefore, even if a DMC of a specified piece of property was 
made by way of promise, the donatary automatically acquired ownership on the death 
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of the donator.425 Unfortunately, there is not much elaboration on this issue in the 
works of the learned lawyers. D. Cobarrubias-y-Leyva (1512-1577) seems to imply in 
his work that the donatary in such case still cannot take possession of the donator’s 
goods by himself and has to find a responsible successor to transfer physically the 
goods.426 
A sharply debated subject was whether to presume a gift to be inter vivos or 
mortis causa in case of uncertainty. As already said above (supra, p.79), a simple 
mention of death was not the decisive criterion. Some jurists held that mentioning of 
death created a presumption of mortis causa disposition, unless another causa was 
mentioned;427 others held the contrary opinion.428 The prevailing opinion was that, if 
the death was not mentioned, even a donation made in extremis was presumed to be 
inter vivos, unless the danger was mentioned in the text.429 However, here as well a 
contrary opinion existed; Aboucaya described how it prevailed in the Parliament of 
Paris and was enshrined in the 1580 edition of Coutume de Paris, turning gifts made 
on deathbed into mortis causa gifts.430 A special question, arising from practice, was 
whether a donation of property with reservation of a usufruct for the donator’s lifetime 
was to be qualified as a DMC or an inter vivos donation. The two most well-known 
and influential medieval Commentators – Bartolus431 and Baldus432 – both dealt with 
this question in their consilia and both deemed the reservation of usufruct a sign of an 
inter vivos donation.  
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430 Aboucaya, op cit, 43.  
431 Bart., cons. 76. In the case, a father bestowed all his goods, present and future, on his son, reserving 
usufruct and a right to dispose of property. Bartolus saw the usufruct as the evidence of the donator’s 
thinking about his life and survival rather than death; mentioning the right of disposition would have 
been unnecessary if that had been a DMC. Thus, Bartolus deemed the transaction an inter vivos deed 
and thus invalid, as it infringed on testamentary freedom.  
432 Bald., cons. 107, vol II. In Baldus’s case, a plot of land was granted to the monastery, usufruct 
reserved. Baldus deemed the usufruct an evidence of the irrevocable inter vivos donation, because 
one would only burden with a usufruct another’s property, not one’s own.  
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3.2. Evolution of the Concept of donatio mortis causa in Scots Law. 
The outline of the classical law of donatio mortis causa in Scotland was 
provided in the case Morris v. Riddick (1867, 5 M 1036). Lord Inglis, giving the 
background of the DMC in Scotland, was quite explicit in that the Scots DMC was not 
received from Roman law and was very unlike its Civilian counterpart. While the Civil 
law DMC was characterized by the Court of Session as “a form of legacy”, the Scottish 
DMC was a “disposition with delivery, made in contemplation of death”, belonging 
largely to the law of contract. A DMC in Scotland involved a transfer of possession, 
either of the goods themselves or of bonds and other documents. In this respect, the 
classical DMC in Scotland is reminiscent of the DMC in English law, where the 
physical transfer of possession within the donator’s life was also required.433 Unlike 
English law, however, a Scots DMC may be revoked by a last will434 and is defined 
by the subjective criterion of “contemplation of death”; there also seems to have been 
no problems in Scotland as to DMCs made by a cheque or a promissory note.435 
Similarly to the Civil law, the Scots DMCs were preferable to legacies but succumbed 
before inter vivos debts. They did not require writing and could be proved by witnesses 
or an oath irrespective of their amount. Finally, they could not concern heritable 
property;436 however, terms like “mortis causa disposition”, “mortis causa settlement” 
or “mortis causa trust” were widely used in respect of various lawful deeds of heritable 
property before the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964.437 The Succession (Scotland) Act 
2016, s. 25, abolished the “customary mode” of DMC, effectually equalizing the DMC 
with all other conditional gifts.  
If we move slightly back in time, to the 18th century, we find basically the same 
account of the law of DMC in the works of Lord Bankton and John Erskine. Bankton438 
                                                          
433 H. Richardson, op cit, 482-485.  
434 Baron David Hume (1757–1838) held an opinion that a DMC of a thing cannot be canceled by 
leaving the same thing by way of legacy (Lectures // SSP, vol 18 (1957), 219). He refers to the case 
Whitefoord v. Aiton (1742, M.8072=12338) in support. However, in that case a nuncupative legacy 
was not allowed to cancel the DMC made in writing; so, this case was about form and did not forbid 
legacies from canceling DMCs. The Early Modern case law referred to in this chapter shows that mortis 
causa dispositions with a reserved power to revoke them on deathbed were quite widespread.  
435 Cf. English law: W.L. Murfree, ‘Donatio mortis causa’, Central Law Journal, vol 19 (1884), 222-226.  
436 M’Laren, Wills and Succession, vol I, pp.383-385.  
437 M’Laren, op cit, vol I, pp.185, 454, 588.  
438 Bankton, Inst.I.9.16-19.  
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deals with DMCs in largely Civilian terms, but the rules he expounds are already 
essentially those of Morris v. Riddick; a DMC for him is a bond, either delivered, but 
containing a right of revocation, or undelivered, but dispensing with delivery. 439 
Erskine, to the contrary, is sceptical about a possible relationship between the Scots 
DMCs and the Civilian DMCs, claiming that, unlike the DMCs of Civil law, the Scots 
bonds need an express, not a tacit, revocation clause to qualify as such.440 For both 
authors, the DMC is first and foremost a type of contract, which only becomes 
“effectual” at the moment of death, hence its inferiority in competition with inter vivos 
debts. Theoretically, such an approach excludes the possibility of making a DMC by 
a nuncupative promise.  
However, if we plunge even further back in time, into 17th century court 
practice, we no longer find such a uniform definition of a DMC. The use of the term 
“donatio mortis causa” in the decisions of this period441 is hard to analyze, because of 
the quality of the reports – there is no guarantee that the wording of the reports 
reflected the wording of the litigation precisely. Despite that, however, it seems 
possible to trace the evolution in the Scots understanding of the DMC in that period.  
The first common feature all the “donationes mortis causa”, as they appear in 
the 17th century cases, share, is that a DMC is always a donation made in 
“contemplation of death”.442 Stair in his Institutions obviously considers DMCs and 
donations in contemplation of death as the one and same thing.443 Deeds made on 
deathbed and in extremis, to the contrary, were not eo ipso considered mortis causa 
                                                          
439 See infra, s.3.3, on this type of bonds.  
440 Erskine, Inst.III.3.91.  
441 Here are the 17th century cases where the term “DMC” is used explicitly: Curriehill v. Executors of 
Currie (1624, M.2937=M.3591), Traquair & Robertson v. Blushiels (1626, M.3591), Sharp v. Sharp 
(1631, M.15562), Law(u)der v. Goodwife of Whitekirk (1637, M.1692=M.3593), Nasmith v. Jaffray 
(1662, M.3593=M.5483), Cruickshank v. Cruickshank (1665, I Stair 282), Henderson v. Henderson 
(1667, M.11339, Dirl.103), Hadden & Lawder v. Shorswood (1668, M. 16997=I B.S.567), Thomsons v. 
Creditors of Thin (1675, M.3593), Grant v. Grant (1679, M.3596), Johnston v. Johnston (1697, M.8198), 
Clerk’s Creditors v. Blackwood (1686, M.8060), Reid v. Daes (1692, M.15000), Straiton v. Wight (1698, 
M.10326), Lesly v. Lesly (1699, M.3597).  
442 Henderson v. Henderson (1667, M.11339, Dirl.103), Grant v. Grant (1679, M.3596), Irvine v. Skeen 
(1707, M.6350). 
443 Thus, in Inst.III.8.32 he enumerates testaments, legacies, deeds on deathbed and DMCs as the 
deeds which do not prejudice the legal shares of the wife and children. In Inst.III.8.39 he enumerates 
in the same list legacies, donations on deathbed and donations in contemplation of death.  
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deeds.444 Thus, Scots law already in this era firmly embraced the “subjective” criterion 
of a DMC. In this respect, it was different from English law and the law of the French 
pays de coutumes (supra, p.79) and followed the original Civil law approach. 
Furthermore, in the vast majority of cases, the effect of recognizing or not 
recognizing a particular deed as a DMC was, respectively, the revocability or non-
revocability of such deed. There are several exceptions, where the concept of DMC 
was invoked for other effects;445 they will be dealt with further in more detail. The 
rules on revocation of DMCs were pretty similar, if not identical, to those of the Ius 
Commune. Expressly or implicitly, the judges held that a DMC might be revoked by 
an express delivered document,446 by a last will made on deathbed,447 by predecease 
of the donatary, 448  by the donator’s escaping the mortal danger 449  and even by 
alienating the donated property.450  
In no case do the judges explicitly use the term “DMC” in respect of a deed of 
land or other heritable property. However, there are several cases where one of the 
parties used the term in such a context.451 
There is one striking difference between the DMC in 17th century Scots law 
and the DMC as formulated in the 19th century. Lord Inglis in Morris v. Riddick 
referred to the Civil law DMC as “a form of legacy”, implying that it was something 
                                                          
444 See, e.g., Aikman v. Boyd (1679, M.3201), where the assignations made on deathbed were not 
assumed to be “testamentary deeds” in the strict sense, and Sandilands v. Sandilands (1683, 
M.3202=M.14384), with a similar outcome.  
445 In Nasmith v. Jaffray (1662, M.3593=M.5483) and Johnston v. Johnston (1697, M.8198) the term 
“DMC” was used in the context of the legal shares (“legitim”) in the estate. In Henderson v. Henderson 
(1667, M.11339, Dirl.103) the question was that of validity of the disposition in respect of legal heirs. 
In Hadden & Lawder v. Shorswood (1668, M.16997=I B.S.567) and Straiton v. Wight (1698, M.10326) 
the term was used for a disposition which requires no delivery.   
446 Thomsons v. Creditors of Thin (1675, M.3593), McBride v. Bryson (1680, M.17002). 
447 Curriehill v. Executors of Currie (1624, M.2937=M.3591), Traquair & Robertson v. Blushiels (1626, 
M.3591) – in both follows a contrario sensu. 
448 Clerk’s Creditors v. Blackwood (1686, M.8060), Lesly v. Lesly (1699, M.3597). 
449 Lesly v. Lesly (1699, M.3597), Irvine v. Skeen (1707, M.6350). Note that, in the Ius Commune, 
whether ceasing of any or just some kinds of mortal danger brought the revocation of the DMC was a 
controversial question (Covarruvias, De testamentis..., Pars III // Tractatus selecti…, 153-154; see also 
D.39.6.29). 
450 Traquair & Robertson v. Blushiels (1626, M.3591), Thomsons v. Creditors of Thin (1675, M.3593). 
451 Sharp v. Sharp (1631, M.15562), Law(u)der v. Goodwife of Whitekirk (1637, M.1692, in this case 
the debt assigned seems to have been heritable), Henderson v. Henderson (1667, M.11339, Dirl.103), 
Lesly v. Lesly (1699, M.3597).  
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alien to Scots law.452 However, in the earliest Scots reports the terms “DMC” and 
“legacies” look pretty much interchangeable. In several cases they go side by side. In 
Nasmith v. Jaffray (1662, M.3593=M.5483) a husband, being on a long journey, sent 
a letter to his wife, bestowing on her the right to take all his goods in case he did not 
return; the Lords declared this deed “a legacy or a donatio mortis causa”. In Hadden 
& Lawder v. Shorswood (1668, M.16997=I B.S.567) one of the parties called an 
assignation, left undelivered by the defunct, a “DMC” which “must be valid without 
delivery, for a testament or legacy is valid without delivery”, while the other party, 
objecting to that claim, mentioned that “DMC is but a legacy”. There are other similar 
cases.453  
Of course, using two words side by side does not imply an identical meaning 
but rather a similar meaning with subtle differences. There were also instances where 
the terms “legacy” and “DMC” were distinguished.454 Nevertheless, in some early 
cases, the term “DMC” is not used where it might have obviously been appropriate, 
with “legacy” or a different term used instead. Thus, in the case of Houston v. Houston 
(1631, M.8049=M.12307) a delivered bond to pay 500 merks after the debtor’s 
decease was found to be “just a legacy” for the purpose of the law of ‘legitim’. In 
another case, Bells v. Parks (1636, M.3593), a contract to pay 300 merks to a father 
from the daughter’s estate in return for the father’s renouncing all rights of succession 
to the daughter, was recognized as a “testamentary c(l)ause”, thus revocable by the 
daughter. In a late case Nisbet v. Scot (1709, M.3809), a disposition of all moveables 
post mortem in the form of a mutual contract was characterized as a “DMC” by the 
winning party and as a “universal legacy” by the Lords. Thus, a “legacy” in early Scots 
law could appear in quite surprising incarnations, often in a contractual form.  
This is why it is obvious that, unlike the Ius Commune, there was no real 
difference in terms of constitution between a DMC and a legacy in 17th century Scots 
                                                          
452 Supra, p.81.   
453 For example, in Thomsons v. Creditors of Thin (1675, M.3593) the terms “legacy” and “DMC” are 
also used interchangeably. The two terms were also used interchangeably by the party in Whitefoord 
v. Aiton (1742, M.8072).  
454 See Cruickshank v. Cruickshank (1665, I Stair 282), where the winning party, who was granted a 
provision in an assignation by the defunct, alleged that, although the said deed was “not in the express 
terms of a legacy, yet it is donatio mortis causa”, and so this provision was deemed a new donation 
and not a payment of the earlier debt.  
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law. Both DMCs and legacies in that period included promises and contract-like deeds. 
In fact, there could not be much formal difference between the two, considering that 
Scots contract law, as it was forming in that period, did not follow the strict principle 
of privity of contract and the doctrine of offer and acceptance. An enforceable contract 
could be made by a unilateral written promise (“bond”), without any acceptance of the 
other party required.455 The only practical guarantee of contractual privity was the 
requirement to deliver the writing. In further discussion we shall see how the rules on 
delivery were adapted so as to get rid of the delivery requirement for the deeds of 
“testamentary nature”, even if they were not, strictly speaking, DMCs (infra, s.3.3).  
It also follows from the case law that the claims of the later Institutional writers, 
that a gift must explicitly mention its revocability in the text of the bond and that Scots 
law did not know “implied DMCs”,456 were incompatible with the early law. Cases 
like Bells v. Parks and Nasmith v. Jaffray obviously are examples of how deeds, which 
did not mention anything about revocability, could be recognized as “legacies” or 
“DMCs”. In fact, the case Law(u)der v. Goodwife of Whitekirk (1637, 
M.1692=M.3593), which Erskine cited in support of his claim, deals with a rather 
special situation. In that case, an assignation of the sum (debt) was granted in return 
for a back-bond to give “compt and reckoning” on the sum after the assignor’s return 
from a journey. The assignor made another assignation of the same sum whilst on the 
journey and died before his return. The Lords found that the first assignation was only 
revocable in case of the assignor’s return; they did not find that this deed was not a 
DMC simply because it did not mention it was a DMC. Thus, Erskine’s claim with 
reference to this case looks quite ungrounded.  
That said, the approach of the Scots judges started to change in the late 17th 
century, probably from around the 1660s. The judges, seemingly, began to narrow 
                                                          
455 T.B. Smith, ‘Jus quaesitum tertio: remedies of the “Tertius” in Scottish law’, JR, vol 1(n.s.)(1956), 3-
21; D.I.C. Ashton Cross, ‘Bare promise in Scots law’, JR, vol 2(n.s.)(1957), 138-150; J.T. Cameron, ‘Jus 
quaesitum tertio: true meaning of Stair I.x.5’, JR, vol 6(n.s.)(1961), 103-118; A. Rodger, ‘Molina, Stair 
and the Jus quaesitum tertio’, JR, vol 14(n.s.)(1969), 34-44, 128-144; D.N. MacCormick, ‘Jus quaesitum 
tertio: Stair v. Dunedin’, JR, vol 15(n.s.)(1970), 228-246; G. MacCormack, ‘A note on Stair’s use of the 
term pollicitatio’, JR, vol 21(n.s.)(1976), 121-126; W.W. McBryde, ‘Jus Quaesitum Tertio’, JR, 
vol 28(n.s.)(1983), 137-151; D. Smail, ‘The Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995: A Nail in the 
Coffin for Stair and Scots Promise?’, ESLR, vol 1(2)(2010), 15-41.  
456 Bankton, Inst.I.9.19; Erskine, Inst.III.3.91. 
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down the definition of the DMC and became more reluctant to recognize particular 
transactions as DMCs. Perhaps, Henderson v. Henderson (1667, M.11339, Dirl.103) 
was one of the first such cases. In that case, the Court of Session refused to recognize 
as a “testament” or a “DMC” disposition of land that was worded like a testament and 
was revocable.457 In the case Thomsons v. Creditors of Thin (1675, M.3593), which 
concerned moveables, the donator granted a bond for a large amount of money 
(exceeding his free assets) to be paid after his death in case of his decease without heirs 
of his body. Afterwards the donator made a disposition of all his goods to his wife, 
reserving a liferent and a right to “affect” the goods in his life. The Court found that 
neither of the two dispositions was a legacy or a DMC: the first one was found to be 
just a debt suspended under a condition, while the second one was not a DMC because 
the right to “affect” the goods, allegedly, entailed only the power to dispose of 
particular property, not to revoke the whole disposition. 
Subsequent practice continued restricting the application of the DMC concept. 
In Grant v. Grant (1679, M.3596) a man promised in future terms all his goods owned 
at the time of death. The judges did not find it a revocable DMC, as it was not made 
“in contemplation of death”. In Lesly v. Lesly (1699, M.3597) a tailzie of all one’s 
moveables and heritage, which reserved the power to “alter” the disposition, was found 
not to be a DMC and thus not revoked by the donatary’s predecease and the donator’s 
returning from the journey. Of course, there were also more successful invocations of 
the DMC concept. In a later case Irvine v. Skeen (1707, M.6350) a disposition of all 
one’s moveable goods was granted; a liferent and a power to revoke the disposition 
even “in articulo mortis” were reserved. Despite the losing party’s claims that this 
disposition was not made “in contemplation of death”, the Lords heeded to the winning 
party’s assertions that the deed contained all essential features of a DMC as defined in 
by the Civil law and was thus revocable by the granter’s surviving the donatary.  
We see that the late 17th – 18th century judges tried to avoid DMCs as much as 
possible. To be a DMC, the bond was now supposed to expressly contain all the 
essential features of the DMC: absolute revocability even by a last will, 
“contemplation of death”, etc. The presumption was now clearly in favour of the inter 
                                                          
457 See the analysis of this case in some more detail infra, p.99. 
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vivos character of a deed. It is no surprise then that Bankton and Erskine had such a 
narrow understanding of the DMC – in their time, a valid DMC they might encounter 
would be either a bond, bearing in the most express terms that it was a DMC, or a 
physical transfer of goods, performed in a very clear situation of contemplation of 
death. It is not surprising either that a DMC by a nuncupative promise was not 
imagined – it was extremely unlikely that someone would make such a promise 
expressly providing for all the requirements for a DMC. 18th century and later lawyers 
could not think of a larger definition of DMC without contradicting contemporary 
court practice, which had been refusing this status to one or another transaction almost 
every time since the 1660s.  
 
3.3. Evolution of the Requirement of Delivery of Deeds. 
Survey of the evolution of the requirement of delivery for bonds and other 
deeds may help to answer the question of why the Scots courts started to narrow the 
definition of DMC in the 1660s. The general law, as presented by Erskine 
(Inst.III.2.43), considered delivery a necessary element for the constitution of a written 
deed, otherwise the deed would be considered incomplete. However, in the next 
paragraph (Inst.III.2.44), Erskine himself provides six exceptions to the rule, “deeds 
of a testamentary kind” being one of those. Moreover, even in the late 19th century, it 
was an accepted opinion of the Lords of Session that the “delivery” required of a 
donatio mortis causa was less than the delivery required of inter vivos documents.458 
All that is traceable to the 17th century.  
It is well known that a postponement of delivery was, since early times, one of 
the devices to avoid the rule forbidding the leaving of heritage by a last will and 
disposing of them on “deathbed”.459 The donator would create an inter vivos deed to 
transfer his land, which would oblige the heir-at-law to perfect the transaction after the 
donator’s death; but the deed was not delivered until the donator’s death, thus retaining 
its ambulatory character and remaining revocable by the granter. Was such practice 
lawful? Most, if not all, of the early 17th century cases on delivery, preserved to this 
                                                          
458 W.M. McBryde, op cit, 143; Crosbie’s Trustees v. Wright (1880, 7 R. 823).  
459 J. Irvine Smith, ‘Succession’, ISLH, 214.  
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day, dealt with heritable deeds. They sometimes contradicted each other. Thus, in 
Children of Wallace v. Their Eldest Brother (1624, M.6344=M.16989) a bond by a 
father in favour of his younger sons, although made 25 years before his death and 
undelivered until then, was sustained as valid, with judges seeing the fact of the 
“evident” (i.e., the document) being in the younger son’s possession as creating a 
presumption of the bond’s valid execution. However, in this case the bond was not 
presumed to have been delivered at the moment of making, either.460  
In another case, Dickson v. Dickson (1627, M.16990), unlike Children of 
Wallace, the judges considered the heir’s claim, that the deed in question had not been 
delivered in the donator’s lifetime, a defence serious enough to make the donatary 
swear an oath on this issue of fact. In Lord Cardross v. Earl of Mar (1639, 
M.11440=M.16993), a disposition of land was recognized as valid, although the heir 
of the original disponee confessed that the disposition was purchased, after the 
donator’s death, from a third party, who himself obtained the document by unknown 
means. The common feature of the aforementioned cases was that the Lords did not 
make specific decisions on whether delivery was necessary or not. They just refused 
to investigate whether the delivery had taken place, creating a presumption of 
lawfulness of the ways that the written deed got into the party’s hands.  
However, the approach changes from around the mid-17th century. Not only 
did the pleadings of the parties become more straightforward and open about the nature 
and purposes of undelivered deeds, but the judges also started to embrace such deeds 
as devices to overcome the law of ‘deathbed’. The Court of Session and parties started 
to treat such mortis causa dispositions as if there were a clear doctrine about them.  
The possible beginnings of such doctrine might have been found in the now 
lost cases from about the early to middle 17th century. In Aikenhead v. Aikenhead 
(1663, M.16994=I Stair 186) the assignation of a bond, granted to bastard son and 
undelivered, was found valid, with the winning party claiming that the father being a 
                                                          
460  This follows from the decision on a different question, touched by the same case. The bond 
provided certain (obviously heritable) sums of money in favour of all sons, with a destination 
(substitution) clause that the sons’ portions will accrue to their brothers in case of death without 
children. Two sons predeceased their father. The Lords held that the destination clause did not apply 
to those two sons’ portions, as they died before the bond was delivered. Thus, there was obviously no 
presumption of the bond’s delivery at the moment of making.  
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legal guardian of the minor son made him a possessor of all the son’s goods and 
documents, so there was no need for the document’s delivery. Surprisingly, the 
winning party referred to this rule as if it were an established doctrine.461 The rule that 
the bonds of fathers in favour of their minor children required no delivery, because 
their possession is undivided in law, was finally settled in 1677, in Stevenson v. 
Stevenson (M.17000). It was one of the exceptions to the requirement of delivery; but 
the judges were aware that it was a means to defeat the heir’s rights and allowed it to 
perform this particular function. In Laird of Glencorse v. His Brethren and Sisters 
(1668, M.16995), the winner alleged (once again, as if it were a settled doctrine) that 
a written deed becomes “vested” in the donatary either at the moment of delivery or, 
if the deed so provided, at the moment of the donator’s death without delivery. The 
Lords in that case found that an undelivered bond by the father to the son was freely 
revocable by the father and, thus, could be revoked by a subsequent marriage contract. 
Obviously, the Lords were treating such deeds as a matter of normal practice, not 
considering them a fraud against heirs.  
Hadden & Lawder v. Shorswood (1668, M. 16997=I B.S.567) was probably 
one of the most remarkable cases on the issue of delivery. Unlike the previously 
mentioned cases, it dealt with moveables. The testator made an assignation to his 
cousin of a bond for 500 merks, which reserved a “liferent” to the testator and was not 
delivered in his life. After his death, the assignee sued the executor for the delivery of 
the bond. The executor alleged that undelivered bonds were valid only if made in 
favour of children. The assignee’s reply was that the reservation of liferent was a sign 
that the deed was a donatio mortis causa, and thus, being similar to a legacy, did not 
require delivery in the testator’s lifetime. The assignee prevailed in the case. This case 
shows that, in the 1660s, not only was DMC deemed equivalent in form to a legacy,462 
but even a deed in the form of an inter vivos disposition could be deemed a “DMC” in 
respect of the rules of delivery. Moreover, it is notable that Scots practice took a 
presumption opposite to the one taken by the Ius Commune. While Continental 
scholars usually considered the reservation of usufruct as a sign of an inter vivos 
                                                          
461 Another surprising fact is that the father was not, strictly speaking, the legal guardian of the bastard, 
the latter having no rights of succession and “no legal relatives” by Scots law. 
462 This we have established supra, p.85.  
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transaction,463 in Scotland, as we see, the reservation of liferent (the Scottish analogue 
of the usufruct) was seen as the mark of a mortis causa deed.  
Although the judges in Hadden & Lawder v. Shorswood made the decision 
taking into account the special circumstances of the case, such as the absence of a wife 
or any children of the testator464 and the fact that the assignee was the testator’s cousin, 
further case law turned this decision into general law. Stark v. Kincaid (1679, 
M.17002) extended the Hadden & Lawder rule to dispositions of heritable property.  
Finally, in addition to the abovementioned rules, a deed could just contain a 
clause that it was to be effectual although not delivered (‘dispensing with delivery 
clause’). This was first explicitly stated in Eleis v. Inglistoun (1669, M.16999), where 
such a disposition was deemed “as if delivered” at the time of making. However, this 
did not restrict the revocability of such deed in the slightest. Even if the document was 
preserved intact until the granter’s death, it might be revoked by a similar subsequent 
deed, because, as was expressly said in an anonymous case from 1683,465 the purpose 
of the clause dispensing with delivery was only to defeat the rights of the heir and the 
executor. Thus, the case law of the 17th century elaborated three main exceptions from 
the requirement of delivery, which were later embodied in Stair’s Institutions and 
became classical: deeds in favour of children, deeds reserving liferent and deeds 
expressly dispensing with delivery.466 These exceptions obviously allowed making 
testament-like dispositions in prejudice of heirs and executors, avoiding the old 
prohibitions. 
We can see that, beginning in the mid-17th century, the Lords of Session began 
to be quite honest about the purpose and substance of mortis causa dispositions, 
allowing them in quite a straightforward way. However, the term “DMC”, with the 
exception of Hadden & Lawder v. Shorswood, was not usually applied to such 
transactions. Different, more amorphous terms were used: for example, “a disposition 
of testamentary nature”. This last term was used, e.g., in McBride v. Bryson (1680, 
                                                          
463 See supra, p.81, the consilia of Bartolus and Baldus.  
464 So that no one was prejudiced by the assignation, except for, possibly, the executor and the 
Commissaries (infra, s.3.4, 3.6).  
465 M.17003, reported by Harcarse. It is unclear whether the case dealt with heritable or moveable 
property.  
466 Stair, Inst.III.4.29. 
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M.17002). In that case, a tenement was disponed, reserving a right of revocation even 
in articulo mortis. The issue at stake was whether an undelivered written declaration 
by the granter revoked the disposition. The judges decided affirmatively, taking a wide 
interpretation of the revocation clause so as to include this declaration. The wide 
interpretation was taken on the grounds that the document in question was of a 
“testamentary nature” and thus was fitting to be interpreted widely, so as to find out 
the true will of the granter.  
The Lords in this last case stopped short of accepting last wills of heritage. 
They could not expressly call them “last wills”. Neither could they, it seems, call such 
transactions “DMCs”, although such a term would sometimes be very convenient. 
What were the possible reasons to restrict the use of these concepts in regard to mortis 
causa dispositions in Scotland, we will see in subsequent sections.  
 
3.4. Gifts mortis causa and the Rights of Executors. ‘Quots’ for Confirmation 
of Testament. 
In this section we shall try to answer the question whether any special rules of 
transmission of ownership, like those accepted in the Ius Commune (supra, pp.80-81), 
were applied in Scotland to mortis causa deeds of moveable property. In the Scottish 
context of 1560-1660, this issue was not purely one of private law. As Scotland, 
similarly to England, continued to employ testamentary executors as the main 
mechanism of moveable succession, the traditional procedures and practices dictated 
restrictions on the testator’s ability to avoid “executorial” process by mortis causa 
dispositions. Before executing the testator’s last will, an executor was first to pay off 
the debts, as well as to pay the legal shares in the estate to spouses and children. 
Moreover, the executor, to be officially bestowed with relevant powers, was to 
“confirm” the testament in a Commissary court. The Commissary courts took tolls 
(“quots”) for the confirmation of testaments, which depended on the size of the 
moveable free goods.467 One of the main articles of income for the prelates of the 
                                                          
467 In the earliest preserved document on this matter, the ecclesiastical Provincial Council declaration 
of 1420, the amount of ‘quots’ was established at 12 pence per pound – 5% of the “Dead’s part” (SES, 
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Scottish Episcopal Church, these ‘quots’ were abolished (1641-1669) during the Civil 
War,468 but were restored afterwards and lasted until 1701.469 Thus, the interest of 
executors to ensure that all succession passed through their hands was “allied” with 
the interest of the Commissaries to receive the intact ‘quots’ and strengthened by the 
administrative powers of the Commissaries.  
It is no surprise then that restrictions on mortis causa gifts of moveables in 
Scotland appeared quite early. The 1610 Injunctions to the Commissaries provided 
that, if anyone challenged the moveable estate of the defunct on the ground of an 
assignation made “before the death”, the assignation was to be “estimat simulat”, i.e., 
deemed made in fraud of the executor and the ‘quots’. The assigned items were to be 
included in the inventory together with other goods; however, the assignee could make 
a protestation in the Commissary record, so that the confirmation would not prejudice 
his rights as a creditor.470 The same provision was repeated almost verbatim in the 
1666 Instructions.471  
We should note here that this provision, despite being quite generally worded, 
obviously implies that the assignation in such situations was not yet perfected. The 
classical Scots law as to assignations provided that they were to be perfected by an 
intimation, 472  the latter being the equivalent of the transfer of possession for 
incorporeal rights. If the intimation had already been performed in the assignor’s 
lifetime, the assignee would not have to challenge the assignor’s estate – the debt 
would not have been a part of the assignor’s estate anymore. Another evidence of this 
is the term “simulat”, used in the text. It was a Civilian term. Among the Ius Commune 
                                                          
166). The same rates were set by the 1563 Instructions to the Commissaries of Edinburgh (c. 30) and 
the 1610 Injunctions (Balfour’s Practicks, 668).  
468 The ‘quots’, due to the “great burden and prejudice” they were causing, were abolished by one of 
the Covenanting Parliaments on November, 16, 1641 (APS, vol V, 410). The “ordinary fees”, however, 
were preserved. At first, the abolition was confirmed at the Restoration (RPS, 1661/1/297); however, 
the 1666 Instructions to the Commissaries brought the ‘quots’ back intact (Acts of Sederunt 1790, 101). 
The 1669 Act of Parliament (RPS, 1669/10/56) legalized them once again, although with restrictions: 
the ‘quots’ were abolished for small estates, worth less than 40 pounds (fixed fees were to be paid to 
the court instead), for executor-creditors and widows; a limitation of 3 years from the death was 
established for their exaction, etc. See also, infra, pp.94-95, some cases in the period of abolition that 
still refer to “quots”.  
469 They were finally abolished by the 1701 Act (RPS, 1700/10/243).  
470 Balfour’s Practicks, 667.  
471 Acts of Sederunt 1790, 99.  
472 Stair, Inst.III.1.7.  
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jurists, simulated transactions and their use in fraud of the creditors and fisc were a 
rich topic of discussion. The retention of possession over alienated property by the 
disponer was the principal sign of simulation, bringing a presumption of fraud.473  
Court practice followed this paradigm already in the very year when the 1610 
Injunctions were published. In Smeiton v. Hamilton (1610, M.14385), the assignation 
of all his moveables by the defunct was found to avoid the confirmation only in so far 
as possession over the goods was transferred in the defunct’s life.474 A particularly 
tight and informative series of cases on this issue followed in the 1660-1680s.475 In 
most of these cases, a demand, at the instance of the procurator fiscal, was made to the 
assignee, as an “intromitter” with the defunct’s goods, to have the goods “confirmed” 
and to make an inventory. Such cases appeared even in the 1661-1666 period, when, 
technically, no ‘quots’ were due in law to the Commissaries;476 the procurators seem 
to have largely been motivated by their administrative duties to enforce the lawful 
procedure of succession.477  
In the aforesaid cases, a rule was firmly established, that the disponed goods, 
unless possession was transferred in the defunct’s lifetime, were in bonis defuncti and 
thus required confirmation.478 Moreover, confirmation was declared a matter of public 
law;479 the confirmation was to take place even if there were no estate goods to put in 
the inventory.480 However, the Lords still expressed uncertainty as to the criteria to 
distinguish deeds which diminished the defunct’s moveable estate and deeds which 
did not. In the case Procurator Fiscal of Edinburgh v. Fairholm (1665, M.14386), as 
reported by Stair, the judges expressed doubts as to whether confirmation would still 
                                                          
473 Bart., D.39.5.15 (the third presumption of fraud); Bald., C.4.22.3, C.5.3.1.  
474 The report, unfortunately, leaves uncertain, who precisely challenged the transaction.  
475 Procurator Fiscal of Edinburgh v. Fairholm (1665, M.14386=I B.S.511), Commissary of St.Andrews v. 
Balhousie (1665, M.14387), Govan v. Paip (1666, M.14384), Procurator Fiscal of Edinburgh v. Whyte 
(1676, M.14388), Kelhead v. Irving (1674, Dirl.206), Sandilands v. Sandilands (1683, M.14384=M.3202). 
476 See the note 464 supra.  
477 However, in the case of Commissary of St.Andrews v. Balhousie (1665, M.14387), the pursuer 
mentioned that “quots” might be prejudiced if dispositions of all moveables were to be allowed. 
Possibly, by “quots”, the ordinary court fees, allowed by the 1661 Act, were meant in this case. 
478 Govan v. Paip (1666, M.14384).  
479 Procurator Fiscal of Edinburgh v. Fairholm (1665, M.14386=I B.S.511). 
480 See Procurator Fiscal of Edinburgh v. Whyte (1676, M.14388), where the husband was obliged to 
confirm himself as the executor to his wife, although the wife in her lifetime had discharged her share 
in the common goods and thus had no property at the time of her death.  
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be necessary if the disposition had been for an onerous cause, made in liege poustie 
(infra, s.3.5) or had been made in respect of specific goods instead of the moveable 
estate in general. In Commissary of St.Andrews v. Balhousie (1665, M.14387), the 
revocability of the transaction by the granter was also pointed to as the sign of 
“simulation”. Finally, in Sandilands v. Sandilands (1683, M.14384=M.3202) it was 
settled that an assignation granted on deathbed and fully intimated in the granter’s 
lifetime was valid and excluded the confirmation and ‘quots’, unless it was revocable.  
All these criteria, when taken together, leave no doubt as to what Scots judges 
and practitioners had in mind while applying them. They took these criteria from the 
Ius Commune. As was already said, alienations where possession remained in the 
hands of the granter were considered simulated in the Ius Commune – hence the 
Scottish requirement of the transfer of possession within one’s lifetime. Dispositions 
of all goods were presumed fraudulent in the Ius Commune481 – hence the doubts of 
Scots judges on whether there was any difference between universal and special 
dispositions. The thoughts about differing effects of lucrative and onerous transactions 
were obviously inspired by similar Civilian distinctions. 482  Finally, making a 
disposition on deathbed and the revocability of such disposition together tell us that it 
was a donatio mortis causa that the Scottish judges were wary of.483 Sandilands v. 
Sandilands, although not using the term “DMC” expressly, seems to deal with possible 
effects of a DMC: the DMC cannot prejudice the executor and the Commissaries, even 
if the transfer of possession (or the intimation) takes place while the donator is living.  
There were signs in Scotland of attempts to use nominal transfers of possession, 
akin to the Civilian constitutum possessionis, to avoid confirmation. However, these 
attempts were unsuccessful, largely due to the general reluctance of Scots law to 
recognize any kind of possession of moveable property short of physical (“natural”) 
                                                          
481 Bart., D.39.5.15 – where Bartolus provides this as the first presumption of fraud. The same he 
deems applicable to the sale of all goods, although some jurists disagreed (see additiones (c), (d) and 
(e) to D.39.5.15, Venice (1602) edition). See also: Bart., D.42.8.17.1.  
482 Bartolus in the same place (see the note above) makes a distinction for most of his six presumptions 
of fraud in that a buyer, unlike a donatary, needs to be malae fidei for the sale of goods to be revoked 
as fraudulent. See also C.7.75.5.   
483 In the Ius Commune, a DMC, being a type of the last will, could never prejudice the creditors or the 
fisc and was always revocable by them in case of insolvency, irrespective whether the donator 
intended fraud or not (Bart., D.39.5.15).  
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possession. “Instruments of possession”, transferring “civil possession” over a pool of 
goods, by analogy to “instruments of seisin” in heritage, were usually disregarded by 
the courts.484 In Brown v. Lawson (1664, I Stair 209) the defunct made a disposition 
with an “instrument of possession” in favour of an extraneous person, who did not 
acquire the natural possession until after the defunct’s death. The Lords recognized 
this disposition as sufficient to cleanse the disponee of being a “vitious intromitter”, 
so that he was not liable in solidum for the defunct’s debts. However, the disponee was 
given a term to confirm himself as an executor,485 because the Lords deemed the 
disposition to be “more of a legacy than an inter vivos deed”.  
Dramatic changes to the practice of confirmation and mortis causa dispositions 
were introduced by the 1690 Act.486 The biggest innovation of the Act was providing 
that “where speciall assignations and dispositions are lawfully made by the defunct, 
tho neither intimate nor made publick in his lifetime, they shall be yet good and valid 
rights and titles to possess, bruike, enjoy, pursue or defend, albeit the soumes of money 
or goods therein contained be not confirmed”. Another innovation, in line with the 
general disestablishment of the Episcopal Church, was the severe restriction of the 
power of the Commissaries to enforce confirmation of moveable estates, which they 
now could employ only at the request of a specific set of persons.  
The Act made it much easier to exclude the goods of one’s estate from the 
general procedure of succession, by way of making a disposition enumerating specific 
goods and rights.487 Moreover, the Act was interpreted so as to abolish the rule that all 
the goods within the moveable estate of the defunct at the time of his death were only 
to be distributed through the executor. That is why, after this Act, even general 
disponees of one’s property were deemed eligible to possess the estate goods without 
confirmation, although not entitled to sue.488  
                                                          
484 See, e.g., Corbet v. Stirling (1666, M.10602), where a third party pursued for specified goods of the 
debtor as belonging to that third party by an “instrument of possession”. The creditor objected that 
the possession of the third party was never made public before the creditor applied his diligence and 
that the possession was “simulate”. The Lords allowed the creditor to “poind” those goods.  
485 Possibly, as an “executor-legatar”. 
486 The Act anent the confirmatione of testaments (RPS, 1690/4/117).  
487 Gordon v. Campbell (1729, M.14384).  
488 Dobie v. Oliphant & Robertson (1707, M.14390); Dickson v. Logan (1711, M.14392). 
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The long-term consequence of the Act was a transformation of practice. 
Traditional testaments experienced a certain decline during the 18-19th centuries.489 
Moveable estates in that period were often bequeathed by dispositions and trust 
settlements, similarly to heritage.490 Even testaments were worded in a way that was 
reminiscent of a de presenti disposition.491  
In such circumstances, the debates of the 17th century about the separation of 
inter vivos and mortis causa deeds as to the effect of confirmation were no longer 
relevant.  
 
3.5. Gifts mortis causa and the Rights of Heirs. 
Unlike in the case of executors, the law on protection of the rights of heirs 
seems to have had a solid grounding in Scottish legal history and to have been quite 
well established from early times. The roots of both the non-disposability of heritable 
property by a last will and the law of ‘deathbed’ were already present in Regiam 
Majestatem (early 14th century).492 Th. Craig circa 1600 presented an already fixed law 
of ‘deathbed’.493 No one, with several exceptions,494 could dispose (even for value) of 
one’s land or other heritage while being sick with a mortal disease, from which death 
would later follow. At the same time, a person could demonstrate recovery from the 
illness by walking unsupported to a public place; 495  the 1696 Act also validated 
deathbed dispositions if the granter survived for 60 days after the deed.496 Dispositions 
made on “deathbed” (“in lecto aegritudinis”) were not null ipso jure, but were voidable 
                                                          
489 R. Bell, A system of the forms of deeds used in Scotland, Vol III (1813), 3-5.  
490 Reid, ‘Testamentary Formalities in Scotland’, 410-411.  
491 See a testament in: Bell, op cit, 10.  
492 Reg.Maj.II.20.4 (only God, not a man, can create an heir), II.18.7-10 (donations of lands made in 
extremis are invalid, as they might easily be made out of a disturbance of the mind).  
493 Craig, Jus Feudale, I.12.36.  
494  These were: performance of an obligation contracted in liege poustie (in good health), sharp 
poverty of the granter (if the heir refused to help), provision of a liferent to the wife, consent of the 
heir (Craig, ibid; Anderson v. Anderson (1568, M.3208); Pollocks v. Fairholm (1632, M.3209); Jack v. 
Pollock&Rutherford (1665, M.3213)).  
495 Craig, ibid.  
496 RPS, 1696/9/56. 
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at the instance of the heir by an action of reduction.497 At some point, even moveable 
debts, created on deathbed, became reducible by the heir, because the heir might be 
held liable for them!498 The attempts of some litigants during the 17th century to 
exclude application of the ‘deathbed’ rule to some particular situations, by reference 
to the general principles and purpose of the institution, failed;499 the law of deathbed 
became a jus strictum of Scots law, inflexible and never mitigated by circumstances. 
Being quite certain and unequivocal as to deeds made on deathbed, Scots law, 
however, was not always so certain as regards deeds which were made in liege poustie 
(i.e., in good health) but were to take effect upon death or were explicitly mortis causa. 
Judicial practice was clear in respect of testaments. If the document was explicitly a 
testament, it could never dispose of heritage, create heritable debts or otherwise create 
a burden for the heir.500 As was pointed out by the counsel for the winning party in 
Colvil v. Colvil (1664, M.15927), a testament, by definition, was equalized with a 
‘deathbed’ transaction. The incompatibility of a testament and the inter vivos 
disposition of heritage was so strong in Scots law that they could not even be contained 
in one document,501 unlike in the Ius Commune, where a testament could contain a 
contract.502  
But what if a disposition was not explicitly called a “testament” but was very 
similar to a testament in its essentials, being suspended until death and(or) revocable? 
To qualify as an inter vivos disposition, the document was to be composed in present 
terms (de praesenti).503 To obtain a testamentary effect, such disposition, nevertheless, 
could be left undelivered until the granter’s death; we have seen how undelivered 
                                                          
497 Lord Craigie-Wallace v. Wallace (1626, M.3206), Seatoun & Laird of Touch v. Dundas (1666, M.2736). 
Deathbed deeds, however, could also be ‘reduced’ by the heir’s creditors, due to their interest in the 
heir’s solvency (G. Mackenzie, Observations upon the Act against the dispositions in fraud, 24-27).  
498 Infra, p.234.  
499 See, e.g., Richardson v. Sinclair (1635, I B.S.207=M.3210), where the ‘deathbed’ rule was applied 
despite the claims that the granter was in good memory and sound mind, and Cleiland & Boyde v. 
Cleiland (1672, II B.S.695), where the granter’s sickness in legs, preventing him from walking, was also 
deemed sufficient to constitute a ‘deathbed’ situation. 
500 I am not dealing here with the rules on homologation, where an heir could be deemed to have 
voluntary rejected the right to challenge the testamentary disposition by his own actions.  
501 Jack v. Gourlaw (1605, M.15923), The Daughters of Soutray v. The Eldest Daughter (1670, M.15927).  
502 Bart., D.28.1.21.3, D.32.37.5.  
503 Gradually, the word “dispone” came to be considered essential for a disposition (J. Irvine Smith, 
‘Succession’, 215-216).  
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deeds came to be recognized around the mid-17th century (supra, s.3.3) to the point of 
being expressly declared a lawful device to defeat the heir’s rights.504  
What if the disposition was delivered, but the right to revoke was expressly 
reserved by the granter? Henderson v. Henderson (1667, M.11339=II B.S.437), 
already mentioned above,505 was one of the most significant cases in this respect. This 
case was reported in the greatest detail by John Nisbet of Dirleton (Dirl.103), and the 
report is in Latin, which Dirleton explained by the heavy reliance on the “subtleties of 
Civil law” by both parties to the case. In this case, Henderson, who had no wife and 
children, before departing abroad made a strangely worded disposition in favour of his 
cousin, appointing the latter the “heir, executor and donatary” of all the granter’s 
heritage and moveables. The donation was called “irrevocable” in the document, but 
the granter, nevertheless, reserved the right to “revoke” it after his return. Henderson 
eventually returned from his trip but died soon afterwards, without expressly revoking 
the gift.  
The granter’s heir, his sister, challenged the deed on several grounds. She 
claimed it was a “testament” and thus was unlawful as to heritage. If not a testament, 
it was, in her opinion, a “donatio mortis causa”. The latter, she claimed, entailed 
several possible consequences. It was either reducible in respect of heritage, just as a 
testament would be. Otherwise, in case it was valid as a “DMC”, it was tacitly revoked 
by the fact of the granter’s returning from his dangerous trip alive. In support of the 
last position, it was claimed that the deed of donation was in the granter’s possession 
at some point of time after his return.  
The donatary, in response to these claims, replied that the transaction was an 
inter vivos donation, as it used the word “donate” in the text. It was not a DMC, 
because DMCs are always revocable, while this particular donation was only revocable 
after Henderson’s return, not before. Moreover, continued the donatary’s side, even 
granted it were a DMC, DMCs of heritage were lawful in Scotland. The example of 
Scottish tailzies was provided, which were, in donatary’s opinion, valid “DMCs”, 
often  reserving a right of revocation and made in contemplation of death. The donatary 
                                                          
504 See the anonymous 1683 case, published in M.17003.  
505 Supra, p.86.  
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also pointed out that the DMCs of Civil law were not revoked by the mere ceasing of 
a mortal danger.506 
The Lords in the case decided that this deed was not a “testament”, but a valid 
disposition. Only the fact of the granter possessing the document after his return raised 
their suspicion in respect that it might have been revoked, so they appointed additional 
investigation into that issue. Unfortunately, the Lords did not answer the question 
whether the disposition under scrutiny was a “DMC” or not, and thus the question 
whether DMCs of heritable property were possible in Scotland remained undecided.  
This “permissiveness” of the Lords in allowing dispositions very similar to 
DMCs continued in subsequent cases. The Lords, however, just as in cases on delivery 
(supra, s.3.3), avoided using the term “DMC” directly. Thus, in Pitillo v. Forrester 
(1671, II Stair 6) lands were disponed with the granter reserving the power to revoke 
the disposition even in articulo mortis and to burden the disposition by legacies. The 
donator subsequently granted heritable bonds to a third party. The donatary challenged 
the bonds on several grounds, one of them being that they were made on deathbed. 
The Lords dismissed this claim, although the bonds were, nevertheless, voided on 
formal grounds. In the already cited case McBride v. Bryson (1680, M.17002=III 
B.S.317) a tenement was disponed with the same reservation – a right of revocation 
even in articulo mortis. The granter afterwards made a unilateral undelivered 
document, in which he declared the disposition “null and void” and restored the rights 
of the heirs of line. The Lords, once again, did not use the term “DMC”, but they 
characterized the disposition as a one of a “testamentary nature”. This “nature”, 
however, does not seem to have been the ground of invalidity of the disposition in this 
case – the judges based their decision solely on the revocation. This decision, 
nevertheless, did not entail that such a disposition could be revoked by a 
straightforward last will.507 
                                                          
506 This question was debatable at the Ius Commune, supra, p.80.  
507 This follows from the Lords’ referring to the fact that the declaration was made in favour of the 
heirs of line, in respect of whom there was no need of delivery of a document. If the declaration had 
been a last will, there would have been no need whatsoever to discuss delivery.  
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In another case already cited, Lesly v. Lesly (1699, M.3597),508 where both 
heritage and moveables were disponed by a revocable tailzie, the substitute of the 
tailzie thought it reasonable to refer to Henderson v. Henderson in support of the 
position that such deeds were valid. The wording is ambivalent, however – it could 
also mean that this tailzie was “valid” in the sense of “not revoked” by the granter’s 
return from the journey, similarly to Henderson. In Lesly, the Lords found the tailzie 
to be inter vivos and thus not revoked by the granter’s return and the disponee’s 
predecease. Whether it would have been valid as to heritage if it had been a DMC once 
again remained unanswered. This is unsurprising, considering that, as was already 
shown above (supra, pp.86-88), the courts were very reluctant in this period to 
recognize particular transactions as DMCs.  
It is possible that this uncertainty on whether a heritable estate could be left by 
a DMC was the exact reason why neither the parties nor the Lords were eager to put 
this issue to the test after Henderson. Particular ways to settle heritable property after 
one’s death were too well established in practice for the heirs to try challenging them 
on the grounds of a theoretical issue only (that they were DMCs). The Lords, on their 
part, might try to avoid using strict Civilian terminology and formulating general 
maxims, like “DMCs of land are (not) allowed”. Their conscious intention to allow the 
populace to overcome the strictness of the law of ‘deathbed’, which was so obvious in 
their treatment of the law of delivery (supra, s.3.3), might also have come into play 
here.  
 
3.6. Gifts mortis causa and the Legal Shares of Wife and Children. 
The custom of tripartitio in Scotland, where a wife and children had rights to 
a share of a man’s moveable estate, is extremely old, first mentioned in Regiam 
Majestatem (Reg.Maj.II.37) and then characterized by the 1420 Provincial Council 
(SES, 166) as being “beyond the memory of man”. This never ceased to be the law in 
Scotland, so that testamentary freedom, as a result, was seriously restricted. 
                                                          
508 Supra, p.87.  
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However, exactly how and when tripartitio became associated with the law of 
‘deathbed’ is much less clear. Where did the rule that DMCs and gifts made on 
deathbed could only burden the “Dead’s part” of the estate come from? Among the 
Scottish legal writers, Stair was the first to mention it.509 Dirleton, circa 1680, was the 
first to provide a more or less comprehensive theory on this matter.510 In the lifetime 
of a married man, family goods, in theory, were common, with the wife and children 
having their own shared interests in them. While the head of the family were alive and 
well, he had the full right of administration and ownership over the estate goods, able 
to dispose of them for value as well as for gratuitous causes. However, as soon as the 
head of the family fell into his lectum aegritudinis, the communion of goods comes 
into real force, so that the father is no longer able to prejudice the shares of the family 
members. This doctrine was largely rejected by the Scots courts in the 19th century,511 
but it was dominant for a century after the Dirleton’s work.512 Some early cases seem 
to confirm Dirleton’s theory.513 
An alternative explanation on how the law of deathbed came to be applied to 
moveable estate might be an analogy from the rights of an heir. As was mentioned 
before (supra, pp.97-98), an heir could challenge a moveable debt created on deathbed, 
in so far as the heir could be held liable for such debt as the defunct’s representative. 
Seeing this, it would be quite logical that not only the heir but also the defunct’s family 
members should be allowed to challenge such a debt. The earliest decisions on wives 
and children successfully reducing deathbed transactions 514  come from the well-
reported decade of the 1620s, when also appear the earliest cases of heirs reducing 
moveable debts.515 
                                                          
509 Inst.III.8.32, 39.  
510 Dirleton, ‘Legitima Liberorum’, Some Doubts and Questions…, 112-113. 
511 See: R.M., ‘The nature of legitim and jus relictae’, Journal of Jurisprudence, vol 3 (1859), 72-75. The 
modern understanding of the “Bairns’ part” and jus relictae is that they are debts burdening the 
testator’s estate, although succumbing before ordinary debts.  
512 Thus, Erskine repeats Dirleton’s doctrine (Inst.III.9.16).  
513 In Moncrieff’s Bairns v. Moncrieff (1637, I B.S.371) the testator on his deathbed gave the keys of a 
chest with cash to one of his sons. The court found that the cash located in the chest at the moment 
of the gift belonged to the testator only in one third, the other thirds belonging to the wife and children.  
514 Cant v. Edgar (1628, M.3199), where a relict challenged the assignation granted on deathbed as 
being in prejudice of her third.  
515 Shaw v. Gray (1624, M.3208) might be the earliest one.  
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Whatever the origins of the anti-mortis causa and anti-deathbed rules in respect 
of the legal shares, these rules were much stronger than the similar rules in favour of 
heirs and executors. It should not be a big surprise, considering that there was a real 
social interest in guaranteeing to a wife and children a part of the testator’s estate, 
which was explained by Stair as a “natural obligation” of the parents towards 
children,516 similar to the legitima pars bonorum or portio debita jure naturae of the 
Ius Commune. In this, the right of wife and children were unlike the interest of heir, 
which ceased to be of social significance after the decline of feudalism, as well as the 
interest of the executor, which was primarily of procedural and fiscal significance 
(supra). Thus, the courts allowed the latter two interests to be avoided by legal means. 
They could not do the same with the legal shares. 
Consequently, unlike the interest of executors, the interests of wife and children 
did not depend on whether possession of the goods was transferred in the testator’s 
life.517 In contrast to the position regarding the executor’s and the heir’s interest, the 
legal shares could not be prejudiced by a donatio mortis causa.518 A deed which was 
an explicit and fully revocable DMC was thus equal to a legacy in that it could not 
burden the whole estate.  
What if a bond by the testator remained undelivered, as was often done (supra, 
s.3.3)? This was one of the questions Dirleton discussed in his Doubts and 
Questions.519 He adopted a subjective criterion to solve the issue: an undelivered bond 
would charge the whole estate if there was no intention of fraud on the granter’s side 
(infra, p.104). Most of the subsequent Institutional writers, however, seem to have held 
that the bond must be fully delivered to be able to burden the entire moveable estate.520 
It is not surprising that in Hadden & Lawder v. Shorswood (1668, supra, p.90), where 
an undelivered bond was recognized as valid, the Lords thought it necessary to mention 
                                                          
516 Stair, Inst.I.5.6, III.8.44. 
517 Cant v. Edgar (1628, M.3199), Moncrieff’s Bairns v. Moncrieff (1637, I B.S.371). 
518 Stair, Inst.III.8.32, 39, 43; Bankton, Inst.III.8.25. See also: Nasmith v. Jaffray (1662, M.3593=M.5483), 
where the deed was recognized as a DMC and thus charging only the “Dead’s part”; Johnston v. 
Johnston (1697, M.8198), where a party claimed that the disposition was a DMC and thus could not 
charge the whole estate.  
519 Dirleton, ‘Bond of Provision to children’, op cit, 10.  
520 Stair, Inst.I.5.6; Erskine, Inst.III.9.22; Henderson & Campbell v. Henderson (1728, M.8199). 
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the lack of a wife and children of the granter as a significant circumstance of the case. 
Only in later cases did the opposite opinion start to prevail.521 
What if a disposition of moveables for a lucrative cause was inter vivos and 
delivered - would it always charge the entire estate? There has never been a clear-cut 
answer to this question in Scots law. In Civil law, the “natural portion” of children was 
protected from both mortis causa and inter vivos donations by the querela inofficiosae 
donationis, usually irrespective of the father’s subjective intentions.522 But the Scots 
law, as pointed out by Bankton,523 “did not receive” this institution. J. M’Laren in mid-
19th century remarked that the doctrine on the issue of fraud against ‘legitim’ was 
underdeveloped even in his time,524 so the courts had to decide on a case-by-case basis, 
employing such discretionary terms as “reasonable provisions to children”, “trusts of 
testamentary nature”, etc.525  
The case law of the 17th – early 18th centuries seems to reveal that the category 
of “fraud” was the most important criterion in determining whether a particular inter 
vivos donation could prejudice ‘legitim’ and jus relictae. The abovementioned 
fragment from Dirleton on bonds of provision seems to confirm this. The law of fraud 
in Scotland in that period strongly relied upon Civil law. As G. Mackenzie testifies in 
his published commentary to the 1621 Act against fraudulent dispositions,526 the said 
Act just followed the Ius Commune rules on the actio Pauliana.527 The Act itself 
incorporated into Scots law only a fraction of the Civilian rules: it allowed creditors 
with preceding debts to revoke posterior gratuitous or inequivalent alienations of the 
insolvent debtor’s property, made in favour of “conjunct or confident persons”.528 As 
already mentioned (supra, p.95), at Civil law, alienations, if made in favour of relatives 
                                                          
521 M’Laren, op cit, vol I, p.121. The first case where a bond of provision lying beside the dying testator 
was found charging the whole estate was McKay v. Fowler (1744, M.3948). Unfortunately, the case 
was reported by J. Fergusson of Kilkerran without any details. 
522 See, e.g., Bart., C.3.29.1.  
523 Inst.III.8.27.  
524 M’Laren, op cit, vol I, p.124.  
525 M’Laren, op cit, vol I, pp.119-127.  
526 RPS, 1621/6/30. 
527 Together with the preceding 1620 Act of Sederunt (G. Mackenzie, Observations upon the Act 
against the dispositions in fraud, 9).  
528 It should be noted, however, that the 1621 Act did not introduce the rules of fraud heretofore 
completely unknown in Scots law. J. MacLeod points out that Scots judicial practice was already 
developing the rules on fraud even before 1621 (J. MacLeod, Fraud and Voidable Transfer, 81, 95-97). 
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for a small price, were presumed fraudulent.529 Scots judges tended to establish fraud 
on more objective criteria then the Ius Commune authors did.530 Nevertheless, the 
Scots judges interpreted the 1621 Act through the lenses of the Ius Commune and 
expanded the anti-fraud rules accordingly. Thus, in Henderson v. Anderson (1669, 
M.888), a sale by the debtor of all his goods was deemed a fraudulent transaction,531 
while in Street v. Mason (1672, M.4917) an alienation of all one’s heritage was 
considered a fraud to the future debt.532 Both cases are full of express and implicit 
citations to Civil law authorities.533  
Fraud to the legal shares of wife and children was identified along the lines of 
the presumptions of fraud, developed by the Civilian authors. Thus, where the testator 
disposed of his entire moveable estate, this was very likely to be ‘reduced’ or 
interpreted in such way as not to prejudice the legal shares. This happened in Nasmith 
v. Jaffray (1662, supra, p.84); this also happened in Grant v. Grant (1679, M.3596), 
where a disposition of one’s all moveables after one’s death, although not a DMC and 
not revocable, was deemed to concern the “Dead’s part” only. Not all the cases were 
the same, though. In Johnston v. Johnston (1697, M.8198), the disposition of all 
father’s goods to the younger son was deemed fully effectual. However, in this case 
the matter was complicated by the elder son being an heir-at-law to the defunct, getting 
the latter’s entire heritage and, possibly, refusing to collate it. Bankton in his 
Institutions (Inst.III.8.26) suggested that dispositions of entire estates could prejudice 
‘legitim’ but could not prejudice jus relictae; however, his opinion does not seem to 
be confirmed by practice.534 
As already mentioned above (supra, p.103), a DMC or a deed of “testamentary 
nature” was always subject to the legal shares and could only extend to the “Dead’s 
                                                          
529 Bart., D.39.5.15; Jason de Mayno, Lectura de actionibus, Inst.Just.IV.6.6. 
530 For example, in Scotland alienations were often ‘reduced’ because of the debtor’s insolvency 
occurring afterwards, i.e., when the debtor subjectively did not intend any fraud (Mackenzie, op cit, 
4-5).  
531 An alienation of one’s all goods also created a presumption of fraud (supra, p.95; Jason de Mayno, 
ibid.). In the case, the buyer was explicitly charged with being a particeps fraudis, fully In line with the 
Civil law requirements (C.7.75.5).   
532 Cf., Bart., D.42.8(9).10.  
533 On the extensive interpretation of the 1621 Act, see: MacLeod, op cit, 105-128. 
534 Henderson & Campbell v. Henderson (1728, M.8199). 
106 
 
part”.535 In this, Scots law was similar to Civil law.536 There was no necessity for the 
deed to be a “DMC” in the strictest term possible, revocable by the donator’s 
survivance, etc. – one and the same deed could be not “testamentary” in respect of its 
revocability but “testamentary” in respect of the legal shares.537 
Another sign of a fraudulent transaction, that is hard to identify with a particular 
Civilian presumption of fraud, was postponement of the obligation to the time of the 
debtor’s death.538 In the mid-19th century, this, although not being the sole reason to 
consider a transaction fraudulent or mortis causa, was a ground for suspicion in that 
respect.539 This seemingly contradicts the Civilian doctrine, which did not consider 
mentioning death a sufficient sign of a DMC and recognized the possibility of inter 
vivos contracts, even donations, becoming efficient at the moment of death or at the 
term or condition fulfilled after one’s death.540 
The difference, however, was not that drastic. Already in the early 17th century, 
Scots case law recognized that promises and dispositions taking effect after death 
could be inter vivos.541 In both the Ius Commune and Scots law, the wording of a 
contract was relevant in determining whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa. 
Bartolus, in one of his consilia, was dealing with the question whether an agreement 
between two men to succeed to each other was effectual.542 His conclusion was that if 
such contract created an express obligation of the parties, albeit a conditional one, it 
was valid, but if it just bestowed the property after a party’s death, it was ineffectual 
as pactum successorium. Although the conclusion of this consilium is not directly 
applicable to Scots law, which has historically been quite welcoming to pacta 
                                                          
535 Nasmith v. Jaffray (1662, M.3593=M.5483); Johnston v. Johnston (1697, M.8198). 
536 See Bartolus in his commentary to D.39.5.15 mentioning that DMCs are revocable by the fisc or the 
creditors, irrespective of intention to defraud.  
537 Such was the deathbed assignation in Aikman v. Boyd (1679, M.3201).  
538 Houston v. Houston (1631, M.8049=M.12307), Thomsons v. Creditors of Thin (1675, M.3593), Lady 
Balmain v. Graham (1721, M.8199), Henderson & Campbell v. Henderson (1728, M.8199). 
539 M’Laren, op cit, vol I, p.123.  
540 See C.4.11.1, et ibi Bald.  
541 See Traquair & Robertson v. Blushiels (1626, M.3591), where a disposition of certain goods to be 
delivered after the granter’s death was deemed an inter vivos donation. Moreover, obligations to 
bestow property on children of marriage were widespread in the marriage contracts since the early 
times, although not, technically, donations (Home v. French (1608, M.12886), McMath v. McCall (1619, 
M.12847), Finlayson v. Veitch (1622, M.12848)).  
542 Bart., cons. 212; infra, p.120.  
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successoria (infra, chapter IV), the logic used in solving this case was, intentionally 
or coincidentally, followed in Scotland; on the one hand, if a promise was made in the 
form of a command to the executors, it would be deemed a “legacy”.543 On the other 
hand, if the granter created an obligation and just “suspended payment” to the time of 
his death, it was an inter vivos deed.544 
As regards the “suspension of payment”, Thomsons v. Creditors of Thin (1675, 
M.3593) should be mentioned again. In that case, a large bond, exceeding the granter’s 
free goods, was granted to be paid in case of the granter’s decease without heirs of his 
body. The granter’s wife tried to challenge the bond, claiming, inter alia, that the 
obligation on the bond did not become effectual until after the granter’s death, so it 
could not prejudice the wife’s share, which was due immediately after the granter’s 
death. The Court’s decision was complex. The Lords rejected the relict’s arguments, 
holding that the bond was inter vivos and just “suspended the payment” until the 
granter’s death. Thus, it could not be voided. However, the Court admitted that 
granting a lucrative obligation in such a way that a relict would receive nothing after 
the granter’s death would obviously be a “fraud”. Therefore, the bond was interpreted 
in such way that it could only charge the defunct’s “Dead’s part”. In the end, as the 
deed was not voided, the Lords found that the relict implicitly renounced her legal 
share by her own subsequent actions, thus becoming liable to the full extent of the 
goods she intromitted with.  
Here we see both the establishment of the “suspension of payment” rule and 
the appearance of a completely new argument. Here a lucrative transaction, although 
undoubtedly inter vivos and within the husband’s marital competence, was 
nevertheless deemed “fraudulent” for the reason that the wife might be left with 
nothing at all. This does not look like a strict rule of law, reminiscent more of a general 
“good faith” principle. There might have been some similarity with the Civil law rule 
that at least something should be left to the heir, so that a gift of “all goods present and 
future” could not be valid, as it deprived the testator of anything to make a will about 
                                                          
543 Houston v. Houston (1631, M.8049=M.12307). 
544 J. M’Laren, ibid.   
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and thus took away testamentary freedom.545  The analogy might be quite forced, 
nevertheless.  
At the same time, it cannot be said that the law of fraud is the only key to the 
history of dispositions in prejudice of the legal shares of wife and children. A late case, 
Henderson & Campbell v. Henderson (1728, M.8199), is an example of that. In that 
case, the father disposed of all his moveable goods after his death to his son. His other 
children were provided with bonds of provision for particular sums. One of his 
daughters, however, challenged the disposition. On behalf of the son, it was alleged 
that, as all the children were provided, the disposition could not be fraudulent. 
However, the daughter’s counsel claimed, even if this transaction was not fraudulent, 
it nevertheless could not prejudice the ‘legitim’, as the obligation here started at the 
moment of death. The pursuer admitted that a mere “suspension of payment’ until 
death was not a sufficient ground for deeming a transaction a DMC, but this particular 
disposition was different. The Lords favoured the pursuer’s case.  
The last case shows that the Civil law of fraud might not be the only source of 
criteria for distinguishing between inter vivos and mortis causa dispositions. Scots law 
had its own more or less ingenious rules, which might be applied by analogy. Thus, 
there was a long and quite consistent line of case law on whether provisions to children 
in marriage contracts could or could not compete with creditors. 546  The sheer 
abundance of cases suggests that most of the provisions to children were actually left 
in marriage contracts rather than in lucrative bonds. The texts of the marriage contracts 
usually followed feudal terminology and the principles of heritable succession, 
appointing children of the marriage as the “heirs of provision” to sums of money or 
the whole estate. In majority of such cases, the contracts of marriage only created 
obligations on the father to bestow property to the children after his death; in such 
case, the children had only a spes successionis and could not compete with the father’s 
creditors. In cases where the children’s rights were already exigible in the father’s 
lifetime, they bore chances to be recognized as jura crediti and had an equal standing 
with other creditors (infra, s.4.5).  
                                                          
545 Infra, s.4.1.  
546 See infra, s.4.5. 
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Practice on marriage contracts, having its basis in the Scots law of heritable 
succession, could thus provide another (besides the Civil law of fraud) mechanism of 
distinguishing between inter vivos and mortis causa deeds and explain why promises 
to be performed after death were often regarded with suspicion in Scotland. But all 
that is a mere speculation. As was already said, the Scottish practice on dispositions in 
prejudice of legal shares was quite controversial, and still underdeveloped even in the 
19th century. What is clear, however, is that the Court of Session took seriously the 
task of defending the legal shares. The rights of surviving spouses and children did not 
share the fate of the rights of heirs-at-law, which since the 1660s turned into a 
formality, easily avoidable by carefully worded instruments (supra, s.3.5). The 
concept of a mortis causa gift remained conservatively wide in respect of the legal 
shares of wife and children.  
 
It is time to summarize this chapter. Originally, the concept of donatio mortis 
causa in Scotland had a much wider definition than the one accepted by 19-20th century 
Scots law. Its original meaning was similar to that in the Ius Commune, encompassing 
both promises and dispositions, fully revocable and very similar to legacies, sometimes 
excluding the standard probate procedure by an executor. DMCs could not prejudice 
heirs and the legal shares of wife and children. However, from around the mid-17th 
century the judges started to avoid applying the term “DMC”. It seems that this turn in 
the courts’ attitude was intentional, calculated to allow devices specially designed to 
overcome the rights of the heirs. A new, intermediate group of dispositions emerged, 
which were deemed mortis causa in some aspects (delivery, interpretation, legal shares 
of wife and children) but inter vivos in other aspects (rights of heirs, revocability). 
This, together with the rule that possession was to be transferred in the testator’s 
lifetime to exclude the executor’s rights, had the side effect of narrowing down the 
definition of  “DMC” proper by the 18th century, so that a DMC could be made only 
by delivery and only in respect of moveable property. However, the definition of a 
mortis causa disposition remained conservatively wide in respect of the legal shares 
of wife and children and (until the 1690 Act) in respect of the executor’s rights and 
“quots” to the Commissaries. In these two last respects, the distinction between inter 
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vivos and mortis causa deeds was strengthened by the Civil law doctrines of fraud of 
creditors.   
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Chapter IV. Agreements on Future Succession (Pacta successoria) 
At first sight, pacta successoria (agreements on succession) seems to be a topic 
where one should not expect to find much in common between Scots law and the 
Continental Ius Commune. Indeed, the Scots authors did not restrain themselves in 
stressing how different their law was from the Continental legal systems in its 
acceptance of contracts on succession. Stair contrasted Scots law with Civil law in that 
the former accepted pacta de hereditate viventis and admitted contracts to bestow 
legacies, thus being closer to “natural Equity” (Inst., I.10.8; III.8.28). G. Mackenzie, 
at the end of his Treatise on Tailies, recommended that the “common law” (i.e., the 
Ius Commune) change its restrictive position on successory agreements. 547  The 
counsel for the winning party in the case Ragg v. Brown (1708, M.5260=M.9492), 
talking about pacta de hereditate viventis, condescendingly noted: “The Romans, a 
jealous people, much given to poisoning, did restrict such bargainings, but our law 
has repudiated these niceties…”. Later legal writers followed suit.548 
The real attitude of Scots legal practice towards pacta successoria, especially 
at the early stages, was, however, much more complicated. Yet even more complicated 
was the position of the Ius Commune itself, where such pacta always remained 
controversial. This chapter will contain a complex analysis of doctrinal and practical 
problems, posed by pacta successoria both in the Ius Commune and in Scotland. 
 
4.1. Pacta successoria in the Ius Commune.  
It will not be possible to provide here a full picture of all the nuanced opinions 
and subtle distinctions put forward by the Medieval and Early Modern Continental 
jurists on the topic. What will suffice are some basic premises and recurring ideas. 
There are common misconceptions about the Ius Commune position on pacta 
successoria. Thus, Dale Hutchison in his 2007 article on succession agreements in 
                                                          
547 Mackenzie, A Treatise on Tailies // Mackenzie’s Works, vol II, 491.  
548 ‘Spes successionis’, Green’s Encyclopaedia of the Law of Scotland (1899), vol XI, 389; J. Trayner, 
‘Pactum corvinum de haereditate viventis’, Latin Phrases and Maxims: Collected from the Institutional 
and Other Writers on Scotch Law (1861), 218; J.L. Wark, ‘Spes successionis’, Encyclopaedia of the Laws 
of Scotland (1933), vol XIV, 161-162.  
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Scots and South African law states that “an agreement can only be a pactum 
successorium if it purports to bind to a disposition of an asset on or after one’s 
death”.549 Nothing could be further from the truth as regards the Ius Commune. 
In fact, this might to some extent be true in respect of Classical Roman law, 
which did not allow obligations becoming effectual in the person of a successor 
(Gai.Inst.III.100). However, Justinian’s 531 A.D. constitution (C.4.11.1) explicitly 
abolished this prohibition. Thus, the medieval learned lawyers considered it perfectly 
possible that an action or a contractual obligation became effectual at a term or a 
condition being fulfilled after the death of either the debtor or the creditor. There was 
no problem in promising that some property be given by your heir or to the creditor’s 
heirs.550  
The problems started where one’s entire estate was to be disponed. The estate 
(“hereditas”) as a universal thing, containing both assets and liabilities, could only be 
disponed by a testament, so the common opinion of jurists did not admit promises to 
bestow either the whole or a portion of the promisor’s hereditas;551 there was however, 
an opinion that a portion of the hereditas could be promised.552 However, instead of 
the hereditas one might promise one’s own “goods” (bona). Unlike “hereditas”, this 
term meant “all property, debts excluded”. 553  As a promise of the portion of the 
“goods” owned by the promiser at the moment of his life did not directly purport to 
make the creditor a universal successor, such promise was generally considered 
valid.554 One might even promise to donate “all goods present and future” after one’s 
death, except that in this case some portion of goods was to be reserved, so that the 
donator retained the property to leave by will and his heirs retained a theoretical 
incentive to accept succession.555 A sale of all one’s goods after one’s death was, on 
                                                          
549 D. Hutchison, ‘Succession Agreements in South African and Scots Law’, ELS (2007), 232.  
550 Bart., D.45.1.61.  
551 Bart., D.45.1.61, C.2.3.30; Jason de Mayno, C.2.3.30; G.D. Durante, De arte testandi, II.10.  
552 Baldus reports this as an opinion of Pierre de Belleperche (c. 1230-1308). See Bald., C.2.3.30.  
553 On the distinction between the terms “bona” and “hereditas”, see the Gloss to D.36.1.23(22).5, s.v. 
“Retinebitur”. 
554 Bart., D.45.1.61; Durante, De arte testandi, II.10.  
555 Bart., D.45.1.61, C.2.3.30, cons. 76; Bald., C.2.3.30.  
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the other hand, considered perfectly valid, as the testator retained the sale price to 
dispone by will.556 
Addressing the issue of pacta successoria in general, we may find here two 
basic considerations, which stood in the way of those agreements’ validity. One was a 
consideration of morality, which has already been slightly touched on here. The other 
consideration was about vesting of rights. In fact, one could not dispose of the share 
of succession to a living person not only because it was contra bonos mores but also 
because one did not have any true rights in the person’s estate in the first place! The 
terms like “vesting” or “vested” were not used by the Ius Commune jurists 
themselves;557 however, they provide good generic terms to describe the extent to 
which a right or an interest at Civil law could be alienated, renounced, transmitted or 
otherwise disposed of.  
A popular way among the learned lawyers to classify the interests depending 
on the degree of “vesting” was to divide them into: 1) fully vested rights in re & spe; 
2) spes de jure (proper expectations), among which a) spes obligationis and b) spes 
successionis could be distinguished; 3) improper expectations, that is, rights existing 
neither in re nor in spe.558 
Into the first (1) category fell rights which did not depend on unfulfilled future 
conditions and were either presently effectual or certain to become effectual: vested 
legacies, a right to accept the estate by the heir, unconditional promises, etc.559 Many 
kinds of rights from this category could be renounced by a unilateral declaration,560 as 
well as by a pactum. Moreover, such rights usually could be transmitted to successors 
and alienated (assigned). The general rule was that a right non-transmissible to 
                                                          
556 Ibid.  
557 Various terms were used for this feature in respect for various kinds of rights: “cessio” for legacies, 
“delatio” for a right in the estate, obligations were “born” (“nascuntur”), etc.   
558 For this classification see, esp., Bartolus’ and Jason de Mayno’s commentaries to C.2.3.1.  
559 The moment when a right became fully vested varied greatly depending on the type of right in 
question. Thus, the death of a particular person, if attached to a legacy, was considered a condition 
(D.35.1.75; D.36.2.4), but was deemed a certain term if attached to inter vivos contracts (Bart., 
D.45.1.38.16). Thus, pending someone’s decease, a legacy was not yet a vested right, while a 
contractual promise in such case was a vested right in re&spe.  
560 Not all kinds of vested rights, however, could be renounced unilaterally. For example, a right of 
possession could be renounced, while a right of ownership could not (D.41.2.17.1; Bart., C.2.3.1).  
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successors was also not assignable;561 there were, however, numerous cases when a 
right was transmissible but not assignable.562 
Those titles of the Corpus juris civilis, that dealt with sales and assignations of 
hereditas (D.18.4; C.4.39), concerned only the sale of a fully vested right of 
succession, which arose after the testator was dead, all conditions fulfilled and 
succession accepted by the heir who was selling.563 A passage from the Digest, talking 
about a sale of “quasi spes hereditatis” (D.18.4.11),564 should not confuse readers: the 
situation it was dealing with was that of uncertainty whether the seller had rights as an 
heir or not, so that such contract was valid only in case there actually was a vested 
right in the seller’s person at the time of making.565  
A disposition of the estate in the Ius Commune, however, could never entail an 
alienation of the title of heir itself.566 You could not entitle another person to accept 
the estate instead of you; in fact, aditio hereditatis could not even be performed 
through an agent (D.29.2.90). The same was true for a universal fideicommissum.567 A 
purchaser of the estate or a share in it could only receive it through the seller, who 
remained the heir or the fideicommissary. Thus, the seller remained liable for the debts 
of the testator. In case of a lucrative (gratuitous) disposition of the estate, however, 
some jurists admitted a possibility of estate creditors directly suing the donatary.568 
However, a person entitled to a vested legacy of particular property could assign the 
                                                          
561 Bart., D.26.7.42; Bald., C.4.39.9.  
562 M.A. Pellegrini (M.A.Pellegrini, De fideicommissis praesertim universalibus tractatus (1599), art 
XXXI, p.476) mentions that there were 39 such cases. A universal fideicommissum, before the 
restitution, was one of such cases (see n.721 infra). 
563 However, it seems that, even if the estate had not yet been technically accepted before the making 
of a contract, making the contract by the heir would obviously qualify as an implicit aditio hereditatis.  
564 Many Romanists hold that this passage is an interpolation (J.A.C. Thomas, ‘Venditio Hereditatis and 
Emptio Spei’, Tulane Law Review, vol 33 (1958), 541-550).  
565 See Gloss to D.18.4.10.  
566 Whether a transfer of the title of heir was possible in Classical Roman law is a debatable question 
(Thomas, op cit, 545-546).  
567 It could not, however, be assigned or granted to a procurator in rem suam (D.23.3.59.1, s.v. “Debet”; 
Bart., D.30.1).  
568 Baldus holds so in his commentary to C.4.39.2, with reference to D.39.5.28 (a donatary of the estate 
must secure the donator against claims of creditors). However, in his commentary to C.2.3.2 Baldus 
seems to take the contrary opinion – that the donatary of the estate may not be sued by the estate 
creditors directly, unless he voluntarily accepts the lawsuit.  
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action to a third party, so that the third party could sue for the legacy in his own name 
by actio utilis.569 
Expectations (spes), the second category of interests mentioned above, were 
rights suspended on some certain condition, such as conditional obligations, legacies, 
hereditary shares, etc. The jurists drew a distinction between two definitions of the 
word spes: legitimate spes (spes de jure) and spes in an improper or vulgar meaning 
of the word. Spes de jure were expectations based on causes existing in the present 
time.570 If there was a legacy or a promise of something, suspended, for example, on 
the arrival of the ship or the fulfillment of some work by the creditor, this was a 
legitimate present cause to expect the realization of the condition and vesting of the 
right in the future. Only such expectations were considered legitimate and fell under 
the second (2) category.571 Expectations which did not depend on a present cause or 
depended on someone’s mere will were not considered legitimate and, although 
sometimes also improperly called “spes”, fell under the third (3) category of 
interests.572  
Unlike vested rights, spes de jure could not be renounced by a unilateral 
declaration.573 A commonly accepted exception was made for renunciations made in 
court during a trial (D.42.7.1). Jason de Mayno, under obvious influence of Canon 
law,574  held that a spes could also be renounced by an oath or by a declaration 
confirmed (geminata) subsequently.575 However, a spes could be renounced or, more 
precisely, bargained against by a pactum (agreement). A pactum, in order to be valid, 
required the participation or, at least, presence of the other party.576  
                                                          
569 C.4.39.5, 8-9.  
570 Bart., D.34.3.6.1; Bald., C.2.3.30.  
571 Ibid.  
572 Bart., C.2.3.30, in fine.  
573 D.31.45.1; Bart., C.2.3.1. 
574 See infra, p.122, on the import of oaths from Canon law.  
575 Jason de Mayno, C.2.3.1.  
576 Bart., C.2.3.1. In obligations, the other party to the pactum de non petendo would be the debtor, in 
legacies and fideicommisses – the burdened heir or legatee or a conjunct legatee (C.6.51.1.11). In case 




Transmissibility and assignability of spes de jure was a much more 
complicated issue. Expectations arising from conditional inter vivos contracts and 
promises (spes obligationis) and expectations arising from conditional last wills (spes 
successionis) were different in this respect. A spes obligationis was fully transmissible 
to the creditor’s successors.577 It could also be assigned freely, with the assignee 
immediately acquiring the right in spe, which could be further assigned by him and 
transmitted to successors (C.8.53.3, 33).  
On the other hand, a spes successionis (e.g., a conditional legacy or a heirship) 
was not transmissible to the entitled person’s successors until the fulfillment of the 
condition.578 The testator could provide in the last will that the legacy would pass to 
the legatee’s heirs if the legatee predeceased the fulfillment of condition,579 but this 
would not be a ‘transmission’ in the strict meaning of the word: the legatee’s heirs 
would receive the legacy not as a part of the legatee’s estate but quasi ex persona 
sua.580 This was because the rights of succession were by their nature attached to a 
particular person; they were always divided when their payment was stretched in time. 
Thus, if a stipulation or another contract provided for annual payments to be made in 
future, this was all one contract; but, if a last will provided for annual payments, such 
payments were considered separate legacies.581 
Not being transmissible, a spes successionis could not be assigned with an 
immediate effect. It could, probably, be promised by future words, similarly to the 
interests of the third category (infra, p.117). It could also be given to someone as the 
assignor’s procurator (agent), but it would not possess the features granted to a 
procurator in rem suam by C.8.53.33; thus, such mandate would be revocable and 
would perish if either party predeceased the vesting of the right.582 The sale of the 
                                                          
577 D.50.17.18; Bart., D.45.1.115; Bald., C.4.11.1.  
578 D.50.17.18; C.6.51.1. 
579 This was the way some jurists interpreted D.35.1.56 (Bald., C.4.11.1).  
580 Bald., C.4.11.1. The adverb “quasi” was added because the legatee’s heir, nevertheless, received 
the legacy “in consideration of the person of the original legatee”. So, in Baldus’ opinion, the heir was 
to include such legacy in the inventory of the original legatee’s estate.  
581 D.36.2.12; Bart., D.39.6.35.5, D.45.1.115. 
582 C.4.35.15; Sext.1.19.6.  
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estate by a conditional heir would not preclude further dispositions of the same 
estate.583  
Finally, the interests of the third (3) category included the rights which did not 
exist either in re or in spe,584 or, in different words, expectations which could only be 
called “spes” improperly. Succession to a living person was a typical example.585 
Taking into account the extensive testamentary freedom at Civil law, it is not 
surprising that a possibility to succeed to a specific person could not qualify as either 
a “right” or a “spes” – it was fully dependent on the will of that person. Other examples 
were also provided: thus, Baldus listed a catch in the net and a fortune won in gambling 
among the examples of a spes with no present cause.586  
The interests of this category, as a general rule, could not be renounced either 
unilaterally or by a pact; they were not transmissible or assignable by present words.587 
However, the jurists allowed renunciation and, generally, bargaining about such 
expectations in future terms: “I will renounce this in case the condition is fulfilled…”, 
etc.588 A future catch in the net or a future trophy won in a game could be sold in 
advance, although the seller would not be liable for inactivity or eviction.589 The object 
of the executory contract in such case, however, was to be certain enough. Baldus 
provides examples of a “vana spes”, an expectation too uncertain to be bargained about 
even in future terms: “all the fish I may capture in future”, “any castle I may be granted 
by the king”, etc.590 
Whether conceived in present or in future terms, contracts and pacts were 
subject to the rules restricting disposability of some rights and interests. In this context, 
it is important to mention one of them, based on several fragments of the Digest 
                                                          
583 In case a vested right of heirship was sold and then sold again to another buyer by the seller, the 
second sale covered not the original goods, but the price from the first sale (D.18.4.21). This was a 
unique feature of dispositions of a universitas.  
584 Bart., C.2.3.1.  
585 Bart., D.29.2.18; D.34.3.6.1, C.2.3.30, in fine. 
586 Bald., C.8.53.3. Of course, this classification might seem doubtful from a strictly philosophical point 
of view.  
587 D.43.3.1.11; C.8.50.4. 
588 D.45.1.31; Bart., C.2.3.1. 
589 Bald., C.8.53.3. 
590 Ibid.  
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(D.2.14.35; D.2.15.6, 12; D.45.1.122.6), which dealt with mutual settlements 
(transactiones) by successors in respect of the estate of a deceased person. Two 
principles the jurists deduced from these fragments were the following. Firstly, the 
right granted by a last will could be renounced, promised, bargained about or alienated 
only if the parties knew precisely the contents of the last will. Thus, no one could 
denude himself of the rights contained “in whatsoever testament there may be” or in 
similar terms – the heir or legatee was supposed to know what he was contracting 
about.591 Another principle was that a general settlement or a renunciation could not 
prejudice the rights contained in a last will that was not expressly referred to.592 Both 
these principles were justified by the need to avoid fraudulent concealing of last wills.  
What about the succession to a living person, could it be bargained about in 
future, present or other kinds of words? Here is where the moral considerations came 
into play. The key passages from Corpus juris civilis on this issue were D.45.1.61 
(which forbade stipulations compelling the debtor to appoint the creditor his heir, as 
contra bonos mores), C.8.38.4 (a similar provision), C.2.3.15 (a promise to the 
daughter that she would succeed in equal portions with her brother did not bind the 
testator), C.2.3.19 (an agreement between two brothers to succeed to each other was 
valid only if they were soldiers), C.2.3.30 (a pact about the succession to a living third 
person was valid only with the consent of that person), C.3.28.35.1 (an agreement 
between the father and the son, that the son would not claim his natural portion, did 
not bind the son), C.6.20.3 (a daughter cannot renounce her entire intestate share in 
exchange for a dowry). Another passage, C.2.4.11, allowed a settlement between two 
brothers to cancel mutual fideicommisses; it was important in that it mentioned the 
term crucial for the law on the matter: “votum captandae mortis” (“a motive to desire 
death”). This expression was taken by the medieval jurists as the general justification 
behind the prohibition of pacta futurae successionis: bestowing a guaranteed right of 
succession on someone was deemed likely to tempt the grantee to seek the granter’s 
death. It was this position of Civil law that would later become the main object of 
ridicule by the Scots authors (supra, p.111), and not without reason. If guaranteeing 
succession to someone was likely to induce attempts at the testator’s life, why would 
                                                          
591 Bart., D.2.15.6, D.45.1.122.6.  
592 Bart., D.2.14.35, D.45.1.122.6. 
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a perfectly lawful inter vivos contract, taking effect after the granter’s death (supra, 
p.112), not induce the same attempts?! Votum captandae mortis, nevertheless, was an 
issue taken seriously by the jurists,593 although the extent of its applicability was 
controversial. Freedom of testamentary disposition was another argument often 
referred to.594 
The Canon law texts, however, offered a different perspective. A decretal by 
Boniface VIII of 1298 (Sext.1.18.2) dealt with the situation where a daughter, in 
exchange for receiving a dowry from the father, took an oath not to seek her intestate 
share after the father’s death. The Pope, though admitting that Civil law did not accept 
such renunciations, nevertheless, recognized it on the ground of the binding force of 
oaths. This oath, the argument went, did not cause prejudice to any third party, neither 
did its subject matter endanger the daughter’s soul; so, it bound her. Subsequent 
Canonists were often inclined to extend the validity of oaths to other situations, even 
overcoming votum captandae mortis.595 
The usual way of solving the issue of pacta futurae successionis was to divide 
them into four classes: 1) pacta de successione adquirenda, 2) pacta de successione 
conservanda, 3) pacta de successione perdenda and 4) pacta de successione tertii 
viventis.596 
Pacta de successione adquirenda, when someone promised to make another 
person an heir or to succeed to the granter, were, generally, considered invalid. This 
category of pacts, as well as their distinction from inter vivos contracts, has largely 
been covered above (supra, p.112). Many authors, however, were ready to qualify such 
pacts as ‘parental wills’ (supra, pp.27-29), if they appointed only the testator’s children 
heirs.597  
                                                          
593 A. Tartagni, for example, uses it as the main argument against a particular agreement in one of his 
consilia (Alex., cons. 28, vol III).  
594 Supra, p.108.  
595 Tartagni mentions an opinion by a Canonist that votum captandae mortis is a subjective matter, so 
it cannot be known for sure if the oath-taker had it in mind (Alex., cons. 28, vol III). 
596 See Bart., D.45.1.61, C.2.3.30 (with more detail); Bald., C.2.3.30.  
597 Jason de Mayno, C.2.3.30.  
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Much attention in this respect was paid to agreements on mutual succession. 
What if two men, especially two brothers, agreed that the surviving party would 
succeed to the predeceasing one? The presence of juristic consilia on this matter 
provides evidence that such agreements were popular in the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance. 598  The Code (C.2.3.19) was nevertheless quite explicit in that such 
agreements were invalid, except when made between soldiers; and even in case of 
soldiers they were valid not as agreements but as military wills and thus were 
revocable. Bartolus in his consilium 212, mentioned above,599 deals with an agreement 
by which two men promised that one of them, in case of a predecease without children, 
would be succeeded to by another. In the facts of that consilium, one of the contracting 
parties died first, leaving children, then the other died without children. Bartolus makes 
the question of the validity of such contract dependent on its wording. If the contract 
used the language of obligation, making the parties conditionally obliged in respect of 
their goods, then it would have been valid.600 However, as the real contract in the facts 
of the case did not use the language of obligation, but just disposed of the parties’ 
property after their death, Bartolus tended to consider it invalid. The consilium ends 
with a reservation that in case the contract were, nevertheless, valid, no right would 
pass to the first deceasing party’s successors, as the contract created only a spes 
successionis.  
Bartolus’ solution was not without critics.601 Many took a stricter approach to 
the pacts on mutual succession. Tartagni in one of his consilia602 is dealing with an 
even more “innocent” case than Bartolus: two brothers agree to succeed to each other 
in case of a predecease without children or a testament. From a formal point of view, 
this agreement did not violate freedom of testation. Nevertheless, Tartagni held this 
agreement invalid, as inducing votum captandae mortis and being contra bonos mores. 
                                                          
598 Bart., cons. 212; Alex., cons. 28, vol III.  
599 Supra, p.106.  
600 It is not exactly clear how Bartolus dealt with the fact that such obligation would restrict the 
freedom of testation, which Bartolus defended so eagerly in other places (supra, pp.107, 119). It seems, 
his logic was that, as the obligation would be conditional, the party would not lose the freedom of 
testation in an absolute way.  
601 P. Peckius the Elder (1529-1589), for example, deemed it unreliable (P. Peckius, De testamentis 
inter virum et uxorem, I.7 // Tractatus selecti…, 268). 
602 Alex., cons. 28, vol III. 
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Unlike Bartolus, he did not draw any difference in respect of the pact’s wording. Such 
pact, in Tartagni’s opinion, would only be valid if it concerned specific goods, but here 
the entire estate was promised. This distinction between a promise of specific goods 
and a promise of the entire estate was popular among the jurists.603 
Some Ius Commune authors, however, quite inconsistently with their general 
views on pacts of mutual succession, were ready to accept such agreements if made 
within marriage (infra, p.124).  
Pacta de successione conservanda were looked upon much more benevolently 
by the Continental legal authors. On the one hand, the Code (C.2.3.15) provided that 
if a father, providing the dowry for his daughter, inserted into the contract a clause that 
the daughter would still be entitled to an equal portion in the father’s estate together 
with her brother, such clause, nevertheless, did not restrain the father from providing 
differently in his testament. On the other hand, according to the Institutes 
(Inst.Just.III.2.8), a father emancipating his son retained the right to succeed to the son 
due to a “tacit agreement”.  
The prevailing opinion of the jurists who followed the mos italicus tradition 
was that pacts to conserve a share of intestate succession for the testator’s relatives 
could not restrict the testator’s testamentary freedom; however, such pacts could take 
off impediments, which deprived the relative of the right to succeed. Thus, a past 
delict, making the heir unworthy, could be forgiven by the testator. Also, in a case like 
the one described in C.2.3.15, the testator might exclude the collation of the dowry. A 
rule proposed by Bartolus was that a pact on preserving succession was valid if the 
testator could dispone in favour of that person by a last will.604 Much discussion of 
pacta de successione conservanda concentrated around real or hypothetical customs 
and statutes by local authorities, introducing new degrees of intestate succession and 
disinheriting Civil law heirs. Could the effect of such statutes be taken away by a 
pactum? In such a situation, Baldus advised examination of the purpose of the statute. 
                                                          
603 Pellegrini took it as the main distinguishing point between invalid pacta successoria and valid 
fideicommissary substitutions in contracts (Pellegrini, De fideicommissis…, art LI, 810-813). See infra, 
chapter V.  
604 Bart., C.2.3.30.  
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Thus, a statute, which provided that a daughter who received dowry could not succeed 
together with brothers, was obviously enacted in favour of the brothers; so, Baldus 
held, the pact to conserve the right of succession of the daughter was only valid if the 
brothers also consented.605 
Such a cautious approach was challenged by the legal authors of mos gallicus, 
such as A. Le Conte (1517-1586). In his short treatise trying to argue whether C.2.3.15 
was a law worthy of application, after invoking arguments from legal authorities, 
practice and common sense, he finally concluded that the father’s promise that the 
daughter would succeed in equal share with her brothers (called Isomeria) was 
obligatory even for the father himself. Among his main arguments were the subsequent 
abolition of that law by the Novels of Leo,606 the contrary practice of contemporary 
France, wide acceptance of renunciations of succession by oath in Canon law (infra) 
and, most importantly, the fact that such agreement did not create any votum captandae 
mortis, but, to the contrary, stimulated children to fulfill their duties towards their 
parents. 607  Another important argument Le Conte added was that the father’s 
testamentary freedom was not to restrict the freedom of marriage of the daughter, 
promoted by such pactum.  
Pacta de successione perdenda seem to have been of the biggest practical 
importance. Writings of learned authors suggest that Canon law’s sworn renunciations 
of succession by daughters in exchange for dowry were quite widespread and 
confirmed by custom.608 An argument in favour of such agreements was that they did 
not create votum captandae mortis but, to the contrary, extinguished such votum by 
extinguishing succession. Such agreements also did not restrict the testator’s 
testamentary freedom,609 as their function was to exclude intestate succession and 
especially compulsory portions. It is no surprise that even authors within the mos 
italicus tradition accepted the validity of such pacts as a matter of custom and as a 
matter of sin for ecclesiastical courts. There were also instances where the jurists were 
                                                          
605 Bald., C.2.3.30.  
606 They were late 9th century Greek constitutions of the Byzantine Emperor Leo VI.  
607 A. Le Conte, Tractatus de pactis futurae successionis… // Opera omnia (1616), 240-243 (error in the 
numeration of pages).  
608 Bart. and Bald. to C.2.3.30.  
609 Baldus in his commentary to C.2.3.30 stresses this point. 
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ready to accept such agreements on the ground of pure Civil law: one in the rare 
situation when the pact was connected with the renouncer’s immoral actions610 and the 
other if the renouncer received an equivalent of his or her intestate share.611 
Baldus elaborated on the way a daughter should renounce her succession. He 
suggested the oath to be conceived not in the words of “renouncing” inheritance but in 
the words of a pactum, which, furthermore, was to mention that the daughter took 
(“perceived”) the dowry in exchange for her natural portion.612 In this way, the oath 
was not merely personal, but also extended to the woman’s own successors.613 If the 
dowry was provided not by the father but by the woman’s brothers, the pact could be 
made by the woman with one of them being present, even in the father’s absence. The 
woman’s intention was to be taken into account in determining whether she renounced 
her future share in favour of one of her brothers, all of them or even in favour of all 
heirs whatsoever of her father, even his collaterals. Finally, Baldus even held that the 
tense of the oath – present or future – was irrelevant as to its effect.614 
The fourth category – pacta de hereditate tertii viventis, which were sometimes 
called pacta corvina (“ravens’ agreements”)615 - occurred when a “right” to succeed 
to the living third person was disponed to another by the potential successor. It was 
the most complicated type of agreement. On the one hand, Justinian’s 531 A.D. 
constitution (C.2.3.30) declared such pacts invalid, except when the testator, whose 
estate was the subject-matter of the pact, consented to it and persevered in that consent 
until his death. On the other hand, several fragments (D.2.14.21.4; D.17.2.3.2; 
D.18.4.2.2; D.19.1.23) seemed to allow such pacts. The jurists tended to admit the 
validity of pacta de successione tertii in special circumstances, which mitigated 
                                                          
610 Such situation was taken from D.37.12.1.3, where a father emancipated his son in return for money. 
It was deemed contra bonos mores for the father to do, so the father was deemed to have renounced 
the right of intestate succession to the son (Bart. and Jason de Mayno to C.2.3.30).  
611 Bart., C.2.3.30. The main fragment in favour of that was D.35.2.56.5, which allowed the testator to 
compensate the Falcidian quarter inter vivos to the future heir, so that the heir would no longer deduct 
it from the estate.  
612 Bald., C.2.3.30, C.6.20.3.  
613 The exception was if the daughter predeceased her father, for in that case her own children, 
representing their mother, would accept their grandfather’s estate in their own right, without 
necessity to accept the mother’s estate and thus not bound by her acts (Bald., C.2.3.30, C.6.20.3).  
614 Bald., C.6.20.3.  
615 Unfortunately, the author of this present thesis was unable to identify the origin of this nickname. 
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potential votum captandae mortis. Thus, Bartolus, Baldus and Jason de Mayno deemed 
such agreements valid if they concerned the estate of an uncertain person (e.g.: “I 
oblige to restore everything I may receive in succession…”) or disponed the right to 
succeed to someone as a part of another estate. Moreover, the agreement was valid if 
it was aimed at discharging an obligation, as well as in the case where a future legatee 
promised not to pursue for the legacy in advance (D.2.14.21.4). Outside those special 
circumstances, C.2.3.30 was applicable.616  
Medieval and Renaissance learned lawyers did not ignore the systems of 
succession developed within the feudal structures of their time. The forms of pacta 
successoria, which were common in feudal relations, found their recognition in the 
juristic works. Thus, Bartolus put a case where an emphyteusis (to which the fiefs were 
often assimilated) was granted to a father and his sons. In such situation, after the 
father’s death, the sons would take the land by virtue of mortis causa capio from the 
landlord; the share of the son predeceasing the father would accrue to the other son.617 
This situation was different from the case where the disposition was made to two 
brothers directly, in which case the predeceasing brother’s share was to revert to the 
landlord.618 
The Ius Commune authors also tended to show leniency in applying the rules 
on pacta successoria to settlements between husband and wife. The Libri Feudorum, 
which was considered a part of Corpus juris, contained fragments (Libr.Feud.II.29) 
allowing spouses to change or exclude succession to fiefs by the children of marriage. 
Indeed, even the Code allowed bargaining about the fate of dowry after the death of 
one of the spouses.619 Moreover, such jurists as Paulus de Castro and Jason de Mayno 
seem to have allowed pacts on mutual succession between the spouses,620 in what 
                                                          
616 Bald. and Jason de Mayno, C.2.3.30; Bart., D.45.1.61.  
617  Bart., D.39.6.31. However, some jurists, such as Cobarrubias-y-Leyva, criticized that opinion, 
holding instead that the sons take as original disponees from the lord (D. Covarruvias, De testamentis... 
Pars III // Tractatus selecti…, 154-155).  
618 Libr.Feud.II.12; M. Ryan, ‘Succession to Fiefs: A Ius Commine Feudorum?’, The Creation of the Ius 
Commune…(2010), 153-154.  
619 C.2.33.1, et ibi Bald. 
620 Cyno de Pistoia was the first to suggest that reciprocal donations between the spouses under 
condition of predecease were valid, but Paulus seems to have been the first to extend this possibility 
to the donations of all goods of husband and wife (Bald., Pau.Castr., Ias., C.3.28.12).  
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seems like a contradiction to the general rejection of such pacts (supra, pp.120-121). 
An opinion was even expressed that testamentary freedom may be restricted if it 
benefits marriage. The Dutch jurist, Peter Peckius the Elder (1529-1589), the author 
of the treatise On the testaments between husband and wife, nevertheless, rejected this 
opinion as being contrary to the established doctrine on pacta successoria. Instead, 
Peckius proposed achievement of the same results by mutual wills, where the husband 
and wife entitled each other to dispose of each other’s property by will and 
contractually obliged each other not to rescind the settlement.621  
 
4.2. Pacta successoria in Scots Law: General Observations. 
The starting point of the discussion of the Scots attitude to pacta successoria 
should be Th. Craig’s Jus feudale. That book in general was quite strongly inspired by 
the Continental literature, and the rules on succession agreements and on similar issues 
were no exception. Thus, Craig explicitly “agrees” with Bartolus in holding that a spes 
successionis is not a right to be defended against the deeds of the defunct.622 Craig 
mentions that a promise to bestow a portion of the “hereditas” is invalid in Scots law, 
being contrary to testamentary freedom and inducing votum captandae mortis;623 by 
hereditas he obviously means both moveable and heritable estate here.624 At the same 
time, Craig mentions that in Scotland marriage contracts, which bestowed the father’s 
entire heritable estate upon the heirs of marriage, were valid despite seemingly creating 
a votum captandae mortis – Craig doubts that a child, who was born and raised in 
expectation of such provision, might be assumed to have votum! This practice of 
marriage-contracts he considers to be of a French origin. 625  In his dealing with 
renunciation of rights, Craig is also heavily inspired by Civil law; he cites Bartolus a 
lot, although does not follow the latter’s doctrine in all the details.626 He is faithful to 
                                                          
621 P. Peckius, op cit, I.7, 13, 18 // Tractatus selecti…, 268, 273, 278; A. Braun, ‘Revocability of Mutual 
Wills’, ELS (2007), 211.  
622 “Bartolo tamen assentior spem succedendi patri non esse in consideratione” (Jus feudale, II.12.11). 
623 Jus feudale, II.17.13.   
624 Only moveable estate was subject to the testamentary freedom, which Craig mentions in the same 
fragment (Ibid.) 
625 Ibid.  
626 Jus feudale, III.1.20-23. 
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one of the abovementioned principles of Civil law: a future right, which does not have 
a present causa, cannot be renounced.627 Thus, no one may renounce succession until 
he becomes actually able to accept it.628 
Craig’s account did not stand the test of time in all its details. As was already 
mentioned above, in the account of donationes mortis causa (supra, p.94), contracts 
to dispose of one’s whole estate, moveable or heritable, were practised and recognized 
from at least 1610 and were quite widespread from the 1660s. Most of such 
dispositions, it should be noted, were more like the Civil law dispositions of bona 
rather than its dispositions of hereditas (supra, p.112), in that the granter was not 
thereby obliged to make the disponee his “heir” or “executor”, liable to the estate 
creditors. However, a gift of heritable property could include a clause that the donee 
would be liable for the deceased donor’s debts, which clause was effectual ad valorem 
of the gift.629 There were also numerous examples where the disponer promised to 
make the disponee his “heir of provision”.630 Dispositions which included appointment 
of an executor were also extremely widespread from the 18th century. 631  Craig’s 
reservation about promises to bestow a portion of estate does not seem to have ever 
been raised in practice. 
The most important 17th century cases on pacta successoria seem to have been 
Sharp v. Sharp (1631, M.4299=M.15562) and, especially, Aikenhead v. Bothwell 
(1630, M.9491). These cases will be analyzed in more detail later (infra, pp.145, 189). 
When expressly dealing with the issue of pacta successoria, Scots legal authors and 
practitioners since Stair’s time would usually just claim that pacta corvina de 
hereditate tertii viventis (i.e., the fourth category of pacta successoria, supra, pp.123-
124) were valid in Scotland, supporting this by a citation of Aikenhead v. Bothwell.632  
                                                          
627 Cf., the Civilian understanding of such future rights as not being a proper spes (supra, p.117).  
628 Jus feudale, III.1.32.  
629 Mercer v. Scotland (1745, M.9786=M.14015).  
630 See infra, chapter V. 
631 See the forms of deed in: R. Bell, A system of the forms of deeds used in Scotland, Vol III (1813), 3-
5. 
632 Stair, Inst., I.10.8, III.9.28; Nielson v. Bonnar’s Heirs (1682, III B.S.441; in this case, however, the 
issue was just mentioned and not decided); Grey v. Udney & Maitland (1694, IV B.S.142); Ragg v. 
Brown (1708, M.5260=M.9492). 
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There were other kinds of explicit succession pacts. Thus, Stair (Inst.III.8.28) 
ascribes unique features to the promise to grant a legacy: such promise, in his opinion, 
is valid and irrevocable, although may charge the testator’s “Dead’s part” only. Erskine 
in the 18th century would uphold Stair’s opinion (Erskine’s Institutes.III.9.6). In 
support of it, the case Houston v. Houston (1631, M.8049=12307) was cited. 
It has already been noted by several scholars that Stair’s and Erskine’s 
interpretation of this case was obviously wrong. The case was already mentioned 
here.633 A bond for 500 merks was granted, commanding the granter’s executors to 
pay the debt after his death. The Lords recognized this bond as a mere legacy, charging 
the “Dead’s part” only. However, that legacy was found not to be cancelled by a 
subsequent nuncupative will. The last position is in full agreement with the Scottish 
non-recognition of nuncupative legacies larger than 100 pounds (supra, p.45). Thus, it 
seems quite obvious that the legacy in this case was found not revoked because of the 
informality of its revocation, not because of any inherent “irrevocability”.634 
In the later case of Curdy v. Boyd (1775, M.15946) the testator granted his 
entire moveable estate after his death, in return for the grantee’s assistance to the 
testator in the last years of his life. After the testator’s death, the grantee sued for his 
goods. The Lords dismissed the testator’s relatives’ claim that this disposition was a 
“fraud”. More importantly, in what seems like an obiter dictum, the Lords referred to 
a principle not found explicitly in any preceding case: pacta de hereditate viventis, 
they held, were valid in Scots law, if given for an onerous cause. It is unlikely that they 
were speaking specifically about the dispositions of all goods post mortem: the long 
established case law was clear that such dispositions were valid even if given for a 
lucrative cause.635 There might be a tentative possibility that the Lords were influenced 
by the Civilian distinction between lucrative and onerous dispositions of “all goods 
present and future” (supra, pp.112-113). A more probable explanation, however, 
might be a distinction between lucrative and onerous tailzies (infra, p.189), which were 
                                                          
633 Supra, p.85.  
634 As D. Hutchison points out (Hutchison, op cit, 239-240), Lord Ivory was probably the first to notice 
this inconsistency in his 1828 edition of Erskine’s Institutes.  
635 Grant v. Grant (1679, M.3596), Irvine v. Skeen (1707, M.6350).  
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among the valid forms of pactum successorium in Scotland but were not directly 
relevant to the facts of Curdy.  
As to the issue of renunciation of future rights, which Craig solved in the spirit 
of the Ius Commune, Scots law has in the long term developed definitions different 
from those of the Ius Commune. Thus, the term “spes successionis” in the 19th century 
legal encyclopedias was defined as a “defeasible or contingent right to succeed to any 
property on the death of another”, 636  under either testate or intestate succession, 
heritable or moveable. Unlike Civil law, modern Scots law considers the right to 
succeed to a living person a proper spes, a future right, although sometimes dependent 
on the will of another living person. In the modern Scots law, such right is considered 
assignable, although assignation becomes effectual only at the moment of vesting 
(such as the death of the testator).637 The Civil law distinction between a spes with a 
present cause and an improper spes without such cause is unknown to modern Scottish 
law. 
However, historically, the Ius Commune doctrine on the disposability of future 
rights was not absolutely irrelevant in Scotland. It was not in vain that already in quite 
an early, 1554, case Laird of Udney v. His Mother (Maitland 66) an argument that a 
particular right was not yet in rerum natura was found sufficient to consider the right 
non-disposable.638 The clearest form in which the Civilian doctrine was present in 
Scots legal practice was the interpretation of general discharges and renunciations. A 
general renunciation was understood in Scotland to include only the vested rights the 
renouncer had at the moment of making it. In Haliburton v. Hunter (1633, M.5042), a 
general discharge made by a sister to her brother was found to cover the debt due to 
that sister directly but not to extend to a sum which the sister might claim in the future 
under condition of another sister dying before the term of payment. Similarly, in 
Baillie v. Baillie (1671, M.5044), a renunciation by the son of all rights in his father’s 
estate was found to extend only to his ‘legitim’ portion but not to his right as the 
                                                          
636 ‘Spes successionis’, Green’s Encyclopaedia…, vol XI, 389. A similar definition may be found in: 
Trayner, op cit, 325.  
637 ‘Spes successionis’, Green’s Encyclopaedia…, ibid; J.L. Wark, op cit, 161-162. 
638 In that case, a tailzie was made by the father, infefting his children of lands, with liferent reserved 
to the father and the mother. After the father’s decease, the Court held that, as the mother was never 
infeft of the lands in fee or in liferent, nothing could have technically been “reserved” to her.  
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substitute in a tailzie, which was deemed a “future right and hope of succession”. In 
the 1743 case of Anderson v. Andersons (M.5054), where a son renounced all “claims” 
to the father’s estate, his renunciation was found not to extend to his intestate portion 
in the father’s “Dead’s part”, as this portion was not a “claim” in the strict meaning of 
the term.639  Finally, in E. Henderson v. J. Henderson & Others (1782, M.8191), 
children agreed with their father to renounce all succession to him, having no 
knowledge about an undelivered settlement made by the father in their favour. The 
Court favoured their claim that, as the settlement was not yet effectual while the 
testator was living, the children’s renunciation of all claims they had did not prejudice 
the rights from that particular settlement.  
The Scottish agreements to bestow succession, in the form of promising to 
make someone an “heir of provision” or “heir of tailzie”, will be dealt with in more 
detail in the chapter on tailzies and destinations (infra, chapter V). Here we are going 
to concentrate on the simpler forms: the renunciations and preservations of succession, 
as well as pacta de hereditate viventis.  
4.3. Pacta de successione perdenda and pacta de hereditate viventis in Scots 
Heritable Succession. 
It is important to deal with the question of renunciation and assignation of 
rights of heritable succession first, as this will provide an insight into the similar 
developments in the Scots moveable succession. The key concept of heritable 
succession in Scotland was the “heir”. Similarly to the Ius Commune, the title of heir 
itself could never be assigned to another person, neither within the defunct’s life nor 
after his death. The liability of the heir for the defunct’s debts could not be transferred 
to another person.  
Moreover, this rule was, to a certain extent, even stronger in the Scots law of 
heritable succession, due to the feudal principles it was based upon. The heir in the 
feudal system succeeded not just to the abstract “universitas” of the defunct’s estate 
but to the property of which the defunct was “infeft”. As the “infeftment” was a public 
                                                          
639 See infra, s.4.4, for more consideration about the legal nature and disposability of the intestate 
share in moveable succession.  
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matter, so that the succession to such property passed to the heir only after the public 
and cumbersome procedure of ‘service of heir’. Unlike the Ius Commune, where the 
acceptance of estate (aditio hereditatis) was an informal procedure for which a 
unilateral declaration by the heir was enough,640 the Scottish ‘service of heir’ involved 
receiving a “retourable brieve” from the Chancery, as well as the participation of the 
defunct’s feudal superior.641 Only after completing the ‘service’ did the heir acquire a 
vested and transmissible right to the heritable property. If the heir died before being 
‘served’ as heir, no right was transmitted to his own heirs, and then the next heirs to 
the original defunct were to obtain ‘service’.642 Thence arose the problem of invalidity 
of acts and deeds made by the ‘heir-apparent’ in respect of the estate property before 
getting ‘service’. In order to solve this problem, the 1695 statute was enacted,643 which 
made the debts created by the ‘heir-apparent’, who possessed the estate property 
without ‘service’ for three or more years, chargeable against the estate. 
 Unlike Civil law, however (supra, p.114), Scots legal practice allowed a 
person to obtain ‘service of heir’ through an agent, including a procurator in rem suam. 
In fact, this was the only way of service for foreigners, who were not sworn in 
allegiance to the King of Scotland and thus could not be infeft in Scottish lands. This 
happened in Ragg v. Brown (1708, M.5260=M.9492), where an Englishman granted 
to a stranger a procuratory in rem suam to get ‘service’ to his Scottish relative after her 
death. Such procuratory obviously would expire in case of either party’s death before 
the ‘service of heir’.644  
Another alternative for one wishing to transfer rights before ‘service’ was 
mentioned in Ragg v. Brown: counsel for the winning party claimed that nothing was 
“more ordinary” than to make a resignation become effectual under a condition of the 
                                                          
640 See, e.g., C.6.30.17, Bald., cons. 224, vol II.  
641 Stair, Inst.III.5.25.  
642 Sometimes the absence of a timely ‘service of heir’ could change the line of heritable succession. 
Thus, if a son died before getting the ‘service’ to his mother, her estate would pass to her collateral 
relatives; but if the son died after the service, the property could only go to the son’s collaterals on 
the father’s side, as the maternal collaterals were excluded from heritable succession (Th. Hope, Minor 
Practicks, §114).   
643 RPS, 1695/5/167. 
644 Nevertheless, a counsel for the winning party in Ragg, to fortify his case, claimed that a mandate 
in Scotland may remain valid even after the mandator’s death, referring to the dubious case of Gray 
v. Ballegerno (1678, II Stair 594).  
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resigner’s ‘service’ as heir. ‘Resignation’ was one of the main forms of conveyance in 
Scotland, where a feu owner resigned his feu in the hands of his feudal superior in 
favour of a third person, on whom the superior was to bestow the feu.645 Thus, the heir 
might resign his future heritable right, with effect after the predecessor was dead and 
the heir had obtained the ‘service’. Such device could avoid the invalidity of a 
disposition by the disponee’s predecease.646 Unfortunately, no cases explicitly dealing 
with this type of resignations were found in the course of the present research. 
Seeing that it was possible in Scots law, in one or another way, to assign non-
vested rights of succession in advance, a question, nevertheless, arises: were they in 
essence just promises to transfer the right in the future, or could such assignation have 
a present, immediate effect? In the Ius Commune, the assignation of a spes successionis 
could have the former but never the latter consequence: it could not bestow upon the 
assignee an actio utilis or any other immediate right, neither could it preclude a 
subsequent assignation to another assignee (supra, pp.116-117). In Scotland this seems 
to have been a doubtful question for some time. In an early case Earl of Murray v. 
Defender (1564, Maitland 135), the ‘heir-apparent’ was found eligible to assign an 
incorporeal right (a reversion) before getting ‘service of heir’, with subsequent service 
in this case being of “declaratory” importance. That case, however, was dealing with 
a simpler “general service”, by which incorporeal heritable rights were transmitted, as 
distinguished from lands and annualrents, which could only be transmitted by a 
‘special service’ with infeftment.647 The ‘special service’ could hardly be called a mere 
“declaration”, being essential to constitute a title in lands and annualrents. 648  
As late as 1696, in Greig, Williamson & Dickson v. Knox (IV B.S.323), it was 
debated whether a tailzied heir-substitute could assign her right before its vesting; in 
this case the question was not explicitly decided, as the right never became vested. A 
                                                          
645 Stair, Inst.III.2.8-13; Erskine, Inst.II.7.  
646 It was a debatable topic in Scots law for some time, whether the resignatio in favorem perfected 
the disposition or a posterior ‘seisin’ by the feudal lord was necessary. However, Stair considers it 
“clear” that the lord is bound to convey the “seisin” to the acquirer by a personal obligation, which is 
transmissible to the acquirer’s heirs (Stair, Inst.III.2.12) 
647 See also Dairsey v. Hay (1663, M.4356), where the children’s renunciation of their right as “heirs of 
provision” to a heritable bond in favour of the liferenter was found invalid until the children obtained 
‘service’ as heirs. 
648 Stair, Inst.III.5.25; Bankton, Inst.III.5.21.  
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more important case is Grey v. Udney & Maitland (1694, IV B.S.142). In this instance, 
a profligate son was found entitled to assign his right as the heir-apparent (“apparency 
of succession”) of his father while the father was still living. The wording of the report 
suggests that both the son himself and his assignee could rightfully demand an 
exhibition of the defunct’s dispositions even before the ‘service’.649 On the one hand, 
this case demonstrates that the assignee of the right in succession could enjoy some of 
its privileges even before the ‘service of heir’. On the other hand, the heir does not 
seem to be completely denuded before the ‘service’, being eligible to sue for the 
exhibition, together with the assignee. The assignation here looks like a procuratory, 
with the assignee’s right still dependable on the heir’s non-revocation of the 
procuratory. This is reminiscent of the position of assignations of spes successionis in 
the Ius Commune.  
But even if Scots law might not originally allow assignations of spes 
successionis with immediate effect, this would become different in the 18th century, 
because of the influence of the “jus superveniens auctori accrescit successori” rule, 
which is called ‘accretion’ in modern Scots law.650 This rule traced its origin to a 
“warrandice” (warranty) by the disponer of heritable property to defend the purchaser 
from any competing claims. If the disponer acquired any right to the disposed property 
after the disposition, it was deemed to be a part of the original disposition and accrued 
to the purchaser ipso jure, without a need for additional disposition. 651  Such 
“supervenient” rights could not be redisponed to third parties, as they were by fiction 
included in the first disposition. 652  In 18th century cases – Creditors of Gordon 
competing (1738, M.7773), Paterson v. Kelly (1742, M.7775) – the ‘accretion’ rule 
was extended to situations where no right was initially transmitted in the disposition 
at all. So, if a debtor disponed one and the same piece of property to several disponees, 
himself not yet being infeft, the first of the disponees was preferable to the posterior 
ones after the debtor finally obtained infeftment. The cases, as far as their reports stand, 
                                                          
649  An ‘apparent heir’ had a right for such exhibition even before obtaining ‘service’ (Bankton, 
Inst.III.5.7).  
650 K.G.C. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996), §677.  
651 Stair, Inst.III.2.1-2; Erskine, Inst.II.7.2-3.  
652 It is possible that G. Mackenzie had the ‘accretion’ in mind when saying that a disposition in Scots 
law creates a “jus ad rem”. The concept of jus ad rem was of Canonical origin (Mackenzie, Treatise on 
Actions // Mackenzie’s Works, vol II, 502).  
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do not seem to deal with spes successionis, but there is no reason why the same solution 
would not have been applied to rights of future succession as well.  
The case law cited above is enough to answer the final question on assignations 
of heritable succession: did it matter whether the assignation was made within the 
defunct’s life or after his death? Ragg v. Brown (1708, M.5260=M.9492) and Grey v. 
Udney & Maitland explicitly decided that it did not, despite the attempts to have pacta 
corvina recognized as immoral. This is not surprising, considering that Aikenhead v. 
Bothwell (1630, M.9491), mentioned above, had by the time of Stair become a 
standard authority for the claim that the Civil law on pacta corvina did not apply to 
Scotland (supra, p.111). However, the original meaning of Aikenhead, which dealt 
with moveable succession, was different, as will be shown below (infra, p.145). 
We pass now to renunciations of heritable succession. As was shown above, in 
the Ius Commune both pacta de successione perdenda, made in the testator’s lifetime, 
and renunciations of succession rights after the testator’s death were distinguished 
from assignations and, under several conditions, were treated more favourably than 
the latter (supra, pp.122-123).  
Th. Craig (Jus feudale, III.1.11), inspired by both Bartolus and Scots practice, 
distinguished between renunciation of rights based on infeftment and of other rights. 
The former (rights in lands and annualrents) could not be renounced by a simple 
renunciation. They required a resignation in the feudal superior’s hands, becoming 
effectual only after the one, in whose favour the renunciation was made, himself 
became infeft. Alternatively, such rights could be renounced in the court during 
litigation, as was done with redemptions. On the other hand, a right not based on 
infeftment could be renounced by a simple renunciation, ipso jure becoming effectual 
for the person in whose favour they were made, even in his absence.  
Craig does not speak here of rights of succession. Indeed, in another passage 
he actually says that no one may renounce succession until it becomes available for 
acceptance (Jus feudale, III.1.15). However, his account of renunciations was logically 
applicable to the rights of future heritable succession as well, because of the one 
fundamental difference of Scots heritable succession from the succession according to 
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the Ius Commune. In the Ius Commune, due to the wide freedom of testation and other 
circumstances, the principle “testator vivus heredem non habet”653 was strong – only 
after the testator’s death could his heir’s right be established. In Scots law, the same 
principle was also invoked from time to time. 654  Despite this, in Scots heritable 
succession, where the making of a testament was forbidden, the heir’s name could be 
known long before the defunct’s death. For example, your elder son was your heir-of-
line, with your grandson by him being your second heir in case of the son’s predecease, 
your second son being your third heir, etc. Such lines of succession could be drawn for 
any person at any stage of his life. One could dispose of his entire heritage in liege 
poustie (supra, pp.97-98), leaving nothing to the heir-of-line, but no one could 
“disinherit” his heir-of-line.  
Because of this, a Scottish “hope” of future heritable succession was a spes 
successionis in the strict, proper meaning of that term in the Ius Commune. It did not 
depend on the defunct’s will, it had a present cause (in the blood relationship) and thus 
it was a conditional right, suspended on the heir surviving the defunct. From the 
Civilian perspective, Scots rights of heritable succession were something you could 
renounce and bargain against in present terms.  
This was the understanding that Scots legal practice followed in the years after 
Jus feudale. One could not renounce the title of heir itself in the defunct’s lifetime. 
However, one could renounce particular rights attached to the heir, which were not 
based on infeftment. Thus, the heir could renounce the right to challenge ‘deathbed’ 
dispositions.655 The right to “heirship moveables” could also be renounced. Extended 
to all feu-holders by the 1474 Act,656 this right entitled the heir-of-line to the “best of 
every kind” of moveables of the defunct, which were excluded from the executry.657 
Indeed, there are several cases658 where the heir effectively renounced his right to the 
‘heirship moveables’ in the defunct’s lifetime. In Pollock v. Pollock (1667, M.5402) 
                                                          
653 See, e.g., D.18.4.1.  
654  See, e.g., Chapman v. Gibson & Fingask (1631, M.8163). That case, nevertheless, dealt with 
moveable succession.  
655 Supra, s.3.5. 
656 RPS, A1474/5/8. 
657 Stair, Inst.III.5.9.  
658 Meidhope v. Sir Hepburn’s Son (1636, M.9691), Pollock v. Pollock (1667, M.5402). 
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the effect of such renunciation was decided upon. In this case, Pollock provided his 
entire heritage to his oldest son of the second marriage, John, as the ‘heir of provision’. 
His oldest son of the first marriage and the heir-of-line, Robert, in exchange for some 
provision, renounced all rights to his father’s heritable and moveable estate in favour 
of his father’s second wife and her heirs. After the father’s decease both Robert and 
John were charged by the father’s creditor. Robert, once again, renounced to enter as 
heir. John, in response to the charge, pleaded that the charge was to be directed first at 
the ‘heirship moveables’ renounced by Robert. 659  It was replied that Robert had 
renounced his right to the ‘heirship moveables’ back in the father’s lifetime, and thus 
‘heirship moveables’ ceased to exist and became part of the executry.  
A division arose among the Lords. Some of them held that a renunciation of 
the right to ‘heirship moveables’ was of the same effect as the renunciation of the right 
to succeed in lands: the defunct became able to dispose of them on deathbed, but, if he 
did not dispose of them expressly, the renunciation was incomplete and the right 
reverted back to the heir. Other judges held that ‘heirship moveables’ were different 
from rights in land, in that they could be renounced by a simple renunciation and thus 
ceased to exist absolutely, with the goods accruing to the executor (the position, in this 
case, held by the defunct’s second wife).  
The Court, eventually, leaned to the latter opinion. Dirleton’s report of Pollock 
mentions that one of the decisive factors that pushed the Lords to that solution was that 
Robert’s original renunciation was conceived in favour of the heirs of the second 
marriage, thus being “in effect an assignation”. However, this passage should not be 
understood as talking about a literal “assignation”. We have already seen above that 
an assignation of the right of the heir could only become effectual after the assignee’s 
‘service of heir’ (supra, pp.129-132), which did not happen in this case. What the 
judges seem to mean here is that the renunciation’s conception in favour of particular 
persons and not in an abstract way suggested that Robert’s intention was to denude 
himself of the ‘heirship moveables’ irreversibly. Such treatment of renunciations in 
                                                          
659 In that period, the widely accepted rule of Scots law was that the ‘heirs of provision’ were liable for 
the defunct’s debts in solidum but only after the ‘heirs of line’ (Craig, Jus feudale, II.17.16, 19; Stair, 
Inst.III.5.17; infra, s.5.2, 5.3). 
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favorem seems similar to the treatment by Baldus, where the renouncer’s mere 
intention was crucial in determining who the beneficiary of the renunciation was 
(supra, p.123). In this, some direct influence of the Ius Commune writings on the 
decision in Pollock seems possible, besides the obvious indirect influence through 
Craig. A similar approach we encounter in case of ‘heirs of provision’: in Sandilands 
v. Sandilands (1680, M.5498) a daughter, appointed as a substitute in the heritable 
bond due to her father, renounced the substitution in favour of the father’s “heirs and 
executors” - a renunciation which was found to render the bond moveable.  
While in the defunct’s lifetime the heir could only renounce particular rights, 
after the defunct’s decease he could renounce the title of heir as such. Moreover, one 
case suggests that a mere spes successionis could be renounced after the succession 
was opened. In Wood v. Blair (1632, M.13899), the younger son was charged by the 
defunct’s creditors to enter as heir or to renounce the estate. The defender’s plea that 
he had an elder brother, who was the true heir-apparent of the defunct and the 
appropriate defender, was rejected by the Court, obliging the younger brother to 
renounce the inheritance nevertheless. This case may be connected with Craig’s 
privileged treatment of renunciations of rights made in court (supra, pp.133-134), 
which he himself took from the Ius Commune (supra, p.115).  
So far, the last case seems to be the only one where the Ius Commune rules on 
the form and requirements of renunciations might have held any ground in Scotland. 
No cases have been found where the distinction between a unilateral renunciation and 
a mutual agreement, so important in the Ius Commune, was made; in fact, there was 
unlikely to be any difference considering the weakness of the doctrine of privity of 
contract in Scotland (supra, n.455). There are no cases to suggest that a renunciation 
of future succession was to be made by a religious oath at any point of Scottish history.  
As to another criterion of the renunciation’s validity at Civil law – receiving of 
the hereditary share’s equivalent by the renouncing heir - there are two cases which 
suggest that the provision of an equivalent could only make things worse for the heir 
in Scotland. In Meidhope v. Sir Hepburn’s Son (1636, M.9691), the heir renounced the 
right to ‘heirship moveables’ during the father’s life in return for the provision of 
specific goods by the father. His father’s creditor attempted to prove that the son’s 
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acceptance of that equivalent to ‘heirship moveables’ constituted gestio pro herede for 
the son, making him liable for the father’s debts. The pursuer failed, but a similar 
argument was presented in Scott v. The Heirs of Auchinleck (1666, M.9693), except in 
that case the equivalent was provided by the heir-male, not by the defunct himself, and 
the female heirs avoided representing the defunct only by proving that the provision 
received by them was unrelated to the heirship they renounced. It seems these attempts 
by creditors were inspired by analogy to the perceptio hereditatis doctrine, by which 
a next heir in Scotland was made liable for the defunct’s debts if he received any 
heritable property from the defunct for a lucrative cause, without any proof of fraud 
being necessary.660 
 
4.4. Pacta de successione conservanda, pacta de successione perdenda and 
pacta de hereditate viventis in Scots Moveable Succession. 
In this section, the various forms of pacta successoria occurring in Scots 
practice will be analyzed in a different order from that of heritable succession. The 
judicial practice on this topic was relatively abundant, but its clarity varied depending 
on the type of the pactum. The Scots position on pacta de successione conservanda 
seemed quite clear since the early times. In its treatment of pacta de successione 
perdenda, it was somewhat ambiguous. The pacta de hereditate viventis, despite the 
seemingly clear position of the Institutional writers (supra, p.111), seldom appeared 
in case law and seem to have been a matter of some controversy.  
Pacta de successione conservanda & perdenda were both usually dealt with 
by the courts in the context of ‘forisfamiliation’ – a medieval concept, possibly of 
Norman origin, designating the separation of the child from the parent’s family, 
usually joined with receiving a material provision from the father.661 The original 
effect of ‘forisfamiliation’ was mainly the exclusion of the child from the “Bairn’s 
part” of the testator’s estate, the natural obligation of the father to support the child 
                                                          
660 Craig, Jus feudale, II.17.4.  
661 Reg.Maj.II.33; Anton, ‘Parent and Child’, 120-121.  
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becoming effectually extinguished.662 Initially the bairns, especially the daughters, 
were deemed to be ‘forisfamiliated’, with their ‘legitim’ discharged, when they 
contracted a marriage, after receiving a dowry or another marriage provision from their 
father.663 Gradually, the separation of the bairn from the family and the discharge of 
the “Bairn’s part” became distinguished in practice; 664  from the time of Stair the 
standard opinion was that the discharge of ‘legitim’ was never presumed but was to be 
made expressly.665 Scottish agreements on preserving succession, especially in the 
first half of the 17th century, were usually attached to marriage contracts and bonds of 
provision to children, providing that the child remained “a bairn of the house” or 
promising a share equal to that of other siblings. The Scots agreements “de perdenda 
successione”, to the contrary, ensured that the bairn became fully forisfamiliated.  
However, from early times, agreements on preserving succession played a 
much wider role than that of exclusion of ‘forisfamiliation’ and of collation.666 Such 
agreements in Scotland bound the testator. If the testator promised a daughter to 
bestow on her a share of succession equal to those of the other children, he could not 
prejudice this promise even by inter vivos provisions to her siblings, as was established 
in McMath v. McCall (1619, M.12847). Finlayson v. Veitch (1622, M.12848) settled 
that such a promise charged not only the “Bairn’s part” but also the “Dead’s part”, 
entitling the bairn to a particular share of the defunt’s moveable estate. The last case 
is also notable in that the daughter-creditor died before obtaining confirmation as the 
father’s executor – it was the daughter’s executors who claimed the relevant share on 
her behalf. Long before a similar rule was established for intestate moveable 
succession in general (Bells v. Wilkie, 1662, M.9250), Finlayson held that the promise 
                                                          
662 Stair, Inst.III.8.44-45; Bankton, Inst.III.8.16.  
663 Hamilton v. Wallace of Cragie (1561, M.8178).  
664 See Smith v. Elleis (1622, Dury 14), where the court held that the defunct’s daughters receiving of 
equal provisions from their father, without any discharge clauses, did not constitute their 
‘forisfamiliation’, but allowed to treat them “as if forisfamiliated” for other purposes.  
665 Stair, however, mentions that the Commissaries in his time presumed the discharge of the “Bairn’s 
part” if all the testator’s children were endowed and married (Stair, Inst.III.8.44-45).  
666 For the cases where the agreement on preserving succession had the effect of excluding the 
collation of the provision the bairn received with the testamentary share, see: Ross v. Kelly (1627, 
M.2366), Corsan v. Corsans (1631, M.2367=M.12849).  
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to a child to preserve succession created a vested right, transmissible to child’s 
successors irrespective of the confirmation and execution of the testament. 
Also notable as regards Scottish clauses to preserve succession is that, unlike 
similar clauses and pacts in the Ius Commune (supra, p.123), they were considered a 
matter between the testator and the contracting child only, in which other bairns had 
no interest and which they could not challenge. In Corsan v. Corsans (1631, 
M.2367=M.12849), the defending siblings of a ‘forisfamiliated’ sister attempted to 
block the latter’s right of succession on the ground that her agreement to have a share 
equal to her siblings could not concern the defenders. The agreement, allegedly, was 
made with other siblings of the pursuer in mind, who were long dead, while the 
defenders were not yet born at the time of its making. However, the Lords interpreted 
the agreement broadly, so that the provided daughter retained the right of succession 
together with all other competing siblings. 
So much on agreements to preserve succession. The practice on pacta de 
successione perdenda in moveable succession was much more abundant. In most 
cases, as was mentioned above, it was about children renouncing their right in the 
“Bairn’s part”. The first case where the intestate share in the “Dead’s part” was 
explicitly renounced comes from 1686.667 Although such renunciations were usually 
attached to the receiving of provisions by the children, there is no clear evidence that 
the giving of an equivalent was necessary at any historical point, which conforms with 
the case law on heritable succession (supra, p.137).  
However, there was a substantial difference from the renunciation of heritable 
rights. While in heritable succession particular future rights, belonging to the heir, 
could be renounced in various ways, so they might revert back to the heir or accrue to 
other successors (supra, pp.134-136), a renounced share in the “Bairn’s part” always 
accrued to other bairns. Until the late 18th century, the judges sought to follow strictly 
the rule that, at the moment of the testator’s death, his goods were to be divided into 
two or three equal parts, even if some of the testator’s children had discharged their 
‘legitim’. The judges usually rejected claims that the discharge of the bairn was meant 
                                                          
667 Inglis v. McMorran, M.9254. 
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to entitle the father to dispose of the share, not to enrich the renouncer’s siblings.668 If 
all the children renounced their ‘legitim’, the “Bairn’s part” ceased to exist and the 
testator obtained libera facultas testandi; however, if he died intestate, the same 
children could divide the estate among them with their shares undiminished.669 It was 
also debated whether the discharge of jus relictae increased the children’s third to the 
half of the estate (and vice versa), with dominant opinion obviously being positive.670 
Thus, the right of ‘legitim’ was less “liquid” than heritable rights in this respect.  
In Hogg v. Hogg (1791, M.8193), the Outer House judge, dealing with the case, 
attempted to change this attitude. In the interlocutory decision, it was held that the 
‘legitim’ was a right assignable to anyone in the testator’s lifetime. Therefore, the Lord 
Ordinary held that the renunciations by the testator’s daughters were intended to be in 
favour of the testator’s testamentary freedom, not in favour of the only non-renouncing 
daughter. However, the final decision of the Court of Session’s Inner House overruled 
the interlocutor, holding that the entire “Bairn’s part” accrued to that non-renouncing 
daughter. In this “illiquid” form ‘legitim’ was preserved in subsequent practice, 
although the law on ‘approbate and reprobate’ allowed some flexibility if ‘legitim’ was 
renounced after the testator’s decease.671  
The discharge of the intestate share of the ‘next-of-kin’ in the testator’s “Dead’s 
part” appears more seldom in the reports and was, it seems, seen as something more 
extraordinary. As was mentioned above (supra, pp.128-129), in the later case law, the 
renunciation of the intestate share was not presumed included into a general 
discharge.672 There was, however, a case where the renunciation of “everything she 
might crave” after the testator’s death was found sufficient to discharge the right to be 
the executor-dative in competition with the brother.673  
                                                          
668 McGill v. Countess of Oxenford (1671, M.8179), The Nisbets v. Nisbet of Dirleton (1726, M.8181, 
this case concerned the renunciation of jus relictae by the wife).  
669 Chisholm v. Chisholm (1672, M. 5046=8180).  
670 Stair, Inst.III.8.46; The Nisbets v. Nisbet of Dirleton (1726, M.8181).  
671 M’Laren, Wills and Succession, vol I, pp.481-482.  
672 Anderson v. Andersons (1743, M.5054). 
673 Equbister v. Defender (1694, M.8181).  
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Unlike with ‘legitim’, not only children but also further descendants could be 
admitted to the intestate succession to the “Dead’s part”. This could only happen if all 
the testator’s children were dead, so that the grandchildren were succeeding equally. 
There was no succession by representation in moveables, as the intestate successors 
were to be the testator’s ‘nearest-of-kin’, being of equally close degree of proximity.674 
Despite controversies among the judges, a renunciation by a bairn was found to 
exclude that bairn’s descendants as well, barring them from competing with the 
testator’s other children and their descendants.675 This solution was quite paradoxical. 
While the Civilian authors held that the renunciation of succession by a child did not 
inhibit succession by representation, 676  here in Scotland the child’s descendants, 
barred from succession, were not even considered his or her representatives. It 
followed that the testator’s grandchildren ceased to be his ‘nearest-of-kin’ just because 
of their father’s renunciation. In this, Scots intestate moveable succession was different 
from heritable succession, where an ‘unserved’ heir could not bar his own children 
from serving to the original defunct.  
More understandable seems another rule, which presumed that a child’s 
renunciation of the intestate succession was in favour of his or her siblings in familia 
and their descendants but not in favour of the testator’s collaterals or the fisc.677 
Similarly to Civil law, the “right” of future intestate succession was not a vested right, 
not even a spes successionis. Thus, the renunciation of future intestate succession was, 
essentially, a promise not to compete with fellow successors, which was not presumed 
to include remoter successors.  
That the future intestate succession was not considered an abstract right or a 
‘spes’ is confirmed by other observations. Firstly, in the early case Bells v. Parks 
(1636, M.3593), the renunciation of such succession was deemed not sufficient to 
constitute an onerous cause for a binding contract. In this case, the daughter made a 
contract with her father, promising to pay him 300 merks, the father in return 
                                                          
674 Stair, Inst.III.4.24. 
675 Campbell v. McLeod (1731, M.9263, divided court is reported); Campbells v. Lady Inverliver (1738, 
M.8187=9265). 
676 Bald., C.6.20.3.  
677 Campbells v. Lady Inverliver (1738, M.9265) – see the court’s final decision. 
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renouncing any kind of succession that might befall to him from her. However, the 
daughter, upon her deathbed, disposed of the same sum by way of a legacy. In the 
ensuing controversy between the testator’s surviving father and the legatees, the Lords 
decided in favour of the legatees. They held that the daughter’s promise to the father 
was not a binding contract but just a “testamentary clause”, which was revocable by 
the granter; the father’s claim to the contrary was dismissed as “unproven”.  
The reasons behind the Court’s decision are not expressed in the report. Indeed, 
the decision seems to contradict earlier case law, which ruled that an onerous deed 
could not be a testament or a donatio mortis causa.678 The reasons, however, may be 
deduced from the circumstances of the case. The father renounced the future “right” 
of succeeding to his daughter. This “right” could become vested only if the daughter 
predeceased the father without a testament and without leaving any descendants and 
siblings.679 Such an opportunity was, apparently, quite slight, which might possibly be 
the reason why renouncing it was not seen as a thing real enough to qualify as an 
onerous cause. The father did not renounce anything from which his daughter could 
not have excluded him. The judges were thus aware of the idea that the future intestate 
succession could not be considered a “right” in the strict meaning.  
Another instance where the effect of the renunciation of succession was tested 
was in Inglis v. McMorran (1686, M.9254) – perhaps, the most important case on the 
issue. This case is already interesting just because there the renunciation of succession 
was made by a sister to her brother, not to the mother to whom they were succeeding. 
Within the lifetime of their mentally disabled mother, Thomas Inglis provided his 
sister, Janet Inglis, with a dowry, in return for Janet’s renouncing of her future intestate 
succession to the mother in favour of Thomas. After the mother’s decease, Thomas 
confirmed as an executor-dative to her. However, he did not include the entire 
moveable estate in the inventory: he omitted a debt for a significant amount, owed to 
the mother by her brother and curator. Without confirming that particular debt, Thomas 
discharged the debtor of a large portion of it. Afterwards, Thomas himself died. As it 
turned out, Thomas died a ‘rebel under the horn’. His sister, Janet, obtained from the 
                                                          
678 See, e.g.: Curriehill v. Executors of Currie (1624, M.2937=M.3591). 
679 Craig, Jus feudale, II.13; Stair, Inst.III.4.35.  
143 
 
Chancery a ‘gift’ of his ‘escheat’,680 which entitled her to take as much from his estate 
as to “make up for the renunciation” she previously granted to him. Learning of the 
debt Thomas omitted as the executor of their mother, she confirmed herself as an 
executor ad omissa to the mother in respect of the debt. After she sued the debtor, he 
pleaded Thomas’s discharge in defence.  
Much of the debate in this case was devoted to whether the discharge by 
Thomas was effectual, which, in turn, depended on whether the executor had a vested 
right in the omitted property before it was “eiked” (included into inventory), whether 
a partial aditio hereditatis was possible in Scotland, etc. That question will be dealt 
with later in this work (infra, s.6.2, 6.4): in line with most of the case law of the time, 
the Court decided that the executor had no vested right in the omitted property and that 
partial aditio hereditatis was possible.681 More important to us at this point is the 
debate on the effect of Janet’s renunciation – did it preclude her from confirming ad 
omissa and challenging Thomas’s discharge?  
Surprisingly, the parties to the litigation showed essential agreement on the 
legal nature of the renunciation. Both parties agreed that the renunciation did not pass 
any “positive right” from Janet to Thomas. The renunciation, at best, had only a “non 
repugnantia” effect: the sister promised not to compete with the brother and not to 
challenge his right and actions in respect of the estate; she would not have been so 
obliged if there had been a third competitor for the executry. 682  The parties, 
nevertheless, drew different conclusions from that. The defender-debtor claimed that 
Janet obliged herself not to dispute any of Thomas’s actions, even the ineffectual ones, 
such as his discharge. Janet, after her initial attempt to have her renunciation of the 
“spes” to the living testator completely invalidated,683 held that this obligation was 
ended with Thomas’s death. Moreover, she sought to draw analogies with heritable 
                                                          
680 By virtue of ‘single escheat’, the Crown was entitled to confiscate all the goods of an uncooperating 
debtor (a “rebel”). This right of the Crown was usually sold to private persons in the form of the ‘gifts 
of escheat’. In fact, it was a separate type of moveable succession (Stair, Inst.III.3.17-19). 
681 The case law, however, changed in the mid-18th century, when the ‘next-of-kin’ was deemed 
eligible to accept payments and the bonds of corroboration even before the confirmation (Spence v. 
Wilson (1751, M.14399=14418)). 
682 The defender admits this on page 9255 (report by Harcarse), the pursuer – on page 9255 (Harcarse) 
and 9259 (P. Home).  
683 This plea by Janet, reported by Harcarse, was left unanswered and undecided upon.  
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succession and (in seeming contradiction with her own claim that no positive right was 
transferred!) compared her renunciation with an assignation of a jus apparentiae by an 
heir-at-law. Just as an heir-apparent could not complete the alienation before the 
‘service of heir’, her renunciation was also not complete until Thomas acquired her 
renounced share.684 As he did not acquire the debt in question by including it in the 
inventory, it, allegedly, reverted back to Janet. 
The Court’s decision was somewhat “Solomonic” in that it divided the omitted 
and discharged debt into halves. One half was a part of the share of succession that 
Janet renounced to Thomas. This half was deemed discharged, as Janet could not go 
against her renunciation in respect of it. The other half, corresponding to Thomas’s 
own share, was not covered by Janet’s renunciation and so, given that Thomas had 
never been vested of it and could not have validly discharged it, this half was still due 
and belonged to Janet as the ‘donatar’ of Thomas’s ‘escheat’.  
Although the decision might look like a compromise, it definitely has logic in 
it. The most important detail in it is the implied consensus of the litigants on the legal 
nature of Janet’s renunciation of succession. The renunciation did not transfer any 
“positive right” to Thomas – otherwise this right would, probably, have fallen to Janet 
as Thomas’s ‘donatar of escheat’ and, thus, successor. Neither was it just a personal 
obligation of Janet to Thomas – because then it would possibly have had no effect as 
to third parties or even have been extinguished by Janet’s succeeding to Thomas. The 
renunciation here is somewhat akin to Baldus’ renunciation of succession (supra, 
p.123), being a “concession” of future succession to the particular “co-heir”. At the 
moment of renunciation, Janet’s future succession did not yet even qualify as a ‘spes’, 
but after the mother’s death the renunciation became the vested right of Thomas, 
remaining in force even after his own death. It is also logical that Thomas’s “own” half 
was deemed not included in the renunciation. For Janet it was just a vague future 
possibility, conditioned on her succeeding not only to the mother but also to Thomas 
as his ‘donatar of escheat’. While Thomas was alive, this possibility was neither a 
vested right nor a proper ‘spes’ for Janet. Janet’s renunciation could not be presumed 
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to include the obligation not to succeed to Thomas himself; this is why, after his death, 
Janet was free to confirm as executor ad omissa to the mother, in her capacity as 
Thomas’s successor.  
Enough is said so far on the renunciation of future moveable succession. What 
about pacta de hereditate viventis? We have already seen (supra, p.111), that the 
Institutional writers from the late 17th century were quite confident that such pacts 
were allowed and valid in Scots law. It is surprising that, no explicit cases were found 
on this topic that might be a clear example of the assignation of the future right of 
‘legitim’ or of the intestate moveable succession and, at the same time, be clearly 
distinguishable from the renunciation of succession. Surprisingly enough, even what 
was considered a landmark case on the pacta corvina in Scots law does not really 
qualify as such.  
That case is Aikenhead v. Bothwell (1630, M.9491). It is reported by 
Auchinleck and by Dury. Both reports stress the acceptability of pacta de hereditate 
viventis as the key issue at stake: the losing party claimed that the contract under 
controversy was such a pactum, invalid at Civil law. Dury’s report makes an informed 
reservation on this question, noting that the regulations of Civil law on such pacta are 
more complicated, sometimes allowing them with the testator’s consent. Nevertheless, 
the decision of the judges seems unambiguous: “the civil law in this case has no 
place… as in tailzies and renunciations of the bairns’ part of gear, and others…”  
However, the circumstances of the case are quite peculiar. The father, making 
a marriage contract for his daughter, inserted a clause providing that the daughter 
would remain “a bairn of the house”, i.e., would succeed to the father in ‘legitim’ and 
as a ‘next-of-kin’. Later on, while the father was still living, the daughter’s husband 
(who was vested in all of his wife’s moveable property jure mariti) assigned this “bairn 
of the house” provision to his wife’s brother, his brother-in-law, in return for a money 
bond payable at the father’s decease. The term of payment fulfilled, the brother-in-law 




The obvious peculiarities of this case are the following. First, it was not just 
the intestate succession that was being assigned – it was a clause de successione 
conservanda, which, as was established above (supra, pp.138-139), was considered a 
regular contractual debt in Scots law. Second, the succession is not assigned to an 
extraneous person, but to the testator’s own son – the daughter’s co-successor. This 
makes this contract reminiscent more of a pactum de hereditate perdenda, a 
renunciation of succession in favour of another successor, rather than an “assignation”. 
Finally, it was the brother, the “assignee” in question, who was trying to invalidate the 
transaction in order not to pay the price.  
This means that the Lords in the case were deciding on the validity of the 
contract in general, not on the question whether the future succession was “assignable” 
and “transmissible”. What Civil law writers might think of such a contract, is an 
interesting question: being a renunciation of succession for value, or, more like, a 
renunciation of the benefit of the pact on preserving succession, it might have 
“chances” at Civil law. Challenging it only on the ground that it was “immoral” at 
Civil law was, anyway, a wrong tactic for the defender. For better or for worse, the 
Lords’ rejection of the Civilian “moral” argument became the most conspicuous 
outcome of the case. This was the reason why it was seen by the later authors as 
“allowing pacta corvina” at Scots law (supra, pp.126).  
No other cases from before 1800, found so far, decide explicitly enough in 
favour of assignations and other types of pacta corvina in moveable succession. In the 
absence of “morality” restrictions, the moveable succession obviously could (and still 
can) be bargained for by way of an executory contract, to be performed when the right 
of succession vests. It is unclear, however, whether the assignation of future succession 
could have an immediate effect, i.e., be intimated before the testator’s death. In Hogg 
v. Hogg (1791, M.8193), as was mentioned above, 685  the interlocutory decision 
suggested that the right of ‘legitim’ was freely assignable in the testator’s life, but the 
final decision in that case overruled such approach. Further research in the post-1800 
case law might shed more light on the modern position of Scots law on this matter.  
                                                          




4.5. Marriage Contracts with Succession Impact. 
In the strict meaning of the legal term, the “marriage-contract” in Scots law 
means an ante-nuptial agreement, establishing the regime of patrimonial relations in 
the marriage. 686  They existed from “comparatively early times” 687  in Scotland. 
Although marriage contracts in the 17th century mainly provided for mutual 
contributions of the spouses and their investment into heritable property and could not 
yet, for example, exclude the husband’s authority over the family property (jus mariti 
and jus administrationis),688 they were in this period expanding their scope, becoming 
the instrument to change the default legal regime of family property and the succession 
to it. In this, the Scots marriage contracts were perfectly in line with the Ius Commune 
and the Continental approach in general, allowing inter-spousal agreements, especially 
those in feudal context, to establish special orders of succession in a contractual way 
(supra, pp.124-125). 
One of the most prominent functions of marriage contracts was to make 
provisions for the children of marriage, either before or after the dissolution of a 
marriage. In this respect, Scots marriage contracts held a unique middle ground 
between contracts and succession. It should be noted that the legal writers did not pay 
significant attention to this feature of marriage contracts. J.D. Wilson in his 1894 
article689 criticized how rigid Scots law had become by his time, in its strict distinction 
between the “pactional” provisions for children (which were irrevocable even with the 
spouse’s consent) and the “testamentary” provisions for extraneous persons (which 
were freely revocable by the husband). Wilson proposed that a distinction between the 
“onerous” and the “lucrative” provisions might be a more appropriate one, but he 
stopped short of realizing that the most logical way of solving that problem was to 
recognize the marriage contract as a unique transaction, where the “onerous cause” of 
provisions was provided by the birth of children. Going further back in time, the 
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Institutional writers also disregarded the special position of the marriage contract, 
often treating it, together with other forms of provision for children, in the rubrics on 
heritable succession.690 This excessively analytical approach of the legal authorities to 
the marriage contract brought some paradoxical outcomes (infra, p.152). 
Debates over the effect of the provisions to children in marriage contracts 
existed as early as the late 16th century. As already noted, Th. Craig refers to marriage 
contracts as the exception from the pacta successoria prohibition, claiming that the 
Scots attitude to them followed French practice.691 Elsewhere, Craig reports the case 
of Lady Pitifirran v. Hepburn of Waucton (Jus feudale, II.12.6, II.14.10, date 
unknown), where a marriage contract between the spouses and the wife’s father 
contained a provision in favour of the children of the marriage. After the wife’s decease 
the contract was rescinded by the surviving husband and his father-in-law. However, 
the only daughter of the said marriage subsequently sued the father’s son of first 
marriage for the fulfillment of the contract, claiming that she had a vested jus 
quaesitum in the contract since the time of her birth, so that her right could not be 
prejudiced without her consent. This particular case ended with a compromise, with 
no decision on the substance given by the court. The daughter’s argument, however, 
resonates strongly with another passage by Craig, where he contends that a marriage 
contract provision in favour of a future child is valid, as it can hardly create any votum 
captandae mortis in the child subsequently born in anticipation of the provision.692  
The right of the child here also resonates, though in a remoter way, with the 
Civilian rules on dowry. Dowry at Civil law was mainly a matter of the relationship 
between the husband, the wife and the provider; but the children of marriage were 
considered the main beneficiaries of the dowry.693 The children did not have any jus 
quaesitum in the dowry while the parents were alive, except, in a few instances when 
                                                          
690 Stair, Inst.III.5.19; Mackenzie, Inst.III.7.21; Erskine, Inst.III.8.38-40.  Bankton, however, is dealing 
with the marriage contracts in the context of marriage (Inst.I.5.15).  
691 Jus feudale, II.17.13.  
692 Jus feudale, ibid.  
693 See Pomponius in D.24.3.1, who mentions the facilitation of procreation of children as the main 
function of the dowry. 
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they could sue their father for the dowry, they had an independent title to it, not merely 
by succession, and their title was considered onerous.694  
However, the notable difference between the Civil law and the Scots law was 
that, in the absence of patria potestas, it was much easier in Scots law for children to 
sue their parents. We start to encounter such instances early. In Hewtam v. Baillie 
(1615, M.13897), an inhibition695 served on the marriage provision by the father to the 
son was mentioned. Moreover, in the same case the provision of the son from the 
marriage contract was characterized as a “titulus singularis”, so that the heir could 
rightfully renounce the inheritance while reserving the marriage contract provision. A 
marriage contract thus made the child a “creditor” in some respects, able to force the 
obliged parents into compliance. And the obligation of a parent to the child was 
considered onerous – this is why Hewtam lies in contrast to the contemporary case 
Nair v. Nair (1613, M.6943), where an inhibition served upon the gratuitous obligation 
to grant a tailzie was found null.696 Later cases697 left no doubt that a child could sue 
and impose diligence upon the obliged father in the father’s life, in order to secure his 
or her provision after the father’s death. 
Despite this, marriage contracts were not “pure” contracts and retained their 
“testamentary” elements, remaining a type of pacta successoria. Thus, a general 
clause, “not to prejudice the heirs of marriage”, was found by the Lords not to impose 
any additional burdens besides leaving to the heirs what the defunct had at the moment 
of death, irrespective of the inhibition served.698 Even if there were burdens on the 
father within his life, they could never extend as far as to prevent the father from 
                                                          
694 See Bart., rep ad D.24.3.24pr, par. II qu. 10: if the father was prodigious and on the verge of 
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debtor to alienate it in so far as it might affect the payment of the debt (Stair, Inst.IV.50.1-23).  
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(infra, p.189).  
697 Frazer v. Frazer (1677, M.12859), Panton v. Irvine (1684, M.12860). 
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making reasonable onerous dispositions.699 In 1631,700 it was decided, probably for the 
first time, that a marriage contract could abolish the regime of community of goods 
between the spouses; the 1669 Act legitimated this practice, empowering 
Commissaries to demand the production of marriage contracts from relicts 
(widows).701 
It seems that the most significant doctrinal development in the marriage 
contracts that happened in the 17th century came when courts and legal writers started 
to classify the provisions of marriage contracts as heritable succession702 and apply its 
rules to them. This was probably facilitated by the development of the concept of 
“designative heir”. The term itself was, it seems, first mentioned in Carnegy v. Blair 
(1693, IV B.S.112), although the rule that the term “heirs of marriage” means “children 
of the marriage” and does not coincide with the strict definition of the “heir” seems to 
have developed earlier.703 In Watt v. Forrest (1702, M.2954) the identification of 
“heirs” with “children” was attributed to the influence of the Continental Feudal law;  
and this was not without reason.704 The identification entailed that a provision to the 
“heirs of marriage” in the marriage contract referred to the children of marriage, even 
if not truly served as heirs, but such entitled children were deemed analogical to “heirs” 
in some way. According to Dirleton, the “bairns of the marriage” were ad instar 
heredum and, effectually, were the same as the ‘heirs of provision’ in a wider sense.705 
If the children of marriage were to be treated as ‘heirs of provision’, then the 
marriage contract provisions for them were the obligations to make the children ‘heirs 
of provision’, similar to the obligations of tailzie (infra, s.5.2, 5.3). Consequently, a 
provision in the marriage contract was supposed to be a strong and irrevocable inter 
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700 Chapman v. Gibson & Fingask (1631, M.8163).  
701 An Act concerning the confirmation and quots of testaments (RPS, 1669/10/56). 
702 See supra, pp.147-148. 
703 See, e.g., Turnbull v. Colmeslie (1630, M.2938). This case, however, dealt with the definition of the 
word “children”, not “heirs”.  
704 The learned Ius Commune authors largely followed the opinion of Accursius that the expression 
“sine heredis” in a feudal context actually meant “sine liberis” (D.36.1.18(17).8, et ibi Glossa, Bart. et 
al; M. Ryan, op cit, 152-153).  
705 Dirleton even compares them with the Civil law bonorum possessores, although the comparison is 
superficial at best (Dirleton, ‘Heirs of Provision and substitute’, Some Doubts…, 87).  
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vivos contractual obligation, making the bairn a creditor (with a “jus crediti”) of his 
parent. The problems with such an approach were obvious. Unlike a bond of tailzie, a 
marriage contract provision was made in favour of children yet unborn – the circle of 
persons entitled to the provision could usually be ascertained only at the time of the 
dissolution of marriage by the parent’s death. This is why the Lords considered an 
obligation from the marriage contract as creating just a spes successionis in respect of 
the children. A child, peculiarly, could sue the father to secure or implement the 
provision, and this would turn the provision into a vested jus crediti; a provision would 
also be vested in the child’s person after the father granted a bond of provision to that 
specific child or if the child just survived the father. 706  However, if the child 
predeceased his father before a bond or a legal diligence followed, no vested debt was 
created and nothing was transmitted to the child’s own successors. 
We can see here that the provided children constituted strange kinds of 
“creditors”: before the provision was vested, they only had a non-transmissible spes 
successionis. But this does not tell the whole story – the jus crediti of the children 
would eventually evolve into not just two, but into three types! Initially the judges 
implied that, simultaneously with vesting, the obligation to provide became good as 
against the father’s creditors, with whom the children could compete after the father’s 
death. Thus, in Creditors of A. Marjoribanks v. M. Marjoribanks (1682, M.12891), the 
father promised to “employ” (invest) 20000 pounds Scots into heritable property in 
liferent for the father and in fee for the children. With the father dying before the 
fulfillment of the investment, the children attempted to compete with his creditors pari 
passu, going so far as claiming that they already owned a vested interest in the father’s 
estate, with the father being just a “fideicommissary fiar (owner)” of the money 
amount. The Lords rejected their claim, implying, nevertheless, that the decision 
would have been different if the children had had bonds of provision from the father 
or had served diligence on him. Similar implications may be found in other cases of 
the time.707  
                                                          
706  Clerk of Pennycuick v. His Sisters (1682, M.6330=M.12881); Creditors of A. Marjoribanks v. 
M. Marjoribanks (1682, M.12891). 
707 See, e.g., Sibald v. Sibald (1677, M.12889).  
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However, considering that the purpose of the marriage contract was, 
essentially, to establish a succession regime and to make the children ‘heirs of 
provision’, a simple giving of the bond of provision was too easy a way to turn the 
children into full-blooded creditors. Thus, subsequent practice soon found (Creditors 
of Marshall v. His Children, 1709, M.12907) that the bond of provision was not 
sufficient to constitute a full jus crediti. The issue of whether the children of the 
marriage could compete with creditors remained hotly controversial throughout the 
18th-century practice, with the parties debating the extent to which the children were 
“heirs” or “creditors”. By the 19th century the possibility of competition was limited 
to cases where the provision was payable in the parent’s lifetime or the child actually 
received a vested interest in his own name before the dissolution of marriage.708 There 
were, thus, three kinds of jus crediti the children might possess: a) a rudimentary one 
after birth; b) a vested one after a bond, a diligence or a dissolution of the marriage; 
and c) a full one, if the provision was fulfilled and the child became a “fiar” in the 
father’s lifetime.  
However, the most paradoxical result of treating marriage contract provisions 
as “the obligation to make children heirs of provision” was a potential degradation of 
the child’s interest at the moment when the provision to invest money into heritable 
property was fulfilled. If an obligation of the parent was vested in the person of the 
child in the way described above but was not performed in the parent’s lifetime, it 
remained just a personal obligation, a jus crediti of the child. Thus, the child did not 
need to get either a ‘service of heir’ or a confirmation as executor to become fully 
entitled to sue, to assign and to transmit the obligation after the parent’s death.709 But 
what if the parent, as often happened, promised to invest an amount of money into a 
heritable asset, to which the children were to succeed afterwards? If he did not fulfill 
the obligation in his life, it remained a jus crediti and needed no ‘service’ or 
confirmation, as was already said. But if the primary obligation was performed and the 
asset was purchased, the child from that moment was only entitled to the asset as an 
                                                          
708 Erskine, Inst.III.8.40; M’Laren, op cit, vol I, p.416. 
709 It seems to have first been established in Wallace v. Wallace (1665, M.9650=M.12857). A much 
earlier case Hewtam v. Baillie (1615, M.13897) features a son claiming a marriage provision promised 
to his father by his grandfather, but the manner of transmission in that case is unclear.  
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‘heir of provision’. So, he could only acquire a vested right in that asset after obtaining 
a ‘service of heir’! This was established in Assignees of James Finlayson v. Jean 
Finlayson (aka Porterfield v. Gray, 1760, M.12874), although there were prior cases 
precipitating this outcome.710 The paradox of this solution lies in that it becomes, to 
some extent, more profitable and convenient for the bairn that the provision is not 
fulfilled rather than fulfilled – the ‘service of heir’ entailed a liability for the defunct’s 
debts, administrative costs and other inconveniences. We see that while a marriage 
contract provision remained on the stage of personal obligation, it was progressing 
with time from the vaguer spes successionis to a more certain vested right. But when 
the personal obligation was converted into an item of heritable property, the direction 
of the development reversed, with the child’s right actually degrading!  
This was, obviously, a result of the excessively analytical approach to the 
provisions in marriage contracts. The lawyers were eager to define their nature in the 
established categories of Civil and Scots law, trying to distinguish too strictly between 
the rights in obligatione and in destinatione and to apply contractual rules to the former 
and the rules of heritable succession to the latter. They were unable to see the marriage 
contract as a unique type of contract, blurring the lines between obligation and 
succession. This was, possibly, because the marriage contract, although known in the 
Continental learned literature (supra, pp.124-125), was, nevertheless, not developed 
well enough to provide a sufficient framework for the Scots lawyers to regulate it with.  
That it was inappropriate to classify the marriage contract within heritable 
succession is further demonstrated by the fact that moveable property, disponed by it, 
did not follow the rules of heritable succession. In Cumming v. Kennedy (1697, 
M.6441=M.12881) a marriage contract appointed the children of the marriage the 
‘heirs of conquest’ – i.e., entitled them to all new moveable property acquired during 
the marriage. With the father dead, his only daughter, surviving him but dying herself 
soon afterwards, was found to have acquired a vested right in the father’s universitas 
                                                          
710 Drummelziar v. Earl of Tweddall (1677, I B.S.795); Campbell v. Duncan (1732, M.12885), Anderson 
v. Heirs of Shiels (1747, M.12868). Lord Bankton was mistaken in citing Campbell v. Duncan as an 
authority for holding that all provisions to children and heirs of marriage are vested automatically, 
without a ‘service of heir’ (Bankton, Inst.III.5.22). In Campbell the service was explicitly decided 
unnecessary only because the provision was not yet performed, while it would have been otherwise 
if it had been performed.  
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bonorum without either a ‘service’ as the ‘heir of provision’ or a confirmation as the 
executor. Vesting of her right entailed the acquisition of the dead father’s moveables 
by her husband via jus mariti. The husband eventually lost the lawsuit, nevertheless, 
due to an unrelated reason, but the judgment on the issue of vesting was clear. Bankton 
interpreted this case as dispensing with ‘service’ for all kinds of provisions 
(Inst.III.5.22), but, in fact, it was a special case about moveable property.711  
Cumming could have been influenced by the 1690 Act,712 which took away the 
necessity of confirmation of testaments for some cases. However, there was an earlier 
precursor to the case - Baird v. Robertson (1681, M.3856). Unlike most of the cases 
so far discussed, it dealt with moveable succession proper. It featured a marriage 
contract that did not make a provision for future children. In this case, the father was 
a party to the daughter’s marriage contract, disposing to the daughter a half of all his 
moveable estate. After his death, the daughter intromitted with his estate. Later, she 
was sued by the father’s creditor as a “vitious intromitter”, having taken possession of 
the father’s goods without confirming as executor. In defence, she pleaded that she 
had already exhausted the value of the goods she intromitted with by paying another 
debt of her father. Despite the pursuer’s reply that she could not have lawfully paid 
that debt without a court decree, the Lords admitted the defence, as the defender paid 
the debt in “good faith”. 
The reason behind the decision is not entirely clear. The case is notable in that 
it seems to go against the rules on “vitious intromission”, already established in the 
law of the time.713 The case mentions that the daughter was eventually confirmed as 
the father’s executor after her intromission. It is not mentioned whether a year had 
passed after the defunct’s death.714 Even more surprising is that the payment of the 
debt, unsecured by a decreet, was admitted as a defence: Scots law was quite strict 
                                                          
711 The husband in Cumming distinguished the facts of the case from the earlier Drummelziar v. Earl of 
Tweddall (1677, I B.S.795) by pointing out that the latter dealt with heritable property, while Cumming 
was dealing with moveables.  
712 Supra, p.96. 
713 Craig, Jus feudale, II.17.3; Stair, Inst.III.9.  
714 If it had not, her subsequent confirmation as executor might have purged her of the effects of 
“vitious intromission” according to the law (infra, p.238).  
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from early times in that only the debts recognized by the defunct or confirmed by a 
decreet could be paid by the executor, not to speak of a “vitious intromitter”.715  
It seems that the marriage contract was the element that made Baird different. 
The marriage contract was a privileged type of post mortem disposition, which entitled 
the disponee to take the defunct’s goods without obtaining confirmation and becoming 
a “vitious intromitter”. Admission of the defence of paying out the debt in good faith 
is accordingly also understandable, as the disponee here is similar in status to a 
‘donatar of escheat’, ‘donatar of bastardy’ or another Crown privilege holder:716 they 
all were liable only secundum vires of their intromission not because of making an 
inventory but due to the fact of their intromission itself. The privileged character of 
the marriage contract is also proved by the case Gallatly v. Scot (1683, M.3857), where 
the debt from a marriage contract was recognized as “privileged” in the sense that it 
did not need a decreet to be paid by the executor.717 
The several cases last cited prove that the marriage contract had special 
properties in the field of moveable succession. In fact, it is hard to classify the 
disponees from a marriage contract as anything more specific in status than just generic 
“intromitters”. The “intromitters”, without an adjective “vitious”, were prominent in 
Early Modern testaments, with testators often giving instructions to their “executors 
and intromitters” to pay the debts and legacies. 718  The executors were often also 
appointed “universal” or “special intromitters” by the testators. 719  Disponees and 
provided children in marriage contracts, it seems, together with “donatars of escheat”, 
were the separate types of such “intromitters”. It was the original, the simpler paradigm 
of the marriage contract. The Scots lawyers, however, were unable to articulate it, 
eventually classifying marriage contracts within heritable succession and the provided 
children as the ‘heirs of provision’ or “of conquest”. This complicated the law, creating 
an excessive differentiation between various effects of the marriage contract. 
                                                          
715 Stair, Inst.III.8.66; infra, p.241. 
716 The Crown and the Crown’s assignees were liable for the debts of a bona vacantia defunct only ad 
valorem of the estate intromitted with (Mackenzie, Inst.III.10). This was almost identical to the similar 
Ius Commune rule concerning the imperial fisc (D.49.14.1.1, et ibi Bart).  
717 The case report, however, mentions a case to the opposite effect from 1688.  
718 See, e.g., CC8/2/62, 28 March 1639, case of Gilbert Sommerwil.  




It is time for a short summary on the relevance of the discussion of pacta 
successoria in Scots law. On the one hand, the moral considerations of the Ius 
Commune, which brought a prohibition of bargains over a living person’s estate, have 
never taken hold in Scotland. The fear of votum captandae mortis, despite its 
sympathetic treatment by Th. Craig, seems to have never been of any practical 
importance. The attempts of some litigants, referring the Ius Commune authorities on 
the “immorality” of such bargains, have never been successful. 
On the other hand, the Ius Commune rules on vesting and the associated 
restrictions on disposability of unvested rights were influential in Scotland, both 
through Craig’s exposition and directly. Thus, despite the certainty with which the 
Scottish authors were talking about the validity of pacta corvina, the available case 
law on heritable and moveable succession, until, at least, the late 18th century, does not 
provide sufficient support to the idea that a right of future succession could be 
assigned. It could be given to a procurator or promised in future terms, but that was 
possible in Civil law as well.  
The renunciation of future succession in Scotland shows similarities with the 
Ius Commune in that it could have an immediate effect, but was to be made expressly, 
not implicitly. It is notable how the “more vested” rights, like those of heritable 
succession or of ‘legitim’ in moveable succession, could be renounced in a more 
abstract way, completely denuding the renouncer, while the future intestate moveable 
succession was not deemed a “positive” right, so it could only be renounced by 
promising not to compete with other successors.  
Agreements to preserve intestate moveable succession in Scotland were not 
only valid but even could turn succession into a vested obligation. This essentially 
followed the spirit of the Ius Commune in its mos gallicus incarnation. 
In its treatment of marriage contracts, Scots law was initially following the Ius 
Commune approach in treating them as privileged contracts, transcending the borders 
between obligation and succession. However, the poor development of the topic in the 
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Ius Commune possibly pushed Scots lawyers into dividing marriage contract 
provisions into “obligatory”, “testamentary” and various shades of intermediate types. 







Chapter V. Destinations and Substitutions 
5.1. Fideicommissary Substitutions in the Ius Commune. 
This section explores the forms by which a “subsequent succession” could be 
achieved in Civil law. A ‘subsequent succession’ is any situation where the testator 
provides not only for the succession to him(her)self but also for the further succession 
to his own successors. 720  The expression “fideicommissary substitution” in this 
chapter has a wide meaning, covering the main form of subsequent succession used in 
the Civil law. Strictly speaking, this term was used by the Ius Commune authors to 
designate the type of a textual clause in the last will: a particular clause, “substituting” 
one successor to another, could be interpreted as either a ‘vulgar’, a ‘pupillary’, an 
‘exemplary’ or a fideicommissary substitution, or several of them together 
(“compendious substitution”). 721  The interpretation of a particular substitution 
depended heavily on its wording.722 The term “fideicommissary substitution”, in strict 
meaning, did not designate the process of subsequent succession itself, which was 
usually called simply “fideicommissum”.  
A simple ‘vulgar’ substitution at Civil law did not create a subsequent 
succession: the substitute did not succeed to the institute but only to the original 
testator. It was different in case of a pupillary substitution. If a testator appointed a 
substitute to the child under his patria potestas, then, if the child died before reaching 
“puberty”, 723  the substitute became an heir to the child, not to the first testator 
(Inst.Just.II.16pr). This was logical, considering the child could not make his or her 
own testament before reaching puberty.724 This was one of the only two cases when 
                                                          
720 A. Dutta, ‘Succession, Subsequent’, MPEEPL, vol II, 1631-1634. 
721 There was also a reciprocal substitution, called breviloqua, when several people were substituted 
to each other; such substitution was deemed to contain other kinds of substitution in it (L. d’Alesme, 
Tractatus in materiam substitutionum, XV, CI, CVI, CXX). Other scholars also distinguished the “military” 
substitution, which was only available to soldiers and had the same effect as the fideiommissary one 
(J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, D.28.6, XXXVI).  
722 Thus, the words might be “direct” (directly entitling someone to succession) or “oblique” (obliging 
the institute to transfer the property to the institute. In doubt, the words were usually presumed direct 
(d’Alesme, op cit, XV).  
723 14 years for men and 12 years for women (D.28.1.5). 
724 D.28.6.2pr.  
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one could appoint an heir to another person at Civil law, the other being to mentally 
incapable persons (Inst.Just.II.16.1).  
The crucial difference between the effects of a ‘pupillary’ substitution and a 
fideicommissary substitution in Civil law was that fideicommissary substitution made 
the substitute a singular successor of the institute, not a universal successor. If the 
testator by his or her last will burdened the heir to give up to an appointed 
fideicommissarius the entire estate or a portion thereof (a universal fideicommiss) or a 
particular property or amount (a legacy),725 the fideicommissarius did not become the 
heir of the heir and was not liable for the heir’s personal debts and liabilities.726 In case 
of a universal fideicommiss,727 the fideicommissarius became liable for the debts of 
the original testator in proportion to the part of estate he received (C.6.49.1-2), but not 
for the debts of the heir or a previous fideicommissary (hereafter – “a fiduciary”) he 
or she received the property from. A fiduciary burdened by the universal fideicommiss, 
by a general rule, could proportionately decrease it if he were a creditor of the testator 
or if he paid off the testator’s debts in whole or in part.728 However, the testator could 
forbid this in the last will, expressly or implicitly, thus putting before his successor the 
choice of accepting the succession with the full burden or rejecting it.729  
The testator could burden by a fideicommiss any person receiving a benefit 
from the last will: an heir, a universal fideicommissarius, a legatee, a legatee of the 
legatee, etc. The heir’s burden was usually restricted by his or her right to the Falcidian 
or the Trebellian portion 730  or a “legitima portio”, although it also depended on 
                                                          
725 The legata and fideicommissa of the Classical Roman law were equalized as to the legal effect by 
Justinianic legislation (C.6.43.2) and became synonymous if a particular (special) amount or property 
was left. However, the universal fideicommisses remained unique; and thus the terms “legatum” and 
“fideicommissum universale”, as used in the works of the Civilian jurists, came to designate the two 
main species of the genus of “fideicommissum” (Bart., D.30.1). 
726 The universal fideicommisses should not be confused with “general legacies”, where a portion of 
“all goods” (omnium bonorum) was left. The latter were considered particular legacies, because the 
term “bona” designated the goods remaining after the payment of debts, not the universal estate 
(Bart., D.30.1; supra, p.112).  
727 Sometimes also called a “fideicommissary estate” (M.A. Pellegrini, De fideicommissis …, art I, p.2).  
728 D.18.4.2.18; D.36.1.65(63); Pellegrini, op cit, art XXXV, p.539. 
729 Pellegrini, op cit, art XXXV, pp.539-540.  
730  The Falcidian quarter was applicable to special legacies, the Trebellian quarter – to universal 
fideicommisses (Inst.Just.II.22-23).  
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whether an inventory was made, etc.731 A fideicommissarius could be burdened up to 
the value of the benefit he received by the last will, 732  although there were also 
exceptions to this rule.733  
A fideicommiss might become effectual immediately, on a certain or an 
uncertain term (like the death of the heir, fideicommissarius, etc.), on the fulfilment of 
a condition. The testator could create a continuous line of fideicommissary succession 
in respect of particular property, prohibiting, for example, its alienation outside of his 
or her family.734 Justinian’s Novel 159 (555 A.D.), which was a judicial decision on a 
particular case, purported to restrict the effect of such fideicommisses to four 
generations after the testator’s death. However, the prevailing opinion of the Medieval 
Commentators and the Early Modern jurists of the mos italicus was that this decree 
established a rule of interpretation only.735 Thus, the general consensus among the 
Civilians was that the testator could overcome this limit (as well as the limit of ten 
degrees of consanguinity for the collateral successors)736 by wording the last will in 
specific ways, like using “descendants” instead of “family” or explicitly commanding 
the succession to be in perpetuum.737 
The procedures required to succeed to a fideicommiss depended on many 
factors. The legacies of particular property usually created a personal action for the 
entitled fideicommissarius. However, things in specie, under certain conditions, could 
                                                          
731 See Nov.1 (=C.6.50(49) Auth. Sed Cum Testator).  
732 C.6.37.15pr; C.6.43.1.4.  
733 Sometimes the fideicommissarius could decrease his burden (D.36.1.65.11-12). However, this could 
never be done against the express will of the testator. 
734 According to David Johnston, in the Roman Empire the lines of fideicommissary succession never 
reached large lengths in practice, probably due to demographic reasons. The fideicommisses were 
usually used not to preserve particular estates or items of property from division but to perpetuate 
the testator’s gentile name and ensure due care about his grave (D. Johnston, The Roman Law of 
Trusts (1988), 77-107). This explains why the Roman law was almost never preoccupied with the issue 
of perpetuities and restraints on alienation.  
735  This was pointed out by other scholars before (T. Nadarajah, The Roman-Dutch Law of 
fideicommissa… (1949), 133; B. Beinhart, ‘Trusts in Roman and Roman-Dutch Law’, JLH, Vol 1(1)(1980), 
28). One should always have this in mind when trying to compare Nov.159 with the Common law ‘rule 
against perpetuities’ (G.L. Gretton, ‘Fideicommissary substitutions…’, 172). 
736 This “limit” was based on the assumption that a fideicommiss in favour of the family may only 
extend to potential intestate successors, which were restricted by the 10th degree in the collateral line 
(Inst.Just.III.5.5; Durante, De arte testandi, VIII.2).  




be immediately acquired in rem;738 there was an opinion that the testator could entitle 
the fideicommissarius to take possession of the property by self-help. 739  If an 
incorporeal right (e.g., an obligation) was left, the legatee acquired an actio utilis to 
pursue it.740 
The law was different in respect of universal fideicommisses. In order for the 
estate or a portion of it to pass from the heir to a universal fideicommissarius with all 
the real and personal rights and liabilities, the heir was usually required to make a 
”restitution” of the estate. Before the restitution, the fideicommissarius only had a 
personal action against the heir, as well as an action to compel the heir to accept the 
estate.741 The restitution itself could be performed by a simple declaration of the heir 
(“restitutio verbo”), which instantly transmitted all real rights in the estate to the 
fideicommissarius and created actiones utiles for him in respect of incorporeal 
rights. 742  The Justinianic legislation made exceptions from the requirement of 
restitution for some cases, e.g., if the heir contumaciously avoided the restitution, in 
which case the estate was transmitted to the fideicommissarius automatically, ipso 
jure.743 The medieval lawyers deemed restitution unnecessary for fideicommisses to 
the Church and ad pias causas.744 There was an opinion that restitution was generally 
not required in the ecclesiastical forum, being a formality contrary to aequitas 
canonica; but this was controversial.745  
If, however, the fiduciary was not an heir but the first fideicommissarius, 
burdened in favour of the second one, etc., restitution was  not needed and the estate 
passed ipso jure when the term or the condition was fulfilled (C.6.49.7.1b).746  It 
                                                          
738 This depended on whom the property belonged to, on the type of property itself, etc (Bart., D.30.1). 
739 Bart., D.31.34.1; Durante, De arte testandi, II.3; Swinburne, A Briefe Treatise…, IV.4.  
740 C.6.37.18.  
741 D.36.1.4; Inst.Just.II.23.  
742 D.36.1.65(63); Pellegrini, op cit, art II, p.21.  
743 C.6.49.7.1b, with Gloss and commentaries.  
744 C.1.2.23; Pellegrini, op cit, art II, p.23. 
745 D’Alesme, op cit, XIII (with reference to Baldus’ commentary to X.2.19.8); Pellegrini, ibid.  
746 The reasons provided by the scholars for the ipso jure transmission in this case were two: the 
absence of the right to deduct the quarter by the prior fideicommissarius and the easier 
transmissibility of jura utilia (Pellegrini, De fideicommissis…, art II, p.23). “Direct” actions remained in 
the hands of the heir unless he completed their in jure cessio, while the actiones utiles, acquired by 
the first fideicommissarius after the restitution of the estate, were transmitted more easily to the 
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remained, nevertheless, controversial, whether a delay of performance of the 
fideicommiss by the prior fideicommissarius was needed: some authors held that a 
judicial demand (“interpellation”) to perform the fideicommiss was necessary for 
transmission to occur.747 M.A. Pellegrini (1530-1616), with reference to contemporary 
practice, noted that the subsequent fideicommissarius was to make a unilateral 
declaration in court about accepting the fideicommiss, without summoning anyone.748  
The issue of vesting (“cessio”) of fideicommisses and of their transmission to 
the heirs of the fideicommissarius was extremely complex and controversial; it cannot 
be elaborated in much detail here. It is enough to recall that, before becoming vested, 
a fideicommiss was just a spes successionis and was usually neither transmissible to 
heirs nor assignable.749 A pure (unconditional) particular legacy became vested at the 
moment of the original testator’s death, while a pure universal fideicommiss became 
vested at the moment of acceptance of the estate by the heir.750 Nevertheless, by the 
prevailing opinion of the late Ius Commune authors, a universal fideicommiss could 
be transmitted to the heirs even before the acceptance of the estate.751 A conditional 
fideicommiss usually vested only at the moment of the fulfillment of the condition; 752 
a moment of someone’s death and other “uncertain terms” were usually considered 
conditions.753  
By the late 16th century, legal writers were distinguishing between several types 
of fideicommissary substitutions in favour of one’s family. One type was a 
fideicommissum simplex et absolutum (also called “restitutorium”), when the property 
was destinated to descend by a strictly determined line and the fiduciary had no powers 
                                                          
subsequent fideicommissarii (Pau.Castr., C.6.49.7.1b; generally on the assignation of actiones utiles 
see C.4.39.5-6, et ibi Bald).  
747 Bart., D.36.1.1.8, C. 6.49.7.1b; Pellegrini, op cit, art II, p.22. 
748 Pellegrini, op cit, art II, p.24. He bases this on the principle that even an ipso jure acquisition cannot 
happen without the will of the acquirer (Pau.Castr., D.36.1.17.8).  
749 D.50.17.18; C.6.51.1.  
750 D.30.11 and D.36.1.26pr, with the Gloss and commentaries.  
751 The reason for this was that even before the acceptance the fideicommissarius had the action to 
compel the heir to accept, which action he could transmit to his own heirs (Bart., D.30.11; Pellegrini, 
op cit, art XXXI, p.467).  
752 In fact, this also depended on the type of condition (arbitrary or casual) and other factors (D.28.7.8; 
D.35.1.75; D.36.2.4; Swinburne, op cit, VII.23).  
753 However, this was subject to the interpretation of a particular will (Bart., D.30.49.2; Swinburne, op 
cit, IV.8).  
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whatsoever to dispose of the property. Another type was a fideicommissum in casu 
contrafactionis, when there was only a ban to alienate the property beyond the family. 
In this case, the fiduciary retained some powers of disposal: e.g., he might donate the 
property to particular persons in the family, excluding others. Such fideicommiss 
became effectual only if the fiduciary broke its terms (“contrafactio”).754 If the first 
fideicommissarius, himself burdened by a “restitutory” fideicommiss, refused to 
accept it from the heir, the right to demand it from the heir passed to the second 
fideicommissarius.755 However, if this happened in a “contrafactional” fideicommiss, 
the condition of the subsequent fideicommisses was broken and the line of 
substitutions became extinguished. Some authors held that in a “contrafactional” 
fideicommiss the fiduciary could still sell the property beyond the family, if all the 
entitled family members refused to buy it;756 however, it could be prevented by making 
a clause that the “contrafaction” had the immediate real effect of transferring the 
ownership to the fideicommissarius.757  
The Civil law texts provided exceptionally strong measures to protect the 
fideicommissary successors from any possible encroachments from the fiduciaries. 
The law forbade the fiduciary to alienate the burdened property in contravention of the 
terms of the fideicommiss. If the fideicommiss was in diem (i.e., due at a certain term) 
or contained a “contrafactional” clause, the alienation was invalid, even if the 
purchaser was bona fide; the ownership immediately passed to the fideicommissarius, 
without a need for restitution (C.6.43.3.2-3). However, if the fideicommiss was 
conditional and had no “contrafactional” clauses, the invalidation of alienation and the 
transfer of ownership were postponed to the time of the condition’s fulfillment (e.g., 
the fiduciary’s death); nevertheless, after the perfecting of the condition, the 
fideicommissarius could claim the alienated property by a real action from any third 
                                                          
754 Nadarajah, op cit, 17-18. 
755 This included the right to compel the heir to accept the estate (D.36.1.57.2, with commentaries).  
756 Bart., D.45.1.122.3.  
757  Bart. et alii to D.30.114.14; Pellegrini, op cit, art XIV, pp.213, 223, art XL, p.606. This is why 
R. Burgess was wrong, when comparing the fideicommiss with the Scots tailzie, by saying that 
“fideicommissum lacked the resolutive clause…” (R. Burgess, Perpetuities in Scots Law // SSP, vol 31 
(1979), 64). Of course, a particular fideicommiss might lack a resolutive clause, but there was no reason 
why it could not be inserted. The resolutive clause was well-known to the learned Ius Commune jurists, 
although it is not prominent in the texts of Corpus juris civilis. 
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party whatsoever.758 The fideicommissarius also had a hypothec over the estate goods 
as a security for non-payment.759 Moreover, a fideicommissarius could compel the 
fiduciary to provide an additional security (cautio) with “worthy sureties”.760  
There were, however, exceptions to the rule against alienation. As was already 
mentioned (supra, p.160), the fiduciary, unless forbidden by the testator, could use the 
burdened property to pay off the estate debts or to compensate for his or her own claims 
against the testator. Sometimes, however, he could also use the burdened goods to pay 
off his own debts, because paying off one’s debts was considered an alienation “out of 
necessary cause”, as opposed to a “voluntary” alienation (D.31.69(71).1). However, 
this type of alienation was only of temporary effect – it lasted until the debtor’s death, 
to which the fulfillment of a term (or condition) of the fideicommiss was effectually 
postponed.761 As soon as the debtor died, the fideicommissarius became entitled to 
pursue the alienated goods in the hands of the creditors or whoever held them!762 
Moreover, such “necessary” alienation was only valid if the debtor had no other goods; 
immovable property could only be sold in the absence of moveable goods.763  
There were also instances when an alienation with a permanent liberation from 
the fideicommissary burden was allowed. For example, it was possible for perishable 
goods.764 The alienation of burdened goods was allowed by Nov.39 if the testator’s 
children had no other goods to constitute a dowry or a donation propter nuptias for 
themselves.765 The testator could expressly allow the fiduciary to alienate the goods; 
the effect of such permission and whether it permitted alienation for a voluntary cause 
or by a last will were controversial questions.766 Finally, the testator could make a 
                                                          
758 Pellegrini, op cit, art XL, p.606. 
759 See Gloss to C.6.43.1.  
760 See, in general, D.36.3.  
761 Pellegrini, De fideicommissis…, art XL, p.608.  
762 Bart., D. 30.114.14.  
763 Pellegrini, op cit, art XXXV, pp.540-541, art XL, pp.609-610. 
764 Pellegrini, op cit, art XL, p.612.  
765 Nov.39.1=C.6.43 Auth. Res Quae.  
766 Another problematic question was whether the rules on the fideicommiss de residuo (infra) were 
to be used in interpreting such permissions (Pellegrini, op cit, art XL, pp.615-620).  
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fideicommiss de residuo (infra, p.167). Whether the burdened property fell under the 
confiscation for a fiduciary’s crimes was yet another subject of discussion.767 
What if the fideicommissarius became the heir of the fiduciary, which may 
have been a widespread situation for fideicommisses in favour of a family? According 
to Pellegrini’s work, the final communis opinio of scholars was that the 
fideicommissarius in this case could not challenge or question the fiduciary’s actions, 
including the alienation of the goods subject to the fideicommiss.768 This was justified 
by the heir’s being una et eadem persona with the defunct, by the defunct’s power to 
burden the heir’s property and, most importantly, by the idea that the heir, accepting 
the estate, made a “quasi-contract” with the defunct’s creditors, legatees and 
disponees. 769  Thus, a fideicommissarius had to choose: either to claim the 
fideicommiss, revoking all unauthorized alienations, or to become the heir of the 
fiduciary, losing the fideicommiss in part or in full.  
What if the fideicommissarius became the fiduciary’s heir but made an 
inventory of the estate, limiting his liability for the fiduciary’s debts? The outcome 
depended on the type of property subject to the fideicommiss. If the property was of 
an “allodial” (regular) kind, the consensus held that the fideicommissarius, after 
making the inventory, could revoke the fiduciary’s dispositions only if there were no 
sufficient free goods in the estate to compensate for the lost fideicommiss.770 The 
opinion was different, however, in respect of feudal property granted to the vassal and 
his children and descendants.771 According to the Libri feudorum (Libr.Feud.II.45), 
the descendants of a vassal, in order to receive the fief by succession from him, were 
required to become heirs to him, taking upon them a share in the general estate of the 
defunct, with debts.772 In such circumstances, preventing the feudal successor from 
revoking the defunct’s alienations might result in the destruction of the system of 
                                                          
767 Pellegrini responded affirmatively to this question (Pellegrini, op cit, art XL, p.604).  
768 Pellegrini, op cit, art XXXIII, pp.496-498.  
769 See, e.g., C.7.16.7.  
770 Bart., C.6.30.22.9; Pellegrini, op cit, art XXXIII, p.498.  
771 Which was different from a simple fief and was reminiscent of the fideicommissary substitution in 
many respects (infra, p.171).  
772 This was different in case when the fief was succeeded to by collaterals, who did not need to be 




feudal succession and the restrictions on alienation associated with it.773 Therefore, 
some of the jurists admitted a revocation of alienation by the vassal’s heir with 
beneficium inventarii.774 
If a fideicommiss in favour of a family was in casum contrafactionis (supra, 
pp. 163-164), the fideicommissarius was precluded from revoking the alienations not 
only if he himself became the heir to the fiduciary, but also even if any other person in 
whose favour the fideicommissary succession was established became the fiduciary’s 
heir. Let us say, there was specific land, forbidden from alienation beyond one’s 
descendants. The current owner of the land, nevertheless, sold it for a “necessary 
cause”. In this case, the owner’s son A could not revoke the sale in the life of his father 
(supra, p.165), but, more than that, he forever lost the right to revoke it if his brother 
B became the only heir to the father after the father’s death. B was not liable before A 
for paying off the fideicommiss because B himself was one of the class of persons to 
whom the burdened property was to descend, as well as because B, as his father’s heir, 
enjoyed the same privileges as his father. In this way, the line of fideicommissary 
succession became extinct.775  
There was also a different type of fideicommiss – de residuo or residui, – which 
allowed much more freedom to the fiduciary in disposing of the burdened goods.776 
Such fideicommiss obliged the fiduciary to transfer to the fideicommissarius the goods 
remaining in the fiduciary’s hands (“residuum”, “quod supererit”) at the moment of 
the fideicommiss becoming effectual (which might be the fiduciary’s death). What 
powers did the fiduciary hold in respect of the goods subject to such fideicommiss? 
The Digest, reflecting the Classical Roman law, provided that the fiduciary could 
dispose of such goods in good faith, but not fraudulently, with the intention to subvert 
(“intervertere”) the fideicommiss (D.36.1.56). The fiduciary was supposed to exercise 
the “arbitrium boni viri”, not preferring his own goods to the burdened goods. If the 
burdened goods were sold, their prices were considered to take their place (D.31.70.3).  
                                                          
773 See infra, p.171.  
774 Bald., C.6.14.3; Pellegrini, ibid.  
775 D.31.69(71).1, s.v. “Exterus heres”; Bart., D.31.69(71).1; Pellegrini, op cit, art XL, p.608. 
776 Gretton, op cit, 161.  
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However, the Classical law was changed by Nov.108 (541 A.D.), which 
provided that the fiduciary in a fideicommiss residui could dispose of the goods and 
decrease the fideicommiss to the extent of three fourths of the initial value, with only 
the remaining quarter being due unconditionally. This quarter could only be 
diminished to constitute a dowry or a donation propter nuptias and to ransom captives. 
In case of an illegal decrease to less than one quarter of the initial value, the 
fideiommissarius was to sue the fiduciary (or his heirs) and, the fiduciary’s estate being 
insufficient, use real actions against the purchasers of the burdened goods.777  
Nov.108 was the source of confusion and debate among medieval jurists. Its 
effect upon the law of the Digest, with the requirement of bona fides and arbitrium 
boni viri, was controversial. Although the generally shared assumption seems to have 
been that the arbitrium boni viri criterion was no longer required, some authors 
contended that bona fides was still a valid requirement and that an obvious intention 
to subvert the fideicommiss invalidated a disposition even within the three quarters 
limit.778 Others held that the fiduciary was absolutely free in disposing of the three 
fourths of the goods, being able to donate them.779 A related debate was whether the 
three fourths of the estate could only be disponed inter vivos or might be left by the 
fiduciary’s last will, as well. Some held that mortis causa dispositions, becoming 
effectual only after the death, could not affect what was residuum at the moment of 
death; others allowed this, with further disagreement over whether an express 
disposition was needed or a tacit one (e.g., an appointment of heir) was sufficient.780 
A Dutch jurist, J. Voet, pointed out that, in the practice of contemporary Holland, a 
fideicommiss de residuo could be diminished by both inter vivos and mortis causa 
deeds; however, good faith was required of the fiduciary, while fraudulent dispositions 
could be challenged.781  
                                                          
777 Nov.108.1-2=C.6.49(48) Auth. Contra Cum Rogatus.  
778 Pau.Castr., D.36.1.56(54).  
779 Bart., D.31.70.3.  
780 Bald., C.6.49(48) Auth. Contra Rogatus; Pellegrini, op cit, art XL, pp.614-615.  
781 Voet’s position is open to interpretation. On the one hand, he mentions (J. Voet, Commentarius ad 
Pandectas, D.36.1, V) that in Holland a fideicommiss could be “simple” (allowing alienation by the 
fiduciary, even by a last will) or “double” (not allowing alienation). In another fragment, he deals with 
fideicommissa de residuo, without specifying whether they are a sub-species of “simple” 
fideicommisses or make up a separate kind (ibid., LIV). T. Nadarajah, in his book, holds that the practice 
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Everything previously mentioned mainly concerns fideicommissary 
substitutions made in last wills. Such substitutions could also be made in donations 
mortis causa.782 But could a fideicommiss or a line of fideicommisses be created by 
an inter vivos contract? There was no easy answer to this question. Ultimately, the Ius 
Commune jurists were able to develop substitution-like devices for inter vivos 
contracts, whence they travelled into some of the modern legal systems;783 however, 
this required extensive work of doctrinal elaboration. 
The Corpus juris civilis was contradictory as regards the possibility of 
contractual substitutions. On the one hand, a fragment of the Digest (D.45.1.137.8) 
held that it was not possible for a stipulation de dando (i.e., to give something) to 
contain a substitution in favour of one of the creditor’s heirs, ignoring other heirs, for 
promises of pecuniary character. This was only possible in respect of a stipulation de 
faciendo (to perform work). The Gloss contrasted this fragment with D.2.14.33 and 
deduced that this law applied to obligations and actions only, while an exception-
producing pactum de non petendo, barring the creditors from suing, could be licitly 
contracted in favour of one of the heirs.784  
Pierre de Belleperche (c. 1230-1308) was of the opinion that this restriction 
could be avoided by creating separate obligations in one contract: one to the original 
creditor, by whose death it was extinguished, and a new obligation in favour of the 
heir. The rule against stipulatio alteri, allegedly, did not apply, as the heir was “one 
person” with the original creditor.785  However, Bartolus strictly opposed that. He 
pointed out that the heir was “one person” with the testator only to the extent of his 
hereditary share (one third, fourth, etc.), while in respect of other shares he was a “third 
party”. Moreover, even an obligation created post mortem still was an estate 
obligation.786 Thus, a pecuniary obligation would always transmit to all the creditor’s 
                                                          
of the Roman-Dutch legal system distinguished between the “simple” fideicommiss of the Dutch law 
(which was defeasible by a last will) and the fideicommiss residui of the Civil law (which was not 
defeasible by any lucrative or fraudulent disposition). See: Nadarajah, op cit, 18-19, 188-193.  
782 Fr. Hotman, Scholae ad titulos de donationibus…, pp. 119-120; M.A. Pellegrini, op. cit., art. I, p. 4.  
783 G.L. Gretton, ‘Quaedam Meditationes Caledoniae: The Property/Succession Borderland’, EPLJ, vol 3, 
issue 2 (2014), 125.  
784 D.45.1.137.8, s.v. “Acquiri”.  
785 Pau.Castr., D.45.1.38.14, D.45.1.137.8.  
786 D.42.5.7 was cited to this point.  
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heirs in their respective portions, although an express or a tacit legacy by the creditor 
could provide otherwise in respect of the relations among the heirs. Obligations to do 
something, in Bartolus’ opinion, were different only in so far as they were indivisible, 
so they would transmit only to the heir having an interest in their performance.787 
However, Bartolus, following the common opinion of authors, admitted pacta de non 
petendo in favour of one of the creditor’s heirs.788 
On the other hand, there were fragments in the Digest that seemed to allow 
“substitution”-like devices in contracts. For example, D.32.37.3 describes a case where 
a father donated all his goods to his son, in return receiving the son’s stipulation that 
the goods would be restored to the father or a person the father might name, as soon 
as the father revoked the donation or died. Later on, the father appointed beneficiaries 
of his revocation by a letter. After the father’s death, the son was found directly liable 
before the beneficiaries. This fragment is not an example of a jus quaesitum tertio: the 
son’s debt was considered here “left by legacy”, which created an utilis actio for the 
beneficiaries (supra, p.162).789 
Furthermore, the Code contained a 290 A.D. constitution by Diocletian 
(C.8.54.3), which allowed the making of donations with a clause that the gift would 
pass to a third person at a later date, with the third person acquiring an utilis actio 
against the first donatary. Medieval lawyers saw it as one of the instances of jus 
quaesitum tertio, which arose only in a fully performed contract of donation, where 
the donor gave away the ownership of the property. 790  Although the exact 
interpretation of this law was debatable,791 it obviously allowed the creation of a line 
of singular succession. 
Feudal practice was another source of contractual substitutions. It was already 
mentioned above (supra, p.124) that Medieval learned lawyers analyzed the situation 
                                                          
787 For example, an obligation to repair a house would be profitable only for an heir who got that house 
from the testator (D.45.1.137.8, s.v. “Unius”).  
788 Bart., D.45.1.137.8. 
789 D.32.37.3, s.v. “Quasi debitorem”.  
790 Bart., D.45.1.48.20. 
791 See infra, p.173.  
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where an emphyteusis or a fief was granted to the father and his sons.792 The sons in 
such case acquired the fief not as the father’s heirs but as the disponees in the original 
grant; however, Bartolus held that the fief was, nevertheless, to be considered 
paternum,793 and thus the sons were obliged to become heirs to the father after his 
death and to be liable for his debts.794 A similar situation occurred if a fief was granted 
to “the vassal and his children”, which created a jus quaesitum for the vassal’s children 
and further descendants.795 Early jurists sometimes went as far as to contend that the 
grandson of the original vassal in such a fief could not be prejudiced by the 
confiscation of the fief that his father (the original vassal’s son) might incur for crimes 
committed by him. The grandson, it was alleged, could take the fief “in the right of his 
grandfather and his own” (ex persona avi et sua), not “in the father’s right” (ex persona 
patris).796 Later Commentators qualified this position with many conditions,797 but the 
underlying principle remained the same: if the heir of the disponee acquired the right 
in the fief not as the “heir”, but as the “child” or the “descendant”, then he might be 
protected against the actions of the member of the line of succession standing between 
him and the original disponee.  
Such “entailed”798 feudal succession in the Ius Commune created a peculiar 
situation. The descendant of the original vassal acquired the fief not by way of 
succession but by way of jus quaesitum, created by the original disposition. However, 
this descendant was still required to become the heir of the previous holder of the fief 
and be liable for his debts (supra, p.166). Such heirship was not essential to the 
acquisition of the fief but was more like a collateral duty, required to complete the 
passing of the fief. This is why such feudal heir could challenge the renunciations and 
other dispositions by his predecessors, if they prejudiced his jus quaesitum. Baldus 
admitted that the holder of the fief, “entailed” in this way, could make his alienations 
                                                          
792 Bart., D.39.6.31; D. Covarruvias, De testamentis..., 154-155. 
793 Bart., cons. 58.  
794 Libr.Feud.II.45; see supra, p.166.  
795 Pellegrini, De fideicommissis…, art LI, pp.820-821.  
796 D.1.9.7.1, s.v. “Patris”.  
797 Bartolus distinguished between a crime committed against the feudal superior, which led to the 
outright loss of the fief, and any other grave crime, where such “entailed” fief went to the 
perpetrator’s descendants (Bart., D.48.22.3).  
798 It seems, there was no special term for this type of succession in the Ius Commune. 
172 
 
secure by obliging himself and his heirs to warrant the alienation against any 
challenges or revocations.799 However, given what has already been established here 
about the rights of a feudal heir, it seems that such warranties could only oblige the 
heir to the pecuniary compensation up to the limit of beneficium inventarii and could 
not disturb his right to the fief.  
Seeing the extent to which devices similar to fideicommissary substitution 
could be created in donations and in a feudal context, it is not surprising that the Early 
Modern jurists were eager to generalize substitutions in contracts and give them an 
equal standing with substitutions in last wills. Pellegrini admitted that 
“fideicommisses”, in the strict meaning of the term, could not be made in inter vivos 
contracts, but he held that contracts which contained substitutions “by way” (per 
modum) of a fideicommiss were governed by the same rules as true fideicommisses.800 
He also clarified that such a fideicommiss might only concern particular property, so 
that it would not be characterised as a pactum successorium (supra, p.121).801 Voet 
was less subtle and straightforwardly claimed that a fideicommiss could be made by a 
contract, although governed by rules slightly different from those of a testamentary 
fideicommiss.802  
One of the problems the jurists had to deal with, in order to accommodate 
contractual fideicommissary substitutions, was the jus quaesitum tertio. A fully 
executed donation (C.8.54.3) was a special case when the law expressly allowed the 
creation of a third party’s right, but what about a different type of contract: a loan, a 
stipulation, a sale, etc? One of the solutions was to involve a notary public.803 Another 
option was making the contract as a negotiorum gestor for an absent third party – in 
this case, the third party’s right became quaesitum after ratification. 804  Most 
importantly, a jus quaesitum could be created by a father in favour of his children and 
descendants, both those belonging to his potestas and the emancipated ones.805  
                                                          
799 Bald., C.6.14.3.  
800 Pellegrini, op cit, art LI, p.805.  
801 Pellegrini, ibid., pp.810-817.  
802 J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, D.36.1, IX.  
803 Supra, p.80. 
804 Pellegrini, op cit, art LI, p.806.  
805 D.2.14.21.2; D.45.1.45.2; Bart., D.45.1.130; Pellegrini, ibid. 
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One of the important and, at the same time, controversial differences between 
contractual and testamentary fideicommissary substitutions was the real effect of the 
ban on alienation of the burdened property. While in last wills the real effect of such 
ban was provided by legislation,806 whether an agreement, prohibiting an alienation of 
an asset, could have not only a personal but also a real consequence was a hotly debated 
topic. There were disagreements even on the issue of whether an actio utilis, provided 
by law to a third-party beneficiary of donation (C.8.54.3), was a real or a personal 
action. Voet, from his perspective of a late Humanist lawyer, was quite confident that 
this law created only a personal action of the beneficiary against the burdened donatary 
and his heirs and not a real action against the purchasers of the thing.807 Many of the 
earlier mos italicus lawyers, like Ph. Decius and M.A. Pellegrini, stuck to the contrary 
opinion.808  
Even then, C.8.54.3, requiring a fully executed donation, covered just a portion 
of the possible contracts with a fideicommissary substitution. What if the contract was 
a sale, a loan, a stipulation to pay, etc? The early Commentators held that, by the 
general rule, such a contract could not prevent an alienation in so far as to preclude the 
change of property owner.809 However, the same jurists developed various tricks, 
enhancing non-alienation clauses in order to achieve the desired real effect. For 
example, a non-alienation clause had a real effect if the person who granted the 
property reserved some real right over it: it could be a hypothec (security)810 or a 
dominium directum (applicable to fiefs and similar rights).811 The alienation was ipso 
jure invalid if a relevant judicial decree was issued against the burdened party812 or if 
                                                          
806 C.6.43.3.2-3. 
807 J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, D.36.1, IX. 
808 They justified it by the privileged position of donations and dowries - the “favour of generosity” 
(favor liberalitatis) (Dec., cons. 239; Pellegrini, op cit, art LI, p.808).  
809 An exception was made for absolutely irrevocable alienations, such as a manumission of a slave or 
a consecration of the land for religious use (Bart., D.30.114.14; Pellegrini, op cit, art LI, p.825).  
810 There was a discussion whether a general hypothec over the receiver’s entire estate was sufficient 
or a special mention of the burdened property was required (Bart., ibid; Alex., D.41.2.38.1).  
811 Pellegrini, op cit, art LI, pp.824-825.  
812 D.18.1.26 (a procedural decree of bonis interdictio mentioned); Pellegrini, op cit, art LI, p.825. 
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the contract allowed the third party to take possession of the burdened property by self-
help.813  
Most importantly, there was an opinion that a device similar to the lex 
commissoria814 could be used to prevent alienations. It was called a “resolutive clause” 
and provided that the burdened property, in case of alienation, reverted back to the 
granter and immediately passed to the beneficiary.815 Not everyone recognized this 
possibility: e.g., Bartolus continued to insist on “reserving” a real right in the hands of 
the granter;816 other legal writers (Baldus, Tartagni) were more enthusiastic. They 
provided slightly different examples of wording for a “resolutive clause”: e.g., Baldus’ 
and Tartagni’s version declared the original contract to be considered “not made” 
(“infecta”),817 while Pellegrini’s version directly declared the deed of alienation itself 
to be “null, invalid and not made”.818 The problem of the real effect of a contractual 
substitution was, in this way, essentially solved.  
Another question troubling the learned lawyers was whether substitution 
clauses in contracts were revocable by the original parties to the contract. The 
dominant opinion seems to have been that a jus quaesitum of the third party could be 
revoked by the original parties until this right became vested and enforceable: i.e., a 
future conditional right (e.g., becoming effectual after one’s death) and even a right a 
die could be revoked.819 One of the exceptions was the case of a solemn stipulation by 
one of the parties in the name of the beneficiary,820 but some authors believed that this 
was restricted only to stipulations made exclusively in a beneficiary’s favour and was 
inapplicable when the stipulation benefited both the stipulator and the beneficiary.821 
                                                          
813 Such pact was interpreted as creating a power of manus injectio in the creditor (D.18.1.56; Pellegrini, 
ibid).  
814 Lex commissoria was a type of contractual clause in Civil law, by which the ownership of the 
transferred property reverted back to the granter, in case a particular condition occurred (usually, if 
the purchase price was not paid on time). See D.18.3.  
815 D.39.5.1, s.v. “Mortis causa donatio”; C.4.54.4; Bald., C.4.6.3.  
816 Bart., D.30.114.14, C.4.6.3. He seems, however, surprisingly accepting of ”lex commissoria”-like 
devices in another fragment, D.41.2.38.1. 
817 Bald., C.4.6.3, C.4.51.7; Alex., D.41.2.38.1. 
818 Pellegrini, op cit, art LI, pp.825-826.  
819 Bart., D.45.1.122.2; Bald., C.5.12.7; Pellegrini, op cit, art LI, pp.818-819.  
820 Bald., C.5.12.7.  
821 Pellegrini, op cit, art LI, p.819.  
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Whether the revocation could be made by one of the contracting parties or required the 
consent of both, depended on the type of contract and on who was primarily interested 
in adding the substitution clause.822 If the substitution was contained in an obligation 
(“obliged to pay to A, whom failing by death to B”), the substitution was considered a 
“mandate” of the creditor and thus could be revoked or altered by him in his life.823  
What if one of the contracting parties was dead? By what seems the universal 
opinion of the scholars, the heir of the granter or the receiver could not revoke the 
substitution – this clearly followed from the Corpus juris civilis fragments.824 The 
same logic applied in feudal matters, where a renunciation of the fief in prejudice of 
the children was generally allowed if it was a feudum novum (newly granted), but not 
allowed in subsequent generations.825  
In most other aspects, contractual substitutions followed the rules similar to 
testamentary substitutions. Just as in last wills, conditional substitutes possessed only 
a spes successionis and there was no transmission until the respective rights became 
vested.826 
 
5.2. Fideicommissary Substitutions and Scottish Destinations: a Conceptual 
Difference. 
The first issue to settle here is that of terminology. The term “fideicommissary 
substitution” was not used in Scots legal practice, although it was mentioned in some 
legal treatises.827 The term “fideicommis” in the Scots context designated either a 
legacy828 or a trust.829 Notably, Th. Craig in his treatise used the term with a meaning 
                                                          
822 Pellegrini, op cit, art LI, pp.817-819.  
823 Pellegrini, when dealing with substitutions in obligations, refers to D.39.5.19.3 – a fragment dealing 
with a mandate by the creditor to the debtor to pay to another person. It should be noted, however, 
that the analogy of the substitution with the mandate is not perfect, as the substitution created a jus 
quaesitum, while the mandate expired after the principal’s death (Pellegrini, op cit, art LI, pp.819-820).  
824 D.18.7.3; C.8.55.1; Bart., D.45.122.2; Pellegrini, op cit, art.LI, p 820.  
825 Bald., C.6.14.3; Pellegrini, op cit, art LI, pp.820-821.  
826 Pellegrini, op cit, art LI, pp.808-809.  
827 Dirleton, ‘Substitution in Legacies’, Some Doubts …, 185.  
828 Stair, Inst.III.8.30; G.L. Gretton, ‘Fideicommissary substitutions…’, 169.  
829 Fothringhame v. Mauld (1671, M.16179); Seton v. Pidmedden (1717, M.4425).  
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close to that of “fideicommissary substitution”: he calls a feu given under a condition 
to transfer it to the third person a “fideicommiss” (Jus feudale, II.5.9), mentioning that 
in England a contravention of such condition entails the loss of the feu. He points out 
that in Scotland the practice on such conditions is absent but thinks that the same rule 
should apply as in England.  
The term “substitution” was often used in Scotland to denote the process when 
one successor succeeded to another successor, in distinction to the “conditional 
institution”, which roughly corresponded to the Civilian ‘vulgar substitution’.830  
The term “destination”, on the one hand, is used as early as the time of Craig 
in the meaning of “directing the use of some property for a third person”.831 However, 
the earliest cases from the printed collections use this term in a different meaning of 
“directing some property to be converted into a different kind of property”: for 
example, promising to invest money into heritable property (infra, p.197). Either way, 
this Scots term seems to have little to do with the Ius Commune “destinatio”.832  
The term “tailzie” in Scots law originally designated a feudum talliatum – a feu 
in which a regular line of succession (especially a collateral one) was “cut off” and 
which descended to the heirs determined in advance by the terms of the infeftment.833 
G. Mackenzie in his Treatise on Tailies (c. 1687) notes that the term “tailzie” is proper 
for heritable property, while substitutions in moveable obligations are properly called 
“destinations”.834  
In this chapter, “destination” will be the general term for a fideicommiss-like 
device, providing for a ‘subsequent succession’.  
                                                          
830 This terminology of Scots law looks even more peculiar when we see the Civilians say: “every 
substitution is a conditional institution” (Bart., C.6.30.20; Pellegrini, op cit, art XV, p.224). Perhaps, the 
Scots lawyers at some point took the more generic Civilian term “conditional institution” and started 
using it in a narrower meaning (Gretton, op cit, 158).  
831 “In tertium… destinatum transferre” (Jus feudale, II.5.9).  
832 In the Ius Commune the term “destinatio” usually meant a subordination of one asset to another 
(e.g., an appurtenance to the principal thing), which mattered in the field of interpretation of legacies 
(J. Del Castillo Sotomayor, Quotidianae controversiae juris, tomus V (1726), 1-22).  
833 Jus feudale, II.16.2. 
834 Mackenzie, A Treatise on Tailies, 484.  
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Similarly to the Ius Commune, Scottish destinations could be found both in last 
wills and in inter vivos contracts.835 Destinations in last wills became the subject of 
decisions of the Court of Session only in the late 17th century, despite appearing quite 
early in the wills themselves. The archival registers of wills reveal a practice of leaving 
a right of tack (lease) of a land or a house to “A, and after his death to B”.836 It is 
notable in that it contradicts the 17th century law, when tacks were considered heritable 
property837 and, thus, could not be disponed by a last will.838 There were also more 
explicit examples of fideicommiss-like arrangements in respect of tacks. Thus, in a 
will by Alan Mortoun839 the testator left one half of the “kyndness of his stedding” to 
his elder son Walter and the other half to the testator’s wife Margaret for the duration 
of her life (both being executors to him); after his mother’s death, Walter was to 
dispose of her half “to quhasome… Margaret thinkis expedit”. The will’s text does not 
allow us to make any conclusions as to the nature of this destination or to guess 
whether Margaret could dispose of her share in her life. A similar substitution of a tack 
may be found in the will of James Corrass.840 Sometimes, a liferent was used to 
achieve the same effect: e.g., in the testament of a famous diplomat Sir Robert 
Deniston of Montjoy a sum of 500 merks was left to Helen Deniston for her lifetime, 
to be divided equally among her children after her death.841 
It seems it was in the 1660s that the first court decisions on destinations in last 
wills appeared. Hill v. Maxwells (1665, M.14355) is notable in this respect. John 
Maxwell left by testament a general legacy of his moveable goods in equal parts to his 
two daughters, Janet and Bessie, substituting them to each other in case of “failing by 
                                                          
835 The designation of destinations in the last wills as “destinations over” and destinations in the inter 
vivos dispositions as “special destinations” (M. Morton, ‘Special Destinations as Testamentary 
Instructions’, SLT(News)(1984), 133-134) is of recent origin and is not found in the pre-1800 literature 
and case law.  
836 Thus, in a testament by William Cochranne (CC9/7/2/91; 7 January 1564(65)) the testator left the 
“kindness of (his) stedding” to the elder son, whom failing – to the younger one. 
837 Stair, Inst.II.1.4, III.5.6; Rule v. Hume (1635, M.14374), Boyd v. Sinclair (1671, M.14375). The actual 
bequests of tacks were still being made as late as 1604 (Archibald Bordland, 27/06/1604, 
CC8/8/39/544).  
838 It should be noted, nevertheless, that the tacks were not included into the testamentary inventories 
of the wills that disponed them. See, e.g., a testament of Alan Mortoun (note below).  
839 CC9/7/2/94; 14 February 1564(65).  
840 CC8/10/3/9/8; 6/03/1583(84).  
841 CC8/10/8/nov1625; 4/11/1625.  
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decease”. Their mother was appointed tutor to them. After John’s death, his daughters 
also died, Janet first, before achieving 12 years of age, and then Bessie, after achieving 
the same age and making her own will, nominating her mother as the general 
legatee.842 Thereafter a controversy arose between the mother and John’s brothers, 
who claimed that Bessie’s death without confirming as executrix to her sister meant 
that Janet’s part of estate was not established in Bessie’s person and thus was to belong 
to Janet’s ‘next-of-kin’ –John’s brothers. The Lords decided in favour of the mother, 
holding that Janet’s half of the legacy accrued to her sister without confirmation; this 
half, however, was to be subject to any debts Janet might have incurred in her life.  
This case, on the one hand, might be easily used to demonstrate a variety of 
Civilian doctrines as applied in Scots practice; on the other hand, to do so would be a 
mere speculation. Thus, the substitution used by the testator might be compared to the 
reciprocal substitution of the Civil law (supra, n.721). This case could be about a 
“fideicommiss” from Janet to Bessie and then the question would be whether such 
“fideicommiss” was vested or not. In Civil law, as was said above, special legacies 
were considered vested at the testator’s death and universal fideicommisses at the 
acceptance of estate (supra, p.163). General legacies in Scotland did not, by 
themselves, transmit a liability for the testator’s debts, which was the exclusive duty 
of the executor.843 However, the terminology of the Scots lawyers of the time was often 
confusing, with general legacies often called “universal”;844 the Maxwell brothers 
could possibly have relied on this confusion to argue that the legacy was not vested 
before the confirmation, which was often considered the Scots equivalent of aditio 
hereditatis.845  
                                                          
842 Newbyth’s report of the case contradicts itself, saying at the end that Bessie died first. However, it 
is obviously a mistake, as in the same sentence the report confirms that the mother was Bessie’s 
legatee (M.14356).  
843 It is unclear who the executor of John was – the daughters, the mother, someone else or no 
confirmation followed at all. The last possibility, however, is implausible, as then John’s brothers 
would have taken an opportunity to bring this point in their favour. If the daughters were executors, 
their mother would exercise their office, being their tutor.  
844 Stair, for instance, uses the words “general” and “universal” as synonyms in respect of legacies 
(Stair, Inst.III.8.38; Mackenzie, Inst.III.9.20). Cf. with the ‘general legacies’ of Civil law, supra, n.726. 
845 Stair, Inst.III.8.51. 
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The defenders’ claim that Bessie was to become executrix to Janet might also 
be associated with Civilian ‘pupillary substitution’, where the substitute became the 
heir of the institute (supra, pp.159-160). This last conjecture seems to reflect the actual 
way in which the Lords interpreted the substitution: Stair’s report of the case stresses 
the fact that Janet died as a pupil, still being under-12 and unable to make a will.846  
Finally, the Lords might, to some extent, have had the Civilian jus accrescendi 
in mind, which might explain their position that no confirmation was needed and that 
Janet’s portion was subject to Janet’s debts.847  
However, all of the above remains a speculation. Neither report of Hill includes 
any references to the Ius Commune. Moreover, the winning party’s argument, as 
reported by Stair, was based on considerations drastically different from those set out 
above. The mother claimed that the substitution made the sisters “heirs of provision” 
to each other, drawing analogy from the case of a bond granted to a father, whom 
failing to his son nominatim. Without referring to a particular precedent, the mother’s 
counsel pointed out that neither ‘service of heir’ nor confirmation were necessary for 
the son in case of such bond, so it should also be unnecessary for Bessie to be Janet’s 
substitute. The notable thing in this argument is that the terminology of heritable 
succession – “heir of provision” – was used in quite an unusual setting of the last will, 
executry and moveable legacies!  
This mixing of the terminologies of heritable and moveable succession may 
also be found in subsequent, albeit scarce, case law involving last will destinations. In 
                                                          
846 The age of pupillarity in Scots law in that period was identical to that of Civil law: 14 for men and 
12 for women (Stair, Inst.I.6.24).  
847 By virtue of the jus accrescendi at Civil law, as understood in the medieval Ius Commune, the portion 
of an heir or a legatee proportionately accrued to other heirs or conjunct legatees, if he died without 
the heirs of his own. No new aditio hereditatis was required. The burdens attached to the vacant 
portion also accrued (see, e.g., Pau.Castr., C.6.51.1.10-11). However, the Humanist scholars provided 
a different interpretation of jus accrescendi and its consequences (see: Voet, Commentarius ad 
Pandectas, D.30.1, LX-LXII). Irrespective of the interpretation taken, the Civilian jus accrescendi was 
only applicable before the legacy was vested, while in Hill v. Maxwells the original general legacy of 
John Maxwell to his daughters was already vested. However, like with many other Ius Commune 
institutions, Scots lawyers could have taken a wider interpretation of jus accrescendi: see, e.g., Dirleton 
applying the ‘jus accrescendi’ concept to a situation when a bond was given to the mother in liferent 
and to her children in fee and one of the children predeceased the mother (Dirleton, ‘Jus accrescendi’, 
Some Doubts…, 104).  
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Nicolson v. Nicolsons (1677, M.8944) the Court of Session was, without any 
objections, dealing with a deed which appointed the granter’s son “heir and executor” 
of the granter and substituted the son’s siblings as “heirs and executors” to him. It 
seems that these siblings were confirmed by the Commissary as the deceased son’s 
executors, which implies that substituting an executor to an executor (at least, an 
underaged one) was an acceptable practice in that period.  
In another case, Christie v. Christie (1681, M.8197=14849), 848  a father 
appointed his daughter Jean his executor and general legatee, substituting another 
person for the occasion of her decease. Jean survived the father and was confirmed as 
executor to him but, soon afterwards, died herself. Jean’s posthumous brother was 
confirmed as executor-dative to her but was sued by the substitute. The substitute 
claimed that he was a “tailzied heir-substitute in mobilibus” of Jean, entitled to the 
general legacy despite Jean’s surviving her father. His action was granted by the Lords, 
who held that Jean (or her tutors) could have defeated the “moveable tailzie”, but, as 
she had not, the “tailzie” was still in force. The Lords however, found that the “tailzie” 
did not extend to the “Bairn’s part” of Jean, which her father could not substitute;849 
the substitute’s claim that he was substitutus pupillariter to Jean was met with a 
pronouncement that the ‘pupillary substitution’ did not exist in Scots law. This 
confirms that the doctrine behind this decision was not Civilian – it was more of an 
analogy with heritable succession. Moveable substitutes were considered “heirs” 
similarly to the heritable substitutes – the ‘heirs of tailzie’ (infra, s.5.3).  
Campbell v. Campbell & MacMillan (1740, M.14855) is considered the main 
Scottish case on destinations in last wills.850 Daniel Campbell appointed his father, 
John Campbell, his executor and general legatee, substituting his sister, Margaret, for 
the occasion of the father’s decease. John survived his son, but not for long, never 
confirming as executor to him. The dispute arose between Margaret, as substitute, and 
John’s elder son, William, who was John’s general legatee. William claimed that, 
                                                          
848 This case was previously analyzed by George L. Gretton (Gretton, op cit, 169).  
849 At Civil law, the father could freely make a ‘pupillary substitution’ of the child’s ‘legitim’. Whether 
the same could be done by a fideicommiss, was a controversial question. There was an opinion that it 
was possible if it did not restrict the son’s freedom to dispose of the ‘legitim’ (Bart., D.28.6.1.2-3).  
850 Gretton, op cit, 170.  
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according to Civil law, a substitution was to be presumed a substitutio vulgaris,851 and 
so John’s surviving Daniel excluded Margaret’s hope of succession. In return, 
Margaret argued that Civil law did not know any other type of substitution besides a 
‘vulgar’ one852 and that Civil law had “this subtility, that… (one) could not name an 
heir to his heir…” The latter statement was not exactly true, as the Civilian ‘pupillary’ 
and ‘exemplary’ substitutions were doing exactly that – appointing “an heir to the heir” 
(supra, pp.159-160). However, this statement by the party reflects the dominant 
approach of Scots lawyers to destinations in last wills. They always tended to draw an 
analogy between them and heritable destinations, which were dominated by the 
concept of “heirship”.  
Margaret prevailed in that case, as the Lords found that she was a “proper” 
substitute and not a conditional institute, as well as that John’s disposing of his estate 
to William could not be interpreted as defeating the substitution. Defeasance itself, in 
theory, was recognized as perfectly possible, even by a last will. The one question that 
caused hot debates among the Lords was how Margaret was supposed to establish her 
title in the legacy. Some claimed that, as the legacy was vested in John’s person 
without confirmation, it was to transmit to Margaret ipso jure, similarly to a substitute 
nominatim in a heritable bond.853 Others, however, held that Margaret was to confirm 
as executor-dative to Daniel, the original testator, in order to establish the title.  
Campbell was confirmed in subsequent cases: Robertson v. Ker (1742, 
M.8202=15942)854 and Brown v. Coventry (1793, M.14863). The last case established 
that substitutionary clauses in legacies, in doubt, were presumed to create “conditional 
institutions”, not proper substitutions. This rule was afterwards widened and extended 
to all moveable property.855 However, George L. Gretton’s claim that “a mortis causa 
                                                          
851 This is partially true, as in doubt the words of a substitution were deemed “direct” and not “oblique” 
at Civil law. The exact interpretation of the substitution depended on the wording and other factors 
(d’Alesme, Tractatus in materiam substitutionum, XV; supra, n.722).  
852 This was untrue (supra, s.5.1).  
853 Infra, p.201. 
854 This case dealt with the question whether the ‘legitim’ of the son could be subject to a substitution, 
previously raised in Christie v. Christie (1681, M.8197). The answer was negative, in so far as the 
substitution restricted the son’s right of disposal; the question remained undecided in respect of a 
simple destination de residuo.  
855 M’Laren, op cit, vol I, p.299. 
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substitution becomes indistinguishable from an inter vivos one”856 is not exactly true 
for the pre-1800 legal context. It will be demonstrated further857 that the same clauses 
that created a moveable substitution in a last will also created a heritable substitution 
in an inter vivos disposition. 
The conclusion that we are to draw from Scottish testamentary destinations, 
besides the scarcity of case law, is that such destinations were not seen as a separate 
legal device until the late 18th century. They were heavily influenced by inter vivos 
destinations, called “special destinations” in modern law, which at the time were 
governed by the rules of heritable succession.  
The inter vivos destinations, called “special destinations” in later law,858 were 
the main form of destinations in Scots law in the 17-18th centuries. How similar or 
dissimilar were they from the Civil law fideicommisses? This is a very complex 
question. Scottish legal writers were themselves divided on this point. Lord Bankton 
considered the Scottish tailzies to descend from the Civil law fideicommisses 
(Inst.II.3.135), although the law as described by Bankton does not reveal a significant 
Civilian influence.859 G. Mackenzie pointed out that the Scots tailzies and destinations 
were very similar to fideicommisses, but he, nevertheless, followed Craig in ascribing 
them mainly to the Anglo-Norman ‘entails’.860 Stair thought them to be of French 
origin (Inst.III.4.33). J. Erskine famously stressed the uniqueness of Scottish 
substitutions (destinations), stating that “Romans had the name of substitution without 
the thing” and pointed out that it was not possible to appoint “an heir of the heir” in 
Civil law, except for a case of the ‘pupillary substitution’ (Inst.III.8.44). The 18th 
century case law usually followed the same line, evidenced, e.g., by Campbell v. 
Campbell & MacMillan (1740, supra p.180). 
Some authors, for example, George L. Gretton, were troubled by what looks 
like the ignoring of Civilian fideicommissary substitutions by the majority of Scots 
authors and practitioners. Further, Gretton points out how Dirleton completely ignores 
                                                          
856 G.L. Gretton, op cit, 170.  
857 Infra, pp.188, 198. 
858 See, e.g., M’Laren, op cit, vol II, pp.592-593.  
859 See infra, n.901.  
860 Mackenzie, A Treatise on Tailies, 484; Jus feudale, II.16.1.  
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it when dealing with tailzies, creating an impression that only ‘vulgar’ and ‘pupillary’ 
substitutions were comparable with tailzies. In that fragment, Dirleton (in Latin) 
opines that a tailzie of lands worded “to Titius and the heirs of his body, whom failing 
to his heirs-male” creates both a ‘vulgar’ and a ‘pupillary’ substitution at Scots law.861 
And this despite Dirleton’s using an excerpt from the text by the Civilian jurist 
A. Perez (1583-1673), which in the original context expressly referred to the 
substitutio fideicommissaria.862 
In the opinion of the author of the present thesis, there is no inconsistency in 
Dirleton’s work. When Dirleton mentions “pupillary substitution” in this fragment, he 
does not mean that the substitution is only effectual while Titius is under 14 years old. 
He means that such tailzie appoints the substitutes as heirs to Titius, similar to the way 
the Civil law ‘pupillary substitution’ operated. In this, Dirleton’s fragment stands in 
line with all other instances when “an heir to an heir” paradigm was mentioned. Nor 
is there inconsistency in this paradigm in general. It was perfectly true that Scottish 
destinations and tailzies, at least since the 1660s, did exactly that – they appointed the 
substitute an heir of the institute.  
The substitutes in tailzies and destinations in Scotland were considered “heirs 
of provision” and were subject to the rules of heritable succession. This did not depend 
on whether the property subject to the destination was originally heritable or moveable. 
Hill v. Maxwells (supra, pp.177-180) showed how the terminology of heritable 
succession was applied to a moveable sum in a legacy. Subsequent cases concerning 
substitutions in bonds used the same language.863 The 18th century Institutional writers 
explicitly held that a bond conceived in favour of the creditor and the substitutes 
nominatim was heritable. 864  The substitutes in destinations were called “heirs of 
provision”, “heirs-substitutes”, etc. and, by a general rule, were required to obtain 
‘service of heir’ to the previous member of the destination in order to vest the right in 
their person (Bankton, Inst.III.5.22).  
                                                          
861 J. Nisbet of Dirleton, ‘Substitutio’, Some Doubts…, 183.  
862 Gretton, op cit, 171-172.  
863  Fleming v. Fleming (1666, M.13999=14848); Laird of Lamington v. Muir(Moor) (1675, 
M.4252=14357); Robertson v. Preston (1680, M.14357).  
864 Bankton, Inst.II.1.36; Erskine, Inst.II.2.19; infra, p.202.  
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The most important consequence of this approach, which was the most crucial 
difference of Scots destinations from the Civil law fideicommisses, was the fact that 
Scots destinations created a universal succession. Being an “heir” of the previous 
holder of the tailzied property, the substitute was liable for the debts created by the 
predecessor. Sometimes this liability was absolute, sometimes limited (infra, p.193-
194). An ‘heir of tailzie and provision’ usually enjoyed a ‘privilege of discussion’, so 
that the general heir of the defunct was to be “discussed” before the creditors could 
use diligence against the ‘heir of tailzie’.865 Nevertheless, the ‘heir of tailzie’ was liable 
for the debts of all his predecessors.  
Moreover, if the heir was obliged to retain the tailzied estate for a further heir-
substitute, the payment of the predecessor’s debts did not take away the burden of the 
tailzie. This was found in the case of Callendar v. Hamilton (1686, M.15476), where 
the heir of tailzie866 paid off the debts of the granter of the tailzie and afterwards 
burdened the tailzied estate with a new debt, in consideration of the money he had 
paid. After his death, the next heir of tailzie challenged the new debt on the basis of 
the 1621 Act on fraudulent dispositions,867 arguing that the transaction violated the 
clause not to “disinherit” him. The pursuer succeeded in his petition, which, as 
evidenced by G. Mackenzie’s report of the case,868 was supported by a large amount 
of Civil law citations: to the Digest, An. Robertus, M.A. Pellegrini. The pursuer was 
able to persuade the judges that any claims the contravening heir might have against 
the tailzied estate were extinguished by confusion. The Civil law citations seem to 
have helped him to prove that the “not to disinherit” clause was sufficient to prevent 
the heir from decreasing the tailzied estate. However, the unique feature of this case, 
distinguishing it from the Civil law, is the use of the anti-fraud legislation by the next 
heir of tailzie to relieve himself of the debts created by his predecessor. This might 
imply a possible creation of the long tailzied succession, where each member was to 
pay the debts of the preceding members from his or her own estate, while the tailzied 
                                                          
865 Craig, Jus feudale, II.17.19; Stair, Inst.III.5.17.  
866 Strictly speaking, the defender in this case was not an ‘heir’ in the proper meaning, because he was 
not ‘served’ as an heir to his predecessor. Instead, he received the tailzied estate from the hands of 
the granter, in return for an obligation to pay off some of the granter’s debts. However, he is called an 
“heir” in the case and is treated as such, which further proves the prevalence of this concept.  
867 Supra, p.104.  
868 Mackenzie was the winning counsel in that case (Mackenzie’s Works, vol I, 154-160, vol II, 488).  
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estate was changing hands intact. Not all the lawyers agreed with such a possibility,869 
but the case is very telling indeed. This shows that the Scots authors were absolutely 
right when they stressed the specialty of the Scottish destinations, which allowed to 
make “an heir for the heir”.  
The other outstanding feature of the Scots law of destinations that Callendar 
and similar cases demonstrated concerned the extent to which a substitute was 
protected against the predecessor’s deeds. It was mentioned above that in Civil law, 
by a general rule, a fideicommissarius could not dispute the fiduciary’s deeds if he 
became the latter’s heir (supra, p.166). In contrast, in Scots law, under some 
circumstances, the ‘heir of provision’ could challenge the acts of his predecessor.  
This was related to the assumption that the ‘heir of provision’, in Craig’s words, 
was an “extraneous” person to the defunct and was not a “true” heir.870 The procedure 
of ‘service of heir’ was performed in a different way for the ‘heir of provision’. As 
was mentioned above, the ‘service of heir’ could be either “general” or “special”, 
depending on the type of property the heir was succeeding to.871 At the same time, 
both a ‘general’ and a ‘special service’ could often be performed by one and the same 
person either as an heir of a particular provision or as a general heir. An heir of line or 
an heir of conquest was always a general heir; an ‘heir of provision’ nominatim or an 
‘heir of marriage’ were supposed to obtain ‘service’ to the particular provision, while 
an ‘heir-male’ could serve as both the general heir and the heir to the particular 
provision.872  
The difference was crucial. An heir obtaining ‘service’ only in respect of the 
property that was due to him by provision was entitled to defend his provision from 
the actions of the defunct and sue the general heirs to implement the provision.873 
However, as soon as the heir became ‘served’ to the estate in general, he lost his right 
to challenge the defunct’s deeds, as the creditor and the debtor became confused in his 
                                                          
869 Thus, Bankton, in what looks to be a contradiction to Callendar, holds that an heir of strict tailzie 
can get a compensation for the debts of the tailzie paid by him (Inst.II.3.159).  
870 Jus feudale, II.17.19.  
871 Supra, p.131.  
872 Craig, Jus feudale, II.16.22; Stair, Inst.III.4.33; Bankton, Inst.III.5.14-16.  
873 Stair, III.5.12.  
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person, in a way not dissimilar to the fideicommissarius losing his right to challenge 
by becoming the heir of the defunct in Civil law (supra, p.166). Mistakes in the form 
of ‘service of heir’ were common and costly.874 This is why most of the ‘heirs of 
provision’ preferred to dispute the defunct’s deeds without obtaining ‘service of heir’, 
often using alternative methods to establish their title. In Callendar v. Hamilton the 
pursuer, in order to prove he was the ‘heir of provision’, granted a simulate bond to 
his brother, was charged by the brother to enter as heir, renounced the succession, and 
his brother afterwards raised an adjudication of the tailzied estate; this practice was 
probably invented by Th. Hope.875  
These two special features make Scottish destinations very different from Civil 
law fideicommisses. They explain why Scots lawyers did not see many similarities 
between the two legal systems on this point. However, in spite of all this, the Scottish 
model of the destination is not completely alien and unprecedented to the Continental 
doctrine. In fact, Scottish destinations are somewhat reminiscent of the feudal 
substitutions of the Ius Commune (supra, p.171). The similarity is already on the 
surface just because the Scots destinations followed the rules of heritable succession: 
heritable succession in Scotland, as is well known, was based on feudal principles.876 
However, there is more to it than that. Th. Craig drew an analogy between the Scots 
‘heirs of provision’ and collaterals succeeding to fiefs according to the Ius Commune 
feudorum.877 Collaterals, according to the Ius Commune, could succeed to the fief 
without becoming heirs to the defunct fiar and accepting the liability for his debts, as 
they were entitled to the fief in their own right (supra, n.772). In a similar way, the 
Scots ‘heirs of provision’ had a safeguard against the debt liability in the form of the 
“privilege of discussion”.  
                                                          
874 Home v. Home (1708, M.12900=14010), where the son’s serving as heir-male general prevented 
him from disputing his father’s dispositions of the property which was due to the son by the contract 
of marriage. Nevertheless, in this case the son prevailed by proving that the opposite party bore special 
responsibilities. See also: Laird of Ayton v. Colvil (1710, M.14010).  
875 George J. Bell refers to this practice as invented by Hope, without, however, making a specific 
reference or citation to Hope’s writings (G.J. Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland (1830), §835).  
876 J. Irvine Smith, ‘Succession’, ISLH (1958), 208-210.  
877 Jus feudale, II.17.19; Libr.Feud.II.45.  
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Craig admitted that the analogy was quite forced.878 However, his analogy 
looks stronger if we modify it, comparing ‘heirs of provision’ not to collateral feudal 
succession but to substitutions in fiefs, which were absent from the text of the Libri 
feudorum but prominent in the writings of the learned jurists (supra, p.171). When a 
fief was granted to “the vassal and his children”, the children, under the Ius Commune, 
received such a fief not as the heirs of their father, but in their own right, although they 
were also required to become heirs to him, as a secondary requirement. In the opinion 
of many Civilian authors, the child in such a situation was entitled to dispute his 
father’s deeds in prejudice of the fief, despite being the heir of his father.879  
This is exactly what we can see in Scots tailzies and destinations. The substitute 
was entitled to the property in his own right, flowing from the provision made by a 
distant predecessor; and, although the substitute was required to be an “heir” of his 
immediate predecessor, this “heirship” was of a privileged kind and did not prevent 
from challenging the predecessor’s deeds or holding the general heir responsible for 
them.  
The subsequent sections will be dedicated to looking through the various types 
of destinations in Scots law and their further similarities and differences from their 
Civilian counterparts.  
 
 
5.3. Tailzies of Heritable Property. 
Th. Craig’s Jus feudale (book II, title 16) was the first text to deal with tailzies 
systematically. The tailzie of circa 1600, as presented in this treatise, was a purely 
feudal institution. There is no talk whatsoever about any vested rights of the ‘heir of 
tailzie’, as the tailzie is created exclusively by an agreement between the granter of the 
tailzie, his feudal superior and the grantee (who could coincide with the granter). The 
tailzie was most often given to “A and the heirs-male of his body, whom failing to B 
                                                          
878 Craig, ibid.  
879 Baldus, C.6.14.3; Pellegrini, De fideicommissis…, art XXXIII, p.498. 
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and…”, but the ‘heirs of tailzie’ could be designated in any convenient way. The heir 
who was substituted by the words “whom failing” was called an “heir of provision” in 
the proper meaning of the term, with “provision”, allegedly, meaning “substitution”.880 
However, in the later Scots law the terminology was less strict and the term “heir of 
tailzie and provision” acquired the widest meaning of anyone succeeding to a certain 
property by the defunct’s appointment.881 A feu was only considered a “tailzied feu” 
if there was still a pending substitution: thus, a feu simply “to him and his heirs-male” 
or “to him and the heirs of his body”, with no provision for the further destiny of the 
feu, was not a tailzied feu and descended to heirs whatsoever of the vassal.882 A 
cancellation of the tailzie was achieved in the same way as its constitution – by the 
consent of the fiar with the superior.883 Without the superior’s consent, the fiar was 
forbidden not only to alienate the feu but also to make the ‘heirs of tailzie’ the primary 
representatives of the fiar’s debts: the “privilege of discussion” in Craig’s treatise is 
presented as a strict rule, with the general heir of the fiar always being the first person 
to be sued.884  
However, already in the time of Craig, there was a method to compel a non-
cooperating feudal superior to consent to the making of the tailzie – namely, the 
creation of a real or a fictitious debt in favour of the disponee and heirs of tailzie;885 in 
the time of Stair this was the usual procedure.886 The same came to be applied in 
respect of breaking the tailzie; this, however, took a more complicated evolution. In 
Bruce v. Buckie (1619, M.10415), it was decided that a right of reversion, granted to 
the person and his heirs, excluding assignees, could be subject to diligence by the 
person’s creditors. This case was dealing with an incorporeal right, so there was no 
“superior” to ask consent of, unlike in the case of corporeal (physical) land. With time, 
                                                          
880 Jus feudale, II.16.19.  
881 Stair, Inst.III.4.33; Erskine, Inst.III.3.38.  
882 Jus feudale, II.16.19; Stair, Inst.III.4.33.  
883 Jus feudale, II.16.21-22.  
884 Craig illustrated this by an undated case of Henry Stewart succeeding to Robert Stewart (Jus feudale, 
II.17.19).  
885 Jus feudale, III.1.13. 
886 Stair, Inst.II.3.43; Gretton, ‘Fideicommissary substitutions…’, 165.  
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it was established, contrary to Craig, that the fiar could put a burden of debts upon 
heirs of provision, irrespective of the superior’s consent.887 
A distinction soon arose between “tailzies by infeftment” and “tailzies by 
contract”. In Sharp v. Sharp (1631, M.15562) the Lords called them “charters of 
tailzie” and “bonds of tailzie” respectively. The former, made between the fiar and the 
superior, were revocable, while the latter were valid contracts, obliging the fiar to grant 
the tailzie. Their revocability varied. In the case of Nair v. Nair (1613, M.6943),888 
one brother granted a lucrative bond of tailzie in favour of the other brother, appointing 
him his heir-substitute. The heir pursued his brother to set up an inhibition against this 
obligation in order to secure the debt. The Court of Session, however, refused to grant 
such diligence on the ground of this bond, holding that the granter could revoke the 
bond freely. This case shows that a contract to grant a tailzie in this period was not yet 
considered a purely contractual obligation but retained elements of succession.  
Nair was interpreted as applying to lucrative promises only.889 At some point, 
the opinion emerged that the granter of a lucrative tailzie was obliged to perform the 
infeftment in accordance with it just once but was not obliged to keep the tailzie 
unchanged after that; opinion was different, however, in respect of the granter’s 
general heirs, who could not go against the tailzie.890 Th. Hope called this the dominant 
opinion of the lawyers of his time, which he, nevertheless, did not agree with, holding 
that a lucrative tailzie did not put any restrictions on either the granter or his heirs.891 
However, it seems that the dominant opinion remained such and persevered. 
Mackenzie confirms that a lucrative promise to grant a tailzie obliged the promisor to 
perform the infeftment just once but did not forbid going against it.892 In Scot v. Scot 
                                                          
887 Fairly v. Heirs of Blair (1611, M.2746=3575), Calderwood v. Pringle (1664, M.3036). 
888 There are several reports, obviously dealing with this same case but each using a different name 
citation. Th. Hope in his Major Practicks (II.15.9) refers to substantially the same case from the 1613, 
but the party’s name he provides is “Thomas Movat”. The same Hope, in the Minor Practicks (§§360-
361), deals with the case in much detail, but does not provide the date and the parties’ names this 
time are “Thomas Maver and Walter Maver”.  
889 Hope, Minor Practicks, §§358-359.  
890 Cf. the Ius Commune rule that the original parties to the contract (but not their heirs) could defeat 
the substitution in favour of a third party until the substitution became a vested right (supra, pp.174-
175).  
891 Hope, Minor Practicks, §§358-361, 364.  
892 Mackenzie, Treatise on Tailies, 485. 
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(1713, M.15569), the mutual consent of the debtor and creditor was found necessary 
to defeat a gratuitous promise to grant a tailzie.893 
However, if the tailzie was promised for an onerous cause, it could not be 
defeated either by the granter or his heirs general or ‘of provision’.894 Moreover, a 
mutual tailzie, in which two persons agreed to be each other’s ‘heirs of tailzie’, was 
also indefeasible. This was established in Sharp v. Sharp (1631, M.4299=15562), 
where two brothers, at the urging of their father, made a contract appointing them each 
other’s ‘heirs of tailzie’, failing the heirs of their body. The general heir of the 
predeceasing brother presented numerous objections against this contract’s validity on 
the ground of Civil law. The heir described this contract as a nudum pactum or a 
contractus innominatus, unenforceable if not executed within the party’s life, and a 
pactum futurae successionis, as it promised heirship. The Lords rejected these 
arguments. It was held that contractus innominati were unknown in Scotland, and thus 
neither party could refuse to perform the tailzie. The contract was found to be grounded 
on a valid cause, being neither a nudum pactum nor a pactum successorium. Thus, 
agreements on mutual succession, which were such a controversial topic in Civil law 
(supra, p.120), were held acceptable in Scots law. The Lords also noted that, if either 
party alienated the lands with obvious signs of fraud (namely, for a lucrative cause in 
favour of a “conjunct or confident person”), the other party might potentially use the 
1621 Act (supra, p.104) to ‘reduce’ the alienation.  
As well as the tailzies for onerous causes, tailzies containing “non-alienation 
clauses” were also considered indefeasible. 895  “Non-alienation clauses” could be 
worded in various ways: as promises “not to do anything in prejudice of the heir of 
tailzie”, “not to alter the tailzie”, “not to contract debts in prejudice”, etc. The problem 
with such clauses, however, was enforceability. They had no real effect and left the 
aggrieved ‘heir of provision’ limited to a personal action against the defunct’s heirs. 
In the Earl of Hume Case (1634, M.15563=I B.S.202), one party to a mutual tailzie 
overburdened the estate and sold lands, in violation of the “non-alienation clause”. 
                                                          
893 Note that W.M. Morison seems to have misinterpreted this case in his summary at M.15569. 
894 Hope, Minor Practicks, §§362-363.  
895 Hope, Minor Practicks, §357; Mackenzie, Treatise on Tailies, 485. 
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However, it was not found a sufficient ground to rescind the contract by the other party, 
who was found entitled to pursue the heirs of the other party for damages (“interest”) 
only.  
Moreover, there were situations when even damages could not be demanded. 
Drummond v. Drummond (1636, M.4302) was, probably, the first case where the 
Civilian distinction between “necessary” and “voluntary” alienations was 
influential.896  In the case, an onerous obligation to tailzie an estate was granted, 
containing no ‘non-alienation clauses’, with an actual infeftment on the tailzie 
following. The tailzied lands were sold by the granter afterwards. The Court of Session 
rejected the pursuit by the creditor against the granter. The Lords held that the 
obligation to grant the tailzie was already performed, while the subsequent sale of 
lands was made for an “urgent and just cause”. The pursuer could not even demand 
the return of the price he bought the tailzie for, because all he bought was “like a hope 
and a catch of the net” (“quasi spes et factum retis”), being constrained by the debts 
created by the granter in his “urgent affairs”. This alienation, the Court held, might 
have been held fraudulent if it had been done to “frustrate the tailzie directly”, but this 
was not proved in the case.  
“Urgent and just cause” is pretty much the same as the “necessary” cause of 
the Civil law. There is, however, an obvious difference between the two. While in 
Civil law a “necessary” alienation of the burdened property did not extinguish the 
fideicommiss but only postponed it until the fiduciary’s death (supra, p.165), in 
Scotland the ‘necessary cause’ for alienation completely evacuated the tailzie in 
respect of the disponed property. Neither was any trace found in Scotland of the 
Civilian rule that the price of the sold property was subject to restitution (supra, 
pp.167-168).897 A tailzie or a destination only extended to the property originally 
subject to it. Probably, it was connected with the nature of the Scots institution of 
                                                          
896 At least, if we do not take Bruce v. Buckie (1619, M.10415) into account; in that case there was no 
obligation on the alienating party.  
897 In Kilburny v. The Heirs of Tailzie of Kilburny (1669, M.15347) there was a non-alienation clause 
with a corollary that the tailzied land could be sold to pay the debts of the granter of the tailzie. The 
Court held that this corollary was applicable even if the sale was for the price larger than the sum of 
debt. The question of the restitution of the surplus price was not even raised.  
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‘heirship of provision’ – the ‘heir of provision’, unlike the general heir, only succeeded 
to the specific assets, which were “provided” by the defunct.  
Other instances of Civilian influence on tailzies may be found. As already 
mentioned (supra, p.165), at Civil law goods burdened by a fideicommiss could be 
converted into a dowry or a donation propter nuptias, if there was no other property 
available for that purpose. As concerns Scotland, already in 1668 (Binny v. Binny, 
M.4304) we encounter a claim that a contract of marriage was “privileged” and could 
freely convey tailzied lands to the spouse; in this case, however, the claim was not 
successful.898  There were later cases, on the other hand, where giving lands in a 
marriage-contract was found sufficient ground to defeat a tailzie.899 However, it should 
be made clear that neither of those cases referred to the Civil law. The discussion in 
these cases, as reported, developed mainly around the question of whether a particular 
marriage contract was “lucrative” or “onerous”; if it were found lucrative in respect of 
the beneficiary of the marriage contract, the contract would not defeat the tailzie.900  
The lack of specific references to the Civil law in Scots practice on breaking of 
tailzies produced a confusion in later Scots law. The “necessary/voluntary” causes 
dichotomy seems to have been replaced by the “onerous/lucrative” cause 
distinction.901 The outcome was that, in order to break a tailzie, a disposition needed 
not to be “necessary” but just onerous. This confusion might possibly have arisen due 
to the influence of the law on fraud as established by the 1621 Act, which created a 
presumption of fraud only for the lucrative deeds.902 It might also have been associated 
with the influence of marriage contract provisions to children, which could be defeated 
by “reasonable onerous dispositions” (supra, p.149-150) and required no “necessity”. 
Most of the destinations we encounter in the case law, in fact, were contained in 
                                                          
898 Disagreement among the Lords in this case are reported. Possibly, the final decision was due to the 
fact that an inhibition was served on the defender before the marriage contract was made.  
899 Strachan v. Dunbar (1714, M.4312); Weir v. Drummond (1752, M.4314).  
900 This was found in Craik v. Craik (1735, M.4313), where the fiduciary’s ‘heir of marriag’e was found 
a lucrative beneficiary of the marriage contract, liable to implement the prior tailzie broken by the 
marriage contract.  
901 See: Bankton, Inst.II.3.137-139, - where the word “necessary” is mentioned only once, when talking 
about “just, necessary and onerous causes”; otherwise, only ‘onerous’ and “voluntary” (in the 
meaning of “lucrative”) causes are distinguished.  
902 J. MacLeod, Fraud and Voidable Transfer, 105-113. 
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marriage contracts, so it is not surprising that the rules on provisions to children were 
influential on the law of tailzies.903 Finally, the enactment of the 1685 Act on tailzies904 
might have contributed to the idea that tailzies unprotected by ‘clauses irritant and 
resolutive’ (infra, s.5.5) could not have vigour against non-fraudulent onerous 
dispositions.905 
The protection of the ‘heirs of provision’ in tailzies was gradually strengthened 
by various devices. Similarly to the Ius Commune, where a judicial bonis interdictio 
could be used to prevent the alienation of goods burdened by a fideicommiss (supra, 
p.178), Scots law, initially at least, allowed an inhibition to be used by the ‘heir of 
provision’ for the same purpose. Nair v. Nair (1613, supra, p.189) established that an 
inhibition was to no avail in a purely lucrative tailzie, but the 17th century lawyers held 
to the contrary if the inhibition was served not on the promise to bestow tailzie itself 
but on the “non-alienation” clause, which was considered “extraneous” to the tailzie.906 
18th century lawyers, however, were doubtful of the inhibition’s effect in respect of 
tailzies.907  
Another important development in the protection of heirs of provision during 
the 17th century was the restriction of their liability for the predecessor’s debts. As was 
already mentioned, 17th-century legal practice rejected the position of Craig’s Jus 
feudale, according to which an ‘heir of provision’ was always protected by the 
‘privilege of discussion’ and could only be sued after the general heir’s estate was 
exhausted (supra, p.184). It was eventually found that the defunct could make his or 
her ‘heirs of provision’ primarily liable for a particular debt, especially for the 
obligation of tailzie which obliged the ‘heirs of tailzie’ before the subsequent ‘heirs of 
tailzie’, etc.908 However, in the 1660s it was established that substitutes in bonds could 
                                                          
903  Erskine, dealing with tailzies and their “non-alienation clauses”, deals almost exclusively with 
marriage-contract tailzies as the main form (Inst.III.8.38-40).  
904 RPS, 1685/4/49.  
905 This was Bankton’s interpretation of the Act (Inst.II.3.139).  
906 Hope, Minor Practicks, §357; Mackenzie, Treatise on Tailies, 490; Binny v. Binny (1668, M.4304). 
See also Dirleton, who distinguishes the tailzie itself and the obligation not to break it, as well (Dirleton, 
‘Quo casu Heirs of Tailzie may be considered as Creditors?’, Some Doubts…, 88). 
907 Bankton, Inst.II.3.140; J. Dalrymple, An essay towards a general history of feudal property in Great 
Britain (1758), 172.  




only be liable for the debts of the institute ad valorem – to the extent of the value of 
the right they received from their predecessor.909 The opinion arose that ‘heirs of 
tailzie’ of lands should also bear a limited liability, by analogy to bonds. Although 
most of the authors still held that the liability of the ‘heir of tailzie’ was in solidum,910 
voices in favour of the limitation appeared.  
For example, Dirleton addresses this question explicitly in several places and 
finally holds that an ‘heir of provision’ in lands should only be liable ad valorem, in 
so far as he is an heir in certa re911 and obtains the ‘service of heir’ only in respect of 
the particular provision, not generally.912 Bankton expressed a similar opinion, making 
an exception for ‘heirs of provision’ who were the defunct’s children.913 The matter 
was only definitely decided in Baird v. Neil (1766, M.14019), where ad valorem 
liability was established as a rule for all ‘heirs of provision’. This was one of the 
instances when the law on substitutions in bonds influenced the law on tailzies, not 
vice versa.  
 
5.4. Destinations in Bonds. 
Destinations contained in personal obligations (mainly, in Scottish context, 
bonds) will be dealt with separately from the tailzies of heritable property. The reason 
for this is that, as will be shown further, destinations in bonds were initially conceived 
as an institution separate from that of tailzies. With time, however, they were 
assimilated, with destinations in bonds taking many features from tailzies, but the 
reverse influence was also true.  
                                                          
909 Fleming v. Fleming (1666, M.13999=14848).  
910 Stair, Inst.III.5.16; Mackenzie, Inst.III.8.26. Erskine also held this opinion (Inst.III.8.51).  
911  Dirleton here is obviously referring to heres ex re certa of the Ius Commune, where an heir 
appointed as such in the certain item of property possessed combined features of an heir and a legatee. 
Like an heir, he participated in the division of the estate property, but, like a legatee, he was not 
directly liable for the debts of the defunct and did not need aditio hereditatis. The details of such heir’s 
legal status were, nevertheless, a subject of controversy. See: D.28.5.35 (with the Gloss and 
commentaries); Sext.3.11.1, s.v. “In re certa” (a good summary on the subject).  
912 Dirleton, 'Heirs of Provision and Substitute', 'Heirs of Tailzie', Some Doubts…, 87-88.  
913 Bankton, Inst.III.5.62-63.  
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The evolution of the status of destinations in bonds to a very large extent 
concerned a question, whether to consider them a form of heritable or moveable 
succession. In classical Scots law, obligations were either heritable or moveable. To 
put it simply, moveable obligations made part of the deceased creditor’s moveable 
estate on his death and could be left by his last will. Heritable obligations descended 
to the creditor’s heirs, either general or ‘of provision’, and could not be disponed by a 
last will.914 The same distinction, usually, held in respect of the debtor, but it was less 
significant here. The debtor’s executor and heir could be sued for both the moveable 
and the heritable debts of the defunct; afterwards they had recourse against each 
other. 915  Heritable and moveable obligations also had different ‘diligences’ 
(procedural forms) to enforce them, but this does not concern the present research.  
Which obligation was heritable and which moveable? This was one of the most 
controversial topics of Scots law. In principle, a bond was considered heritable if it 
contained an obligation to infeft the creditor in land or annualrents from land. 
However, even if there was no obligation to infeft, a bond creating an annualrent 
(interest) on a principal sum916 or any other right of periodical character (tractum futuri 
temporis) was usually considered heritable.917 This was due to the medieval Canon 
law prohibition of usury: the obligation to pay annualrent, being theoretically attached 
to the profits of the debtor’s heritable property, was not considered usurious. 918 
However, the bonds could often be very confusing as to their nature; the pre-1641 case 
law was also often confusing and contradictory on what to consider a heritable and a 
moveable bond. The same bond could be deemed moveable before the coming of the 
                                                          
914 Established as early as Dickson v. John (1581, M.3205). 
915 G. Mackenzie expounded the classical law on this issue in his commentary on the 1503 Act (RPS, 
A1504/3/121), in the Observations upon the Acts of Parliament (113-114). The heir could not be sued 
by the moveable creditors of the defunct within one year of the defunct’s death. After the year expired, 
both the heir and the executor could be sued for moveable and heritable debts. The heir had recourse 
against the executor in respect of the moveable debts paid, but always within the vires inventarii of 
the executor. The judicial practice introduced a mirror remedy for the executor, who could have 
recourse against the heir in respect of the heritable debts he had to pay. 
916  The term “annualrent” in Scots law denoted two closely related but still separate rights. An 
“annualrent by infeftment” was a real right, due from a particular piece of land (Stair, Inst.II.5.2-3). An 
“annualrent” could also be a purely personal obligation to pay interest on borrowed money (Stair, 
Inst.I.15.7).  
917 W. Alexander, The practice of the Commissary Courts in Scotland (1859), 7-12.  
918 Stair, Inst.II.5.2; A.J. Mackenzie Stuart, ‘Moveable Rights’, ISLH (1958), 204-206.  
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term of payment but turn into heritable after the annualrent became due and then turn 
moveable again after the creditor formally demanded that the debtor pay the principal 
sum.919 If, for example, the creditor died before the term of payment and the debtor 
died after the term, the bond would be moveable as to the creditor and his executors 
and heritable as to the debtor and his heirs.  
In 1641, the Covenanting Parliament issued an “Act in favours of orphanes, 
fatherlesse and otheres”.920 This Act was confirmed at the Restoration in 1661, as the 
Act concerning heretable and moveable bands.921 This legislation aimed at widening 
the definition of a moveable bond but only ended up in complicating the issue further. 
The Act provided that “contracts and obligations for soums of money”, even 
containing annualrents, were to be considered moveable. Two exceptions from this 
rule were provided: a) bonds providing for infeftment remained heritable, b) bonds 
conceived in favour of the creditor’s heirs and assignees, “secluding executors”, also 
remained heritable. Finally, the Act did not extend to the rights of spouses and of the 
Crown.922 So, the bonds that were heritable by the old rules but moveable by virtue of 
the Act could not increase or decrease the wife’s jus relictae or the husband’s jus 
mariti; nor could they fall to the Crown by virtue of ‘single escheat’.923  
Despite this legislation, even after 1661 new categories of heritable obligations 
continued to develop. Specifically, bonds “heritable by destination” were actively 
being developed by the case law exactly in this period. The term “destination” 
originally meant not a “destination to the named persons” but a “destination for 
particular purposes”. In the first printed cases where we encounter this term it was used 
                                                          
919 Hope, Minor Practicks, §§99-104.  
920 APS, vol V, 414-415. The Act purported to solve the problem of the children who were defrauded 
of their ‘Bairn’s parts’ by their fathers by way of heritable bonds. The Act also mentioned the 
concealment of heritable bonds from their “owners” (possibly meaning heirs of line) and the 
opportunity of their fraudulent defeasance as other motives for its enactment. It should be noted that 
this Act did not use the terminology of “heritable” and “moveable” and its language was legally crude 
and not well refined.  
921 RPS, 1661/1/300. The legal terminology of the new Act was much more refined.  
922 The motivation provided by the 1641 Act was preventing the Crown or the relict from taking away 
or diminishing the children’s share in the bonds. 
923 Which extended only to moveables, supra, n.678.  
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in the context of moveable debt “destinated” to be converted into heritable property.924 
The most widespread example of such “destination” were “employment clauses” in 
marriage contracts (supra, s.4.5), where the bride’s father promised a sum of money 
to the future husband in dowry, which the husband, in turn, promised to invest into 
annualrents or other kinds of heritable property to the benefit of the heirs of marriage.  
There were two cases in the 1630s where an issue was discussed whether an 
obligation to pay money to a husband, who was to employ the money on heritage 
afterwards, was heritable or moveable. In the first of them, Ayton v. Watson (1635, 
M.5489=I B.S.205, 356), the husband assigned this sum, still unpaid, on his deathbed, 
an assignation challenged by his heir on the ground of “deathbed” law. The Court, in 
what seems to have been an interlocutory judgment, initially refused to ‘reduce’ the 
assignation, holding that the obligation, until it was actually converted into annualrent, 
remained moveable and disposable by will. However, a month later the Lords issued 
the definitive sentence, deciding that the heir of the defunct could not have been 
prejudiced by the deathbed assignation. It is unclear whether the obligation was finally 
held moveable or heritable; it was mentioned that the defunct’s executor, who included 
the obligation in the inventory, would be obliged to assign it to the heir or to employ 
the sum in the way originally intended. This suggests the sum was still moveable, albeit 
not assignable on deathbed.925 
The other case was Robertson v. Seton (1637, M.5489), the circumstances of 
which were almost the same, except that here the dispute was directly between the heir 
and the executor of the deceased husband. Unlike in Ayton, here the Lords made it 
clear that the obligation to pay dowry was “heritable by destination” in respect of the 
husband-creditor, whose heir could sue the dowry-provider by a direct action. At the 
same time, it was mentioned that the obligation remained moveable quoad debitorem, 
implying that the debtor, or his executor, could also validly pay the dowry to the 
                                                          
924 See: Drumkilbo (Tyrie) v. Stormonth (1629, M.4254=I B.S.282), where a moveable debt, which after 
the term of payment was to be converted into an annualrent by infeftment, was called a “destination”.  
925 The report of Ayton v. Watson by Dury (Dury 753), which was used by Morison in his Dictionary 
(M.5489), reports only the first stage of the case (which was decided on the 6 February 1635) and is 
misleading as to the final outcome of the case. The two stages of the case were reported by 
Spottiswoode (I B.S.205), while Auchinleck reports only the final decision (I B.S.356).  
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creditor’s executor, although the latter would be obliged to repay the money to the heir 
instantly.  
These two cases were taken as a ground for the existence of a separate category 
of bonds –bonds “heritable by destination”, not abolished by the 1641 Act. They were 
heritable only in respect of the creditor, while remaining moveable for the debtor. They 
contained an obligation to employ the money into heritage; the obliged person’s 
executor was to perform this task.926  
In the time of Stair, bonds “heritable by destination” were still understood in 
the abovementioned way. What about bonds that just contained a substitution: “to A, 
whom failing by decease to B and the heirs of his body, whom failing…”? The attitude 
of the case law to them in the 1660-70s was still ambivalent. In Hill v. Maxwells (1665, 
M.14355), it was established that a substitute by name was the ‘heir of provision’ of 
the institute. The same was confirmed shortly afterwards in Fleming v. Fleming (1666, 
M.13999=M.14848), where the substituted sum was found not to belong to the 
institute’s moveable estate and to pass to the ‘heir of provision’ without any ‘service’ 
or confirmation; subsequent case law confirmed this position.927 On the other hand, in 
the report of Fleming, the reporter Newbyth, while pointing out how different that case 
was from those of the tailzies of heritable property, called the bond in Fleming 
“moveable”.928 Strangely enough, a “moveable” bond turns out to descend to the ‘heirs 
of provision’ and not to be included into the defunct’s executry!  
Another sign of the ambivalence of substitutions in bonds in this period is the 
case of Scrimzeour v. Murrays (1663, M.464=M.6446). In Scrimzeour, a bond was 
granted to a husband and wife and the survivor of them in liferent and, afterwards, to 
their ‘heirs of marriage’ in fee. After the husband’s decease, it was found that the wife 
could not claim both the liferent of the bond and a half of the bond’s value as her jus 
relicti – she was to choose one of the options. This decision seems to imply that the 
                                                          
926 Stair, Inst.II.1.3; Mackenzie, Inst.II.2.6-10; Nasmith v. Jaffray (1662, M.5483).  
927 Laird of Lamington v. Muir(Moor) (1675, M.4252=14357; in this case, however, the bond was 
heritable by its nature); Robertson v. Preston (1680, M.14357). 
928 M.14000.  
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defunct’s widow could decide whether to treat the bond as heritable (and thus take the 
liferent) or moveable (and claim jus relicti)! 929 
So, substitutions in bonds in this period were seen as creating a line of heritable 
succession, although the bonds themselves were not yet considered “heritable” just 
because they contained a substitution. Nevertheless, this was enough for multiple rules 
applied in heritable tailzies to be applied to bonds as well, both in theory and in 
practice. Dirleton expressed a particular interest in comparing the substitutes in bonds 
and the ‘heirs of tailzies’. In two fragments, he straightforwardly held that substitutes 
in bonds should be treated as ‘heirs of tailzie’.930 In other fragments, however, he is 
still speculating, whether the substitute might be something else: e.g. a donatary mortis 
causa or inter vivos?931  
This last speculation by Dirleton - that the substitution in a bond might, in fact, 
be a donation mortis causa, - is very interesting and is not, strictly speaking, entirely 
implausible. As was already said, there was no strict requirement of “privity of 
contract” in Scotland, especially in relation to the DMCs (supra, p.86). A substitution 
in favour of a third party was understood as a completed (albeit still revocable) 
assignation.932  Newbyth’s report of Fleming v. Fleming also reflects this “DMC” 
interpretation of substitutions, noting that in bonds “the substitution is rather like a 
condition than a substitution” (M.14000). James Stewart, the author of the 
“Responses” to the “Dirleton’s Doubts”, was quite confident and enthusiastic in 
qualifying substitutions in bonds as “donations mortis causa”. 933  This approach 
disappeared in later writings, when the interpretation of substitutions in bonds as 
‘heirship of provision’ prevailed (infra, p.201-202). However, the “DMC” approach 
prevailed in respect of documents which were ineligible to create a destination.934 
                                                          
929 Cf., with the later law: M’Laren, Wills and Succession, vol I, pp.134, 136.  
930 Dirleton, 'Heirs of Provision and Substitute', ‘Substitutes’, Some Doubts…, 87, 183.  
931 Dirleton, ‘Substitutes’, ‘Substitution in bonds’, Some Doubts…, 183, 185.  
932 In Robertson v. Preston (1680, M.14357) it was pointed out that the debtor already knew the 
substitute from the tenor of the bond and so there was no need for any formal intimation to complete 
the bond’s transfer to the substitute.  
933 J. Stewart, ‘Substitutes’, ‘Substitution in Bonds’, Dirleton’s Doubts and Questions in the Law of 
Scotland, Resolved and Answered (1715), 280-283. 
934 Thus, in the post-1800 Scots law, a deposit receipt is not a document eligible to create a special 
destination, because it does not by itself constitute a right (M. Morton, op cit, 134). Nevertheless, a 
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Moreover, this approach might be helpful in interpreting the pre-1660 law of 
destinations (infra, p.202).  
In practice, not only were substitutions in bonds often governed by the same 
rules as heritable tailzies, but, it seems, they led in the development of such rules. If 
the bond contained a clause of reversion to the granter/debtor, this reversion was 
considered an ‘heirship of provision’ and could be defeated by a ‘necessary cause’. It 
was found that, if a bond was granted to the children under a condition of reverting 
back to the debtor in case children died before getting married, the children could still 
pursue for the principal sum before getting married, if it was “necessary for their 
upbringing”.935 It was also found that a bond with a clause of nullity in case the creditor 
died without children could still be assigned for a “necessary and onerous cause” and 
pursued by the assignees, even though the creditor died without children.936 It was in 
respect of bonds, not in respect of land, that the law of fraud was first applied to protect 
the rights of the substitute.937  
Another instance where the substitutions in bonds followed feudal principles 
and notably diverged from the Civil law was the transmission of non-vested rights by 
the substitutes. In Innes v. Innes (1670, M.4272), a heritable bond was granted to 
Robert, whom failing by decease, to William and Janet in equal shares. Janet 
predeceased Robert, and, after Robert’s death, a controversy arose between William 
and the heirs of Janet. Did Janet’s share, which was just a spes successionis when she 
died, accrue to William or transmit to Janet’s heirs? According to the Civil law rules 
on legacies and fideicommisses, Janet’s share was to accrue to William, unless the 
bond specially provided for its transmission (supra, p.117). However, the Lords, while 
admitting that the Civil law prevailed in the case of legacies, nevertheless, held that 
the last substitute in a bond – which Janet was – was entitled to succession with all her 
                                                          
deposit receipt taken by A, conceived “to A, B, C or the survivor of them”, could be interpreted as a 
“donation mortis causa” by A in favour of “B” and “C” (Crosbie’s Trustees v. Wright, 1880, 7 R. 823).  
935 Grahame v. Laird of Morphie (1673, M.4305).  
936 Strachan v. Barclay (1683, M.4310).  
937 In Drummond v. Drummond (1677, M.4338), the father granted bonds to his daughters and the 
heirs of their bodies, whom failing, to return to the granter. The daughters assigned their respective 
bonds to each other. The Lords found their assignations “neither onerous nor necessary deeds”, 
fraudulent to the substitution.  
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heirs whatsoever. As soon as Janet died, her own heirs took her place as the heirs-
substitute of Robert. This stemmed from the same principle as the one which governed 
the tailzies: the line of substitutions was always supposed to end with the general heirs 
of the last substitute.938  
Nevertheless, despite these strong similarities, bonds were not governed by 
exactly the same law as heritable tailzies. As was mentioned above, substitutes in 
bonds were liable for the predecessor’s debts ad valorem,939 while other ‘heirs of 
tailzie’ were still liable universally (supra, p.193). Furthermore, if the substitute was 
appointed nominatim in a bond, he did not require ‘service as heir’ and was vested in 
the provision as soon as the institute died.940 A special concern was the interpretation 
of destinations in bonds, as it was often unclear whether the particular member of the 
destination was a “fiar” (and thus could accept and dispone the principal sum) or a 
“liferenter” (and thus could not defeat the bond and burden the substitutes by any 
debts). The principle of interpretation, as elaborated by practice, was that, in a bond 
granted to a husband, wife and children (or to a father and his children), the 
husband/father was usually considered the “fiar”.941 The same held for the maker of 
the destination: for example, a money lender receiving a bond to himself and the heirs 
of his body was presumed to retain the right to change and break the destination 
freely.942  
The ambivalent approach to destinations in bonds of the mid-17th century 
gradually changed by the mid-18th century, when such bonds were finally recognized 
as heritable. This might seem strange, taking into account that 18th-century judges 
generally tended to see bonds and obligations as moveable, having the “interests of 
                                                          
938 Supra, p.188. 
939 Hill v. Maxwells (1665, M.14355); Fleming v. Fleming (1666, M.13999).  
940 Fleming v. Fleming (1666, M.13999); Laird of Lamington v. Muir(Moor) (1675, M.4252=14357). It 
was, however, not applicable if there were other conditions to be fulfilled, besides the predecessor’s 
death: for example, to acquire the bond “to A and the heirs of his body, whom failing – to B”, B was to 
‘serve’ as an ‘heir of provision’ to A, thus ensuring that there were no living heirs of A’s body (Bankton, 
Inst.II.3.151).  
941 Tulliallan v. Clackmanan (1626, M.4253); Drumkilbo (Tyrie) v. Stormonth (1629, M.4254=I B.S.282); 
Laird of Lamington v. Muir(Moor) (1675, M.4252); Mackenzie, Treatise on Tailies, 486. 
942 Murray v. Murray (1680, M.4339).  
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trade” in mind.943 Indeed, if the bond was granted “to A and his heirs”, 18th century 
authors interpreted it as fully moveable and descending to the executor, who was “the 
heir in moveables”.944 However, if the bond was conceived to substitutes nominatim 
(“to A, and then to B, etc.”), it was now considered ‘heritable by destination’;945 the 
category of bonds ‘heritable by destination’ was thus effectively expanded. This 
development was quite logical, considering the ambivalent approach of the earlier 
lawyers to such bonds. Thus, irrespective of whether the obligation itself was heritable 
or moveable by its nature, the destination of such obligation was governed by the rules 
of heritable succession. One of the few distinctive features of the moveable character 
that such bonds retained was that, in the opinion of some lawyers, they could be left 
by the creditor’s last will, disregarding the destination.946 This opinion, however, was 
not sufficiently resolved by practice before 1800; the question remained and is still 
debated in the Scots law.947  
The present account, so far, shows that destinations in bonds, in the developed 
Scots law, largely followed the same feudal principles as tailzies of heritable property. 
However, this account would be incomplete without an observation on the destinations 
found in pre-1660 practice, which showed substantial differences from the later 
practice.  
The first observation is that, in the available pre-1660 cases, a substitute in the 
bond is never expressly called an “heir”, “heir-substitute” or an “heir of provision”. 
Furthermore, it seems, the difference between destinations in moveable and heritable 
bonds was much more pronounced in this period. In this time, unlike heritable bonds, 
moveable bonds, or, at least, a particular type of them, passed to the substitute through 
the hands of an executor and the procedure of confirmation. Such, at least, was the 
                                                          
943 According to Erskine, the judges of his time were prone not to consider a bond heritable when the 
creditor did not intend it to be heritable (Erskine, Inst.II.2.9).  
944 Bankton, Inst.II.1.36; Erskine, Inst.II.2.11-12.  
945 Bankton, Inst.II.1.36; Erskine, Inst.II.2.14, 19.  
946 Dirleton doubted whether a destination could be defeated by the last will, while James Stewart, in 
his “Responses” to the “Dirleton’s Doubts”, was positive about that, on the ground that a destination 
in a bond was just a “donation mortis causa”, referring to a decided case on this issue, but providing 
no citation (J. Stewart, ‘Substitutes’, Dirleton’s Doubts…, 280-281).  
947 Erskine, Inst.II.2.19. See also Porterfield v. Cant (1672, M.3179), where the substitutes in bonds 
were found protected against the deathbed assignations. For modern law, see: Perrett’s Trs. v. Perrett 
(1909, SC 522); Morton, op cit, 134-135.  
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usual practice, evident from the case law. In Ayton v. Watson (1635, M.5489=I 
B.S.205, 356), a moveable sum, “destinated” to be employed in favour of the creditor’s 
heirs, was subject to confirmation and was to be employed by the executor.948 There 
are other cases to the same effect.949 Now these cases will be analyzed in more detail. 
The earliest preserved cases that we have on destinations in moveable bonds 
are notable in that the bonds there did not actually create a “substitution” in the Scottish 
meaning of this term950 – they created a ‘conditional institution’. If the creditor of the 
bond survived the term of the debt’s payment, the ‘conditional institution’ was 
considered extinguished. After the creditor’s death, the sum fell to his executor and 
was subject to his testament.951 This seems clear for a situation where the creditor died 
testate. It is unclear whether the outcome would be the same if he made no will, as the 
‘conditional institution’ in a bond could be interpreted as a form of legacy or as a 
donation mortis causa.  
This last point may be indirectly supported by the case of Laird of Wauchton 
v. Hamilton (1627, M.14355). In that case, a bond was taken by the lender to be paid 
to himself or to his son, William. After the father died (unclear, whether before or after 
the term of payment),952 the cautioner (surety) of the bond paid the debt to William, 
who was not confirmed as the executor to his father. In exchange, William “assigned” 
the action against the principal debtor to the cautioner. When the cautioner sued the 
debtor, the latter objected to the action, pleading lack of title. William, the debtor 
claimed, could not have “assigned” the debt before having obtained confirmation. The 
Lords rejected the objection, holding that the “assignation” was in reality a discharge 
of the debt paid, which the son could make without confirming as executor. 953 
                                                          
948 And this is unlike Robertson v. Seton (1637, M.5489), where the heir was found to have a title to 
the sum without the confirmation of executor.  
949  Cousland v. Laing (1609, M.14845); Leitch v. Balnamoon (1623, M.3844=M.14845); Laird of 
Wauchton v. Hamilton (1627, M.14355); Graham v. Symes (1628, I B.S.254); Nisbet v. Crawford (1629, 
I B.S.171=Dury 361). 
950 Supra, p.176.  
951 Cousland v. Laing (1609, M.14845); Leitch v. Balnamoon (1623, M.14845). 
952 It seems most probable that the father survived the term of payment. If he had not, then, taking 
into account Thomson v. Merkland (1630, M.5774), there would have been no need for the Lords to 
motivate their decision by drawing the distinction between an assignation and a discharge.  
953 This case implied that the debtor could safely pay to the defunct creditor’s ‘next-of-kin’ before 
confirmation. This was finally confirmed in Spence v. Wilson (1751, M.14399, n.677 supra).  
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Although the Lords avoided answering this question directly, the case implies that, in 
order to make a real assignation, the confirmation would have been necessary. The 
substitution in the bond, then, had an effect similar to that of a legacy.  
This approach was soon controverted by two later decisions. In Watt v. Dobie 
(1625, M.14846) and Keith v. Innes (1634, M.14846), the argument that the first 
creditor’s death after the term of payment excluded the substitute did not prevail, and 
the bond was found to pass to the substitute, without need for confirmation. Later 
lawyers, e.g., Erskine (Inst.III.8.44), interpreted these two cases as the sign of a legal 
change that occurred in that period, fitting well into the post-1660s doctrine of 
destinations. However, upon closer examination, Watt and Keith did not really change 
anything, as, it seems, they were dealing with a different type of bond. Both cases 
mention that annualrent was due on the bonds after their term of payment. This means 
that the bonds, most probably, were heritable by their nature - at least, after the term 
of payment came (supra, pp.195-196). If this assumption is correct, it was quite logical 
that there should be no need for the bonds to pass through the process of confirmation. 
In Keith, the judges also supported the decision by the fact that neither executors nor 
heirs of the defunct challenged the substitute’s claim against the bond debtor. Thus, 
although the case reports are quite short and do not allow us to be 100% sure about the 
nature of the bonds, these two cases should probably be not taken into account when 
dealing with moveable destinations. 
Thus, we see that purely moveable obligations in the early 17th century, if they 
contained a substitution, did not pass by way of ‘heirship of provision’. At least in a 
situation when the first creditor survived the term of payment on the bond, the 
substitute was to acquire it by way of confirmation of the moveable estate. 954 
Moreover, the substitute was liable for the defunct’s debts only in case he was 
confirmed as his executor, not otherwise.955  So, what about a situation when the 
                                                          
954 Another case, which speaks in favour of this position, is Nisbet v. Crawford (1629, I B.S.171), where 
a wife, having confirmed herself as the executor to her husband, was pursuing the debtor on the bond, 
which was granted to the husband, the wife and the longest liver of them.  
955 In Graham v. Symes (1628, I B.S.254=Dury 361), the husband, in contravention of the marriage-
contract, lent the family funds on bonds payable to himself and his sons nominatim. After his death, 
his wife sued the sons for the marriage-contract debt. However, the Lords found that she could only 
sue those sons who were confirmed as executors to the father, as well as his general heir.  
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creditor died before the term of payment came – how and in what capacity did the 
substitute acquire the bond?  
The only pre-1660 case found dealing precisely with this situation is Thomson 
v. Merkland (1630, M.5774), and it is very interesting. In this case, a bond was granted 
to a father and his son nominatim. The father dying before the term of payment,956 the 
bond was confirmed by the executor and the relict claimed a third of its value as jus 
relictae. However, the Lords held that the sum did not make part of the defunct’s 
moveable estate and that neither the relict nor the executors had any right to it. 
Moreover, it was mentioned that the outcome would have been different if the defunct 
father, by his testament or any other means, had changed the substitution or otherwise 
had disposed of the sum – in this case, the sum would have been considered a part of 
the executry.  
The legal status of a moveable destination before the coming of the term of 
payment turns out to be quite peculiar: the obligation is not part of the creditor’s 
moveable estate, but the creditor can defeat it at any moment, returning the obligation 
back into his moveable estate! Such a construction is quite hard to classify. One might 
hold that it was not a type of succession and that such bonds were just conditional 
obligations. This would mean, both the first creditor and the substitutes had jura 
quaesita; upon the first creditor’s death, his right was extinguished and the right of the 
substitute became effectual. However, such an interpretation cannot explain the right 
of the first creditor to defeat the substitution, even by a last will. One also might 
compare such substitutions to ‘donations mortis causa’ – something the later lawyers 
would often do (supra, p.199). However, as we have already seen in the chapter on 
DMCs (supra, s.3.4, 3.6), such dispositions in Scotland could not defeat the rights of 
the executor, children and relict – which is exactly what substitutions in bonds did, as 
evidenced by Thomson.  
                                                          
956 Dury’s report of the case stresses the fact that the father died before the term – possibly, to 
distinguish this case from all the previous ones, where the defunct survived the term. The short report 
by Kerse, to the contrary, reads that this outcome happened “albeit” the father died ante terminum. 
What could this “albeit” imply? It is possible that this bond, like many other bonds in that period, 
contained a clause of annualrent to be due after the term of payment. In that case, the outcome would 
have been the same if the father had survived the term of payment, as the bond then would have 
been heritable, excluding any claims by the executor and the relict.  
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It would be purely speculative to try to fit these moveable substitutions into 
any theory. Nevertheless, it should be noted that they look more logical if one 
compares them with the Civilian contractual fideicommisses. If we look at the creditor 
in the bond with substitution as the “fiduciary” of the fideicommiss, obliged to assign 
the moveable sum to the substitute under condition, it becomes logical that the sum 
was not considered a part of his estate – he was both the creditor and the debtor of this 
sum. Unlike Civil law, in Scots law an assignation did not require judicial action: it 
was sufficient that the debtor knew of the change of creditor. Thus, the obligation of 
the first creditor to assign the bond to the substitute was, technically, “performed” from 
the very beginning,957 albeit the condition for the assignation (the creditor’s death) had 
not yet come. Thus, there was no need for any additional assignation, confirmation or 
any other procedure to transfer the sum to the substitute. Finally, it was mentioned 
above that a contractual fideicommiss in Civil law was usually considered revocable 
by the first creditor until the condition and term for the substitution came.958 This 
might explain the revocability of moveable substitutions in Scots law.  
This analogy between Civilian contractual fideicommisses and the early Scots 
substitutions in moveable bonds remains largely a speculation. We lack much of the 
information that could facilitate the comparison. For example, in every pre-1660 case 
available, the substitution the court was dealing with was a “one-generation” 
substitution; we cannot know if longer lines of substitutions were possible. We also 
cannot know what the rules of vesting of bonds were in this period: were they similar 
to those established by Innes v. Innes 959  or did they follow the rules of the Ius 
Commune?960  The scarcity of Scottish cases, the shortness of the reports and the 
absence of surviving citations do not allow a clear answer. It is possible that the post-
Restoration generation of judges was unable to discern the law from the pre-
Restoration cases, which might be the reason why they simply extended the rules of 
heritable succession into the destinations of moveable bonds. 
                                                          
957 Supra, n.932. 
958 Supra, p.174-175. 
959 1670, M.4272.  





5.5. Clauses Irritant and Resolutive. 
‘Clauses irritant and resolutive’ were one of the devices designed to strengthen 
Scots destinations with a real effect, making them enforceable against third parties. A 
theory about their origin was provided by John Vans Agnew in his 1826 work.961 
According to Agnew, these clauses were “borrowed” from the ‘voluntary 
interdictions’ of Scots law. The ‘voluntary interdictions’ were primarily an institution 
of the law of persons, designed to protect minors, incapacitated, drunken or simply 
inexperienced persons. By a ‘bond of interdiction’, such person obliged himself not to 
commit any alienation of his heritable property without the consent of certain persons 
(“interdictors”), otherwise the deeds of alienation or debts created by him were 
voidable.962 In order to be effectual against third party purchasers, interdictions were 
to be published and registered by the sheriff. 963  Agnew considered the ‘irritant’ 
element to be the more important in a ‘clause irritant and resolutive’, because it was 
very similar to the wording of a ‘bond of interdiction’, declaring “null and void” the 
deeds contrary to the clause.964 Agnew supported his opinion with the Viscount of 
Stormonth Case (1662, p.210).  
Agnew’s opinion is not completely ungrounded, seeing that ‘interdictions’ 
were referred to in the Viscount of Stormonth Case. We shall deal with this case later. 
Nevertheless, this is just one side of the coin. Let us look at the way ‘clauses irritant 
and resolutive’ were first mentioned in the Scottish texts. 
The first description of such clauses was provided by Th. Hope in his Minor 
Practicks: “…there is a new Form (of tailzies) found out, which has these two 
Branches, viz. either to make the Party Contracter of the Debt to incur the Loss and 
Tinsel of his Right, in Favour of the next in Tailzie, or to declare all Deeds done in 
                                                          
961 J. Vans Agnew, Some important questions in Scots entail law (1826), 8.  
962 Craig, Jus feudale, I.15.24; Stair, Inst.IV.20.30-32.  
963 1581 Act anent registratioun of inhibitionis and interdictionis (RPS, 1581/10/43).  
964 For an example of a bond of interdiction, see: The Juridical Styles, vol III (1794), 33.  
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Prejudice of the Tailzie, by Bond, Contract, Infeftment or Comprising, to be null of the 
Law”.965 The first variant that Hope mentions here describes a ‘clause resolutive’, 
when the tailzied property is to pass to the next member of the tailzie upon 
contravention, while the second part describes a ‘clause irritant’, simply declaring all 
deeds in contravention null and void. Hope then proceeds to argue that both clauses 
stand firm against bona fide third party purchasers and creditors, despite the maxim 
“pacta privatorum non derogant juri publico”: he points out that the rights of third 
parties are private, not public.966 We can see that both versions of clauses were given 
equal weight by Hope. This contradicts Agnew’s opinion that the ‘irritant’ clause was 
the main variant. 
Subsequent tradition regarded Hope as the inventor of ‘clauses irritant and 
resolutive’. Fountainhall, in his report of Earl of Ross v. Lord Melville (1677, III 
B.S.170),967 says so, calling the tailzie of the Laird of Calderwood, drafted with Hope’s 
assistance, to have been the first ‘clause irritant’ in Scotland. Modern authors share 
this view.968 Whether this is true or not, we are unlikely to know for sure. It should be 
pointed out that the wording of the Hope’s text – “there was a new form found out” – 
does not seem to support the version of his authorship of ‘clauses irritant and 
resolutive’, although it might have been just an expression of modesty. The more 
important question here is whether Hope or another inventor of the clauses was 
inspired by Civil law.  
As we have seen, ‘clauses resolutive’ were known to the Civilian authors. 
Moreover, quite similarly to Hope’s account, the Civilian authors provided two 
different forms of wording, with some authors offering the ‘resolutive’ variant and 
                                                          
965 Hope, Minor Practicks, §367. 
966 Ibid., §368-369.  
967 That case is very interesting by itself, with the issue at stake being whether a remoter heir of tailzie 
may succeed while there is still a possibility of the closer heir. The case contains numerous references 
to the Ius Commune texts and authors, none of which, however, directly concerns’ clauses irritant and 
resolutive’. This case is unique and outstanding, which is why it will not be analyzed in detail in this 
thesis. See other reports of this case are in M.14880 and in Mackenzie’s Works, vol I, 131-137.  
968 G.L. Gretton, op cit, 165-166.  
209 
 
others preferring the ‘irritant’ version.969 In Civil law, such clauses were associated 
with the leges commissoriae of the law of contract.  
The text of the Minor Practicks reveals little use of the Civilian doctrines on 
substitutions by Hope. He does not refer to the subtle distinctions in the wording of an 
‘irritant’ clause.970 He is dealing with the effects of confiscation and forfeiture of feus 
on the rights of substitutes – the exact question the Ius Commune scholars dedicated 
significant attention to.971 However, he does not make use of the Civilian criteria of 
solving this question, employing instead his own improvised logic: the substitute’s 
rights are defeated if the feu is lost for a public law crime, like treason or rebellion, but 
substitutes are protected against private delicts of the fiar against the superior.972  
However, other evidence that we have shows that at least some of the Scots 
lawyers were aware of the Civilian ‘clauses resolutive’ and their association with leges 
commissoriae. ‘Clauses irritant and resolutive’ in Scotland were not restricted to 
tailzies and succession. Similar clauses were employed in “wadsets” (the Scottish 
version of the mortgage), where they provided that the debtor, not paying the debt at 
the prescribed term, forfeited his right (“reversion”) to the pledged property. Stair, in 
the second edition of his Institutions, contrasts Civil law, which forbade such “leges 
commissoriae in pignoribus”,973 with Scots law, which allowed them, except when 
they were exorbitant (Inst.IV.18.3-5). 974  Here, Stair expressly uses the term “lex 
commissoria” in respect of ‘clauses irritant’ in wadsets. Right in the next paragraph 
(Inst.IV.18.6), Stair is dealing with ‘clauses irritant’ in tailzies; he does not use the 
term lex commissoria then, but the proximity is quite telling.  
                                                          
969 Supra, p.174. 
970 The predominant opinion of the Civilian authors distinguished between the clause “if alienates” 
and “if proceeds with alienation”: the former had no effect against the third parties, while the latter 
invalidated the alienation (Bart., D.30.114.14, D.41.2.38.1, C.4.6.3; Bald., C.4.6.3, C.4.51.7).  
971  See discussions on this by Dynus, Cynus, Bartolus, Pellegrini: Bart., D.48.22.3; Pellegrini, De 
fideicommissis…, art XL, p.604.  
972 Hope seems to refer here to the loss of fief by ‘recognition’, which in Scotland mainly applied to 
alienations of the fief without superior’s consent (Jus feudale, III.3.7-36).  
973 Such clauses were truly forbidden in the Civil law pledges and hypothecs; however, some jurists 
argued that the pledge parties could agree on the retention of the pledge by the creditor for a term 
not exceeding 30 years (C.8.34(35).3, Gloss s.v. “Amissa”).  




Even more telling are the citations of Civil law in two cases, Viscount of 
Stormonth v. Creditors of Annandale (1662) and Callendar v. Hamilton (1686), as 
reported by George Mackenzie, who was the winning counsel in both of them. 
Debating whether ‘clauses irritant and resolutive’ had a real effect both in Scots law 
and the Civil law, both Mackenzie and his opponents referred to the fragments of the 
Corpus juris which were dealing with lex commissoria and other clauses with real 
effect.975 Mackenzie never expressly calls or compares ‘clauses irritant and resolutive’ 
with leges commissoriae, but the logic of his arguments is pretty much the same as 
that of the Civilian authors.  
Viscount of Stormonth v. Creditors of Annandale (1662, M.13994) was, in fact, 
the first and the most important case to test effect of the ‘clauses irritant and 
resolutive’. A tailzie under discussion was conceived in favour of consecutive 
substitutes and their heirs-male, protected by a clause, which was, it seems, worded as 
either purely ‘resolutive’ or both ‘irritant’ and ‘resolutive’. The clause forbade not just 
an alienation of the tailzied lands, but also any deed which might cause their alienation. 
The Earl of Annandale, the heir of tailzie, while being a fiar, created debts, for which 
the tailzied land was “comprised” from him by the creditors. The representatives of 
the next substitute named in the tailzie brought a declarator against the creditors. 
The defenders adopted a smart defence strategy. They referred to the uncertain 
status of ‘clauses irritant and resolutive’, as well as their “private” status, which could 
not defeat the right of a bona fide third party. The defenders also referred to Civil law 
to argue that the payment of a legal debt constituted a “necessary” cause of alienation 
and that an irritant clause could only be effectual against the third party if a real right 
had been reserved by the granter or if inhibition had been served upon the tailzie 
(supra, p.173-174). In response, the pursuers argued that the clause in this tailzie could 
be qualified as an ‘interdiction’ (supra, p.207). As the clause was contained in the Earl 
of Annandale’s retourable brieve, which constituted the Earl’s title, it was known to 
the creditors, constituting them in “bad faith”. While the pursuers conceded that the 
                                                          
975 D.20.5.7.2 (a pact between the debtor and the creditor, forbidding the alienation of the pledged 
property by the debtor, invalidates alienations by him), C.4.6.3 (about prohibitions of alienation, cited 
by the opposing party), Baldus to C.4.51.7 (about prohibitions of alienation and their effect), C.4.54.6 
(a law from the title dealing with leges commissoriae).  
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alienation might have been valid if made for a truly “necessary” cause, e.g., to ransom 
the Earl from enemies, in the facts of the case the debt itself was created in 
contravention of the clause. It was also stated that the granter of the tailzie, in fact, 
“reserved” a real right to himself and his heirs of tailzie, bestowing only a “limited” 
ownership on the fiars of the tailzied estate.  
The Court decided in favour of the pursuers. It held that the pursuers could 
establish title to the tailzied estate by ‘serving as heir’ either to the Earl of Annadale 
himself, but without becoming liable for his debt before the defenders, or directly to 
the member of the tailzie who immediately preceded the Earl. Thus, it was recognized 
that the ‘clause irritant and resolutive’, in case of contravention, turned the 
contravener’s title void, excluded the heirs of his own body and allowed the next ‘heir 
of tailzie’ to take the contravener’s place. This effect is similar to that of the lex 
commissoria, which could turn a contract of sale or donation “not made”. 976 
Nevertheless, the term “lex commissoria” itself was not used.  
J. Vans Agnew saw Viscount of Stormonth as a decision based on the law of 
‘interdictions’, extending that law to the situation when the third party could know 
about the ‘interdiction’ from the title of the estate which was purchased or burdened. 
However, Agnew himself recognized that this case was not a perfect example of 
identity between interdictions and tailzies, in that there was no ‘clause irritant’ in 
Viscount of Stormonth, only a ‘clause resolutive’.977 It hard to discern from the reports 
whether there was really no ‘clause irritant’ in Viscount of Stormonth.978 Later case 
law interpreted Stormonth as involving both forms of clauses. 979  In any case, 
Stormonth cannot be seen as an example of the ‘clause irritant’ taken “ipsissimis 
verbis” from the formula of interdiction, which is the claim of Agnew.980  
                                                          
976 D.39.5.1, s.v. “Mortis causa donatio”; Bart., D.39.5.1; Bald., C.4.6.3; supra, p.174.  
977 J. Vans Agnew, op cit, 12, 14-15.  
978 According to Stair’s report of the case (M.13996), the clause was purely ‘resolutive’, while the 
report by Gilmour (M.13994) contains the words ‘and the said charter and infeftment… should be null 
and expire…’. It is unclear whether these last words referred to the contravention deed or to the tailzie 
itself.  
979 Reidheugh v. Bruce (1707, M.15489).  
980 J. Vans Agnew, op cit, 12. 
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Moreover, the effects of interdictions and of ‘clauses irritant and resolutive’ 
were substantially different. Interdictions were created for the benefit of the interdicted 
person, so that they did not invalidate onerous alienations,981 while ‘clauses irritant’, 
at the time of Viscount of Stormonth, could be defeated only by “necessary” deeds 
(supra, p.191-192, 210). A deed in contravention of the interdiction was valid, but 
voidable, requiring an action of ‘reduction’ for its invalidation;982 a ‘clause irritant and 
resolutive’, if contravened, immediately invalidated the contravener’s title with a 
retrospective effect: it is not by chance that the action used in Stormonth was not a 
‘reduction’, but a ‘declarator’. All this, together with other abovementioned evidence, 
speaks against Agnew’s opinion on the origin of ‘clauses irritant and resolutive’. The 
reference to interdictions in Stormonth was a case of remote analogy, not identity 
between the two institutions.  
Viscount of Stormonth was the only major pre-1685 case involving a non-
statutory clause irritant and resolutive. It is not surprising, then, that it was criticized 
by many later legal scholars, considering it a mistaken decision. It was the opinion of 
Lord Kames that an operation of the ‘clause resolutive’ could not, technically, reverse 
a performed deed of alienation.983 Despite the doubts and criticism, the approach set 
by Viscount of Stormonth was eventually enshrined in the 1685 Act concerning 
tailzies.984 The Act provided for exactly the same basic scheme: the wording of the 
clause was to be both ‘irritant’ and ‘resolutive’;985 in case of contravention the ‘heir of 
tailzie’ could “dismiss” the contravener and ‘serve as heir’ to the previous member of 
the tailzie. The innovation of the Act was the creation of the register of tailzies, kept 
by the Court of Session. Much of the subsequent practice concerned registered tailzies.  
It was unclear if the Act stripped non-registered tailzies of all real effect. The 
predominant opinion was that it did.986 Agnew’s opinion was that the Act concerned 
                                                          
981 See: Earl of Athol Case (1607, M.7147); Collington v. Faw (1624, M.7148). 
982 J. MacLeod, op cit, 8, 28.  
983 H.H. Kames, Historical Law-Tracts, vol I (1758), pp.205-212; cf. the Civilian attention to the wording 
of ‘clauses resolutive’, supra, p.174.  
984 RPS, 1685/4/49. 
985 See: Reidheugh v. Bruce (1707, M.15489). 
986 Bankton, Inst., II.3.141; Willison v. Dorator & His Creditors (1724, M.15369, 15371); Dickson v. 
Dickson (1786, M.15534).  
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the heirs of the granter of tailzie, but not the party to the original tailzied disposition, 
to which situation the “common law” still applied.987 Professor George L. Gretton’s 
seems to be of the view that the Act did not touch “one-generation” tailzies (“to A, 
then to B”, “to A, B and the survivor of them”, etc.), so that even after the abolition of 
registered tailzies by the Abolition of Feudal Tenure Etc. Act, 2000, one-generation 
“common law tailzies” with ‘clauses irritant’ can be created.988 Gretton’s opinion does 
not seem to be shared by some of the classical authors.989 17th-century practice does 
not provide the ground for any special treatment of the one-generation tailzies. It was 
mentioned that the destinations in bonds were usually limited to one generation (supra, 
p.206), but it was not so with tailzies in lands, where the lines of substitutes could often 
be quite long.  
 
We have seen now that in Scots law, unlike the Ius Commune, the devices of 
‘subsequent succession’ were predominantly used in inter vivos contracts and 
dispositions, not in last wills. Destinations contained in bonds of obligation, as 
demonstrated by Thomson v. Merkland ((1630, M.5774) were initially governed by the 
rules similar to the Civilian fideicommissa, but, beginning from the 1660s, even they 
were assimilated to heritable tailzies. Scots heritable tailzies themselves demonstrate 
significant differences from Civilian fideicommissa, creating a universal, not a singular 
succession. Some similarities may be found between Scots tailzies and the Ius 
Commune substitutions in fiefs, but they are not strong enough to make any 
conclusions.  
Nevertheless, there were instances where the Ius Commune influence on Scots 
tailzies and other destinations looks quite plausible. One such instance is the 
distinction between “voluntary” and “necessary” alienations. Although the 
consequences of the distinction were different in Scots law, there does not seem to be 
any other possible source of this distinction. It is not surpirsing, then, that this 
                                                          
987 Agnew, op cit, 8-10.  
988 G.L. Gretton, op cit, 167.  
989 M’Laren, op cit, vol I, 513-514.  
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distinction was gradually washed away and was substituted by the “onerous”-
“lucrative” juxtaposition, which was more familiar in Scots practice.  
The same can be said of Scottish ‘clauses irritant and resolutive’, which seem 
to have been inspired by Civilian ‘clauses resolutive’ and leges commissoriae. The 
analogy was drawn between the Scottish ‘clauses’ and Scottish ‘interdictions’, but it 
looks more like a convenient argument from jus proprium, provided by litigants. The 
machinery of the ‘clauses irritant and resolutive’ looks so similar to its Civilian 
counterpart that it is hardly imaginable that the learned Scots judges drew no analogy 




Chapter VI. Office of Executor. 
6.1. Office of Executor in the Ius Commune. 
The “executors” in succession were not expressly mentioned in the Roman law 
texts. However, Roman law, in fact, had this institution. A legacy could be left to a 
person “as a minister”, so that he was obliged to transfer it immediately to a third party, 
without receiving any profit even if the third party could not receive the bequest 
(D.31.17pr). The Roman texts provided that such persons did not, by a general rule, 
have actionable rights to the bequeathed property in their own name.990 In the Digest, 
such “ministers” (which did not yet have a special term) were most prominent in the 
field of aliments. Aliments left to minors and pupils required regular payments, control 
and safeguarding – the functions performed by the persons specially authorized by the 
testament.991 If the testator appointed no executor for the distribution of the aliments, 
the public judges could appoint one (D.34.1.3). 
However, the most influential passages to shape the law of executorship were 
contained in the late Imperial legislation on ecclesiastical matters. A constitution by 
Emperor Leo of 468 A.D. (C.1.3.28) provided that testamentary dispositions for the 
redemption of captives were valid despite their obscurity and were to be executed by 
a person appointed by the testator. If the testator appointed no one, this function was 
to be taken by the local bishop, who was to perform the task within a year and give an 
account of its results. A later constitution by Justinian of 531 A.D. (C.1.3.48) extended 
this to bequests in favour of the “poor” and all other dispositions ad pias causas. This 
constitution provided that a testament might contain no institution of an heir but 
instead dispose of the entire estate for charity, in which case it was taken over by the 
bishop or the bishop’s oeconomus; no “Falcidian quarter” or other profit was to be 
deducted by anyone from such an estate. Justinian’s 545 A.D. constitution 
(Nov.131.11-12)992 empowered bishops to issue monitions to the heirs on performing 
charitable legacies.  
                                                          
990 D.36.1.80.1.  
991 See, e.g., D.34.1.9pr; D.34.1.15pr.  
992 A.C. 9.6; extracted into Auth. Licet Testator (C.1.3(6).28).  
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The Church in the High Middle Ages used the above legislation to secure 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction over charitable bequests. It is, therefore, no surprise that the 
main contribution in the development of the executor was made by the Canon law. The 
Canon law of executors was mainly developed through practice and doctrine, not 
through Papal legislation. Even the Papal legislation dedicated to this issue was mainly 
restricted to decretals deciding particular cases. Several decretals issued by Gregory 
IX (1227-1241) developed the Imperial legislation and fortified the principle of 
Church supervision over the execution of charitable bequests (X.3.26.17). The 
testator’s precept was to be executed within one year, after which the execution 
devolved to the bishop (X.3.26.3), while the executor could be compelled to fulfill his 
mandate by the bishop acting ex officio (X.3.26.19). The only general constitution on 
executors was issued by Pope Boniface VIII in 1298 (Sext.3.11.2).993 It was, however, 
the glosses and commentaries of the learned Canonists that were the most influential 
in shaping the law of executor. 
Gu. Durandus (Durantis, c. 1230-1296) was probably the most important 
scholar for the early development of this issue. His Speculum judiciale994 provided a 
list of questions which were to become standard questions for any writer on the subject 
of executors to answer: 1) what were the types and classes of executors? 2) did the 
executors have an actionable right to pursue heirs and third parties, and, vice versa, 
could an executor be sued by third parties? 3) could an executor appoint procurators 
(agents)? 4) was an executor obliged to provide cautions or securities and give oaths? 
5) could an executor sell or otherwise alienate the estate property? 6) could he 
discharge the estate debts? 7) was an executor always obliged to make an inventory 
and give an account and what were the terms established for that? 8) could an executor 
be compelled to fulfil the task? 9) in case of several executors appointed, could one of 
them act without the others? 10) what happened to the office of executor after his 
death? 11) who could be an executor? We are going to deal with the majority of these 
questions below. 
                                                          
993 See infra, p.227, for more detail on this constitution.  
994 Last version dated c. 1291.  
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The Civil law texts suggested that a nudus (merus) minister was a separate type 
of executor, distinguished by the lack of any material profit received from the office.995 
Correspondingly, the learned lawyers used the term “executor mixtus” for an executor 
who was the testator’s heir or had a legacy bestowed on him.996 The exact way to 
distinguish them was debated. Some authors held that a “mixed executor” was an 
executor in respect of the part of estate left for further distribution and a legatee in 
respect of the part left to him personally. 997  In the opinion of other authors, the 
executor was to be considered “mixed” even if he was simply entitled to possess the 
estate property for a period of time.998 Unlike a “mixed executor”, a merus minister 
was not entitled to the residue of the legacy in case its beneficiaries or conditions 
failed.999 Quite an original version of this classification was provided by the English 
Canonist John Ayton (d. 1349): a nudus executor, in his interpretation, was the one 
with just a “naked” power of custody over the estate goods, while a non nudus executor 
had the power of discretionary administration.1000 
Another classification was that of testamentarii, legitimi and dativi executores. 
Testamentary executors were appointed by the testator. The executor legitimus of a 
last will made for pious uses was the local bishop, although this power could be 
delegated to any private person, even an unwilling one.1001 The term ‘executor dativus’ 
was initially reserved for the court-appointed distributors of aliments (D.34.1.3);1002 
but in later times it was used for the bishop’s delegates.1003 
A distinction was also made between “universal” and “special” executors. A 
universal executor was one appointed to the entire estate to distribute it all for charity, 
                                                          
995 D.31.17pr; D.34.1.9pr; D.36.1.80.1.  
996 Gu. Durantis, Speculum judiciale, II.2 De instr edit, rubr. Nunc vero, fo. CXCIV; Bart., D.31.17pr; see 
also: D.32.8pr, D.34.1.15pr.  
997 Durantis, ibid., fo. CXCVI; J. Oldendorp, De executoribus ultimarum voluntatum, tit. III // Tractatus 
selecti…, 410. 
998 Bart., D.31.17pr.  
999 D.32.8pr.  
1000 See: Constitution of Ottobuono, 1268, tit. 14 // Constitutiones Legatinae sive Legitimae regionis 
Anglicanae D. Othonis et D. Othoboni Cardinalium…, 108.  
1001 Bart., D.31.1.  
1002 Durantis, ibid., fo. CXCIII.  




so that there were no heirs instituted by the testator. From the 1200s, there was an 
opinion that a universal executor was loco heredis and enjoyed the same rights and 
duties as the heir;1004 and, although Durantis in his Speculum expressed doubts on this 
issue, the identification of the universal executor with the heir seems to have been 
approved by the common opinion of the doctors by the 16th century.1005 Having the 
same rights as the heir, the universal executor was always a “mixed executor”.1006 A 
‘special’ executor was one entitled to keep and/or distribute a part of the estate; much 
of the learned discourse was dedicated to the relationship of such executor with the 
heir. In some countries, e.g., in England, the normal way to distribute the moveable 
estate after one’s death came to be through a universal executor with no role 
whatsoever given to the feudal heir. This is why it became customary for English 
testamentary executors to be the beneficiaries of the undisposed remnant (residuum) 
of the estate. The English Canonist, W. Lyndwood, with reference to the rules on 
‘soldier’s wills’ (C.6.21.3), held that the residuum was presumed left to the executor, 
unless the testator’s will to die “intestate” in respect of the residuum was apparent.1007 
Nevertheless, English practice also allowed appointment of ‘particular’ executors, in 
which case the testator could be deemed to have died partim testatus, partim 
intestatus.1008 
Whether the executor had actionable rights was problematic, as the executor 
was not considered an independent subject of legal rights and liabilities – he acted in 
favour of someone else. The prevailing understanding among scholars, especially the 
early ones, was that the executor was not the owner of the goods he was dealing with, 
but just the administrator, similarly to tutors, curators and procurators.1009 Eventually, 
it seems that the jurists reached a frail consensus. The executor mixtus had the same 
actions for the estate goods and debts against both the heir and third parties as if he 
                                                          
1004 Durantis attributes this opinion to Roffredus Beneventanus (c. 1170-1244). See: Gu. Durantis, ibid., 
fo. CXCVII.  
1005 Thus, J. Oldendorp (c. 1486-1567) stated that the universal executor bears the name of the heir 
and is considered the heir (Gu. Durantis, ibid.; J. Oldendorp, op. cit., p. 410).  
1006 This is implied by J. Oldendorp, who effectually divides only the particular executors into “mere” 
and “mixed” (J. Oldendorp, ibid.)  
1007 W. Lyndwood, Provinciale (seu Constitutiones Angliae)…, tit. 13, s.v. “Effectum”, 175; Swinburne, 
op cit, IV.4, p.115. 
1008 Swinburne, op cit, IV.18, p.176.  
1009 See: D.32.8pr, s.v. “Petierit”; Gu. Durantis, ibid., fo. CXCVII.  
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had been an heir or a legatee. The executor merus could not sue the heir, with three 
exceptions: a) when the bequest was charitable (ad pias causas), b) when the bequest 
was about aliments, and c) when the testator expressly granted this right to the 
executor. The executor merus could sue third parties and estate debtors only if the heir 
was negligent in ensuring the execution of the legacy.1010 It also came to be accepted 
that the executor could be sued by legatees and estate debtors in the same instances 
when he could sue.1011 But even when the executor could not sue, he could enforce the 
execution of the testament by invoking the officium judicis of the bishop;1012 thus, the 
aforementioned subtle distinctions retained practical significance only for the issue of 
transmission of the executor’s office (infra, p.228). The English Canonists initially 
followed the same logic1013 but eventually abandoned this classification, entitling all 
executors to sue and be sued.1014 
As the executor was not the owner, but just the administrator of the goods and 
rights he was managing, it could be doubted whether he was entitled to commit 
litigation or administration to agents. At Civil law, a procurator, by a general rule, 
could not reassign his power to pursue an action to another procurator before he filed 
the action and the litis contestatio followed (C.2.12.8). Similarly, tutors and curators 
could not appoint a procurator before the litis contestatio (C.2.12.11). Were executors 
subject to the same restriction, seeing they were often assimilated to tutors in many 
respects? For a merus executor it seemed to be so, seeing he performed a mere office 
and was personally selected by the testator for this purpose. Executor mixtus, however, 
was assimilated by some scholars to a procurator in rem suam – an agent appointed in 
his own interest. A procurator in rem suam, according to the Code (C.8.53.33), could 
appoint procurators and otherwise dispose of the right assigned to him from the 
moment of mandate, even before the litis contestatio. It followed that the same should 
                                                          
1010 D.31.17pr, s.v. “Ut ministrum”; D.36.1.80(78).1, s.v. “Non posse”; Durantis, ibid., fo. CXCV-CXCVIII; 
Bart., D.30.96.3, D.31.17pr; G.D. Durante, De arte testandi, VII.9.  
1011 Bart., D.30.107(110); D.36.2.26.2. 
1012 Gu. Durantis, ibid., fo. CXCVIII; Bart., D.31.17pr. 
1013 For example, John Ayton held that a nudus executor could not sue for acquisition of possession 
over the estate goods but only for the recovery of possession lost by him (Constitution of Ottobuono, 
1268, tit. 14 // Constitutiones Legatinae…, 108).  
1014 This problem is not raised at all by Lyndwood in his Provinciale or by Swinburne in his Briefe treatise.  
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apply to the executor mixtus.1015 The disagreements, nevertheless, continued into the 
16th century.1016 
The question whether the executor was obliged to provide caution, or even a 
security, or swear an oath on the faithful performance of his duties, was very 
controversial. Some authors made this contingent on whether the executor was merus 
or mixtus and whether he was testamentary or dative: an executor merus, especially if 
he was appointed by the testator himself, was not required to provide any obligations 
or securities.1017 Others allowed some discretion for the judge to decide whether the 
executor was a solvent and trustworthy person or, otherwise, suspect and 
perfidious.1018 The latter approach eventually prevailed in English practice.1019  
On the issue of the executor’s powers to sell the estate property, the jurists held 
that a universal executor, who was loco heredis and possessed discretion over the 
distribution of estate, was always entitled to sell. The executor appointed to particular 
goods, on the other hand, could do that either for a just cause or by direct authorization 
of the testator. Much of the juristic discourse was devoted to the relationship between 
the executor to particular goods and the heir, whose interests were to be taken into 
account during the sale of the goods.1020 One of the questions to which, it seems, no 
definite answer was found, was whether the executor could discharge the debts of the 
defunct: on the one hand, it was a lucrative transaction, on the other, as he could pursue 
those debts, he was by implication entitled to make out-of-court settlements. In 
England, where the universal executor was the rule rather than exception, the 
executor’s right of sale and disposal was largely undisputed; the lawyers dedicated 
much of their attention to the prohibition of unauthorized appropriations by the 
executor from the estate goods.1021 
                                                          
1015 Gu. Durantis, ibid., fo. CXCVII; Bald., C.8.53(54).33.  
1016 Thus, G.D. Durante still held that the executors could not appoint procurators before the litis 
contestatio (G.D. Durante, De arte testandi, VII.9).  
1017 Bart., D.35.3.7.  
1018 Gu. Durantis, Speculum judiciale, II.2 De instr edit, rubr. Nunc vero, fo. CXCVI-CXCVII.  
1019 Swinburne, op cit, VI.14, p. 225.  
1020 Gu. Durantis, ibid., fo. CXCVIII; Bart., D.34.1.9; G.D. Durante, De arte testandi, VII.10.  
1021 Namely, much discussed possibility was buying something from the estate by the executor. See: 
J. Ayton, ibid., 110; W. Lyndwood, Constitution of J. Stratford, c. 1343 // Provinciale…, tit. 13, s.v. 
“Titulo emptionis”, 178.  
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Both the Civil and the Canon law texts agreed that the executor had one year 
for the execution of the testament and six months if the bequest was ad pias causas.1022 
By coincidence, the same term was prescribed as the standard one for the performance 
of a particular legacy.1023 The moment from which the year ran differed in the Ius 
Commune depending on various circumstances, but, in practice, as noted by 
Panormitanus, the bishops often enacted local statutes, providing that the year for 
execution ran from the moment of death of the testator.1024 At the expiration of the 
year for execution, if the executor was mixtus, all the profit he was entitled to was, 
after a monition by the judge or the bishop, to pass to the legatees, while the office of 
executor devolved to the bishop.1025 The legatees, however, could sue the executor 
even before the expiration of the year, if there were free goods or money available in 
the estate; the term for performance of such legacies was up to judicial discretion.1026 
If the executor did not accept the office in the first place, so that the estate was intact 
(“res integra”), then, if he was an executor mixtus, he could be obliged to accept and 
perform it by a private action; an executor merus could be forced into performing the 
office by the public authority ex officio.1027  
A universal executor was to make an inventory of the goods under his 
administration (C.1.3.48). There was an opinion that the executor appointed for 
particular goods was not held to make an inventory. 1028  In England, the legatine 
constitution of Cardinal Ottobuono in 1268 forbade all executors to take possession of 
the estate before the inventory was made. The commentators on the constitution, 
however, were ready to make an exception when the goods required quick disposal;1029 
this is confirmed by the actual English practice, where probate powers were often 
granted before the inventory was actually made.1030  
                                                          
1022 C.1.3.28; Nov.131.12.1; X.3.26.3, 6.  
1023 Nov.1.1.1=C.6.43 Auth. Hoc Amplius.  
1024  See: Abb., X.3.26.3. Swinburne pointed out that in England even the term itself was at the 
discretion of the bishop but usually was no less than a year (Swinburne, op cit, VI.19, pp.234-235). 
1025 X.3.26.17, 19; Durantis, Speculum judiciale, II.2 De instr edit, rubr. Nunc vero, fo. CXCIX, CCV.  
1026 Abb., X.3.26.6; Oldendorp, De executoribus …, tit. VII // Tractatus selecti…, 412. 
1027 Bart., D.31.1.  
1028 Gu. Durantis, ibid., fo. CC.  
1029 J. Ayton, ibid., s.v. “Inventarium”, 107.  




The form and effect of the executor’s inventory posed a problem. There were 
two main types of inventory in the Civil law: the tutor’s inventory (D.26.7.7, 57) and 
the heir’s inventory (C.6.30.22). The function of the tutor’s inventory was to be a 
safeguard against maladministration. This is why the tutor’s inventory was to be 
submitted to the judicial authority and could even be made before the judge. However, 
the making of the tutor’s inventory allowed for some laxities. For example, the tutor’s 
inventory was to include all corporeal goods and instruments of debts found in the 
pupil’s estate; however, there was no requirement to include obligations unsecured by 
any writing, as they were not considered “found” (inventa, reperta) in the estate.1031 
There was also no requirement to include the liabilities and debts due by the 
defunct.1032 Non-compliance with the making of the inventory could result in the 
tutor’s removal from the office.1033 
The heir’s inventory served a different function. It was mainly aimed at 
protecting the heir’s own interest, which is why it was voluntary. The heir without 
inventory was liable ultra vires hereditatis before the creditors and the legatees of the 
testator.1034 The contents of the heir’s inventory required much greater precision, and 
thus by necessity included all incorporeal rights of the defunct, as well as the debts due 
by him.1035 An omission of goods by the heir from the inventory in fraud of the 
creditors might result in the duplication of his liability before the creditors or in the 
inventory’s invalidity; 1036  goods omitted by accident were to be included with 
retroactive effect.1037 The heir’s inventory was to be prepared within a particular term: 
up to 90 days if the testator’s goods were concentrated in one region, up to one year if 
they were spread over a large territory (C.6.30.22.2-3). It was to be composed in a 
special notarial form.1038 
                                                          
1031 C.5.37.24; Bart., D.26.7.7, 57.  
1032 Bart., D.26.7.7; Fr. Porcellini, De confectione inventarii…, c. 3 // Tractatus selecti…, 523.  
1033 Porcellini, ibid., 524. 
1034 C.6.30.22.5-6; Nov.1.2.2.  
1035 Porcellini, ibid., 524.  
1036 Porcellini, ibid., 523.  
1037 Bald., C.6.30.22.1a.  
1038 The form of the heir’s inventory, elaborated and almost universally accepted by the Commentators, 
involved one notary and two witnesses, while all the creditors, legatees and other persons who could 
be prejudiced by the confection of the inventory were to be invited. A second additional notary public 
was required if the heir was illiterate. Three additional witnesses were to be present of any one of the 
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These two types of inventory were substantially different both in function 
performed and in formal requirements; there was, nonetheless, a tendency among the 
jurists to bring these two types together and find shared features in them. For example, 
Baldus pointed out that, in his day, the inventories of both tutors and heirs were often 
made before a judge, dispensing with many of the Civilian formalities.1039 Both types 
of inventories, especially if made before a judge, were presumed to contain correct 
information, unless proven otherwise; therefore, written bonds held by the defunct, 
after being fully transcribed into the inventory, made full proof against their respective 
debtors.1040 
The universal executor combined the features of heir and tutor. Like an heir, 
the executor was tasked with purging the defunct’s estate of debts and distributing it 
among the legatees and beneficiaries. On the other hand, like a tutor, the executor was 
acting mainly in someone else’s interest and was subject to the supervision of public 
authority. This dual nature was to be taken into account when dealing with the 
executor’s inventory. There is very little material dedicated specifically to the 
executor’s inventory in the Ius Commune. The English Canonists, with reference to 
the obligatory nature of the inventory for the executor, held that the executor’s 
inventory was more similar to that of a tutor rather than to that of an heir.1041 Moreover, 
they extended to English inventories the rule that only debts secured by writing could 
be included, although Swinburne opined that “some sort of commemoration” of such 
debts (outside of inventory) was needed.1042 The debts due by the testator could be 
included only after their ascertainment by the bishop’s official, as a false debt might 
be used as an instrument of fraud.1043 From the formal point of view, the inventory was 
made by the executor before two witnesses and submitted under oath to the bishop.1044 
                                                          
interested persons, invited for the procedure, was absent. The text of the inventory was to begin with 
the Sign of the Cross (“In nomine Patris…”) and end with a subscription. See: Bart., C.6.22.30pr; 
Porcellini, De confectione inventarii…, c. 2 // Tractatus selecti…, 521; Angelus de Ubaldi (Perusinus), 
Tractatus inventarii // Tractatus selecti…, 513-516; J. Coras, Tractatus inventarii // Tractatus selecti…, 
538-543.  
1039 Bald., C.6.30.22pr.  
1040 Bart., D.26.7.57; Bald., C.6.3.22.10.  
1041 W. Lyndwood, Provinciale…, tit. 13, s.v. “Prius”, 176. 
1042 W. Lyndwood, Provinciale…, tit. 13, s.v. “Dictis bonis”, 176; Swinburne, A briefe treatise…, VI.7, 
p.219. 
1043 Swinburne, ibid.  
1044 Swinburne, op cit, VI.9, p.220. 
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With a reference to Baldus,1045 Swinburne holds that a complete inventory is presumed 
true unless proven otherwise, so that all the goods mentioned in it are presumed to 
belong to and be in possession of the executor.1046  
J. Sichard (1499-1552) held that an heir who accepted the estate without 
inventory was liable ultra vires, because he was presumed to be acting fraudulently.1047 
This was the doctrinal ground for Swinburne to justify an English practice, according 
to which any person who intermeddled with the defunct’s estate without an inventory 
or a prior authorization was considered an executor de son tort (“in his own wrong”), 
liable before the estate creditors ultra vires, irrespective of the extent of the estate he 
intermeddled with.1048 This liability arose in case the perpetrator performed actions of 
an executorial nature (paying the testator’s debts, receiving the profits, etc.). However, 
Swinburne stressed that a person who meddled with the estate goods as a “mere 
trespasser” did not qualify as an executor de son tort.1049 This changed in the later 
English law, where even a trespasser could be considered the executor de son tort, 
while the extent of his liability depended on whether he had “devastated” the estate 
and on the technicalities of pleading.1050 This change was probably due to the fact that 
jurisdiction over the defunct’s debts in England was shared between the ecclesiastical 
and the secular courts, so that Swinburne’s doctrine reflected only the attitude of the 
former.1051 
The Civil law procedure for paying off the estate debts and legacies by the heir 
or the executor followed the principle prior tempore potior jure. The first creditor or 
legatee to present his claim to the executor received his debt in full. An exception was 
made for creditors with hypothecs over estate goods, as well for legacies ad pias 
causas. Moreover, if the executor knew about insolvency and the existence of other 
debts, he was obliged to obtain a caution (cautio cessantium partes reddi) or even a 
security (satisdatio) from the payee about proportionate repayment; otherwise, he was 
                                                          
1045 Bald., C.6.3.22.10. 
1046 Swinburne, op cit, VI.10, p.221.  
1047 Sicchard., C.6.30.22.4.  
1048 Swinburne, op cit, VI.3, p.214, VI.10, p.221.  
1049 Swinburne, op cit, VI.22, p.237.  
1050 'Legal Position of an Executor de Son Tort’, Monthly Law Magazine, vol 9, issue 35 (1841), 184-194. 
1051 R.H. Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England, 85-86.  
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in mala fide.1052  If a legacy was paid unbeknownst of a creditor’s existence, the 
creditor had recourse against the legatee by means of condictio indebiti (C.6.30.22.5). 
The making of the inventory prevented a confusion of the executor’s actions against 
the testator, and thus the executor could deduct debts owed to him on par with other 
creditors.1053 During the making of the inventory, the heir could not be sued for the 
estate debts and legacies.1054 
However, in England this system for the payment of debts had little to no 
application. According to Swinburne, contemporary practice established the order in 
which the debts were to be paid by the executor: debts to the Crown, then debts on 
statutes merchant,1055 then debts secured by judgements, then debts upon deeds of 
obligation, then debts upon books and “simple bills and specialties”. Within each 
particular category the executor was free to pay to whatever creditor he preferred; an 
exception was made for debts on which a lawsuit was already initiated and outstanding 
debts, which were to be preferred. Debts unsecured by writing, in the times of 
Swinburne’s writing of his treatise (1580-91), were not exactable from the executor, 
as the defunct himself could have purged them by a “wager of law”. Swinburne, 
however, admitted the possibility of the executor claiming a debt due to him by the 
testator from the estate. Even if the executor broke the aforesaid rules, the aggrieved 
creditor could only sue the executor, not the payee, be he creditor or legatee.1056 This 
divergence of the English practice from the Ius Commune can, probably, be explained 
by the influence of the secular courts.  
At the end of the term given for the execution of the testament, the executor 
was expected to give an account before the bishop or his official.1057 The expenses the 
executor incurred while in office were to be proved by witnesses or documents, except 
                                                          
1052 D.35.2.41; Bart., D.35.3.7, C.6.30.22.4; Sichard, C.6.30.22.4. 
1053 Baldus, however, held that, in case the executor had no written instruments evidencing his debt, 
he was to establish it by a special judicial procedure (Bald., C.6.30.22.9; Porcellini, De confectione 
inventarii…, c. 4 // Tractatus selecti…, 525-526). 
1054 Porcellini, ibid., 526.  
1055 A statute merchant was a type of security, entered into before the civic officials and having a force 
of judgment.  
1056 Swinburne, op cit, III.17, pp.108-109, VI.16, pp.229-230.  
1057 Clem.3.5.1; Gu. Durantis, Speculum judiciale, II.2 De instr edit, rubr. Nunc vero, fo. CC; Oldendorp, 
De executoribus …, tit. VIII // Tractatus selecti…, pp.413-414.  
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for small expenses, for which an oath was sufficient.1058 After giving account, the 
executor was officially exonerated of the office and any further lawsuits and 
obligations.1059 
What if several executors were appointed by the testator or the bishop: how 
were they to exercise their powers? This question was very controversial, especially at 
the early stages of the doctrinal development of executorship. The Civil and Canon 
law texts provided three possible models of multiple co-administrators: those of 
procurators (agents), of tutors and curators and of judges and arbiters. In respect of 
procurators, the Civil law texts provided that out of several procurators appointed for 
one case, the one who was the first to take control of the case (namely, to achieve a 
litis contestatio stage in the lawsuit) became the only one entitled, excluding all others 
(D.3.3.32), unless the contrary was provided by the mandate. Unlike that, every single 
tutor out of several could act alone in the interest of the pupil, unless there was a protest 
from the others (D.21.2.55; D.26.7.3, 24). Finally, if judges or arbiters were appointed 
to decide a case, the decision was to be taken by the majority, but all the judges or 
arbiters were to be present (D.4.8.17.2, 7); the mandate could provide for a smaller 
quorum, but all the arbiters were to be called, unless their participation was obstructed 
by distance (X.1.29.21, 30; X.1.43.1); in case of an equal vote on any issue, the public 
authority could appoint an additional arbiter (D.4.8.17.6).  
All three models were referred to by the jurists dealing with the executor. 
Which model was to be used for executors, if the testament did not provide for exact 
rules? Durantis in his Speculum provided the best synthesis available for the pre-1298 
period. He classified the commissions of executors according to the tasks set by the 
testator.1060 Firstly (1), a group of executors could be assigned with distributing certain 
property to certain beneficiaries. Such task could be performed by every executor 
individually in respect of a particular portion of property. Here he seems to have 
largely adopted the procuratorial model: the business and property the executor 
personally intermeddled with was to be sorted out by himself; Durantis, however, 
                                                          
1058 C.6.30.22.9, et ibi Bart. et Bald. 
1059 Swinburne, op cit, VI.20-21, pp.235-236. 
1060 Durantis, ibid., fo. CXCV.  
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would allow the co-executors to fulfill the office of their colleague who was impeded 
in any way.1061 Secondly (2), a college of executors might be set up to sell the estate 
of the defunct and distribute the proceeds for the poor at their discretion. To this 
situation Durantis applied the principle of co-judges and co-arbiters: decisions were to 
be taken by all the executors together, with majority prevailing over minority. Finally 
(3), a college of executors might be tasked with performing together a pious task (e.g., 
building a monastery) – in this case, the executors were to do everything together, 
unanimously. In the last case, if a disagreement obstructed the performance of the task, 
the bishop by his authority could force the dissenters to comply with the best solution.  
It is only for this last situation (3) that Durantis provided a specific outcome on 
the death of one of the executors: his office was to accrue to other co-executors, as 
such a task, although requiring consensus of all active executors, could still be 
performed if some of them were dead. The co-executors in such a situation, effectively, 
made up one “person” or “body”, which could decrease but was still to act in unison. 
It seems that Durantis admitted such an outcome in case (2) as well: depending on 
whether the executors were appointed by the testator “conjunctly” or “separately”, 
either the office of the dead executor accrued to other executors or the bishop 
substituted a new executor in place of the old one.1062 Irrespective of the form of 
appointment, however, if one executor was not dead, but was prevented from 
performing his duties due to being away or other temporary causes, Durantis held that, 
“out of equity”, other executors could take the decision without him, similarly to 
arbiters appointed with a quorum.1063 
However, many conclusions of Durantis and other 13th century lawyers were 
set aside by the legislation of Pope Boniface VIII in the Liber Sextus of 1298. The 
pope issued two constitutions which marked a shift towards the principle of unanimity 
in making collective decisions. One constitution, concerning procurators (Sext.1.19.6), 
established that several procurators, appointed for one lawsuit, could only pursue the 
action together, unless the mandate provided otherwise. Another constitution, which 
                                                          
1061 Durantis, ibid., fo. CCI.  
1062 The distinction between “separate” and “conjunct” appointments was an analogy from legacies 
and jus accrescendi (Durantis, ibid., fo. CC).  
1063 Durantis, ibid., fo. CCI.  
228 
 
directly concerned testamentary executors (Sext.3.11.2), provided that, if one of 
several executors died or was away, unavailable or unwilling to act, his office accrued 
to the other co-executors, unless the testament provided otherwise.  
Sext.3.11.2 introduced a profound change into the doctrine of co-
executorship.1064 For the first time, it set the same consequence for the death of an 
executor, his temporary unavailability and his inactivity. In that, the constitution 
assumed that the co-executors, taken together, were akin to “one person”. This was a 
sign that out of the three paradigms of an executorial task, provided by Durantis (supra, 
pp.226-227), the constitution selected paradigm (3) to be the main one; the co-
executors were not to be treated like co-arbiters, but like an indivisible “body”. Taken 
together with the new constitution on procurators (Sext.1.19.6), this implied that, 
without testamentary instructions to the contrary, the executors were to make their 
decisions together, unanimously. Subsequent authors, like G.D. Durante (1490-1565), 
confidently held that one executor could not act without others, unless the testator 
allowed them to act in solidum; a reference was made both to Sext.3.11.2 and to the 
constitution on procurators, Sext.1.19.6.1065 
The problem of co-executors was closely connected with another problem – 
the transmission of the executor’s office to his heirs. On the one hand, the executor 
was an administrator, personally selected for the position, akin to a tutor, which 
implied that the office was not supposed to be transmissible. On the other hand, in 
many cases the executor had personal actions – what happened to them after his death? 
The eventual consensus was to apply to the executor the same principle as was applied 
to procurators and judges-delegate. An executor mixtus transmitted to his heirs all the 
rights and actions that he had, together with the obligation to assign them to the 
beneficiaries; thus, the executor mixtus was effectually equalized with a procurator in 
rem suam, who was able to transmit and assign the right at any moment.1066 If the 
executor was merus, receiving no profit out of the estate, then, if he died without 
having intermeddled with the estate goods, leaving them intact (“res integra”), no 
                                                          
1064 Bartolus points out the change brought by Liber Sextus in his commentary to D.26.7.3.  
1065 G.D. Durante, De arte testandi, VII.8. 
1066 Bart., D.34.1.15pr, 16pr; Bald., C.8.53(54).33.  
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transmission took place, just as no transmission could take place in case of a regular 
procurator (C.4.35.15; X.1.29.21); a new executor was to be appointed in his stead. If 
the executor actually intermeddled with the estate goods, then, after his death, the fund 
(“bursa”) he took possession of was transmitted to his own heirs, together with the 
obligation to employ the fund in favour of the beneficiaries; the heir, however, was not 
obliged to take upon himself any other unfinished business of the deceased 
executor.1067  
The writings of the English Canonists are a good demonstration of how flexible 
the above-expressed principles were and how they could be reinterpreted and adapted 
to justify local practice. J. Ayton, having presented the prevalent opinion on the 
necessity of unanimity among the executors, eventually leant in favour of the opinion 
that every executor can both sue and be sued in solidum, which Ayton called the 
practice of contemporary England. The doctrinal justification Ayton provided for this 
is that the unanimity rule was devised for procurators, who were appointed mainly for 
judicial matters; on the other hand, most of the functions of executors were 
“extrajudicial”, as with tutors, where the in solidum rule was more convenient. Ayton, 
nevertheless, admitted that the consideration of the lawsuits of several executors 
together is desirable, “favore testamenti”.1068 By the time of H. Swinburne, English 
practice was to allow the co-executors to sue and be sued individually, unless a party 
to the litigation objected to this.1069 One executor could also discharge the debts due 
to the testator, without consent of the other executors. 1070  Nevertheless, even in 
England the co-executors were seen as “one person” in that they could not sue each 
other over possession of the estate; if one of them died or rejected the office, the office 
accrued to the others.1071  
In sharp contrast to the Ius Commune, in England the executor never 
transmitted the office to his own representatives, even in respect of property he actually 
possessed. If there were no co-executors, a testamentary executor could appoint a 
                                                          
1067 Durantis, ibid., fo. CCVII; Bart., D.31.1, D.34.1.15pr.  
1068 Constitution of Ottobuono, 1268, tit. 14 // Constitutiones Legatinae…, 108.  
1069 Swinburne, op cit, IV.20, pp.183-184. 
1070 Swinburne, op cit, VI.3, pp.215-216.  
1071 Swinburne, op cit, IV.20, pp.183-184. 
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substitute to complete the executorial tasks after his death; however, this was not a 
transmission, because the substitute was considered the executor of the original 
testator, not the executor of the executor.1072 
As to the qualifications to be an executor, the early jurists dedicated a lot of 
attention to whether various types of consecrated persons and clergy were eligible to 
take the office.1073 Besides that, an executor was supposed to be over 25 years old, so 
that he possessed a persona standi in judicio. In England, however, this last 
requirement did not apply: in practice, children were often appointed executors, in 
which case, if they were underage, the office was performed by their tutors or 
curators.1074 For women to hold this post was initially doubtful;1075 but it afterwards 
became accepted practice.1076 
6.2. Duties and Mechanism of Executorship in Scotland. 
The long-term development of the office of executor in Scotland was very 
similar to that in England. In pre-Reformation Scotland, executors and the lawsuits 
involving them were dealt with predominantly by the Ecclesiastical Courts, and, in 
contrast to England, there seems to have been no strict control and pressure from the 
secular courts over jurisdictional encroachments. A.E. Anton in his research into the 
rudimentary Scottish pre-Reformation Church court records showed how their practice 
was heavily based on Canon law. 1077  Similarly to England, the ordinary way to 
administer a moveable estate was through the universal executor, who was often 
characterized as “heres in mobilibus” in subsequent writings and case law.1078 In the 
same vein, the Church courts’ procedure of ‘confirmation of testament’,1079 by which 
                                                          
1072  An intestate executor, which was called an “administrator” in England, could not appoint a 
substitute (Swinburne, op cit, II.9, pp.49-50, VI.3, pp.213-214).  
1073 Durantis, ibid., fo. CCVI.  
1074 Swinburne, op cit, V.1, pp.196-197.  
1075 Durantis, ibid., fo. CCVII.  
1076 Oldendorp, De executoribus …, tit. V // Tractatus selecti…, p.411; Swinburne, op cit, II.9, pp.49-50. 
1077 A.E. Anton, ‘Medieval Scottish Executors and the Courts Spiritual’, 129-154. 
1078 The earliest writing in which I have found this expression is Th. Craig’s “Jus Feudale” (II.17.1).  
1079 In Lyndwood’s Provinciale similar procedure was called “insinuation” (Lyndwood, Provinciale (seu 
Constitutiones Angliae)…, tit. 13, s.v. “Insinuationem”, 170). 
231 
 
the executors were bestowed with powers, was compared to the Civilian aditio 
hereditatis by the Scots authors.1080 
Executors in Scotland were either executors-testamentar (-nominate) or 
executors-dative. The latter were appointed by the bishop before the Reformation; after 
the Reformation they were to be appointed by the Commissary, although various 
instructions directed to the Commissaries from time to time reserved the right to deal 
with some estates to the bishops of the Scottish Episcopal Church.1081 In this case, the 
functions of the executor were performed by the procurator-fiscal. While initially the 
appointment of an executor-dative was at the discretion of the Commissary (infra, 
p.249), the 1666 Instruction to the Commissaries provided for a strict order of priority 
in confirmation as such: the defunct’s ‘nearest-of-kin’ first, then his creditors, then 
legatees and, finally, the procurator-fiscal.1082 The definition of the ‘nearest-of-kin’, 
provided by Th. Hope and by Stair, suggests that this category of Scots intestate 
moveable succession was taken by analogy from heritable succession, except: 1) there 
was no primogeniture, 2) there was no preference of males,1083 and 3) there was no 
succession by representation, i.e., the defunct’s children excluded the grandchildren 
from a predeceasing child. 1084  The last rule was probably caused by the literal 
interpretation of the term “nearest-of-kin”, meaning the closest extant relatives of the 
defunct, to the exclusion of the remoter ones.  
The terminology of “mere” and “mixed”, “universal” and “particular” 
executors was not part of the usual Scots legal discourse. However, Scots law made 
use of several special types of executors. One of them was an ‘executor-creditor’. An 
executor-creditor was a creditor of the defunct who was confirmed as an executor-
dative to his debtor, who died intestate. In fact, the machinery of executor-creditor was 
used as a type of diligence (execution) against the debtor. The special feature of such 
                                                          
1080 Stair Inst.III.8.51.  
1081 The 1610 Injunctions to the Commissaries (Balfour’s Practicks, 667) reserved to the bishops the 
privilege to be executors-dative where no other claimant existed. Unlike that, the 1567 Instructions (c. 
4) reserved this right, in respect of large estates, for the Lords of Session. 
1082 Acts of Sederunt 1790, 99-100. Stair in his Institutions also mentioned the surviving spouse as 
entitled, on par with legatees (Inst.III.8.54).  
1083 But there was still an exclusion of the uterine lines in the succession of collaterals. See note below.  
1084 Hope, Minor Practicks, §76; Stair, Inst.III.8.31-32.  
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executor’s position was that he was not obliged to obtain a confirmation for the entire 
estate of the defunct – he might include in the inventory just as much as would pay his 
debt;1085 it seems that initially an executor-creditor was not even obliged to repay the 
surplus estate to the defunct’s next-of-kin, but this was changed by the 1679 Act of 
Sederunt.1086 There were also other special types of executors: executors ad omissa, 
ad male appreciata and ad non executa (or ad extra); these were appointed for the 
goods which the principal executor, respectively, omitted, undervalued or was unable 
to collect. These types are traceable to pre-Reformation practice.1087   
In compliance with Canon law, the executor in Scotland had one year to 
execute the testament. Later legal writers1088 ascribed this term to statute – to the 
provision in the 1503 Act,1089 which concerned the payment of the defunct’s debts. 
However, the Act was not the real source of this term. The Act was dedicated to a 
different purpose: it established that the heir-at-law could not be sued by the moveable 
creditors of the defunct before the expiration of one year after the defunct’s death; the 
reason for this was that during the first year after the death the defunct’s executor was 
responsible for paying off the defunct’s debts. Thus, the 1503 Act just referred to this 
yearly term, which was established by pre-existing law and practice, conform to the 
Canon law. Indeed, subsequent Scottish practice often confused this term of one year 
and a different term of “one year and one day”, during which the heir could decide 
whether to accept or to reject the heritable estate.1090 There are decisions which imply 
that the executor had “one year and one day” to execute the testament, not just one 
year.1091 However, the source of this confusion is quite obvious, as the two terms 
performed a similar function; the Canonical origin of the “one year” term should not 
be put into doubt.  
The year given for the execution of a testament was particularly important in 
the period before roughly the mid-17th century, because the moveable property, 
                                                          
1085 Spottiswoode’s Practicks, 352.  
1086 14/11/1679, Acts of Sederunt 1790, 143.  
1087 Anton, Op cit, 139; 1563 Instructions, c. 31; Spottiswoode’s Practicks, 110-113.  
1088 Erskine, Inst.III.9.41.  
1089 RPS, A1504/3/121.  
1090 This term was established by the later 1540 Act (RPS, 1540/12/78).  
1091 Collington v. Johnston (1557, M.5201).  
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especially incorporeal rights, omitted by the executor from the inventory and not 
intromitted with by him, were to pass to the heir-at-law. The judges considered this 
logical, as the heir could be pursued for the moveable debts of the defunct on the 
expiration of the year.1092 Craig1093 and Spottiswood1094 still mention this possibility, 
which seems to have been a relic of the medieval practice, when the distribution of the 
defunct’s goods for the payment of debts was primarily the function of the heir.1095 
However, this practice disappeared from later writings and case law, which may imply 
that it went out of use.  
Scots judicial practice demonstrates uncertainty as to when the executor was to 
pay a specific legacy or a share due by law. On the one hand, the executor was found 
not liable for an annualrent on the legacy until a court decree was obtained against 
him;1096 on the other hand, he was found liable for the annualrent on a ‘legitim’ share 
for the defunct’s children, who were minors and thus unable to sue.1097 Later authors, 
such as Erskine, held that that an executor could be sued for the legacy when there 
were available goods but was fully liable after one year expired.1098 
Akin to the English practice of the same period, Early Modern Scots practice 
did not limit the procedural capacity of executors: they could sue and be sued in the 
defunct’s name.1099 More than that, the executor was supposed to sue the debtors and 
be sued by the creditors in order to be able to dispose of the respective sums. Even if 
the testator had a court decree upon a debt awarded for him or against him in his life, 
the decree was not automatically valid in respect of his executors in Scots law: until 
1693, an ‘action of transference’ had to be filed by the executor or against him in order 
to formally change the party to the obligation.1100 Thus, all the defunct’s creditors, who 
did not start the execution of diligence in the defunct’s lifetime, were to file new 
                                                          
1092 Collington v. Johnston (1557, M.5201=Maitland 84).  
1093 Jus feudale, II.17.16.  
1094 Spottiswoode’s Practicks, 113.  
1095 Reg.Maj.II.36.  
1096 Mackmichael v. Makfegie (1628, I B.S.252).  
1097 Hendersons v. Sanders (1634, M.8164).  
1098 Erskine, Inst.III.9.41; cf. the Ius Commune position, supra, p.221. 
1099 See infra, p.239, however, on the importance of the title of “universal intromitter” in the early 
case law.   
1100 Stair, Inst.IV.34.1-3. Note that the active transference was abolished by the 1693 Act (infra, p.247).  
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lawsuits with the executor (infra, p.241). In a similar way, the executor was deemed 
to have “executed” (i.e., meddled with) the testator’s debt only after he obtained a 
court decree on that debt in his own name, although receiving a bond of corroboration 
from the debtor was also considered sufficient. 1101  The debts unsecured by the 
executor in the aforesaid fashion, by a general rule, could not be transmitted to the 
executor’s executor (infra, s.6.4).  
Moreover, Scots law demonstrated strictness in respect of the executor’s title 
to pursue. The executor could only file a lawsuit upon a debt that he included in the 
inventory of the defunct’s estate.1102 By way of exception, the Commissaries could 
grant a “licence to pursue” a debt before the completion of the inventory, in case of 
urgency or when it was uncertain if the debt existed.1103 Because of the last reason, as 
the archival evidence demonstrates, executors sometimes confirmed the inventories 
under a protestation that the debts which were not real and “responsal” were not to be 
counted into the general estate value.1104  
As regards the liability of the executor for the defunct’s debts, the focus of 
attention for the early legal authors was the executor’s position vis-à-vis the heir. Both 
heir and executor could be pursued for either heritable or moveable debts.1105 The 1503 
Act (supra, p.232) provided the heirs with a recourse against the executor in respect 
of moveable debts, but the executor could not be held liable ultra vires.1106 The reverse 
recourse – of the executor against the heir – was not expressly provided by the statutory 
law. However, such recourse was often given by the courts in practice 1107  and 
gradually became the established law.1108 
Scots law showed a striking similarity to the Civil law in the question of 
appointing agents and assigning debts by the executor. The executor at Scots law could 
                                                          
1101 Stair, Inst.III.8.71; Erskine, Inst.III.9.38.  
1102 Pool v. Morison (1628, M.3493=3846); Brown & Duff v. Bizet (1666, M.4498).  
1103 1610 Injunctions (Balfour’s Practicks, 667); 1679 Act of Sederunt (14/11/1679, Acts of Sederunt 
1790, 143).  
1104 CC8/2/62, 19/11/1639, second entry (David Wilsone).  
1105 Crawford v. Mathisone (1628, I B.S.273).  
1106 Laird of Elphingston v. Lord Glamis (1561, M.5204).  
1107 Falconer v. Blair (1629, M.12487); Carnousie v. Meldrum (1630, M. 5204).  
1108 Stair, Inst.III.8.65.  
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not appoint a procurator to sue upon a debt in his own name before the debt was 
secured by a court decree in the executor’s name.1109 Similarly to Civil law, this rule 
was mitigated in respect of the executor having interest in the estate (infra, s.6.4).  
The 1617 Act1110 is evidence that the practice preceding the Act was to leave 
the residue of the “Dead’s part” of the estate to the executor-nominate. It was exactly 
this practice that the 1617 Act aimed to abolish, calling it a practice of “ignorant” 
testators, contrary to “law, conscience and equity”. The Act provided that, from then 
on, the executors-nominate could only claim a third of the “Dead’s part” as a reward 
for their services and were obliged to give up the rest to the defunct’s nearest-of-kin. 
The case law that immediately followed the Act found this right of the executor subject 
to contrary dispositions by the testator.1111 
Early cases provided that the executor could not gift or assign anything from 
the estate for a lucrative cause.1112 In the later case law, under the influence of the 1617 
Act, most of the executors were recognized as trustees of the legatees and other parties 
interested in the estate;1113 this entailed that they had no plenum dominium over estate 
goods and could not voluntarily assign them to the detriment of the beneficiaries (infra, 
p.248).  
The making of an inventory and the probate procedure were the fields where 
the Scots law and practice demonstrated significant robustness and bureaucracy, when 
compared to the Ius Commune and the English law. The making of an inventory in 
Scotland was indispensable, and, aside from the narrow instance of a “licence to 
pursue” (supra, p.234), in theory the executor could not intermeddle with the goods 
before the inventory was made and confirmed, which was different from English 
practice.1114 Moreover, as was already mentioned in the survey of the Scottish wills 
(supra, s.1.5), in the majority of cases the inventory was made by the testator himself 
                                                          
1109 Millar v. Lindsay (1633, I B.S.339); Ramsay v. Demperstoun (1633, I B.S.344). In the last case, the 
appointment of a procurator was actually allowed under condition that the lawsuit was in the 
executor’s name and the executor personally concurred at the process.  
1110 RPS, 1617/5/28. 
1111 Forsyth v. Forsyth (1626, M.3923).  
1112 Anonymous case, 1546, Sinclair’s Practicks, §396; anonymous case, 1558, Maitland 90. 
1113 Gordon v. Laird of Drum & Irving (1671, M.3894). 
1114 A.E. Anton, op cit, 138; supra, p.221. 
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– the practice that many Ius Commune authors straightforwardly rejected as 
unacceptable.1115 Scottish inventories routinely contained corporeal goods, debts due 
to the testator and debts due by him; no visible distinction was made between the debts 
secured and unsecured by writing.  
The archival evidence shows that the probate procedure for both testate and 
intestate executors usually started with an “edict of executry”, published at the instance 
of the procurator fiscal, which edict commanded all executors, intromitters and other 
interested parties to provide an inventory of the defunct’s goods, under pain of 
appointing executors-dative at the commissary’s discretion. The executors-nominate 
then usually appeared with a complete inventory, although sometimes they asked for 
additional time.1116 In case of intestacy, the executor-dative was first to be granted 
powers by a “decree-dative”, which provided an additional term for completing the 
inventory. 1117  The various instructions addressed to the Commissaries established 
various terms for making an inventory: six months from the testator’s death were 
provided by the 1567 Instructions,1118 three months by the 1610 Injunctions and 1666 
Instructions.1119 However, in practice these terms were often not complied with; the 
extant materials reveal no sanctions imposed for this upon the executors. One undated 
pre-Reformation monition by the Archbishop of St. Andrews 1120  provided for an 
extremely short term for making the inventory – nine days, - which, surprisingly 
enough, became the usual term set by the individual decrees-dative and was even 
mentioned as such by Erskine.1121 
Both pre- and post-Reformation documents required the executor to take an 
oath on the faithful administration of the estate. 1122  A 1559 constitution by the 
St. Andrews Provincial Council1123 commanded executors-dative to give “sufficient 
caution” for the same purpose, by “caution” here meaning a security. In practice, 
                                                          
1115 Bald., C.6.30.22.1a; Porcellini, De confectione inventarii…, c. 2 // Tractatus selecti…, 520.  
1116 CC8/2/1, pp. 13v, 15v.  
1117 CC8/2/62, 22/11/1639. 
1118 C. 9, Balfour’s Practicks, 664. 
1119 Balfour’s Practicks, 667; Acts of Sederunt 1790, 100.  
1120 St. Andrews Formulare, §53 (f. 51).  
1121 Erskine, Inst.III.9.31.  
1122 SES, 212; Balfour’s Practicks, 667.  
1123 SES, 280.  
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however, in the same robust spirit as with other issues, both executors-nominate and 
datives had to provide “caution”, which was given in the form of surety for the value 
of the entire estate.1124 This was only changed by the 1823 Act.1125 
Originally, the form of inventory in Scotland1126 involved giving up the goods 
by the executor under oath before the judges, but the oath lost its legal significance at 
some point,1127 and thus the practice faded away by mid-18th century.1128 The 1690 
Act1129 had the effect that the inclusion of all the goods in the inventory was no longer 
required and all types of executors could obtain partial confirmations. 1130  This 
possibility was abolished by the 1823 Act.  
However, the effect of compiling an inventory in Scotland was quite similar to 
that of England and the Ius Commune. Besides limiting the executor’s liability, it 
prevented a confusion of the executor’s debts against the testator: the executor was 
entitled to claim his debt against the estate, having effectual priority before all other 
creditors.1131 The inventory also created a presumption about the contents and value of 
the estate, which could be used both for and against the executor. Thus, it came to be 
accepted in practice that the goods possessed by the defunct at the time of his decease 
and included in the inventory belonged to him, putting the burden on all intromitters 
to prove their title;1132 this differed from the ordinary Scots requirement for real actions 
that the pursuer was to prove quo modo desiit possidere.1133 And, unless the contrary 
was proven, the inventoried goods were presumed to be in the executor’s possession 
and to be of the value designated by him.1134  
                                                          
1124 Bankton, Inst.III.8.62.  
1125 4 Geo. IV, c. 98.  
1126 Here we are talking about the inventories given up by executors, not the inventories contained in 
the testamentary deeds, which we have reviewed previously (supra, s.1.5-1.6).  
1127 In Ker v. Ker (1667, M.3874) the oath was recognized a mere formality, unable to entail perjury.  
1128 Erskine, Inst.III.9.33.  
1129 Supra, p.96. 
1130 Brodies v. Stephen (1753, M.3911).  
1131 Smith v. Gray (1628, M.9660=I B.S.182=243).  
1132 Inglis v. Inglis (1670, M.12727); Semple v. Givan (1672, II Stair 78).  
1133 Stair, Inst.III.2.7.  
1134 Hamilton v. Laird of Kinbrachmont (1628, I B.S.158); Ludquharn v. Haddo (1632, M.3872).  
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Similarly to the Ius Commune, an executor in Scots law could reject the office 
before intermeddling with the goods: the Ius Commune expression “res integra” 
(supra, pp.221, 229) was used as a technical term in Scots practice.1135 In case of 
misconduct, the executor could be removed by the Commissaries,1136 although the case 
law on this issue is extremely scarce, which possibly implies that removals occurred 
very seldom. Should the executor fraudulently omit some goods from the inventory, 
the instructions provided for their forfeiture in favour of the bishop.1137 However, in 
practice the two main remedies for the aggrieved party in such a situation were either 
to sue the executor as the “vitious intromitter” (infra) or to confirm him- or herself as 
an executor ad omissa; the case law was contradictory on whether these two 
alternatives were for the pursuer’s choice or one of the two had priority over the 
other.1138 If the execution of a testament was not completed within one year after 
confirmation, the executor could not use the lack of funds as a defence against claims 
from creditors and legatees.1139 Finally, the 1695 Act1140 entitled the creditors of the 
defunct to charge the ‘next-of-kin’ to confirm as executor and empowered the creditors 
of the ‘next-of-kin’ to confirm as executors-dative to the defunct. 
Unauthorized meddling with the defunct’s moveable estate was dubbed 
“vitious intromission” in Scots law. This issue in the Scots law was, probably, first 
dealt with by Th. Craig, where it was designated as “universal intromission”.1141 
Subsequently, the law of vitious intromission did not change significantly. Any person, 
irrespective of whether executor or not, taking possession of the defunct’s property 
before such property was confirmed and inventoried, was considered to be a ‘vitious 
intromitter’. How substantial was the amount of the intromitted property to be? This 
depended significantly on the discretion of the judges.1142 The main consequence of 
‘vitious intromission’ was that the intromitter was liable to the defunct’s creditors 
                                                          
1135 See: Learmont v. Holme (1561, M.3829); CC8/2/62, 11/07/1639, entries 3, 4.  
1136 Wood v. Bonnington (1609, M.5201); Young v. Murray (1629, M.3880).  
1137 1610 Injunctions, Balfour’s Practicks, 667; 1666 Instructions, Acts of Sederunt 1790, 99.  
1138 Johnston v. Ker (1616, M.9848); Schaw v. Auchinleck (1623, M.14411); Peebles v. Knight (1629, 
M.3494); Inglis v. Bell (1639, M.14414); Irving v. Forbes (1676, M. 7722).  
1139 Craig, Jus feudale, II.17.16.  
1140 RPS, 1695/5/207. 
1141 Jus feudale, II.17.3, 16. 
1142 Johnston v. Ker (1616, M.9848); Bad v. Haddington (1622, M.9865); Stark & Tam v. Jolly (1713, 
M.9830); Bankton, Inst.III.9.1, 14.  
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irrespective of the value of his intromission, ultra vires. The intromitter was, 
nevertheless, not liable to the creditors if he became the executor and confirmed the 
disputed goods before the defunct’s creditor brought an action against him.1143 The 
same followed if someone else became the executor – in this case, the intromitter was 
liable to account before the executor for the possessed goods. If the intromitter was the 
defunct’s executor-nominate, relict, child, legatee or another person entitled to some 
benefit by way of succession, there was a period of privilege – one year and one day 
after the death – during which no lawsuit by the defunct’s creditors could be initiated, 
while confirmation and inventory were being prepared. The same period of privilege 
applied to the disponees of the defunct’s goods in his life, if the possession was not 
transferred until death.1144 However, the 1690 Act (supra, p.96) freed the disponees of 
particular goods from the need of confirmation, unless the dispositions were in fraud 
of creditors. 
The Scots Institutional writers considered ‘vitious intromission’ a unique legal 
device. Bankton called the unlimited liability of an intromitter a “singularity of our 
law” (Inst.III.9.1), obviously comparing it with the executor de son tort of English law 
(supra, p.224), who in Bankton’s time was liable ultra vires only in special 
circumstances. 1145  Erskine, in his turn, saw similarities between the ‘vitious 
intromission’ and the actio expilatae hereditatis of the Civil law.1146 Both authors, 
however, were quite far away from the truth. As was mentioned above, the English 
law on the executor de son tort evolved in time; in the 16th century, the English 
executor de son tort was liable ultra vires, just like a ‘vitious intromitter’. The 
comparison of vitious intromission with the actio expilatae hereditatis is also 
inadequate. That actio was a purely criminal action, given against one who spoiled the 
estate goods before the estate was accepted (D.47.19.2). The actio expilatae hereditatis 
                                                          
1143 However, there were some cases where the action against the intromitter was sustained despite 
the existence of the executor (Schaw v. Auchinleck (1623, M.14411); Carnousie v. Meldrum (1630, 
M.5204)).  
1144 Spottiswoode’s Practicks, 350-352; Th. Hope, Minor Practicks, §§77, 92-94; Stair, Inst.III.9; Bankton, 
Inst.III.9; Erskine, Inst.III.9.49-56.  
1145 Bankton, Inst.III.9, Observations on the Law of England…, §§4-5.  
1146 Inst.III.9.49.  
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entailed a criminal punishment upon the perpetrator, not any additional liability in 
favour of the estate creditors.1147  
In fact, ‘vitious intromission’ seems to be very similar to the early English 
executor de son tort and based upon the same principle: the meddling with the estate 
without inventory creates a presumption of sufficiency of goods and(or) of fraud 
(supra, pp.223-224). “Intromitter” in Scots law had a wide meaning, not restricted to 
that of an unlawful perpetrator (supra, p.155). In almost all testaments, an executor 
was routinely appointed a “universal intromitter”. This was not just a form, in the early 
law at least, as there was a case where out of several executors only the one who was 
also appointed a “universal intromitter” was found entitled to sue and be sued in the 
testator’s name.1148 Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that, in early law, not all 
intromitters could be sued by creditors: in one case from the Edinburgh Commissary 
Court the defunct’s relict successfully defended herself against the creditor by 
claiming that she was not an executor and that her “intromission” extended only to 
what was owed to her by the deceased husband.1149 It seems that, originally, only those 
intromitters who acted under disguise of an executor incurred liability; the fact that 
they were not really entitled to the office and did not make an inventory could not, 
obviously, be pleaded in their defence.  
This is confirmed by the early writings, which spoke about a “universal 
intromission” and stressed that a “vitious” intromission must be to the universitas of 
the estate.1150 Stair insisted on the necessity that the intromitter takes possession of a 
“universal thing”, like the estate in general or the flock of sheep; taking possession of 
individual goods was not to be qualified as an intromission;1151 Erskine, in the 18th 
century, no longer saw the need for such a distinction.1152 This is reminiscent of the 
way “mere tresspassers” were not considered executors de son tort in the early English 
                                                          
1147 D.47.18.1; D.47.19.1; C.9.32.1, 6.  
1148 Pursuer v. Hamilton (1565, M.14686).  
1149  CC8/2/1, p.2, 1564, lawsuit by John Hepburn. In the case, the defender held that she only 
intromitted with her relict’s third due from the first husband, which was later possessed by her second 
husband, now also defunct. The court assigned her to prove her case, which is a sign that her 
arguments were deemed acceptable.   
1150 Craig, Jus feudale, II.17.3, 16; Spottiswoode’s Practicks, 350-352.  
1151 Stair, Inst.III.9.7.  
1152 Erskine, Inst.III.9.50.  
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law (supra, p.224). Moreover, the “one year and one day” period, during which the 
defunct’s successor could not be sued for intromission, might be of Civilian origin. 
Stair explained this rule on the ground that “there being no competent time to confirm, 
neither any time limited in law other than year and day” (Inst.III.9.10). Stair seems to 
be unaware of the shorter terms for confirmation, set by the various instructions to the 
Commissaries.1153 Further in the text, Stair associates the “year and day” term with the 
similar term, established by law for the execution of a testament.1154 Nevertheless, the 
underlying principle itself – that during the making of an inventory the successor could 
not be sued by the defunct’s creditors – is quite recognizable as Civilian (supra, p.225). 
It was only the later authors who started to explain the “year and day” rule from the 
necessity of “custody” over the defunct’s goods by his relatives and potential 
successors.1155  
In respect of procedure for the payment of debts, Scottish law once again 
demonstrated a certain strictness and inflexibility. On the one hand, the 1567 and 
subsequent Instructions forbade the inclusion of debts due by the defunct into the 
inventory, unless the inventory was given up by the defunct himself, in line with the 
testator’s statement having the force of, at least, a ‘half-proof’ (supra, s.2.3).1156 The 
debt, however, could also be proved by the creditor and established by a court decree 
against the executor. The chief motivation behind these rules was to ensure a fair 
calculation of ‘quots’ due to the Commissaries (supra, s.3.4); but they also served to 
protect the estate against embezzlement by the executor. In this, Scots law was not 
much different from English practice, where all debts were to be established by the 
bishop’s official before their inclusion in the inventory (supra, p.223). However, 
unlike English law, Scots law did not allow the executor to pay whichever debt he 
preferred, adopting instead a “first come – first served” principle.1157 A 1662 Act of 
Sederunt, to prevent fraud, forbade the executor from distributing the estate within six 
                                                          
1153 This is especially striking, seeing that the 1666 Instructions to the Commissaries were registered 
as an Act of Sederunt by the Court of Session, of which Stair was a member.  
1154 Supra, pp.221, 233. This opinion of Stair does not seem logical, because, as was already shown 
above, a confirmed executor was not free from lawsuits during the year given for execution, but, to 
the contrary, was to sue and be sued.  
1155 Mackenzie, Inst.III.9.23; Bankton, Inst.III.9.2; Erskine, Inst.III.9.53.  
1156 1567 Instructions, c. 2; 1610 Injunctions (Balfour’s Practicks, 666).  
1157 It was, probably, first formulated by Craig (Jus feudale, II.17.15).  
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months after the testator’s death and provided that all creditors, presenting their claims 
within that term, had equal standing, pari passu.1158 However, at the expiration of the 
six months, the “first come” principle prevailed. In this, Scots law followed the Ius 
Commune more closely, with the exception, that the priority of creditors here was 
established not by the order of demand but by the order of obtaining court decrees.  
Moreover, sometimes even a court decree was not sufficient for a secure 
payment. The executor could not simply pay upon a decree which was based solely on 
the executor’s oath,1159 confession or inactivity during the litigation.1160 In such a case, 
the executor was supposed to receive caution from the creditor to return the paid debt 
in so far as a posterior creditor was prejudiced. The Civilian principle of bona fides in 
paying off debts (supra, p.225) was also referred to and applied in Scotland, although 
to a limited extent: the executor was held to be in “bad faith” if he paid the debt while 
knowing of another debt, recognized in a last will; but this did not extend to a debt 
unrecognized and unsecured by court decree.1161 
There were attempts to introduce into Scots law the privilege of legacies ad 
pias causas, following the Ius Commune. However, these were unsuccessful. 
Curiously enough, this failure seems to have been due to a peculiar interpretation of 
Civil law by the judges. In Monro v. Scot’s Executors (1630, M.8048), the Lords 
refused to grant priority to a legacy in favour of the Kirk. According to Dury’s report 
of the case, the Lords referred to the ‘Falcidian quarter’ of Civil law, which, allegedly, 
was not deductable from a legacy ad pias causas if the estate was sufficient to pay all 
the legacies; it was, however, deductable from all kinds of legacies if the estate was 
insolvent. Consequently, a legacy ad pias causas had no privilege before other 
legacies.  
The problem with this statement by the Lords (of course, if it was reported 
correctly) is that it is outright wrong. At Civil law, a legacy ad pias causas was free 
                                                          
1158 28/02/1662, Acts of Sederunt 1790, 82. 
1159 Unlike England (supra, p.242), in Scotland the executor could take an oath in the lawsuit upon the 
defunct’s debt (Relict of Hamilton Case (1630, I B.S.300)). 
1160 Kerr v. Lady Collington (1627, I B.S.235); Nesbet v. Hume (1629, 1 B.S.277); Relict of Hamilton Case 
(1630, I B.S.300). 
1161 Scougall v. Horseburgh (1621, M.3863).  
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from the ‘Falcidian quarter’ in case of both solvency and insolvency (C.1.3.48; 
Nov.131.12pr.). In fact, the body text of Nov.131.12pr quite explicitly states that the 
insolvency of the estate is no ground for the deduction of the ‘Falcidian’: to the 
contrary, it says that the entire insolvent estate should be directed to the payment of 
the “pious” legacy! This interpretation was accepted both by the Commentators1162 
and by the Humanist jurists.1163 Some scholars held to the opinion that Nov.131 was 
only applicable to situations where the heir/executor was at fault in not paying the 
legacy, but even they did not distinguish between solvent and insolvent estates.1164 
Thus, the interpretation expressed in Monro looks extremely peculiar; nevetheless, it 
is to blame for the absense of the privilege of charitable legacies in Scots law.  
There was one more instance where Scots probate procedure was strikingly 
similar to the Ius Commune, although the connection between the two was 
problematic. It was mentioned above that the Civilian executor, after paying off the 
debts and legacies, was free from further liability, while the creditors who came late 
could have recourse against the legatees who received their legacies (supra, p.225). 
An essentially similar rule was accepted in Scotland by the time of Stair.  
The Scots rule, however, underwent a peculiar evolution. Spottiswood in the 
1630s held that a Scottish executor was not liberated from the debts by paying off the 
legacies, but the creditor could pursue either the executor or the legatee at his 
choice.1165 He mentioned that it was a Scottish practice for executors to get cautions 
from the legatees in case forgotten creditors emerged. Such caution in Scots practice 
was called “cautio mutiana (muciana)”, which was a complete misnomer, as cautio 
Muciana in Civil law served a different function.1166 Indeed, there was little case law 
involving cautio mutiana in Scotland, and what there was was indecisive on whether 
this caution was necessary.1167 Stair in his Institutions gives a different account of the 
                                                          
1162 Bart., D.35.2.52; Pau.Castr., D.30.79.  
1163 Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, D.35.2, XVI.  
1164 J. Voet, ibid.  
1165 Spottiswoode’s Practicks, ‘Legacies’, 195.  
1166 In Civil law, cautio Muciana was applicable to legacies under a resolutive condition; this caution 
was provided by the legatee to repay the legacy back in case the condition was fulfilled and the legacy 
failed (D.35.1.7).  
1167 Craufurd v. Matheson (1634, M.15925); Binning v. Hamilton (1675, M.3853).  
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law: the executor, according to him, was liberated by paying off the legacies, while the 
creditor had direct relief against the legatees; the cautio mutiana, surprisingly, Stair 
called “not accustomed” in Scots law.1168 This was the approach taken by subsequent 
practice and writings.1169 The new direction taken by Stair and subsequent authors 
possibly implies conscious imitation of the Civilian doctrine, which, nevertheless, was 
not very well understood.  
Originally, with the office finished, the executor was required to give an 
account of it, all the creditors being called, and receive a “decree of exoneration”.1170 
However, this practice went out of use, as a simple procedural exception was found 
eligible to defend the executor from further lawsuits.1171  
As to the person of the executor, Scots law largely followed the English 
approach (supra, p.230). The executor could be a minor, and then his or her functions 
were performed by the tutor or curator. Both men and women were routinely appointed 
executors; however, a married woman, as the executor, participated in litigation only 
together with her husband, “for his interest”.  
6.3. Plurality of Executors in Scotland. 
The earliest Scottish cases available to us demonstrate quite a faithful following 
of the Ius Commune rules on co-executorship. As early as 1548 it was decided that the 
office of a dead executor accrued to the remaining co-executors;1172 in 1557 it was 
established that one co-executor could not be pursued without the others. 1173 
Correspondingly, in 1566 it was decided that one co-executor could not pursue the 
estate debtors without other co-executors joining in the lawsuit.1174 It is notable that 
all these cases are from the Court of Session, which shows that the Scots royal courts, 
in contrast to those of England (supra, p.230), did not contradict the practice of the 
                                                          
1168 Inst.III.8.70.  
1169 Erskine, Inst.III.9.46; Executors of Maccomie v. Isabel & Rachel Strachans (1760, M.8087). 
1170 Jus feudale, II.17.15.  
1171 Lord Brughton v. Aikman (c. 1570s, M.2737); Tailzifer v. Wilson (1629, M.2190); Inglis v. Bell (1639, 
M.14414).  
1172 Culross v. Balvaird (1548, M.3877). 
1173 Earl of Morton v. Duke (1557, M.14685). See also: Lovat v. Frasers (1567, M.2189=3878).  
1174 Borthwick v. Douglas (1566, M.14686).  
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Ecclesiastical and then Commissary courts. In this way, the Scottish solution of this 
issue remained closer to the Ius Commune rules than the English solution.  
The Canonical origin of Scots law in this respect is further proved by the 
difference in the way executors were regulated from that of similar institutions. Tutors 
in Scots law were liable in solidum for their administration.1175  The rules on the 
liability of heirs-portioners were also different: the early cases on heirs-portioners 
allowed creditors to sue them separately to the extent of their hereditary shares.1176 In 
later cases, it was established that all heirs-portioners were to be summoned in a 
lawsuit by the estate creditors.1177 However, this was a matter of form and procedure; 
unlike with executors, who held their office pro indiviso, the renunciation of one heir-
portioner did not make his share of liability accrue to the other, while the insolvency 
of one co-heir could make the other liable in solidum.   
Nevertheless, even in Scotland some deviations from the Ius Commune 
standard appear in later practice, in the 1620s. To some extent, they all are connected 
to the development in the field of transmission of the executor’s rights. First of all, it 
was found that, with one co-executor of the several dying, the remaining co-executors 
could not be pursued by the creditors and legatees for the property intromitted with 
(goods taken possession of, decrees awarded, etc.) by the deceased executor;1178 the 
executor of the deceased executor was to be pursued for those goods if the residue was 
insufficient.1179 The transmission of the goods in possession, as will be shown further 
(infra, s.6.4), was also inspired by Ius Commune doctrine; so, in this respect, Scots law 
was reconciling the two Civilian rules rather than deviating from them.  
Another peculiar rule that Scots practice developed was that an executor who 
possessed as much property as could pay the entire debt or legacy, could be sued 
                                                          
1175 Stair, Inst.I.6.23.  
1176 Home v. Home (1632, M.14678); anonymous (1633, M.14680); Duncan v. Ogilvie (1635, M.14680). 
1177 Lawers v. Dunbar (1637, I B.S.368); Burnet v. Leper (1665, M.14682); Salton v. Salton & Forbes 
(1670, M.5360); Oswald v. Somervel (1685, M.14682). 
1178 Aitkin v. Hewart (1625, M.3878); Peacock v. Peacocks (1628, I B.S.265=M.2189).  
1179 This is why the claim by Th. Hope in his Minor Practicks (§90), that the surviving executors were to 
be sued for the share of the deceased one and have recourse against the latter’s representatives, was 
imprecise. Aitkin v. Hewart (1625, M.3878) made a clear point that the surviving executor could not 
be sued for the property in the hands of the dead one. The recourse could only be possible to restore 
the pro rata distribution of liability among the executors.  
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without summoning other executors;1180 the aggrieved executor had recourse against 
his colleagues. This rule seems to correlate with the previous one. To an extent, these 
two rules look like “mirror images” of each other: the executor cannot be sued for the 
goods in possession of the dead co-executor but can be sued for the goods in his own 
possession. It seems that the judges at some point overlooked the important detail that 
one of the co-executors was dead in the former case but alive in the latter case.  
Furthermore, in 1630 the judges deduced by analogy an even more peculiar 
rule: one of the co-executors could pursue, discharge and receive payment of the debt, 
if the other co-executor intromitted with as much more property above his own share 
as equaled the amount of the discharged debt.1181  
In addition to the above, other details of the legal regulation of the plurality of 
executors may be found in Scots practice. Thus, a case from 1629 suggests that, just 
like the pre-Reformation bishops, the Commissaries could force one of the executors 
into compliance if he prevented his colleagues from effective performance of their 
duties.1182 The decision in the Lag’s Case (1634, M.14689) implied that executors 
could be appointed by the testator either “conjunctly” or separately to several parts of 
the estate, in which latter case they could act or sue individually.1183 G. Mackenzie 
tells us that one executor could discharge a debt of an estate debtor to the proportion 
of his share in the estate, which suggests that co-executors could individually perform 
extra-judicial acts in respect of their proportional shares.1184  
With time, however, the approach of the Scots law changed. In the 18th 1185 and 
especially 19th century,1186 instead of the unanimity principle, the majority principle 
started to be applied to executors-nominate: the majority of co-executors was entitled 
                                                          
1180 Mc’Mitchell v. Mc’Quharrc (1625, M.14687); Turnbull v. Mathison (1626, M.7574); Salmon v. Orr 
(1630, M.14688).  
1181 Semple v. Dobie (1630, M.14688).  
1182 Young v. Murray (1630, M.3880).  
1183 Possibly, this was what an option that Th. Hope was talking about when he reported witnessing a 
case where the Lords allowed one co-executor to pursue for his share (Minor Practicks, §91). However, 
without a more specific citation we cannot confirm this.  
1184 Mackenzie, Inst.III.9.19.  
1185 Grant & Gregory v. Representatives of Campbell (1764, M.14690).  
1186 Mackenzies v. Mackenzie (1886, 13 R 507); W.A. Wilson, A.G.M. Duncan, Trusts, Trustees and 
Executors (1975), 414.  
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to make decisions on both judicial and extrajudicial matters. The change was obviously 
inspired by the influence of the law of trusts. A large proportion of moveable estates 
in this period was administered through inter vivos settlements and trustees rather than 
traditional testaments and executors;1187 the powers of trustees did not depend on the 
Canon law tradition, but on the interpretation of dispositions and various statutes.1188 
19th century doctrine interpreted the 1617 Act (supra, p.235) as making the executor-
nominate a trustee, which further facilitated the analogy.1189 Executors-dative qua 
‘next-of-kin’ (infra, p.249), in their turn, were found eligible to sue and act individually 
in respect of their own shares, as they held the office in rem suam.1190 Eventually, the 
Executors (Scotland) Act, 1900,1191 confirmed the majority principle in respect of all 
types of executors, effectually dispensing with the Ius Commune regime. 
 
6.4. Transmissibility of the Office of Executor in Scotland. 
The early Scottish practice and writings demonstrated an absence of the 
category of executor mixtus and of the special treatment of executors who had a 
personal interest in the estate. The early case law seems to imply that, originally, a 
dying executor’s share accrued to the co-executors;1192 if the only executor died, an 
executor ad non executa was appointed in his stead.  
After the 1620s, if not earlier, as was shown above (supra, p.245), goods 
intromitted with by the executor were treated differently: such goods were transmitted 
to the executor’s executors, and, with them, the liability for the estate debts and 
legacies to the extent of the goods’ value was also transmitted. There was a controversy 
for some time over what constituted “intromission” and “execution” for incorporeal 
rights: the filing of an action, a court decree or a letter of horning?1193 This question 
                                                          
1187 See supra, pp.96-97.  
1188 M’Laren, Wills and Succession, vol II, 185-187.  
1189 M’Laren, op cit, vol II, 143.  
1190 M’Laren, op cit, vol II, 187. 
1191 63&64 Vict, c. 55.  
1192 Culross v. Balvaird (1548, M.3877). 
1193 “Letters of horning”, in the 17-18th centuries, was the main type of executorial diligence in Scotland. 
The letters, read publicly at the market-cross with the blow of the horn, commanded the debtor to 
pay the debt, under the threat of becoming a “rebel to the King” (Stair, Inst.IV.47.1-22).  
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was eventually answered by the 1693 Act, which abolished the active ‘action of 
transference’; a lawsuit, initiated by an executor, was now automatically transmitted 
to the pursuer’s representatives.1194  
In respect of the “not executed” part of estate, the pre-1660 case law was quite 
clear: such goods could not be transmitted; they either accrued to co-executors or 
passed to an executor ad non executa.1195 Even if the dead executor was the only son 
of his defunct mother, the mother’s ‘nearest-of-kin’, confirmed as executor ad non 
executa to her, excluded the son’s executors; the claim that the son was the mother’s 
successor “ex asse”1196 was to no avail.1197 
However, this gradually changed through the 17th century, with Scots law 
eventually coming to apply the same logic as the Ius Commune applied to “mixed” 
executors, although the term “mixed” was never used in Scots practice. The exact way 
it happened was different for the executors-nominate and executors-dative. 
As was mentioned above, before the 1617 Act executors-nominate in Scotland 
were presumed to receive the undisposed part of the estate (supra, p.235). However, 
the Act restricted their interest in favour of that of the ‘next-of-kin’ and legatees. 
Subsequent practice, most crucially, Gordon v. Laird of Drum & Irving (1671, 
M.3894), interpreted the Act in the way that an extraneous executor-nominate, 
appointed by the defunct, only possessed a nudum officium, or, simply, a trust over the 
goods he was administering. In the case, the defunct’s relict and son were appointed 
executors by him; together they obtained a decree for the debt due to him, and then the 
relict died being a “rebel under horn”. A dispute arose between the surviving co-
executor and the ‘donatar’ of the relict’s ‘escheat’ as to whom the recovered but yet 
unpaid debt belonged. The Court eventually decided that the executor-nominate did 
not have a plenum dominium over the estate goods. Thus, even though the relict would 
have transmitted the debt she intromitted with to her successors (had she not died 
                                                          
1194 RPS, 1693/4/65.  
1195 Duke of Lenox v. Cleland (1627, M.3879).  
1196 I.e., to the entire estate; it was a technical term of the Civil law (Inst.Just.II.14.5-8).  
1197 Wilson v. Nicolson (1633, M.9249).  
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“under the horn”), yet she could not assign it and it could not fall under her escheat; 
thus, the debt was found to accrue to the son.  
However, in Spreul v. Miller (1665, M.8052) it was decided that, if the 
executor-nominate was also appointed a universal legatee by the testator, such 
executor transmitted to his own executors both the rights to the entire estate and the 
liability for the debts and legacies, excluding the executors ad non executa. The 
decision did not use the term executor mixtus. However, the argumentation for the 
winning party in this case involved using the term “heres heredis” for the executor of 
the deceased executor, implying that the universal legacy left to him turned the “naked 
executor” into the main beneficiary of the estate, akin to an “heir”. The logic of the 
decision was that the executor, who was to take the main benefit out of estate, was not 
a “trustee” and thus could transmit the entire office, irrespective whether the estate 
property was collected (“executed”) or not.  
The office of executors-dative experienced a different evolution, although it 
eventually reached the same result as with testamentary executors. This evolution was 
closely connected to the question of who was the beneficiary of intestate moveable 
succession. As was already shown above (supra, p.231), the 1666 Instruction was the 
first official document to set up directly the categories of people entitled to be 
appointed executors-dative. What was the situation before then?  
It seems that we should, in general, agree with Lord Kames’s short discourse 
on executors-dative,1198 in which he shows that the appointment of an executor-dative, 
similarly to English practice, used to be largely at the discretion of the public authority: 
a bishop before the Reformation, a Commissary after. The most well known pre-
Reformation document aimed at restricting the bishop’s discretion was the 1526 
Act.1199 This Act provided for the preferential appointment of the ‘next-of-kin’ as the 
executors-dative of deceased pupils, unable to make a will; the Act was limited to the 
estates of people under 14 years old. Besides that, in Kames’ opinion, the executor-
dative could be anyone the bishop or the Commissary might appoint, who, after paying 
                                                          
1198 H.H. Kames, Remarkable decisions of the Court of Session (1766), p.89. The same discourse was 
published in Morrison’s Decisions (M.3902-3907).  
1199 RPS, 1526/6/40; later re-enacted in 1541 (RPS, 1540/12/95).  
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off the debts and leaving a part of the estate for charity, could essentially appropriate 
the residue to himself. This, Kames held, changed only in 1654, by an Order of the 
Cromwellian Commission, which Order was, allegedly, the first document to 
specifically command the executors-dative to restore the relevant free goods to the 
defunct’s wife and next-of-kin.1200 
The picture provided by Kames is incomplete. It omits the ecclesiastical 
legislation. The constitution of the 1559 St. Andrews Provincial Council, already 
mentioned above, 1201  instructed the Commissaries to appoint "specially well-
qualified" kinsmen of a deceased person as executors-dative, to distribute the goods 
among other kinsmen. This document shows that, even before the Reformation, neither 
were the Church officials free to appoint whoever they wished as executors-dative, nor 
were the executors free in disposing of the estate. As early as that, executors-dative 
managed the estate in favour of the defunct’s next-of-kin, in a “trust”-like fashion. 
However, it is clear that, before the confirmation of executors, the defunct’s kinsmen 
did not have any strict actionable right to the estate. In this respect, Kames is right.  
In practice, however, the ordinary way in which the defunct’s ‘next-of-kin’ 
obtained an interest in the estate was by getting personally confirmed as the executor-
dative, together with all other next-of-kin within the same degree of proximity. 
A.E. Anton explained this on the basis of simple expediency: the kinsmen, being the 
most trustworthy people to commit the administration to, were also the main 
beneficiaries of the estate; the undisposed residue of the estate was simply appropriated 
by them.1202 However, in theory the office of executor-dative remained separate from 
the right of the ‘next-of-kin’ to a share in the defunct’s “Dead’s part”. Perhaps, this is 
why, before 1660, the ‘next-of-kin’ could not transmit the right to “unexecuted” goods 
(supra, p.245). Moreover, if the defunct’s kinsman died before the confirmation of 
estate (by anyone), he or she did not transmit any right whatsoever!1203  
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The discernible changes started with Bells v. Wilkie (1662, M.9250). In the 
case, three sisters were confirmed executors-dative to their brother. One of them died 
before the testament was executed. Her own son and executor sued his aunts for a third 
of his uncle’s “Dead’s part”. The defenders alleged that the executors-dative had no 
right to the estate separate from their offices, and so the dead sister’s share in the estate 
was extinguished and accrued to the co-executors. In response, the pursuer, with a 
reference to the 1617 Act, claimed that, besides the office which accrued to the 
defenders, his dead mother also possessed a separate “right of relation” (“jus 
agnationis”), which she acquired simply by surviving her brother and which was 
transmissible to her successors. The Court decided in favour of the pursuer. The jus 
agnationis of the ‘next-of-kin’, mentioned by the pursuer, began to be designated in 
practice as the “right of blood”.1204  
Nevertheless, contemporary authors did not accept the far-reaching claim that 
a mere survivance vested the “right of blood” in the ‘next-of-kin’. Stair insisted that 
the right of the ‘next-of-kin’ was extinguished by his death before the confirmation 
extinguished his right, although he considered such a situation an “extraordinary 
contingency”.1205 Dirleton called the right of the executor a “jus anomalum”, because 
it combined both the office of executor and the right of moveable succession; however, 
even Dirleton held that the title of the ‘next-of-kin” was an empty name, useless 
without a confirmation of the executor-dative.1206 Both authors, it seems, saw the 
“right of blood” as providing the ‘next-of-kin’ with only a personal action against the 
executors.  
Eventually, however, even this began to change, along the lines of Ius 
Commune rules. The important case in this respect was the Graeme of Claverhouse 
Case (1686, M. 3899). In this case, the issue was whether the ‘executor qua next-of-
kin’ could validly assign a debt due to the defunct, for which a decree was not obtained. 
Ordinarily, an executor did not have a title to the goods he did not intromit with. 
However, in this case the assignee argued that the assignor, being a ‘next-of-kin’, had 
                                                          
1204 Stair, Inst.III.8.51; Inglis v. McMorran (1686, M.9254).  
1205 Stair, ibid. This was only changed by statute in 1823 (4 Geo. IV, c. 98).  
1206 Dirleton, ‘Executor’, Some Doubts…, 50-51.  
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a real interest in the action from the moment of confirmation. This is probably the first 
Scots case where an executor with a nudum officium was directly contrasted with an 
executor qua next-of-kin, who had a personal interest in the estate. The claim was 
successful, although its ratio decidendi was not exactly clear.  
Finally, the question was expressly decided in Mitchel v. Mitchel (1737, 
M.3900). In this case, an executor-creditor assigned a debt, unsecured by a decree, and 
died afterwards. An executor-dative, confirmed later, denied the validity of the 
assignation, because the unexecuted debt remained in bonis defuncti and belonged to 
the defunct’s executors. However, the Court decided that the executor-creditor was, 
essentially, a procurator in rem suam, acting in his own interest. Thus, following the 
Ius Commune, he had no need for a decree, being able to transmit and assign the estate 
property from the moment of confirmation. The Court extended the same principle to 
‘executors qua next-of-kin’, as well. In the words of Erskine, it applied to all executors 
who administered the estate “chiefly for themselves”, so that there had been “few or 
no” executors ad non executa appointed by the Erskine’s time.1207 
The improvement of the rights of the next-of-kin did not stop there. In 
McWhirter v. Miller (1744, M.14395) it was decided that the defunct’s ‘next-of-kin’ 
could acquire a title to the defunct’s goods by taking physical possession of them, even 
before the confirmation as an executor. An even further step was taken in Murray’s 
Executors v. Murray (Falconer 52, 1745), 1208  where it was decided that the 
confirmation of a part of estate by the defunct’s ‘next-of-kin’ bestowed on him the title 
to the entire estate. These last two decisions were probably inspired by the Civilian 
privileges of the suus heres;1209 in yet another case, Scots ‘next-of-kin’ were expressly 
compared with the Civil law sui heredes.1210 However, this was the highest point for 
                                                          
1207 Erskine, Inst.III.9.38. See also: Bankton, Inst.III.8.72.  
1208 In Morison’s Dictionary (M.3902) this case was cited as Sommervil v. Creditors of Murray.  
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(C.6.51.1.5; C.7.29.2; Bart., D.28.2.11).  
1210 Ogilvie v. HM Advocate (M.3916).  
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the rights of ‘next-of-kin’ in Scotland: in a line of cases, Murray was effectually 
overruled.1211 
 
In general, Early Modern Scots practice on the office of executor demonstrates 
significant conservatism and preservation of the pre-Reformation, Canon law-inspired 
practice. In most respects, Scots practice was very similar to English practice, as 
described by the English Canonists. In some respects, e.g., in the making of inventory, 
Scots judges were stricter than their English counterparts. In other respects, namely, 
in respect of ‘vitious intromission’, plurality of executors and transmissibility of the 
executor’s office, they followed the Ius Commune principles more closely than English 
practice. The last observation could be explained by the absence of competing 
jurisdictional forums in Scotland, where the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was accepted 
pretty much intact into the secular legal system. The evolution of the approach to the 
transmission of the executor’s office in the 17th century seems to show that these Ius 
Commune principles were not just retained from the pre-Reformation period but 
continued to exert, at least, a hidden influence on Scots practice.  
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This thesis has produced few definitive results. A large number of the 
discovered Ius Commune influences are not explicit but conjectural; alternative 
interpretations are possible. Nevertheless, we can draw some conclusions from this 
research when we compare the different ways in which various fields of the law of 
succession developed.  
Thus, in the field of constitution and form of last wills, Scots law revealed very 
little evidence of Ius Commune influence. The Scots rules on the form of last wills 
were, with a few exceptions, the same as the rules on contracts and all other documents; 
the relation of the latter to the Ius Commune rules is ambiguous. The same can be said 
of the Scots destinations and tailzies, which largely followed the logic of feudalism 
rather than the principles of the Ius Commune fideicommisses. An additional result of 
the research into Scots destinations is that, while originally there were different rules 
for destinations of heritable and moveable property, by the mid-18th century the 
peculiarity of moveable destinations all but disappeared and the destinations of both 
types of property came to be considered heritable destinations, governed by the the 
same rules.  
As regards agreements on future succession (pacta successoria), the case law 
reveals a largely theoretical influence of such Civilian concepts as ‘spes successionis’. 
This influence, however, was signifiant enough to make a difference. The position of 
the Institutional writers, who juxtaposed Civil law and Scots law on this issue, turns 
out to be unsupported by the case law. 
However, the influence of Continental doctrines was much more noticeable in 
the field of the evidential force of the last wills. Nevertheless, it was not the influence 
of the Civilian rules on last wills but rather of the Civilian rules on books of account 
that played the most obvious role in the development of Scots law in this field. The 
research into the concept of a ‘donation mortis causa’ demonstrates the prevalence of 
the Civilian understanding of this concept at the early stages. In both fields, the law 
seems to have experienced change in second half of the 17th century, when last wills 
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lost full evidential force, while ‘donations mortis causa’ were redefined more 
narrowly.  
The regulation of the office of executor in Scotland displays the strongest 
inspiration of Ius Commune rules. To a large extent, this was due to the preservation 
of the Canon law-related tradition of ecclesiastical court practice. This tradition, in its 
turn, seems to be largely inspired by English ecclesiastical practice. However, in some 
respects, the Scots practice in this field followed the Ius Commune rules more closely 
than English practice. This may possibly be explained by the absence in Scotland of 
the jurisdictional competition between secular and ecclesiastical courts. Instead, at the 
Reformation in the 1560s, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, transferred to the 
Commissary courts, was incorporated into the system of the royal courts in a wholesale 
manner, without attempts to create a competing system of rules within secular courts. 
Indeed, a divergence between the practice of the Commissaries and the Court of 
Session did exist in the early 17th century;1212 but this only concerned minor issues.  
In summary, the influence of the Ius Commune on the Scots law of succession 
in this period was real, due both to the retaining of the tradition of ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction and to the knowledge of doctrine by the judges and litigants. However, 
this influence was often fragmentary and not properly articulated in the litigation and 
writings. Even then, we can hardly say that the Ius Commune influence was negligible. 
This thesis concentrated on the fields of the law of succession where one was least 
expecting any Civilian or Canonist analogies. The research results demonstrate that, 
even in such unlikely areas, Scots law was not isolated from Continental learning. 
Among the interesting observations this research provides are the noticeable 
changes in legal practice in the mid-17th century. This is when the judges started to 
narrow down the definition of ‘donation mortis causa’, to assimilate all types of 
destinations to heritable ‘tailzies’ and to change the preceding practice of succession 
in other ways. It is no coincidence that it was exactly the time of the Restoration, when 
the Court of Session was reestablished after the period of “Cromwellian Usurpation”, 
when new judges were appointed and when case reporting became much more 
                                                          
1212 Hope, Minor Practicks, §93 (on the issue of ‘vitious intromission’).   
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systematic. This possibly implies that the post-Restoration judges, encountering the 
scarcity of pre-Restoration practice and lacking the experience of their older 
colleagues, had to systematise the old case law within their own conceptual 
framework. This could also imply that further research into the succession practice of 
the “Usurpation” is needed, in order to fully evaluate the possible influence of this 
period on the subsequent legal development.  
Another area where further research could be useful is the citations of the Ius 
Commune texts in the original Mss. of the Scottish reports and ‘practicks’. In numerous 
cases, we encountered the legal actors following principles similar to those of the Ius 
Commune, without direct reference to such. It is possible that in some of such cases 
the citations were present in the original Mss., but were dropped when the ‘practicks’ 
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